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INTRODUCTION 
t a May 1981 “Proseminar in Space History” held at the Smithsonian A Institution’s National Air and Space Museum (NASM) in Washington, 
DC, historians came together to consider the state of the discipline of space 
history. It was an historic occasion.’ The community of scholars interested in 
the history of spaceflight was not large; previously, well-meaning but untrained 
aficionados consumed with artifacts had dominated the field, to the exclusion 
of the larger context.’ At a fundamental level, this proseminar represented a 
“declaration of independence” for what might be called the “new aerospace 
history.” In retrospect, it may be interpreted as marking the rise of space 
history as a recognizable subdiscipline within the field of U.S. history. Bringing 
together a diverse collection of scholars to review the state of the art in space 
history, this proseminar helped in a fundamental manner to define the field 
and to chart a course for future research. Its participants set about the task of 
charting a course for collecting, preserving, and disseminating the history of 
space exploration within a larger context of space policy and technology. 
In large measure, the course charted by the participants in this 1981 
proseminar aided in advancing a very successful agenda of historical research, 
writing, and understanding of space history. Not every research project has 
yielded acceptable results, nor can it be expected to do so, but the sum of 
the effort since 1981 has been irnpressivc. The opportunities for both the 
exploration of space and for recording its history have been significant. Both 
endeavors are noble and aimed at the enhancement of humanity. Whither the 
history of spaceflight? Only time will tell. But there has been an emergent “new 
aerospace history” of which space history is a central part that moves beyond 
an overriding concern for the details of the artifact to emphasize the broader 
role of the spacecraft. More importantly, it emphasizes the whole technological 
system, including not just the vehicle but also the other components that 
make up the aerospace climate, as an integral part of the human experience. It 
suggests that many unanswered questions spur the development of flight and 
that inquisitive individuals seek to know that which they do not understand. 
1. Richard E Hirsh, “Proseminar on Space History, 22 May 1981,” his 73, no. 266 (1982): 96-97. 
There had been previous gatherings of hlstorians interested in the subject, but these had mostly been 
oriented toward specific subdisciplines such as space science. See Paul A. Hade and Del Chamberlain, 
e&., Space Science Comes ofAge: Perspectives in the History of Space Sciences (Washington, DC: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1981). 
2. At that time, only the several volumes published as part of the NASA History Series, all written by 
credible scholars, and John M. Logsdon’s The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National 
Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970) were accepted as works of serious scholarship by the larger 
historian community. 
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This assumption arises within historians and is based on their understanding 
of humans, for technological systems are constructions of the human mind.3 
This “new aerospace history,” therefore, emphasizes research in aerospace 
topics that are no longer limited to the vehicle-centered, project-focused, 
scientific internalist style of space history. Many of the recommendations that 
historian James R. Hansen suggested in an important historiographical article 
in Technology and Culture are beginning to come to f r~ i t i on .~  Taken altogether, 
these tentative explorations of themes build on what has gone before. At the 
same time, they represent a departure from the simplistic works that preceded 
them, notably the argumentative volumes and essays that either espouse or 
ridicule space exploration. 
Twenty-four years after the 1981 proseminar, the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) Headquarters History Division and NASM’s 
Division of Space History brought together another group of scholars- 
including historians, political scientists, sociologists, public administration 
scholars, and engineers-to reconsider the state of the discipline. This volume 
is a collection ofessays based on this workshop on “Critical Issues in the History 
of Spaceflight,” held at the Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center of the National Air 
and Space Museum on 15-16 March 2005. The meeting was especially timely 
because it took place at a time of extraordinary transformation for NASA, 
stemming from the new Space Exploration Vision, announced by President 
George W. Bush in January 2004, to go to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. 
This Vision in turn stemmed from a deep reevaluation of NASA’s goals in 
the wake of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident and the recommendations 
of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. By June 2004, a nine- 
member Presidential Commission on Implementation of United States Space 
Exploration Policy, led by former Secretary of the Air Force Edward “Pete” 
Aldridge, had produced a report on “A Journey to Inspire, Innovate, and 
Discover.” In February 2005, NASA’s strategic objectives were released in a 
report called “The New Age of Exploration.” All these documents placed the 
new vision in the context of the importance of exploration and discovery to 
the American e~perience.~ 
3. Roger D. Launius dwusses the richness ofwhat has been accomplished thus far in “The Historical 
Dimension of Space Explorahon: Reflections and Possibhties,” Space Policy 16 (2000): 23-38. 
4. James R .  Hansen, “Aviation History 111 the Wider Context,” Technology and Culture 30 ( fd  1989): 
643-649. 
5. Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report, (Washington, DC, 2003), 6 volumes. The 
President’s program for NASA as announced on 14 January 2004 was entitled “A Renewed Spirit 
ofDiscovery.” It was followed in February by a more detailed “Vision for Space Exploration.” The 
Aldridge Commission report was A Journey to Inspire, Innovate and Discover. Events leading up to 
the Vision are detailed in Frank Sietzen, Jr., and Keith L. Cowing, New Moon Rising: The Making of 
America’s New Space Vision and the Remaking of N A S A  (Burlington, Ontario: Apogee Books, 2004), 
as well as in the Aldridge report. 
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As the meeting took place, NASA had not flown a Space Shuttle since the 
Columbiu accident on 1 February 2003 and was looking forward to returning 
to flight in mid-2005. At the same time, the space agency was in the midst 
of a reorganization and a change in programs of truly historic proportions. 
The transformation potentially heralded the beginning of a new era, as the 
Agency’s human spaceflight program sought to leave the Space Shuttle behind 
and depart Earth orbit for the Moon and Mars-something that humans had 
not done since the end of the Apollo era more than three decades earlier. 
Because the new Vision was to be achieved with little or no addition to 
NASA’s $16-billion annual budget, attempts to develop an implementation 
plan set off a debate on the relative merits of other areas of NASA’s portfolio. 
Funding for aeronautics was under severe pressure, with serious implications 
for NASA’s aeronautics research centers at Glenn, Langley, and Ames. In the 
wake of renewed emphasis on human spaceflight, the space science community 
was quick to argue that its activities were also exploration, an integral part 
of the “Moon, Mars, and beyond” vision, and therefore should not be 
subject to cuts. Earth science-which had been administratively co 
with space science as part of the recent transformation-could not s 
make that argument, but it had Congress largely on its side becaus 
practical implications of the Earth Observing System. Also in the mix 
extraordinary and sustained controversy over a servicing mission for the 
Space Telescope, in which the public, Congress, and the science co 
had strong opinions, mostly favoring a servicing mission. Finally, 
a time of transition between Administrators: after three years of heading the 
Agency, Sean O’Keefe departed in February, and on 11 March, the President 
nominated a new Administrator, Michael Griffin, who was confirmed by the 
Senate and became the 11th NASA Administrator on 14 April. 
As these issues swirled, March 2005 thus proved a particularly appropriate 
time to assess some of the perennial challenges and concerns of spaceflight, 
with the primary goal of providing perspective on current issues. Six critical 
issues were chosen for analysis. The first session examined motivations-the 
persistent question of why we should go into space at a time when there 
are so many problems on Earth. The second session provided background 
on another often-asked question, why should so much be spent on human 
spaceflight if robotic spacecraft were cheaper and more efficient? The 
controversy then raging over servicing the Hubble Space Telescope with 
the Space Shuttle demonstrated that this dichotomy was not quite so simple; 
without human spaceflight and four servicing missions, the myopic Hubble 
would never have functioned properly and certainly would not have reached 
its 15th anniversary on 25 April 2005. The third session could provide only a 
sampling of case studies of NASA’s relations with external groups, in this case 
with the Department of Defense (DOD), international relations, and a portion 
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of the aerospace industry. The fourth session shed light on another persistent 
issue: why there has been no replacement for the aging Space Shuttle. The 
fifth session, on NASA cultures, reflected the preoccupation with safety and 
risk in the wake of the Columbia accident. A concluding session addressed 
specific questions relating to the historiography of spaceflight and suggested 
possibilities for future research. After the assessment of distinct issues, it 
particularly considered the second goal of the meeting: to assess the state of 
the field of space history. 
Two decades had passed since serious attempts had been made to assess the 
state ofthe field. In addition to the 1981 proseminar, NASA and NASM joined 
forces once again to hold a broader meeting in the spring of 1987, published 
as A Spacefring Nation: Perspectives on American Space History and Policy.6 In its 
treatment of issues, Critical Issues in the History Of Spaceflight is broader in some 
respects but narrower in others. The title and spirit of the current volume 
hearkens back to Marshall Clagett’s book Critical Problems in the History o f  
Science, a collection of essays from a meeting at the beginning of the Space Age 
that had a considerable influence on the evolution of the history of science? 
Space history was no part of that volume, but the 50 intervening years have 
given rise to a new kind of history with links to scientific, technological, 
political, cultural, and social history. 
Although the subject of the meeting was “Critical Issues in the History 
of Spaceflight,” this did not imply that history was the only mode of analysis 
that could be applied. Experts with a variety of backgrounds brought a variety 
of approaches to the chosen critical issues, including history, cultural studies, 
political science, and sociology. The reader will therefore find a range of 
approaches reflecting these backgrounds. 
Certainly not all subjects could be covered at this meeting. NASA’s first 
A, aeronautics, was not represented at all-not for a lack of issues, but precisely 
because an entire conference could be devoted to the subject. In addition, 
the focus was naturally on NASA and American space history, despite papers 
on international relations, and comparisons of the U.S. and Soviet space 
programs. The space sciences also received short shrift in this workshop and 
in this resulting volume. Again, there is more than enough in this arena to 
fill an entire volume. The issues encompassed by space history, along with its 
interconnections with the broader world and with other forms of analysis in 
6 .  Martin J. Collins and Sylvia D. Fries, eds., A Spacefaring Nation: Perspectives on American Space 
History and Policy (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991). A similar conference 
hosted by Yale University in 1981 was published as Alex Roland, ed., A Spacefaring People: Perspectives 
on Early Space Flight (Washington, DC: NASA, 1985). 
7. Marshall Clagett, Critical Problems in the History of Science (Madison: University of  Wisconsin 
Press, 1959). 
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history and the social sciences, compose a field now grown so large-in scope if 
not in practitioners-that only a fair sampling can be given here. Ifthis volume 
serves to stimulate more research in these areas, which we believe are of vital 
importance to the nation and the world, it will have served its purpose. 
The meeting was a small workshop with 18 presentations and several 
dozen audience members who contributed substantially to the discussions. 
Even a small workshop, however, engendered numerous logistics. We would 
like to thank General John R. Dailey, Director of the National Air and 
Space Museum, for allowing us to use the beautiful Udvar-Hazy Center, just 
opened in December 2003 and adjacent to Dulles International Airport. It 
was a pleasure to contemplate space history in the midst of the Concorde, the 
SR-71 Blackbird, and the Space Shuttle Enterprise, among other aviation and 
space icons, all part of “the cathedral of the artifact,” as it was termed during 
the meeting. For essential logistical help, we thank Nadine Andreassen, Giny 
Cheong, and Annette Lin, all of the NASA History Division. We are grateful 
to Chris Brunner and Tim Smith of SAIC for recording the proceedings 
on videotape. A copy of the video, along with transcripts of the discussions, 
may be accessed in the NASA Historical Reference Collecti 
Headquarters. 
At the NASA Headquarters Printing and Design Office, 
Lisa Jirousek for copyediting and Shelley Kilmer-Gaul for desi 
Finally, we wish to acknowledge the many contributions 
participated in the workshop, both as presenters and from the 
book represents a final report on the activities of the workshop, and we hope 
that it will stimulate additional contemplation, research, and presentation of 
the history of spaceflight. 
Steven J. Dick, NASA Chief Historian 
Roger D. Launius, Chair, NASM Department of Space History 9 
SECTION I 
MOTIVATIONS FOR SPACEFLIGHT 

INTRODUCTION 
he first section of this volume examines what is perhaps the most basic T question that can be asked of the Space Age: Why do nations under- 
take spaceflight, and why should they? It is a question equally important for 
understanding the history of spaceflight and for divining its future. And it is a 
question that history is in a unique position to illuminate. From its inception 
in 1957 to “The New Age of Exploration” that NASA proclaimed in 2005 in 
the wake of the Vision for Space Exploration, the Space Age has inevitably 
been linked with the idea of exploration as a motivating force. In the opening 
paper of the conference, Stephen Pyne argues that the idea of exploration and 
its links to the past need to be examined in more detail and in the context of 
the cultures in which it is embedded. Many writers, especially journalists, have 
seen space activities as part of an unbroken line of exploration going back at 
least to the Renaissance Age of Discovery and even earlier. Richard S. Lewis’s 
From Vinland to Mars: A Thousand Years ofExploration is a prime example of this 
view. By contrast, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian William H. Goetzmann 
distinguishes a “Second Great Age ofDiscovery,” beginning with 18th-century 
explorers such as Captain James Cook and Alexander von Humboldt-an age 
characterized by further geographic exploration, now driven by the scientific 
revolution and still in progress. Goetzmann sees this fissioning of ages as 
important to understanding the differences between the two.’ 
While examining the characteristics and lessons of the first two ages, Pyne 
now proposes a Third Age of Discovery, which segregates space exploration 
from the motivators of the Second Age and places it with the exploration of the 
Antarctic and the deep oceans.2 This distinction, he argues, is important to 
understanding the unique character of the current age. Just as for the Second 
Age, science replaced God, commerce replaced gold, and national prestige 
trumped individual glory, the motivators for the Space Age have changed in 
part. Most strikingly, at least so far, and perhaps happily, since such encounters 
in the past have left more than one civilization decimated, explorers of the 
Space Age have not had to worry about encounters with indigenous inhabitants 
of the lands they e~plore .~  
l.W&am H. Goetzmann, N e w  Lands, New Men:America and the Second Great Age OfDiscouery (New 
2. He also made this case in his article,“Space:AThird Great Age of Discovery,”Space Policy 4 (August 
3. For a discussion of this problem, see Jane M.Young, ‘“Pity the Indians of Outer Space:’ Native 
York: Penguin Books, 1987). 
1988): 187-199. 
AmericanViews of the Space Program,” Western Folklore 46 (October 1987) 269-279. 
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Pyne also argues that it is “cultural conditions that prompt and sustain 
discovery” and that exploration is an invention of particular societies. This is 
no academic distinction, but one with real-life consequences: if exploration is 
a cultural invention, then it may pass away as have other cultural inventions 
and, indeed, as exploration itself has withered in some societies throughout 
history. This is no less true in the American context than it is in other 
societies, now or in the past: Carl Sagan, Ray Bradbury, Robert Zubrin, 
and others have argued that exploration is a societal imperative with unique 
valences to American history and the American ~haracter.~ Exploration means 
many things to many people, and historians need to analyze these meanings 
and understand the myriad ways in which culture imbues exploration with 
meaning, or with no meaning at all. 
Pyne’s essay is full of provocative suggestions: that the idea of exploration 
needs to be decoupled from the idea of colonization; that the Second Age 
collapsed not only from closed frontiers, but also from a weariness with the 
Enlightenment enterprise; that geopolitical rivals may divert some of their 
energies from the battlefield to exploration; that Voyager’s Grand Tour may 
be for the Third Age what Humboldt was for the Second and Magellan for 
the First; that the Third Age may already be in decline; that cyberspace may 
be more important in historical terms than outer space; and that although 
encounters with other cultures were essential to creative individuals and 
societies in the first two Ages, that possibility is unlikely for the Third Age, at 
least in the near future, unless by remote radio communication. 
In the second paper, Roger Launius takes a broader view of the motiva- 
tions for spaceflight and enumerates five, and only five, rationales operating 
over the last 50 years: human destiny and survival of the species; geopolitics, 
national pride, and prestige; national security and military applications; eco- 
nomic competitiveness and satellite applications; and scientific discovery 
and understanding. Launius argues that some of these rationales rest on a 
fundamental desire to become a multiplanetary species and, in particular, to 
found utopian societies beyond Earth. 
In the context of the human destiny argument, Launius finds that the 
“frontier thesis”-the idea that the existence of a frontier has given Americans 
their most distinctive characteristics and that space exploration is important 
for that reason alone-is counterproductive for a postmodern, multiculturalist 
society. Yet “the final frontier” continues to be a rallying cry for space 
enthusiasts. Is this inappropriate, or can the frontier thesis be separated from 
the charges of excessive ethnocentrism? 
4. See in particular Robert Zubrin,“Epilogue:The Significance of the Martian Frontier,”in The Case 
for Mars (NewYork Free Press, 1996). 
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In the area ofnational security and military applications, Launius emphasizes 
a fact little known outside the space community: that since 1982, military 
spending on space has outpaced civilian spending. By 2003, the Department of 
Defense was spending $19 billion on space, compared to NASA’s $14 billion. 
Obviously, the military is motivated to use space as “high ground.” Launius 
finds that the economic competitiveness argument, though emphasized by the 
conservative agenda since the 1980s, remains mixed: although communications 
satellites have proven a commercial success since COMSAT and Intelsat in the 
early 1960s, other efforts such as Landsat and the Global Positioning System 
(GPS), while great technical successes, have not yet proven commercially 
viable. Space tourism and private investment for access to space are barely at 
the beginning of their potential. Whether these activities become economically 
viable, thereby causing the commercial motivator to become increasingly 
important, is one of the great open questions of the Space Age. 
Launius discusses science as a motivator at some length; however, in 
the context of Pyne’s paper, it is notable that he does not explicitly include 
exploration as one of his five motivations, instead viewing it as a means to an 
end rather than an end in itself. He briefly discusses it in the context of the 
human destiny argument and the frontier thesis, and he later uses it again in 
the context ofthe science motivator, noting that a National Research Council 
(NRC) study in 2005 proclaimed that “exploration done properly is a form of 
~cience.”~ It should be noted that the NRC did so in the context of threatened 
cuts to space science-money that would go to the new human exploration 
program-and therefore had a vested interest in relating science to exploration. 
This raises the interesting question of the differences between science and 
exploration in principle and in practice. While it is clear that, as Launius 
argues, there are synergies between science and exploration, one could clearly 
argue that they are not one and the same. After all, Magellan was an explorer, 
not a scientist; conversely, many scientists undertake routine science that 
can hardly be called exploration. One might argue a relationship as follows: 
when exploration is undertaken, it may lead to discoveries, which then are 
explained by science and in turn add to the body of scientific knowledge. 
Alternatively, one might also argue that when exploration is undertaken, it 
is usually done with an economic, military, or nationalistic purpose in mind, 
but that exploration, viewed as benign while the true objective may be less 
so, serves as the rationale. As Pyne puts it in his article, historically “society 
needed science, science needed exploration, exploration to far countries [or 
outer space] needed support,” at the national level. 
5. National Research Council, Science in NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration ( m C :  Washington, 
DC, 2005). 
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These distinctions are more than semantic in nature-they become an 
issue of public policy when decisions must be made about the balance between 
human and robotic exploration (see section 11). Although Apollo clearly 
produced important science, as Launius points out, it was criticized for not 
generating enough science relative to its high cost. Yet one could argue that 
the explorations of Apollo represented something beyond science that will 
be remembered as one of humanity’s greatest triumphs. At least some space 
scientists have come to this realization, despite the high costs and the risks 
involved in human spaceflight. At a NASA meeting on risk and exploration, 
Steve Squyres, the science principal investigator for the Mars Exploration 
Rovers, allowed that he loved his machines, which are still active after 16 
months. But, he added, “when I hear people point to Spirit and Opportunity 
and say that these are examples of why we don’t need to send humans to 
Mars, I get very upset. Because that’s not even the right discussion to be 
having. We must send humans to Mars. We can’t do it soon enough for me.”6 
Squyres’s words reflect a deep truth: even though science may be a motivation 
for exploration and a product of it, human exploration is more than the sum 
of all science gained from it. If exploration is a primordial human urge, and 
in a larger sense the mark of a creative society, to what extent should a society 
support it in the midst of many other priorities? In a democratic society, that is 
a question with which the public, and public policy-makers, must grapple. 
6. Steven J. Dick and Keith Cowing, e&., Risk and Exploration: Earth, Sea and the Stars (Washington, 
DC: NASA SP-2005-4701,2005), p. 179. 
CHAPTER 1
SEEKING NEWER WORLDS: 
AN HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR SPACE EXPLORATION 
Stephen J. Pyne 
Come, rnyfYiends, 
Tis not too late to seek a newer world 
-Tennyson, “Ulysses,” 1842 
early 40 years ago, William Goetzmann, in his Pulitzer-winning N Exploration and Empire, argued that explorers were “programmed” by 
their sponsoring societies. They saw what they were conditioned to see, and 
even novelty fell within a range of expected “curiosities” and “marvels.” 
What is true for explorers has been no less true for exploration’s philosophers, 
historians, and enthusiasts. Pundit and public, commentator and scholar, all 
have become accustomed, if not programmed outright, to see exploration 
and space as inseparable. Space has become the new frontier; exploration, if 
it is to thrive, must push to the stars; the solar system is where, in our time, 
exploration is happening.l 
Since Sputnik, no survey of exploration has not looked heavenward, and 
no advocate for space adventuring has failed to trace its pedigree through the 
lengthening genealogy of the Earth’s explorers. But in the particulars they 
differ; this field, too, has its “lumpers” and “splitters.” The lumpers consider 
the long saga of geographic exploration by Western civilization as continuous 
and thematically indivisible. The Viking landers on Mars are but an iteration 
of the long ships that colonized Greenland. The Eagle, the Command Module 
orbiter, and Saturn V rocket that propelled the Apollo XI mission to the Moon 
are avatars of Columbus’s Niiia, Pinta, and Santa Maria. The “new ocean” of 
planetary space is simply extending the bounds of the old. The ur-lumpers 
would go further. The historic eruption of European exploration was but 
the most recent device to carry humanity’s expansive hopes and ambitions; 
1. William H. Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire (NewYork: Knopf, 1966). 
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its origins reside in the genetic code of humanity’s inextinguishable curio- 
sity. Even more, space exploration shares an evolutionary impulse. Through 
humanity, life will clamber out of its home planet much as pioneering species 
crawled out of the salty seas onto land. The impulse to explore is providential; 
the chain of discovery, unbroken; the drivers behind it, as full of evolutionary 
inevitability as the linkage between DNA and proteins. 
The most prominent have generally boosted space exploration as necessary, 
desirable, and inevitable. The argument assumes the form of a syllogism: The 
urge to explore is a fundamental human trait. Space travel is exploration. 
Therefore, sending people into space is a fundamental characteristic of our 
species-what more is there to say? The only impediment to the past serving 
as prologue to the future is imagination, as translated into political will, 
expressed as money. From Carl Sagan to Ray Bradbury, such advocates have 
self-admittedly been fantasists, whether they argued that the motivating vision 
is embedded in our genes or our souls. But the urge, the motivating imperative, 
they place within the broad pale of Homo sapiens sapiens.2 
Yet humanity doesn’t launch rockets; nations do. So there exist also 
among the spacefaring folk special themes that place interplanetary exploration 
within the peculiar frame of a national experience. In particular, there exist 
groups for whom extra-Earthly exploration is a means to perpetuate or recreate 
what they regard as the fundamental drivers of American civilization. Space 
exploration offers the chance to discover another New World and to erect a 
New America, a technological New Jerusalem, beyond the tug of the Earth’s 
gravitational field and the burdens of its past. Only a New Earth can save the 
Old. Space colonization would remake William Bradford’s vision of Plymouth 
Plantation into a very high-tech city and transplant it to a very distant hill.3 
Still, a countercase exists. What expands can also collapse. Ming China 
launched seven dazzling voyages of discovery and then shut down all foreign 
travel and prohibited multirnasted boats. Medieval Islam sponsored great 
travelers before shrinking into the ritual pilgrimage of the hajj. The Norse 
spanned the Atlantic, then withered on the fjords of a new world. Moreover, 
plenty ofpeoples stayed where they were: they lacked the technological means, 
the fiery incentives and desperate insecurities, or the compelling circumstances 
to push them to explore beyond their homeland. Like Australia’s Aborigines, 
they were content to cycle through their ancestral Dreamtime and felt little 
2. Examples among the celebrity celebrants might include Carl Sagan, Cosmos (NewYork Random 
House, 1980); Ray Bradbury et al., Mars and the Mind ofA4ind (NewYork Harper and Row, 1973); and 
Arthur C. Clarke, The Exploration of Space (NewYork Harper, 1959). 
3. See, as an extreme example, Robert Zubrin, The Case for Mars (NewYork:Touchstone, 1996). 
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urgency to search beyond the daunting seas or looming peaks. A walkabout 
was world e n ~ u g h . ~  
In this perspective, what matters are the particulars-the cultural condi- 
tions that prompt and sustain discovery. What is commonly called “geographic 
exploration” has been, in truth, a highly ethnocentric enterprise. It will thrive 
or shrivel as particular peoples choose. There is nothing predestined about 
geographic discovery, any more than there is about a Renaissance, a tradition 
of Gothic cathedrals, or the invention of the electric lightbulb. Exploration 
as a cultural expression is something peculiar to times, places, and peoples. 
General historians might site exploration within dramas of human mobility, 
of empires, of Europe’s astonishing millennial-long expansion, and its equally 
astounding almost-instantaneous implosion. They would grant exploration 
little intrinsic motivation; explorers would derive their inspiration, no less 
than their characteristics, from a sustaining society. They view contem- 
porary arguments for space trekking as not grounded in historic reality but 
inspirational rhetoric. 
From such a perspective, the exuberant era of exploration that has 
dominated the past five centuries, bonded to European expansion, is simply 
another in a constellation of cultural inventions that have shaped how peoples 
have encountered a world beyond themselves. It will, in time, pass away 
as readily as the others; European-based exploration may yet expire, even 
after 500 years, perhaps exhausted like the cod fisheries of the Grand Banks. 
The history of exploration bears littlc similarity to the simplistic narrative of 
triumphalists. Historians, litterateurs, humanists, and a significant fraction of 
ordinary citizens may wonder why a chronicle of past contacts, particularly 
when burdened by imperialism and inflated by tired clichts, should argue for 
doing more. The record suggests that future worlds will be corrupted as old 
ones were. The much-abused Earth is world enough. Space exploration may 
prove to be a defiant last hurrah rather than a daring new departure. 
To date, the lumpers have commanded the high ground of historical 
interpretation and historiography. Dissenters are few, and even they accept space 
travel’s exploring pedigree. Scholarship has hardly begun to parse exploration’s 
long chronicle to understand what features might apply or not apply to the Space 
4. For a good discussion of the Norse traverse across the Atlantic, see Carl Sauer, Northern Mists 
(Berkeley: University of Cahforma Press, 1968). Studies of the Chinese voyages have become a rmnor 
cottage industry; see, for example, Gavin Menzies, 2422: TheEar China Discovered the World (NewYork: 
Bantam, 2002). On the Islamic eucumene, see %chard Hall, Empires .f the Monsoon: A History .f the 
Indian Ocean and Its Invaders (London: HarperCollins, 19961.The Polynesian voyages are the subject of 
endless retellings; an early, defining work is Peter Buck, Vikings of the PM@ (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1959). 
10 CRITICAL k J J E S  IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
Age. Does the Apollo program resemble Columbus landing in the Bahamas, 
or the abortive Greenlanders at Vinland? Does Voyager mimic Captain James 
Cook’s circumnavigating sallies, or Roald Amundsen’s small-craft threading of 
the Northwest Passage? Is Mariner a robotic version of Lewis and Clark, leading 
America to its new westward destiny, or a Zebulon Pike, whose expeditions 
south led him to a Mexican jail and whose forays north left him dead outside 
a Canadian fort? The history of exploration is so complex that one can find 
whatever anecdote and analogy one wants. 
How one identifies the exploratory character of space depends on how one 
interprets the enterprise-whether space travel is primarily about technology, 
science, adventure, geopolitics, or inspiration. Each theme can lead to its own 
history. For space as exploration, however, two clans dominate the discourse: 
space enthusiasts eager to trace the genealogy of exploration from ancient 
times to contemporary launch sites, and historians anxious to push their 
erstwhile narratives into today’s news. The two display a kind of symmetry, 
a yin and yang of emphasis. Space enthusiasts tend to condense exploration 
prior to the mid-20th century into a lengthy prelude, while historians of 
exploration-there aren’t that many-update their chronicles to include 
space endeavors into a kind of coda. The common assumption is that space 
is of course exploration, so there is little need to explain how and why. One 
only needs enough of the past to boost the narrative into orbit, or enough 
contemporary events to predict the narrative splashdown. Instead of analysis, 
the ur-lumper rhetoric tends to conflate a cascade of themes: intellection with 
exploration, exploration with contact, contact with colonization, colonization 
with human settlement. 
Of course there are exceptions; the best scholarship usually is. A good 
example of exploration considered from the perspective of space is Richard S. 
Lewis’s From Vinland to Mars: A Thousand Years of Exploration. The Space Age, 
he concludes, “can be defined reasonably as the modern extension of a process 
of exploration that began a thousand years ago with the Norse voyages to 
Greenland and North America.” The common motivator was “intraspecific 
competition,” the deadly contest “among men and families for land, among 
nations for power and wealth.” This persistent trait could yet “carry future 
generations to the stars.” Lewis devotes 100 pages to exploration prior to 
1957 and 300 from the International Geophysical Year (IGY) to the Viking 
landings on Mars. Like most lumper historians, he came to space themes by 
way ofjournali~m.~ 
5. Richard S. Lewis, From Vinland to Mars: A Thousand Years .f Exploration (New York Quadrandle, 
1976), pp. xi, xii. 
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Scholar historians, by contrast, are likely to carve up the long chronicle 
into more manageable units. Unquestionably, the outstanding practitioner is 
William H. Goetzmann. Building on J. C. Beaglehole’s scholarship on Captain 
Cook and the exploration of the Pacific generally, in which Beaglehole argued 
that the voyages constituted something new, a renewal of global exploration, 
Goetzmann has elaborated the concept of a Second Great Age of Discovery, 
which he believes has not yet ended, which extends unbrokenly into space, and 
which has fundamental valences with America. “Just as in the Renaissance,” 
he writes, “a New Age of Discovery began-born of competition between 
men and nations, dependent alike on abstract theory, applied science, now 
called ‘engineering,’ visionary imagination and the faith of whole cultures 
who invested billions of dollars or rubles in the great adventure out into the 
frontier that President John F. Kennedy called ‘this new ocean.”’ The under- 
taking has special resonance for the United States, for “America is the product 
of an Age of Discovery that never really ended. From the Viking voyages 
in the 10th century to the lunar voyages of the twentieth, much that is held 
to be American derives from a sense of the ongoing and complex process of 
exploration that has made up so much of its history.” The explorer, Goetzmann 
concludes, “stands as a kind of archetypal American.”6 
Even so, Goetzmann, ever the scholar, concluded that the ultimate payoff 
lay in the realm of knowledge, particularly the peculiar moral understanding 
that helps us understand who we are and how we should behave. In explicating 
that understanding, Goetzmann, always the historian, chronicles exploration 
against the “constant imaginative redefinition of America.” In that sense, 
“America has been almost anything its explorers or their ‘programmers’ 
wanted it to be at the time. And yet constant discoveries and rediscoveries 
have continually changed the meaning of the country for its citizens.” 
Thus, “to many,” by implication himself included, the analogy of Apollo 
to Columbus “seems false.” Rather, “what Armstrong and Aldrin and all 
their heroic space predecessors have revealed is not a series of new worlds for 
escape and habitation, but a profounder knowledge of the earth’s true place 
in the universe. They have changed once again the entire perspective of the 
globe and man’s place on it.” Yet Goetzmann, author of a trilogy of books on 
American exploration, never included space exploration in those volumes, 
save allusively in a preface? 
6. J. C. Beaglehole, The Exploration ofthe Pacii, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966); 
William H. Goetzmann, “Exploration’s Nation. The Role of Discovery in American History,” in 
American Civilization: A PortraitJmm the Twentieth Century, ed. Daniel J. Boorstin (New York: McGraw- 
W Book Co., 1972), pp. 36,25. 
7. Goetzmann, “Exploration’s Nation,” pp. 33,36. 
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And then there are those for whom space is continuous not merely with 
exploration but with evolution, for whom the Space Age represents a quantum 
leap in human existence. The nuances of geographic discovery’s chang- 
ing technologies, beliefs, lore, institutions, and personalities become mere 
background noise, the junk genes of story. Most practitioners come from 
literature or natural science, an odd couple joined by conviction and pulp 
fiction rather than formal scholarship. History is a loose jumble of anecdotes, 
like oft-told family stories or the sagas of the clan. For them, the future is what 
matters. What preceded contact is only preamble. What follows will be, in 
Arthur C. Clarke’s words, childhood’s end. 
Regardless, no one questions the linkage ofspace with exploration. Their 
analysis ofwhat that bond is, and what benefits the country might derive, vary. 
Exploration remains a means to other ends. The recent report of the President’s 
Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy 
described the goal of the “vision” as “to advance U.S. scientific, security, and 
economic interests . . . ,” and not least national prestige. More realistically, 
at the time Mariner orbited Mars, Bruce Murray observed simply that “we 
are exploring,” that the “very act of exploration is one of the more positive 
achievements open to a modern industrial society,” that space exploration is 
“as important as music, art, as literature,” that it is “one of the most important 
long-term endeavors of this generation, one upon which our grandchildren 
and great-grandchildren will look back and say, ‘That was good.”’ But if space 
exploration is a cultural enterprise, then it should be examined as such, subject 
to the same tangible criteria.’ 
All this suggests ample opportunity for future research. There is, first, a 
place for dedicated analysis beyond the selective anecdote, heroic narrative, 
and flimsy analogizing. There is little empirical heft, even less quantitative 
data, and sparse scrutiny of what, exactly, exploration has meant in terms of 
economics, politics, ethics, knowledge, fiction, and the like. Serious scholarship 
has not tracked exploration to the extent it has related fields such as the history 
of physics, military history, government institutions, or even the literature of 
the western hero. The founding saga of the Great Age of Discovery, Luis de 
Cambes’s Lusiadas, is, after all, a tragedy, brooded over by the Old Man of 
Belem, who declaims its debased origins: the enterprise to the Indies will turn 
out badly, though it cannot be stopped. By the time we arrive at the Space Age, 
“literature” has come to mean Edgar Rice Burroughs and the imagination of 
nine-year-old boys. A similar declension seems to affect the scholarship. 
8. Report of the President’s Commission on Implementation of Umted States Space Exploraaon 
Policy, AJourney to Inspire, Innovate, and Discover (Washngton, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 
June 2004), p. 11; Bruce Murray, quoted in Ray Bradbury et al., Mars and the Mind ofMan, pp. 24-25. 
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A part of this general task is comparative study. We know things in the 
context of other things. We will understand contemporary exploration better 
if we arrange suites of comparisons with past efforts, understanding their 
common elements, isolating what features make them similar or different. But 
this exercise should not be restricted to exploration, comparing itself in various 
eras. If expeditions are a cultural creation, then they should be compared as 
well with other undertakings, perhaps with opera, baseball, publishing, art 
museums, extreme sports. Exploration is not the only way by which a society 
can express its restlessness or exercise its curiosity. A society must choose to 
explore. What is the basis for that choice and how does the outcome compare 
with other choices? 
Of particular value to Americans is the need to segregate exploration from 
colonization. American accounts of the Space Age almost invariably begin with 
the drscovery of North America, preferably by the Norse. This is teleologd 
history: the point, the conclusion, of exploration was to find a New World and, 
subsequently, to found the United States. The epic of America is its expansion 
westward. When exploration completed its survey ofAmerica, it had to continue 
elsewhere, to the Poles, for example, and then to planetary space, or else that 
epic would end. It makes a wonderful national creation story. It works less well 
as scholarship. The exploration of America was part of a global project, rising 
and falling with those same geopolitical tides. So it is proving to be with space. 
I confess to being a splitter. This is a minority viewpoint without much 
of a clientele; it may be a singularity. My premises are these: that exploration 
as an institution is an invention of particular societies; that it derives much of 
its power because it bonds geographic travel to cultural movements, because 
it taps into deep rivalries, and because its narrative conveys a moral message; 
that, while unbroken, the trajectory of a half millennium of exploration by 
Western civdization can be understood best by parsing its long sweep into smaller 
increments; and that the future of exploration may become a reversed mirror 
image of its past. In particular, my splitter history would partition the past half 
millennium of European exploration from humanity’s various migrations, and 
it would then fraction that grand chronicle into three great ages of discovery, 
fissioning William Goeztmann’s Second Great Age of Discovery into two, addmg 
a Third Age as dstinctive from the Second as the Second was from the First. 
This is not a commonly held analysis, not least because it compels us 
to examine differences. It demands that we identify what segregates space 
exploration from its progenitors beyond exalted claims that, in leaving the 
Earth’s gravitational pull, humanity is, at last, leaving its nest. It places space 
exploration with the exploration of Antarctica and the deep oceans. It suggests 
a future that will less resemble the near past than the deep past. The Space Age 
is different; the Space Age is the same. A splitter history asks, how? and what 
does it mean? My version of a sample such history follows. 
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ISLANDS IN THE MIST: THE CASE FOR AGES OF DISCOVERY 
Why three eras? Why not four, or eight? Why any at all? History is messy, 
and exploration history, with its perpetual disputes over prediscoveries and 
rediscoveries, messier still. So consider, as an index of exploration, the case of 
Pacific islands. None were known empirically to Europe prior to the Great 
Voyages. While some discoveries, particularly by the Portuguese, were no 
doubt hoarded as state secrets, the dates of discovery for most are reliably 
known. Plotting those discoveries by 50-year increments yields three fairly 
distinct periods (see figure below). 
The first coincides with the classic voyages of discovery, led by Portugal 
from the west and Spain from the east. Every island is new: discovery is rapid 
and relatively easy (if anything done by ship in those days can be considered 
easy). Between 1500 and 1550, mariners discovered some 32 islands. They 
found fewer in the next 50 years, and half as many again in the next 50. By 
the mid-17th century, the long wave has exhausted itself. Some 75 percent of 
the discoveries occurred over roughly 75 years. 
Discovery of Pacific Islandsg 
9. Data horn Henry Menard, Islands (NewYork Scientific American, 1986). 
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An explanation for the odd curve, a peak followed by a rapid decay, is 
simple. Mariners were not searching for islands, but for routes to the great 
entrepbts of the East. They found islands along the way, and once they plotted 
out the best paths, they had scant incentive to keep at sea. The latter discoveries 
happened from miscalculations or accidents-storms, for example, that blew 
ships off course-or, as the Dutch became more expansive in their plans to 
outflank the Portuguese, a scattering of islands that they chanced upon. There 
was no reason to randomly rove the seas. Explorers had completed their task, 
had hewed routes to the riches, and the discovered islands had been, as it were, 
the chips that scattered to the side. 
Then, in the mid-18th century, after nearly 150 moribund years, the 
process rekindled Europeans begin encountering new islands. But these are 
new Europeans-British and French, mostly-entangled in hesh rivalries, and 
they have novel purposes. They come as emissaries of the Enlightenment; they 
are keen to explore nature’s economy for its exotic wealth and commercial 
wonders; they carry naturalists eager to catalog the Great Chain of Being, trace 
the contours of the world ocean, and draft a new muppu mundue; and they haul 
artists and litterateurs avid for lush tropical utopias. They search out the blank 
spots of the Pacific. They seek unknown islands as ends in themselves. A great 
age of circumnavigators commences, of which the three voyages of Captain 
James Cook are a prime exhibit. 
The number of known islands explodes. More islands are discovered in 
70 years than in the previous three centuries. But this, too, quickly expires. 
They reach the last island, Midway, in 1859. Then nothing, and it is a nothing 
all the more profound because the voyagers have revealed all that exist. 
By the onset of the 20th century, not only have explorers exhausted the 
dominion of Pacific islands, the Enlightenment itself has begun to crumble 
before the intellectual tremors and metaphysical termites of Modernism. For 
the Pacific Ocean, a second age of exploration ends with traffic in guano 
and copra; excursions by tourists, adventurers, and anthropologists; and color 
prints by Gauguin. 
How, then, might there be another era? Because mariners went below 
the deep swells; they traveled by submarine and surveyed the hard-rock 
topography of the deep ocean by remote sensing devices. They discovered 
a vast realm of volcanic islands-guyots-that had eroded and subsided 
beneath the surface. In a few brief decades, an exploring science mapped 596 
new Pacific isles. These were more Pacific islands than Western civilization 
had discovered since Vasco da Gama first landed Portugal at the gates of the 
Indies. More powerfully, the context of discovery revived with another global 
rivalry, this one begun in World War I1 and accelerated during the Cold War; 
with another intellectual syndrome, the curious culture of Modernism; with 
another revolution in technology. 
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The Cold War competition beneath the waves complemented almost 
perfectly the better-known competition for the high ground beyond the Earth's 
atmosphere. Space exploration was part and parcel of this sameThird Great Age of 
Discovery. If islands are a reliable index, three eras might equally characterize the 
vast sweep of Western exploration since the natal times of Henry the Navigator. 
If space, however, becomes a powerful enough presence, then the Eurocentric 
frame itself might need resetting and another index might in time be necessary. 
Perhaps discovered moons might replace encountered isles, although it's hard 
to imagine a future artist rendering Titan or Europa with the lavish cultural 
colorations that William Hodge, traveling with Cook, brought to Tahiti.'O 
GREAT VOYAGES: THE FIRST AGE 
The Great Age of Discovery opened with centuries of false dawns. 
Part of the difficulty is disentangling exploration from other forms of travel: 
from migration, walkabout, exile, wars of conquest, trading expeditions, 
reconnaissance, long hunts, great treks, missionizing, pilgrimage, tourism, 
and just plan wanderlust. Roman merchants had contact with the Canaries 
and Cathay. European pilgrims trekked from Hibernia to the Holy Land. 
Franciscan scholars trudged to the court of the Great Khan. Each age of 
expansion, every expansionist people, experienced a burst of discovery about 
a wider world. What made events of the 15th century special was that these 
exploring contacts did not end in a rapid contraction. They became welded 
to a revived expansion of Europe that would stretch over half a millennium; 
they bonded with revolutionary epochs of learning and political reform. They 
became institutionalized. Exploration became the outward projection of 
internal unrest that would not let the momentum long languish." 
The Great Voyages began cautiously enough. That Portugal pioneered 
the practice should alert us to the process's uncertain origins and its often 
desperate character.There was little in Portuguese history from which someone 
might predict, in 1450, that it would leap across whole seas and over unknown 
continents, establish the world's first global empire, and create the raw template 
1O.To match the discovery of Pacific islands with the general swarm of exploration, consult standard 
references. A sprawl of atlases exist that trace the general contours of geographic exploration, for 
example, and there is the flawed but indispensable A History of Geographical Discovery and Exploration, by 
J. N. L. Baker (NewYork Cooper Square Publishers, 1967). 
11. The doyen of the founding Age of Discovery is J. H. Parry. Among his many works, three are 
especially informative as syntheses: The Establishment .f the European Hegemony, 1425-2 725, 3rd ed., 
rev. (NewYork: Harper and Row, 1966); The Discovery o f fhe  Sea (Berkeley: University of Califorma 
Press, 1981); and The Age of Reconnaissance: Discovery, Exploration, and Settlement, 2450-2 650 (NewYork 
Praeger, 1969). 
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for European expansion.Yet that is precisely what happened. For several hundred 
years, exploring nations sought to emulate the Portuguese paradigm, whose 
outposts survived until the 21st century.Within a generation, it came to be said 
that it was the fate of a Portuguese to be born in a s m a l l  land but to have the 
whole world to die in. 
What happened was that exploration became-directly, or indirectly through 
charters-an organ of the state, and because no single state dominated Europe, 
many joined the rush. Geographical exploration became a means of knowing; of 
creating commercial empires; of outmaneuvering political, economic, religious, 
and military competitors-it was war, diplomacy, proselytizing, scholarship, and 
trade by other means. For this reason, it could not cease. For every champion, 
there existed a handfii of challengers. This competitive dynamic-embedded 
in a squabbling Europe's very fabric-helps explain why European exploration 
did not crumble as quickly as it congealed. On the contrary, many Europeans 
absorbed discovery into their culture, even, in some cases, writing explorers into a 
founding mythology, a cultural creation story. In short, where exploring became a 
force, something beyond buccaneering, it interbred with the rest of its sustaining 
society. The broader those cultural kinship ties, the deeper the commitment. 
Societies dispatched explorers; explorers reshaped society, Exploration became 
an institution.The explorer became a role. 
N N N  
The fabled Greatvoyages announced a First Age of Discovery. Its particular 
domain was the exploration of the world ocean, the discovery that all the world's 
seas were one, that it was possible to sail fiom any shore and reach any other. 
Of course, there were some grand entrudas in the Americas, and missionaries, 
Jesuits especially, penetrated into the vast interiors of the Americas, Africa, and 
Asia. But as J. H. Parry observes, it was the world sea that defined the scope 
and achievements of the First Age.The mapping its littoral was the era's finest 
cartographic triumph." 
The map reminds us that the First Age coincided with a Renaissance. 
The era unveiled two new worlds: one of geography, another of learning. 
Francis Bacon conveyed this sense perfectly when he used as a frontispiece to 
his Great Instaurution the image of a sailing ship pushing beyond the Pillars of 
Hercules. The voyage of discovery became a metaphor for an age of inquiry 
that would venture far beyond the dominion of the Mediterranean and the 
inherited wisdom of the ancients. The discoveries overwhelmed a text-based 
12. Parry, Discovery ofthe Sea. 
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scholarship: scholasticism, that arid discourse that resulted from too many 
scholars and not enough texts, collapsed as new information poured into 
Europe like New World bullion into Spain and, like it, inspired an inflationary 
spiral of kn0w1edge.l~ 
An age of discovery, however, demands more than curiosity and craft. 
It has to speak to deeper longings and fears and folk identities. The ships 
must voyage into a moral universe that explains who a people are and how 
they should behave, that criticizes and justifies both the sustaining society and 
those it encounters. The Great Voyages provided that moral shock: they forced 
Europe to confront beliefs and mores far beyond the common understanding 
of Western civilization. The Renaissance expansion of Europe profoundly 
altered Europe’s understanding of itself and its place in the world. There was 
plenty of hollow triumphalism, of course, but those contacts also inspired 
Montaigne’s celebrated preference for the cannibalism of Brazil’s noble savages 
to that of Versailles’s courtiers, and Las Casas’s excoriating denunciation of 
the conquistadoves. They compelled a reexamination of the political and ethical 
principles underlying Christendom and its secular principalities. Exploration 
could upset the discovering society as well as the discovered. It often found 
things it didn’t like, not least things about itself. The dark regions held horrors 
as well as marvels. 
For all this, the Portuguese were the originators. If exploration became, 
as Goetzmann argues, programmed, then the Portuguese paradigm was the 
template, the default setting for exploration’s software. The degree of inter- 
penetration between exploration and society was astonishing, of which the 
suite of exploring ships was only a down payment. Consider the founding 
explorers: Henry the Navigator, late-medieval prince, blurry-eyed speculator, 
and wastrel, who began the fusion of discovery with state policy; Vasco da 
Gama, merchant and administrator, representing the bonding of commerce 
with the state; Afonso de Albuquerque, soldier and strategist, seizing at gun- 
point the critical nodes of traffic throughout the Indian and South China seas; 
St. Francis Xavier, tempering the sword with the cross, missionizing in India, 
the East Indies, and especially Japan, with plans to proselytize in China; and 
Luis de CamBes, adventurer turned litterateur, author of the epic Os Lusiadas 
(1572), which cast contemporary explorers into the mode of classical heroes. 
Together they embodied, literally, the swirl of Renaissance ambitions-God, 
gold, glory-while wrapping it in an enduring saga. “Had there been more 
13.This has long been a common theme.A somewhat eccentric but insightful (and lively) recreation 
ofwhat it meant can be found in William Manchester’s A World Lit Only by Fire:The Medieval Mind and 
the Renaissance: Portrait ofan Age (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992), which tracks the imaginative impact of 
Magellan’s voyage. 
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of the world,” Cam6es wrote, his bold mariners “would have discovered it.” 
Revealingly, all the founders died  oversea^.'^ 
When this tidal bore of discovery passed, it left an institutional berm 
throughout the strands on every continent save Australia and Antarctica. 
Portuguese explorers and fishermen plied the Grand Banks and probed the 
shorelines of North America and the North Atlantic isles. They established 
colonies in Brazil. They held trading fortresses along the coast of Africa and 
India, in the Spice Isles, Cape Verde, St. Helena, Tristan da Cunha, and at 
such major trading entrephts as Malacca, Macau, and Nagasaki. Probably they 
had reached Australia, though they found nothing to hold them. Those who 
followed were interlopers, seeking to poach parts of an empire too vast for tiny 
Portugal to hold. Or they sought to outflank the Portuguese. That was surely 
the intention of Christopher Columbus, who after all had learned his mariner’s 
craft sailing on the Portuguese Atlantic circuit. And that was the prospect held 
by Magellan, who had already been to the East Indies in service to Portugal 
before, on Columbus’s example, he offered fealty to Spain.15 
The Portuguese paradigm pointed as well to the enormous liabilities inher- 
ent in geographic discovery. The overseas posts, never i l l y  staffed, nevertheless 
siphoned off perhaps a tenth of the Portuguese population. They drained the 
homeland without demographically overwhelming the colonies. The rapid 
infusion of knowledge failed to spark a Portuguese renaissance; much of the 
data was hoarded as a state secret, and the rest demanded an infi-astructure of 
scholarship that did not exist. Worse, the sudden inundation of wealth proved 
destabilizing. It tempted rulers to indulge personal and geopolitical fantasies, 
typically expressed as foreign wars. The unwisely sainted Henry was here the 
prototype-What wealth he gleaned, he sank in f i d e  fighting on Moroccan sands. 
Exploration could led to profitable colonization where the discovered place was 
uninhabited, as at Madeira. Where lands were already occupied, colonization 
led to extravagant wars and bottomless expenses. The paradigm thus had its 
paradox: exploration required money as well as will, but beyond sacked towns 
and coastal trade, there was little wealth to get from it. Once permanent, the 
colonies became not sources of sustainable wealth, but economic placers, quickly 
14. Even in English, the Portuguese experience looms large. In addition to €’arv, see C.  R. Boxer, The 
Portuguese Seaborne, 1415-1825 (London, Hutchinson, 1969), and Four Centuries OfPortuguese Expansion, 
1415-1825:A SuCnnct Survey (Johannesburg:Wicwatersrand University Press, 1965), as well as BaileyW. 
DSie and George D. Winius, Foundations of the Portuguese Empire, 1415-1580 (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1977). Luis de Camdes’s epic, The Lusiads, is translated by Leonard Bacon with an 
introduction and notes (NewYork, Hispanic Society ofAmerica, 1950). 
15. On the Dutch strategy, see C. R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800 (New York, 
Knopf, 1965). 
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plundered, before plummeting into fiscal sinks. An exploring imperium proved 
easier to grab than to hold.16 
The Portuguese paradigm should remind us how much geographic explora- 
tion has morphed over the centuries. By the late 18th century, as motivating 
forces, science had replaced God; commerce, gold; and national prestige, individual 
glory. The issues are even more serious for space exploration, although America’s 
spacefaring traverse through the solar system may be the closest geographic romp 
comparable in scale to Portugal’s. But there the simdarities cease. Pioneer did 
not have to force access to the outer planets by the sword, Mariner did not have 
to proselytize, andvoyager did not have to wrestle with restless indigenes and 
obstreperous crews. Instead of CamGes, American letters had Norman Mailer 
and Ray Bradbury, neither of whom had been in space, and instead of classic 
heroes, Renaissance versions of Odysseus, we had Tom Wolfe’s test pilots, forever 
fretting about drinking and screwing and their ranking on the ziggurat. No one 
wrote about the vessels themselves, any more than the 16th century &d about the 
Victoria. Mostly, Portugal’s voyages were a prelude to imperium, an extension of 
ancient empire-building by new means. America’s probes were valenced to the 
limited conflict of the Cold War. If Portugal faltered, someone else would move 
in. IfAmerica stalled, the void might widen. 
CORPS OF DISCOVERY THE COMING OF THE SECOND AGE 
The inflection to what William Goetzmann has termed a Second Great 
Age of Discovery was messier than the paradigm of Pacific islands suggests. 
Yet the same basics apply. By the early 18th century, exploration had become 
moribund; mariners did more poaching and piracy than original probing, like 
William Daumpier more buccaneer than naturalist; the explorer blurred into 
the fantasist and fraud, the promoters of the Mississippi and South Seas bubbles, 
the Lemuel Gulliver of Jonathan Swift’s savage satire, or with the forlorn 
adventures of Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, who curses a woeful addiction 
to adventuring that repeatedly brings him to grief. Exploring expeditions 
persisted largely because interlopers tried to outflank established competitors, 
but little new was added. Exploration seemed destined to be left marooned on 
the shore of a fast-ebbing historical tide.17 
Then the cultural dynamics changed. The long rivalry between Britain 
and France, the penetration of high culture by the Enlightenment, a hunger for 
16. Peter Russell, Prince Henry “the Navigator”: A L$e (New HavexYale University Press, 2000). In 
fact, all the standard accounts of the Portuguese eruption, even the most celebratory, relate the same 
sad dechne. 
17. See William H. Goetzmann, New Lands, New Men: The United States and the Second Great Age .f 
Discovery (NewYork:Vi!sing, 1986). 
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new markets, all combined to move Europe again out of dry dock and onto the 
high seas of exploration and empire. Naturalists lengthened their excursions; 
artists painted natural scenes; philosophes looked to pure nature for guidance. 
The Grand Tour became a global excursion around the Earth. Perhaps most 
extraordinarily, the missionary emerged out of a secularizing chrysalis into the 
naturalist. Increasingly, scientists replaced priests as the chroniclers and observers 
of expeditions, and scientific inquiry substituted for the proselytizing that had 
helped justify an often violent and tragic collision of cultures." 
From Linnaeus's apostles gathering the fruits of nature from the Americas 
to Antarctica, to expeditions measuring the arc of the meridian and the transit 
of Venus, explorers swarmed across the Earth and often sailed around it. Over 
the next century, every aspiring great power dispatched fleets to seek out new 
wealth and knowledge, to loudly go where others had not yet staked claims. 
Cook,Vancouver, Bougainvdle, LePerouse, Wilkes, Bellingshausen, Malaspina- 
these became the Magellans of the Enlightenment.They placed the competition 
intrinsic to science into the service of geopolitical strife. Once again, the rivalries 
among the Europeans were as great as anything between Europeans and other 
peoples. A civilization's internal conflicts drove its outward expressions. 
In the process, the old motivations became secularized and updated. In 
petitioning the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to support the 1761 
transit, the Royal Society of London laid out the new rationales for systematic 
discovery : 
The Memorial itself plainly shews, that the Motives on 
which it is founded are the Improvement ofAstronomy and the 
Honour of this Nation [an Englishman, Edmund Halley, had 
proposed the transit as a means of measuring the astronomical 
unit] . . . .And it might afford too just ground to Foreigners for 
reproaching this Nation in general (not inferior to any other in 
every branch of Learning and more especially in Astronome); 
if, while the French King is sendmg observers . . . not only 
to Pondicherie and the Cape of Good Hope, but also to the 
Northern Parts of Siberia; and the Court of Russia are doing 
the same to the most Eastern Confines of the Greater Tartary; 
not to mention the several Observers who are going to various 
18. The classic figure, of course, is James Cook, so see J. C.Beaglehole's classic (if exhaustive) biography, 
T h e  Ltfe ofcaptainJames Cook (Stanford, C A  Stanford University Press, 1974). But see also the impact of 
Linnaeus in The Compleat Naturalist; a Liji ofLinnaeus (NewYork:Vikig Press, 1971), by Wdfrid Blunt, 
with the assistance of WiUiamT. Stearn, and see the impact of Banks, a critical catalyst for whom Patrick 
O'Brian offers a popular biography,Joseph B a n k A  Liji Fondon: Collins H a r d ,  1987).The hterature 
on all these men and their apostles and imitators is almost oceanic in its extent. 
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Places, on the same errand from different parts of Europe; 
England should neglect to send Observers to such places . . . 
subject to the Crown of Great Britain. 
This is by foreign Countries in general expected from us; 
Because the use that may be derived from this Phaenomenon, 
will be proportionate to the numbers of distant places where 
. . . observations . . . shall be made of it; And the Royal Society, 
being desirous of satisfying the universal Expectations of 
the World in this respect have thought it incumbent upon 
them . . . to request your effectual intercession with His 
Majesty . . . to enable them . . . to accomplish this their desire 
. . .which . . . would be attended with expense disproportionate 
to the narrow Circumstances of the Society. 
But were the Royal Society in a more affluent State; it would 
surely tend more to the honour of his Majesty and of the Nation 
in general, that an Expense of this sort, designed to promote 
Science and to answer the general Expectation of the World, 
should not be born by any particular Set of Private Persons.” 
Here, in a nutshell, were the formal reasons for state sponsorship: society 
needed science; science needed exploration; exploration to far countries needed 
support beyond what individuals could contribute; international scholarship 
and national honor demanded participation. Unsaid, but indispensable, were 
the rising popular enthusiasms for geographic discovery, bonded not to reason 
but to sentiment.The Lacondamine expedition to Ecuador commanded public 
attention not for Lacondamine’s meticulous mapping of the Amazon’s latitude 
and longitude, but for Isabella Godin’s heart-wrenching journey down it to find 
her husband. Public interest widened. By the latter part of the 18th century, 
as select colonies moved from the littoral inland, wider populations found in 
explorers a Moses-like leader of the people to promised lands. Daniel Boone, 
not George Washington, for example, would become America’s folk-epic hero. 
From high culture to pop cult, the explorer claimed cultural standing.20 
Those grand circumnavigations revived geographic exploration, but they 
mostly proved a means to reposition explorers, who promptly moved inland. 
The world’s continents replaced the world sea as an arena for discovery: the 
19. Harry Wolfe, The Transits OfVenus (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), quoted on p. 83. 
20.The Lacondarmne expedition is not as well known among English speakers as it should be. A good 
introduction, leading to the successors in South America, is avadable inVictor von Hagen, South America 
Called Them. Explorations ojthe Great Naturalistr: La Condomine, Humboldt, Darwin, Spruce (New York: A. 
A. Knopf, 1945). A popular version has recently been pubhshed Robertmtaker ,  The Mapmaker’s W$e: 
A True Tale of Love, Murder, and Suwival in the Amazon (NewYork: Basic Books, 2004). 
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cross-continental traverse superseded a circumnavigation as the grand exploring 
gesture of the age. 
The pivotal figure was Alexander von Humboldt, whose five years in Latin 
America redefined exploration for the era. Humboldt rewove the loose strands 
into a taut fabric. He projected Linnaeus’s natural-history excursion into a cross 
section of continents. He carried the artist’s GrandTour to the Newworld. He put 
legs under Cook’s tours and let them trek from the shoreline over vast landscapes. 
He gave empirical heft to the m i s t y  musings of Nuturphilosophie. He empowered 
geographic science with a global reach. In the words of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
he was one of “those Universal men, like Aristotle.” While he was not the first 
European to paddle up the Orinoco or climb in the Andes, Humboldt was the 
first of a new kind of European, such that even when explorers of the Second 
Age revisited sites known to the First, they did so with original eyes and to novel 
ends. Symbolically, upon his return to Europe, he dined with Thomas Jefferson 
the same month that Lewis and Clark’s Corps of Discovery departed St. Louis. In 
the person of Humboldt, the explorer embodied the Romantic hero.” 
The transition matters because, as the 19th century ripened, Europe was 
no longer content to remain as a trader on the beaches of the world sea. Like 
its exploring emissaries, it shoved and swarmed inland.Trading ventures became 
imperial institutions; coastal colonies became continental nations; and the politics 
of commerce gave way to outright conquest.Thus commenced a grand era of 
exploring naturalism. New scholarship, particularly sciences, bubbled up out of 
the slush of specimens shipped home. The returns from the earliest explorers to 
a particular place were often phenomenal-the scholarly equivalent to placer 
mining. A revolution in geographic discovery again accompanied a revolution 
in learning, aptly symbolized by the similltaneous recognition by two exploring 
naturalists, Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace, of evolution by natural selection. 
The moral drama changed accordingly. Secularization and science trans- 
1atedVasco da Gama’s famous declaration that he had come to the Indies for 
“Christians and spices” into a cry for civilization and commerce. The deeper 
drama concerned that fraction of Europe’s imperium colonized by European 
emigrants. Most of what Europe nominally ruled was densely inhabited by 
long-residing peoples, often in numbers far vaster than that of the rulers. But 
in some lands, the indigenes were swept away, and into that demographic 
vacuum European 6migr6s poured in. These settler societies tended to look 
21. Probably the best biography of Humboldt is s t d  Helmut de Terra, Hum6oldt:The Liji and Times of 
Alexander von H~mboldt, 1769-1859 (NewYork: Knopf, 1955). For a fascinating insight into h s  cultural 
impact, however, see Hahna Nelken, Alexander von Humboldt: His Portraits and Their Artists: Documentary 
Iconography (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1980). On his impact in America, see Goetzmann, New 
Lands, New Men. 
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upon discovery as part of a national epic and to honor explorers as vital 
protagonists- Moses, an Aeneas-of those founding events. With Lewis and 
Clark, for example, the frontiersman morphed into a naturalist, the scout into 
a scholar, and the adventurer into an Aeneas on his way to the founding of a 
new civilization. Their subsequent folk expansions proceeded hand in glove 
with formal exploration. These were new worlds, premised on the prospects 
for a new order of society. America truly was, in William Goetzmann’s words, 
“exploration’s nation,” but so were Russia, Australia, Canada, and others.= 
Discovery metastasized. As measured by the number of exploring expeditions, 
a slight increase appears in the latter 18th century and then erupts into a supernova 
of discovery that spans the globe. By the 1870s, explorers had managed continental 
traverses-cross sections of natural history-for every continent save Antarctica. 
With the partition of Africa, expeditions proliferated to assess what the fines 
drawn on maps in a Berlin library actually meant on the ground. Exploration had 
become an index of national prestige and power. The first International Polar 
Year (1882) turned attention to the Arctic. An announcement by the Sixth 
International Geographical Congress in 1896 that Antarctica remained the last 
continent for untrammeled geographic discovery inspired a stampede to its icy 
shores; even Belgium and Japan sponsored expeditions. (America’s attention 
remained fixated on the North Pole and that other stampede to the Klondike.) 
Ernest Shackleton’s celebrated Trans-Antarctic Expedtion was, after all, an 
attempt to complete for that continent the grand gesture that had crowned 
every other.23 
But Antarctica was the last: there were no more unvisited lands to traverse 
other than such backwaters as, for example, the Red Centre of Australia, the 
crenulated valleys and highlands of New Guinea, and the windswept Gobi. 
The number of exploring expeditions began to decline. Plotting them reveals 
the Second Age as a kind of historical monadnock, rising like a chronological 
volcano above a level terrain (see figure on opposite page).The peak crests in 
the last decades of the 19th century, as exploration crossed the summit of the 
Second Age. Then it began a descent down the other side. 
22. Goetzmann, “Exploration’s Nation.” 
23. Accounts &om the Heroic Age of Antarchc Exploration are legion. The entire literature is 
contained-incredbly-wthin the Antarctic Bibliography pubhshed by the Library of Congress. A 
surprismgly good compdatlon, wonderfidly Illustrated, is avadable in Reader’s Digest, Antarctica. 
Great Storiesfrom the Frozen Continent (Surrey HIlls, New South Wales: Reader’s Digest, 1985). For 
an interpretwe summary that places the experience w h i n  the Three Ages of Discovery schema, see 
Stephen J Pyne, The Ire:A Journey to Antarctica (Iowa City, IA: Umversity of Iowa Press, 1986). 
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LOST WORLDS: THE WANING OF THE SECOND AGE 
The reasons for the slow bursting of this exploration bubble are many. 
The simplest is that Europe had completed its swarm over the (to it) unknown 
surfaces of the planet. There was nowhere else for the Humboldtean explorer to 
go. Equally, there were no more lands to mean inmy colonize. Instead, Europe 
turned upon itself in near self-immolation, with two world wars, a depression, 
and the sudden sheddmg of its old imperium. The enthusiasm for boundary 
surveys and natural-history excursions-for imperialism itself-waned with 
the slaughter of the Great War. 
The critical players were exhausted, especially Great Britain. The Second 
Age had kindled with a rivalry between Britain and France, much as the contest 
between Portugal and Spain had powered the First Age. Thereafter, virtually 
every competition featured Britain, which is why its explorers so dominate the 
age. Britain and France clashed in India, the Pacific, and Africa; Britain and the 
U.S., in North America; Britain and Russia, the Great Game, across central Asia; 
Britain and all comers in Antarctica. After the Great War, Britain and France 
Great Ages of Discoveryz4 
24. Data from J. N. L. Baker, A History of Geogriphical Discovery and Exploration, rev. ed. (G. G. Harrap 
and Co., 1937);Alex Roland, ed., A Spacefaring People: Perspectives on Early Spaceflisht (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 1985); and J. H. Parry, The Discovery ofthe Sea (NewYork Dial, 1974). 
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could no longer afford the enterprise; Russia turned inward with revolution; the 
U.S. had few places other than Antarctica in which discovery had geopolitical 
meaning.The Second Great Age of Discovery, like the First before it, deflated. 
By the middle 20th century, Kipling’s “Recessional” had become pro- 
phetic: Europe was rapidly disengaging itself from its imperial past and thus 
from the exploring energies that had, like lampreys, attached themselves to the 
institutions of an expansionist era. Decolorization accompanied an implosion 
of exploration; Europe turned inward, quelling the ancient quarrels that had 
restlessly and violently propelled it around the globe, pulling itself together 
rather than projecting itself outward. Antarctica, the deep oceans, interplanetary 
space-these arenas for geographic discovery might be claimed, but they would 
not be colonized. No one was willing to wage war over the asteroid belt or Io. 
Other reasons were cultural.The Second Age had served as the exploring 
instrument of the Enlightenment. Geographic discovery had bonded with 
modern science: no serious expedition could claim public interest without a 
complement of naturalists, while some of the most robust new sciences like 
geology and biology relied on exploration to cart back the data that fueled 
them. Science, particularly natural history, had shown itself as implacably 
aggressive as politics, full of national rivalries and conceptual competitions, and 
through exploration, it appeared to answer, or at least could address, questions 
of keen interest to the culture. It could exhume the age of the Earth, reveal 
the evolution of life, celebrate natural monuments to nationalism and Nature’s 
God. Artists like Thomas Baines and Thomas Moran joined expeditions or, like 
John James Audubon, mounted their own surveys; general intellectuals eagerly 
studied narratives of discovery (even Henry David Thoreau, nestled into his 
Walden Pond cabin, read the entire five volumes of the Wilkes Expedition). 
Exploring accounts and traveler narratives were best sellers; explorers became 
cultural heroes; exploration was part and parcel of national epics; exploration 
was a means to fame and sometimes fortune. The Second Age, in brief, braided 
together many of the dominant cultural strands of its times. 
By the early 20th century, however, this splendid tapestry was unraveling. 
The Enlightenment found itself challenged by Modernism’s avant-garde: in 
field after field, intellectuals turned to subjects that no longer lent themselves 
to explication by exploration. Modernism spread like an intellectual infection, a 
fever that turned the attention ofhigh culture away from a tangible, commonsense 
world to an interior realm hll of paradoxes.The vital truths no longer lay in the 
domain of geographic discovery. Art looked to art, mathematics to mathematics, 
literature to literature. Natural scientists scrutinized the very large and the very 
small, to red-shifting nebulae and subatomic particles or molecular genes. Artists 
turned inward, probing themselves and the foundations of art, not outward to 
representational landscapes. High culture was more inclined to follow Sigmund 
Freud into the symbol-laden depths of the unconscious or Joseph Conrad into 
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a heart of imperial darkness than to ascend Chimborazo with Humboldt or to 
row with John Wesley Powell through the gorges of the Grand Canyon. The 
Second Age sagged not simply from the exhaustion of closed frontiers, but from 
a more profound weariness with the entire Enlightenment enterprise. 
In the early 19th century, an intellectual could claim international acclaim 
by exploring new lands. By the early 20th, he could not, if he could even find 
suitable lands. There were a few spectacular exceptions: the gold-prospecting 
Leahy brothers trooping into the unknown Highlands of New Guinea; Richard 
Byrd, wistfully erecting Little America on the Ross Ice Shelc Roy Chapman 
Andrews, with carbine and Model T, whisking across the Gobi in search of 
dinosaur eggs, the very model of a Hollywood action hero (and inspiration for 
Indiana Jones). But there was, overall, a rueful, forlorn quality to the striving, 
aptly expressed when the American Museum of Natural History, with Andrews 
at the helm, dispatched an expedition to Shiva Temple, an isolated butte within 
the Grand Canyon, to look for exotic creatures. Sixty years before, the Canyon 
had claimed center stage, not only for geographic discovery, but for what it said 
to fundamental questions about the Earth's age and organic evolution. Now the 
press boosted a minor foray into a search for lost worlds and possibly living relics 
from the age of dinosaurs. Lost world, indeed.25 
BOLDLY GOING WHERE NO ONE IS: T H E  THIRD AGE 
The fascinating question is why the bubble did not burst more catastro- 
phically. One reason is that Western civilization did discover new lands to explore. 
There were the ice sheets (and sub-ice terrains) of Greenland and especially 
Antarctica; there were the deep oceans; and, of course, a solar system beckoned, 
full of wonders beyond the vision of Earth-bound observatories. As powerful 
instruments and remote sensing technologies emerged, as manned vehicles and 
unmanned probes plummeted to the depths and beyond the atmosphere, the 
prospects for a revival of exploration became possible. 
Yet dazzling technologies and a rekindled curiosity are not enough to 
sustain an era of exploration: cultural engagement also demands a sharp rivalry. 
Those competitive energies flourished with the Cold War. In retrospect, the 
Great Game between the United States and the Soviet Union lasted far less than 
25. Contrast, for example, the classic explorers of the Second Age mth  the career of Roy Chapman 
Andrews, as described in Charles Gallenkamp, Dragon Hunter: Roy Chapman Andvews and the Central Asiatu 
Expeditions (NewYork:Vi!&g, 2001). Andrews set out to be an explorer in the classic mode but found that 
the times had changed. For the story of a contemporary who did manage to make the transinon in part, 
see Carol Gould, The Remarkable L@ ofWilliam Beebe: Explorer and Naturalut (Washington, DC: Island Press, 
2004). Beebe famously plunged into the Atlantic in a bathysphere.An attempt to trace the contours of the 
Second Age's rise and fall, using the Grand Canyon as a test site, can be found in Stephen J. Pyne, How the 
Canyon Became Grand:A Short History (New YorkVihng, 1998), which recounts the Shva Temple saga. 
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those between Spain and Portugal, or Britain and France, but the era is young, 
and if it does in fact mark a Third Age, some other competitors, keen to secure 
national advantage or prestige through sponsored discovery, may emerge. China 
has announced its intention to land a tikonaut on the Moon; India and Japan have 
launch capabilities and may choose to compete.Without the Cold War, however, 
there would have been scant incentive to erect bases on the Antarctic ice, scour 
the oceans for seamounts and trenches, or launch spacecraft. The Cold War 
allowed a controlled deceleration of exploring energies, a reversed complement 
to the British-French competition that helped accelerate the Second Age. Two 
geopolitical rivals, both with active exploring traditions, chose to divert some of 
their contest away from battlefields and into untrodden landscapes. 
But perhaps more profoundly, exploration did not wither away because 
the culture, the popular culture, did not wish it to. Exploration had become 
not only institutionalized, but internalized. This was a civilization that could 
hardly imagine itself as other than exploring. Explorers flourished, if only in 
pulp fiction, movies, and adolescent fantasies. Quickly, it forged new institutions, 
of which the International GeophysicalYear is an apt annunciation, and in the 
Voyager missions, it found what is likely to endure as the great gesture of the 
Third Age, a traverse through the solar system.Voyager’s Grand Tour may serve 
for this era as Magellan’s voyage did for the First and Humboldt’s travels &d for 
the Second.Voyager demonstrated both the power and peculiarities of the era.26 
What has not happened is a new knitting together of exploration and high 
culture. Instead, popular culture has filled that void, but in ways that resuscitate 
the images and narrative templates of previous eras. Stur Tuek, for example, is 
the voyage of the Beagle with warp drive. Enthusiasts show Conestoga wagons 
26. The hterature on IGY is large but mostly technical. A good popular survey is J. Tuzo Wdson, 
I G Y  The Year of the New Moons (New York Knopf, 1961). The Third Age has not been the object 
of a comprehensive survey since space seems to command its own literature and, to put the matter 
bluntly, the concept IS not mdely known. Useful starting points for works about space travel are 
Alex Roland, ed., A Spacefring People. Perspectives on Early Space Flght (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985); 
Wdliam Burrows, Thrs New 0cean:The Story ofthe First Space Age (NewYork Random House, 1998); 
Roger Launius, Frontiers ofspace Exploration, 2nd ed. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004); Roger D. 
Launius et al., Reconsidering Sputnik: Forty Ears Since the Soviet Satellite (Amsterdam: Overseas Publishers 
Association, 2000); and, for the political context of the Cold War,Walter A. McDougall, . . . The Heavens 
and the Earth:A Political History ofthe Space Age (NewYork: Basic Books, 1985).The deep-ocean story 
has been much less described, although declassification of d t a r y  documents IS beginmng to change 
the record. See Wilham Broad, T h e  Universe Below: Discovering the Secrets .f the Deep Ocean (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1997); Robert D. Ballard mth  Wdl Hively, The Eternal Darkness:A Personal History 
of Deep-sea Exploration (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Umversity Press, 2000); Henry Menard, The Ocean 
of Tnth: A Personal History of Global Tectonics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); and 
Anatomy of an Expedition (New York McGraw-Hill, 1969).To measure the contrast with the supreme 
oceanic expeditlon the Second Age, see &chard Corfield, The Silent Landscape: T h e  Scientific Voyage o f  
H M S  Challenger (Washmgon, DC: Joseph Henry Press, 2003). 
SEEKING NEWER WORLDS: AN HISTORICAL CONTEXT. . . 29 
trekking to Mars, prairie schooners propelled by solar wind. But popular culture 
can be fickle and selective. The first Stuv Trek movie, for example, imagined a 
Voyager spacecraft returning to Earth, stuffed with a universe of wonders, 
reporting to its “creator.”Ten years later, StuvZek Vopened with a bored Klingon 
commander blasting atroyager probe as space junk. Exploring the galaxies needed 
a story-a deep narrative of moral and imaginative power-as much as dilithium 
crystals. With neither a rambunctious imperialism nor an eager Enlightenment, 
the Third Age must, for now, continue its downward declension. 
There are good reasons, then, for considering the Third Age-our age-as 
continuous with its predecessors.Yet it is also different, and those differences matter. 
Most intrinsically, the Third Age is going where no one is or ever has been. 
The geographic realms of the Third Age are places where people cannot 
live off the land. In Antarctica, they can at least breathe. In the deep oceans, 
beneath the ice sheets, or in space, they can survive only if encased in artificial 
life-support systems. These are environs that offer no sustaining biota. There is 
little reason to believe that much more thrives beyond Earth.These geographies 
remain, for all practical purposes, abiotic worlds.They propel exploration beyond 
the ethnocentric realm of Western discovery, but also beyond the sphere of the 
human and perhaps beyond the provenance of life. 
This is a cultural barrier to exploration, in comparison to which the limiting 
velocity of light may prove a mere technological inconvenience. The reason 
goes to the heart of exploration: that it is not merely an expression of curiosity 
and wanderlust but involves the encounter with a world beyond our ken that 
challenges our sense of who we are. It is a moral act, one often tragic, a strong 
nuclear force that bonds discovery to society. It means that exploration is more 
than adventuring, more than entertainment, more than inquisitiveness. It means 
it asks, if indirectly, core questions about what the exploring people are like. 
This was unavoidable in the past because almost all previous encounters had 
involved people. Exploration meant the meeting of one people with another, 
the transfer of knowledge and experience 6-om one group to another. Most 
of the world Europe did not discover, except to itself. Almost every place that 
could have people did have them, and those indigenes proved indispensable. 
They served as interpreters, translators, native guides, hunters, and collectors. 
Explorers often succeeded to the extent that they borrowed &om or emulated 
the peoples who already resided in these (for Europe) far and foreign realms. 
What Europe did was to stitch these separate someones together into a vast 
cosmological quilt: its voyages of discovery were needles and threads that joined 
geographic patches into new collective patterns. 
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The Third Age has no such option. No one will live off the land on 
Deimos, go native on Titan, absorb the art of Venus, the mythology of Uranus, 
the religious precepts of Mars, or the literature of Ceres.There will be no one 
to talk to except ourselves. Discovery will become a colossal exercise in self- 
reference. Consider some of the iconic images of the American space program. 
There is the image of Earthrise, which is a view of ourselves from the Moon. 
And there is Buzz Aldrin, encased like a high-tech Michelin Man, staring into 
a camera on the lunar surface. His visor, however, reflects back the image of 
the photographer. In a classic image, WundevevAbove u Seu $Fog, Caspar David 
Friederick could position his painting’s observer peering over the shoulder of 
a Humboldtean traveler, in turn overlooking a valley of mist. In a comparable 
classic, Neil Armstrong could photograph Aldrin, looking at Armstrong, showing 
the photographer taking the photograph. That shift in perspective captures 
exactly the shift from Enlightenment to Modernism and from Second Age to 
Third. Add to the survey the curious plaques affixed to Pioneer and Voyager, 
surely indecipherable to any entity that might find them.They are a message in 
a bottle dispatched to ourselves. 
Yet there is promise amid the paradox. For a century, Modernism has 
grappled precisely with how to reconcile observer with observed, with 
somehow putting ourselves into the scene. Russell’s paradox, Godel’s proof, 
Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle-all struggled with self-reflexivity. 
They addressed precisely, if abstractly, the conundrum of exploring without 
an Other. As a result, Modernist art, literature, and philosophy can outfit 
exploration with the intellectual kit it will need to survive such alien scenes and 
self-encounters.They can provision it to move beyond the landscapes of earlier 
eras of discovery. 
The other good news is that the coruscating ethical dilemmas of so much 
earlier exploring and empire-building will disappear. No group need expand at 
the expense of another. Ethnocentricity will vanish: there is only one culture, 
that of the explorer. There is no exoecosystem to foul. With no distinctively 
humun encounter possible, there is no compelling reason for humans to even 
serve as explorers. As long as other life or cultures are not present, there is no 
ethical or political crisis except whatever we choose to impose on ourselves. 
Beyond the Earth there may well be no morality as traditionally understood, 
that is, as a means of shaping behavior between peoples.The morality at issue is 
one of the self, not between the Self and an Other. 
The bad news is that exploration’s moral power-the tensions, awful and 
enlightening both, that are involved in a clash of cultures-also vanishes. The 
price of ethically sanitizing exploration is to strip it of compelling humun drama. 
Planetary probes become technical challenges, to make machines to withstand 
the rigors of space travel, a technological equivalent to extreme sports, like 
white-water kayaking in Borneo or NASCAR’s Daytona 500. The intellectual 
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challenge has telescoped, more or less, into a search for life, notably on Mars. 
Whether this can command the kind of cultural attention that earlier exploration 
did is unclear.What is inescapable is yet another paradox: we are safe as long 
as we don’t find lie. If we do, then the old morality returns. (Here is the real 
intergalactic ghoul.) If we decline to revive those concerns, and withdraw, then 
the primary justification for continued discovery vanishes and the space program 
becomes a hnd  of national hobby, a jobs program, or a daytime TV soap opera. 
But the matter gets even worse. 
In past ages, dxovery had to be done by people.There was no other option 
by which to learn the languages, to record data and impressions, to gather 
specimens, to meet other societies and translate their accumulated wisdom. It is 
impossible to imagine the great expeditions of the past without considering the 
personality of individual explorers who inspired, collected, witnessed, fought, 
wrote, sketched, exulted, feared, suffered, and otherwise expressed the aspirations 
and alarms of their civilization. But it is entirely possible to do so now. Not 
only is there no encounter between people, there need not even be a human 
encounterer. People do not have to be physically present at the discoveries of 
the Third Age, and there are sound reasons for arguing that they should not be. 
Nor is the case for planetary colonization truly compelling, not at present, 
any more than it was for Magellan at the Marianas or Peary at the Pole, or 
those fatally premature experiments from promoters like Walter Raleigh. The 
theses advanced to promote outright settlement are historical, culturally bound, 
and selectively anecdotal: that we need to pioneer to be what we are, that new 
colonies are a means of renewing civilization, that the Second Age can have a 
Second Coming. America, in particular, could not survive the closing of the 
final frontier (although the American Century flourished only after the old 
frontier nominally shut down). 
There is little to justify this assertion. Even considered on economic 
grounds, Europe’s imperial nations boomed only after they shed their foreign 
colonies. Moreover, advocates for exploration as a prelude to colonization 
conveniently ignore such fiascos as the Darien debacle-the scheme boosted 
by William Paterson in the 1690s to establish a Scottish settlement in Panama. 
The isthmus would be critical to global trade, he insisted; Scotland’s economic 
future and national identity depended on it seizing control of that geopolitical 
chokepoint; destiny demanded colonization. The outcome was a crushing 
failure that, not incidentally, bankrupted Scotland and drove it into union with 
England. Paterson was a visionary: in 200 years, a canal would join the two 
oceans across Panama. He was also a lethal crank who cost hundreds of lives 
and ruined a national economy. Successful settlements followed a long gestation 
period of reconnaissance and aid from indigenes. Examples abound of societies 
that chose to withdraw into themselves and suffered.There are, equally, examples 
of societies that chose to push outward and suffered. Portugal, as the founding 
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paradigm, is a good case. Within a generation, it had sunk into collapse, even 
absorbed by Spain, only emerging M y  as a modern state when it finally shed 
its colonies.The issue is not whether to explore or not, but how to engage the 
wider world: where, with what means, how much. More likely is an era of space 
tourism or historical reenactment-Plymouth Colony on the Moon, Golden 
Goa onVenus, Magellan Tours TakesYou to P h o b o ~ . ~ ~  
This is precisely what the closest Earth analogues do. No one lives in the 
Marianas Trench or the Laurentian Abyss. No one homesteads in Antarctica. 
There are permanent settlements, but not permanent residents. There are 
no schools because there are no children.There are no families.There is no 
indigenous society. These enclaves are the scientific equivalent of the commercial 
and military posts that characterized the early centuries of European expansion, 
only a fraction of which ever evolved into full-blown colonies, and most of 
those in defiance of the wishes of the commercial joint-stock companies or 
royal monopolies that oversaw them. In some ways, the contemporary colonies 
of the Third Age on Earth offer even less because there are no indigenes with 
whom to co-inhabit, interbreed, or coerce into labor. (The historic outposts of 
Europe’s exploring imperium tended to be populated by indentured servants, 
slaves, serfs, solders, convicts, religious refugees, or company employees, most of 
whom survived thanks to the largesse or forced conscription of native peoples; 
all in all not a formula for the demographic renewal of Earth.) 
Within the realm of the solar system-the dominion of the Third Age- 
the likelihood is that posts, if established and staffed by humans, would 
involve short tours of duty and high turnovers. The infrastructure would 
remain; the people would not. Exploration could thrive; outright colonization 
would not. 
BACK TO THE FUTURE: BEYOND THE THIRD AGE 
The Third Age encompasses more than space exploration, but the Antarctic 
has not enough undiscovered terrain to sustain a whole era, and oceanographic 
exploration has not yet gripped the public imagination, although it might. The 
future of exploration will depend on the exploration of the solar system. What 
might it look like? 
It will look like what its sustaining society wants it to look 1ike.The possibility 
exists that political contests will boil over into space, perhaps if China declares a 
colony on the Moon as essential to its prestige and the European Union joins the 
27. For a thumbnail of the Darien fiasco, see Arthur Herman, How the Scots Invented the Modern World 
(NewYork:Three Rivers Press, 2001), pp. 15-37. Interestingly, several nations tried to gain a foothold 
in Panama and failed, including the United States in the 1850s. 
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fray, using space as an alternative to military might in the search for a multipolar 
world.There is a prospect that the search for life d take on an imaginative, even 
a theological cast, sufficient that a large fraction of the culture wants to pursue it 
among the planets. It may happen that extreme arts, brash new sciences, an as- 
yet-undeveloped commerce, an astropolitics, and some critical personalities will 
combine to kindle a Third Age echo of the Second Age. In some form or another, 
a virtuous cycle is possible. But it is not likely. For the American economy, the 
world's greatest debtor, cyberspace is far more significant than outer space. Like 
Spain before it, the United States squandered its windfall. Something might reverse 
that slide, but as Damon Runyon advised, the race is not always to the swift nor 
victory to the strong, but that's where you place your money. 
The most plausible prognosis is that the future will resemble the past, that the 
Second Age's monadnock w d  mark an axis around which the evolving contours 
wdl unfold with rough historical symmetry. The Third Age will resemble the early 
Second, though in reverse, eventually mimicking with hgh-tech hardware the 
tempo of the First. (Even the attrition of spacecraft resembles that of far-sailing 
mariners.) Expehtions will slide to a new steady state, perhaps on the order of one 
or two a year (see figure below). These will be complicated probes, requiring years 
of preparation, similar to the expeditions launched during the Great Voyages and 
A Prospective Future for Exploration 
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quite unlike the brawling swarm that so inflated the Second Age. The motor for the 
past half millennium of exploration-Europe’s internal quarrels-is now directed 
inward, to the European Union, or in absorbing rivalries that once drove exploration 
outward. Such expeItions d be targeted to some particular purpose-commercial, 
scientific, technological, national prowess, and prestige. They are udkely to spdl out 
fiom colonization: they will rather resemble those expeItions that early established 
trading factories on islands or episo&cally visited coastlines for barter or sought out 
new routes. If the process thrives, there will be several rivals, not some collective 
United Earth Space Agency, and that institutional unrest is what wdl keep the pot 
simmering. Steadily more and more of the solar system will be visited, cataloged, 
mapped, assessed. Perhaps, here and there, an outpost will appear, staffed for a few 
years. Reversing this trend would require an immense, global commitment that could 
only come fiom some dark necessity or irresistible rivalry, say, the discovery amid the 
asteroids of some mineral absolutely vital to national existence-the equivalent of the 
Potosi mines of Mexico, perhaps-or fromVenusians announcing that they intend to 
colonize Mars and the moons of Saturn, and defying Earthlings to stop them. 
What might all this portend for NASA? It likely means that exploration 
will continue to command popular interest, that scientific pursuits may well be 
sufficient to justifjr the further exploration of the solar system, with curiosity 
replacing commerce as a motive force and modern science substituting its own 
fierce competitive for geopolitical rivalry, and that the cultural continuities inherent 
in the long trajectory of geographic discovery by Western civilization w d  persist. 
For the near future, exploration’s own inertia will propel more exploration. But the 
interpretation also argues that NASA would do well to attend to the Ifferences. It 
suggests that treklung among the planets will not be the same as crossing a continent 
or sailing the seas.The distinction is not simply one of technology and vessels, but 
of psychology and the meaning, ultimately the morality, of what occurs. It suggests 
that in the future, expeditions wdl be complex, public commitment modest, and the 
vigor of the program measured not by the number of expeltions so much as the 
impact of their novelty. It suggests, as so much other evidence does, that the Apollo 
program was an aberration and the attempt to institutionalize a successor through 
the Space Shuttle, an anomaly. It suggests that the chief novelty unveiled by space 
travel will be the character of exploration itself, that the explorer may be---ought 
to be-robotic and virtual. It is, in truth, more than a little odd that an enterprise 
premised on the discovery of the new should be so obsessed with retaining the 
old, especially cultural archaisms. The vital requirement for future exploration is 
less a new propulsion mechanism than a new appreciation for how geographic 
discovery must proceed in a context beyond Earth. Eponymously named spacecraft 
and planetary rovers may be the future’s prosthetic explorers. An obsession with 
colonization wdl be a burden rather than a boon. 
There may even be a deeper symmetry in the narrative arc of the Great Ages 
of Discovery. The Grand Ages may themselves end. They were created; they can 
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expire.The conditions that sustained them may cease altogether; they may no longer 
inspire interest as a tradition worthy of institutional support. One can even imagine 
a robotic Columbus, ceremoniously announcing an end to the enterprise. If the late 
19th century marks a bilateral middle in this saga, that passing may happen some 
400 years later, the early 23rd century, where Stay Trek now resides in the popular 
imagination. Exploration, even of space, may then exist only in literature, history, 
film, and popular imagination, and in a past where no one, boldly or otherwise, 
wishes any longer to go. 

CHAPTER z 
COMPELLING RATIONALES FOR PACEFLIGHT? 
HISTORY AND THE SEARCH FOR RELEVANCE 
Roger D. Launius 
re there compelling reasons to travel into space? Assuming that there are, A when did they emerge in the consciousness of the space community, opinion 
leaders, politicos, larger public? How have those compelling reasons for spaceflight 
been articulated and adjusted over time? With all of the changes in the larger 
society during the last half century, do those rationales remain persuasive at the 
dawn of the 21st century? Finding answers to these questions are probably the 
most critical issues currently facing the space policy community. Of course, these 
issues may be considered without the use of historical analysis, and many do so, 
but the debate is immeasurably enriched by an understanding and explication of 
the historical evolution of the rationales that have been offered for why humanity 
seeks to fly in space.This essay begins with a discussion of the motivations for 
spaceflight-ultimately resting on the deep-seated desire to become a multiplan- 
etary species and a quest for utopia beyond this realm-before moving into a 
sustained discussion of the five rationales for spaceflight that have been advanced 
over time: national pride/prestige/geopolitics, human destiny/survival of the 
species, commercial and other applications, national security, and science and 
technology. All of these have been used over time to support the concept of 
spaceflight. But are they compekng rationales today? Were they ever? The 
conclusion of t h s  essay explores the long-term consequences of these rationales. 
A QUESTION OF MOTIVATION 
Of course, one must ask the question, why did spaceflight advocates 
believe so thoroughly in the necessity of moving beyond “Mother Earth?” 
Certainly, they viewed it as a thrilling adventure, one that would test the 
best that humanity had to offer. Was it simply a problem to be solved, or did 
they envision something more? Ultimately, what was the point of sending 
people into space? Is not the expansion of a human presence throughout the 
cosmos the real, long-term agenda? I am convinced that there was much more 
to it than just trying to solve an engineering problem, although few of the 
spaceflight enthusiasts systematically expressed their long-term objectives. In 
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essence, the advocates have long believed that it is human destiny to become a 
multiplanetary species, not just as an end in itself, but because of the desire to 
create a utopian society free from the constraints of cultures on Earth. 
De Witt Douglas Kilgore has recently noted that this motivation may be 
characterized as “astro!31turism,” the application in the American tradition of 
technological utopianism responding to the political upheavals of the 20th 
century. Kilgore asserts that the pro-space utopian impulse was founded in the 
imperial politics and utopian schemes of the 19th century but envisions outer 
space as an endless frontier that offers solutions to the economic and political 
problems that dominate the modern world. Its advocates used the conventions 
of technological and scientific conquest to express the ideals and contradictions 
endemic to American culture. Astrofuturists, according to Kdgore, imagined 
space frontiers that could extend the reach of the human species and heal its 
historical wounds. Their efforts both replicated dominant social presuppositions 
and supplied the technologies necessary for the critical utopian projects that 
emerged in the latter 20th century.’ 
One critical astrofuturist, the American rocket pioneer Robert H. Goddard, 
wrote effectively about breaking the bonds of Earth to achieve the full potential 
of the human spirit. A native of Worcester, Massachusetts, Goddard had a 
surprisingly metaphysical perspective on the cause of human spaceflight. As a 
boy, while his family was staying at the suburban home of friends in Worcester on 
19 October 1899, he climbed into an old cherry tree to prune its dead branches. 
Instead, he began daydreaming. A5 he wrote later, “It was one of the quiet, 
colorful afternoons of sheer beauty which we have in October in New England, 
and as I looked toward the fields at the east, I imagined how wonderful it would 
be to make some device which had even the possibility of ascending to Mars, 
and how it would look on a small scale, if sent up from the meadow at my feet.” 
From that point on, Goddard enthusiastically pursued the idea of spaceflight 
as a necessary part of human destiny. He wrote in his diary, “Existence at last 
seemed very purposive.” In addition, 19 October became “Anniversary Day,” 
noted in his diary as his personal holiday. He went on to tie space exploration 
to a surprisingly utopian vision of the future.At his high school oration in 1904, 
he summarized his life’s perspective:“It is difficult to say what is impossible, for the 
dream of yesterday is the hope of today and the reality of tom~rrow.”~ Later he 
added, “Every vision is a joke, until the first man accomplishes it.” 
1. See De Witt Douglas Kdgore,Astrofiturism: Sczence, Race, and Visions of Utopia in Space (Philadelpha: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003). 
2.Two solid biographes of Goddard are Mdton Lehman, This HI$ Man.The LI$ ofRobert H. Goddard 
(NewYork: Farrar, Straus, 1963), whch is outdated, and David A. Clary, Rocket Man: Robert H. Goddard 
and the Birth ofthe Space Age (NewYork Hyperion, 2003).The quotahons are from Esther C. Goddard, 
ed., and G. Edward Pendray, assoc. ed., The Papers ofRobert H. Goddard, 3 vols. (NewYork McGraw-Hd 
Book Co., 1970), l:lO, 1:63-66. 
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The most powerful justification Goddard ever offered for humanity’s move- 
ment into space was an essay called “The Great Migration,” written on 14 
January 1918 but not made public until much later. He scrawled across the 
envelope: “To be given to the Smithsonian Institution, after the owner has 
finished with it, there to be preserved on file, and used at the discretion of the 
Institution. The notes should be read thoroughly only by an optimist.” In this 
essay, Goddard postulated a time in the distant hture when the Sun had cooled 
and life on Earth could no longer be sustained. He envisioned gigantic, 
intergalactic arks taking the essence of the creatures and knowledge of this 
planet to new homes throughout the vastness of the Milky Way. “It has long 
been known,” he wrote,“that protoplasm can remain inanimate for great periods 
of time, and can also withstand great cold, if in the granular state.”There, amidst 
the stars, human society would replicate the best of what it had to offer.3 While 
the issue of utopianism is implicit, it is still present and offered for Goddard a 
reason to dedicate his life to building the technology necessary to achieve 
multiplanetary migration. 
These ideas of human destiny and perfect societies on new and perfect 
worlds have been expanded upon and extended far beyond Goddard’s basic vision 
in numerous subsequent works. Wernher von Braun, the single most important 
promoter ofAmerica’s space effort in the 1950s and 1960s, captured the essence 
ofAmerican utopian idealism and used it to justiftr an aggressive space exploration 
pr~gram.~ Although a German immigrant to the United States afterworld War 11, 
or perhaps because of it, he was remarkable in his grasp of what made Americans 
tick. He spoke often of “The Challenge of the Century” as a continuation of 
American exploration and settlement and the creation of a perfect society in a 
new land. “For more than 400 years the history of this nation has been crammed 
with adventure and excitement and marked by expansion,” he said. “Compared 
with Europe, Africa, and Asia, America was the New World. Its pioneer settlers 
were daring, energetic, and self-reliant. They were challenged by the promise 
of unexplored and unsettled territory, and stimulated by the urge to conquer 
these vast new frontiers.” Americans need the space frontier both physically and 
spiritually, von Braun insisted, and suggested that greater efforts in moving beyond 
the Earth would lead to a society in which “right relationships” pre~ailed.~ 
3. Robert H. Goddard, “The Great Migratlon,” in Papers of Robert H. Goddard, ed. Goddard and 
Pendray, 3:1611-1612. 
4. It is important to understand that this effort to colonize the cosmos was not limted to Goddard. 
Hermann Oberth wrote,“This is the goal.To make avadable for life every place where life is possible. 
To make inhabitable all worlds as yet umnhabitable, and all hfe purposeful” (Hermann Oberth, Man irtto 
Space [NewYork Harper and Brothers, 19571, p. 167). 
5. Wernher von Braun,“The Challenge of the Century,”3 Aprd 1965,Wernher von Braun Biographcal 
Fde, NASA Historical Reference Collecnon,Washngton, DC. 
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Von Braun never wavered in his commitment to creating a perfect society 
in space. In a 1976 speech to the National Space Institute, he pointed to a bright 
future for humanity if it embarked on the high frontier of space. He said space 
would “offer new places to live-a chance to organize a new interplanetary 
society, and make fresh  beginning^."^ He believed this was “as inevitable as the 
rising of the sun; man has already poked his nose into space and he is not likely 
to pull it back . . . . There can be no thought of finishing, for aiming at the 
stars-both literally and figuratively-is the work of generations, and no matter 
how much progress one makes, there is always the thrill ofjust beginning.”7 
Gerard K. O’Neill, an experimental physicist at Princeton University, 
emerged during the 1970s to emphasize the possibilities of human settlement 
in space colonies. He left an indelible mark on the utopia-in-space movement 
by advocating the development of gigantic cylinders or spheres of roughly 
one-half by a few miles in size that would hold a breathable atmosphere, all 
the ingredients necessary for sustaining crops and life, and include rotating 
habitats to provide artificial gravity for thousands of inhabitants. While the 
human race might eventually build millions of these space colonies, each 
settlement would of necessity be an independent biosphere. Animals and plants 
endangered on Earth would thrive on these cosmic arks; insect pests would be 
left behind. Solar power, directed into each colony by huge mirrors, would 
provide a constant source ofnonpolluting energy. Positioned at a specific point 
between the Earth and the Moon where the gravitation fields are equalized, 
known as LaGrange Point 5 (L-5), these O’Neill colonies could pursue the 
perfect society absent the problems of the parent society.* 
This bold vision catapulted O’Neill into the spotlight of the space 
community and prompted a collective swoon from the thousands attracted 
to his ideas. They formed the L-5 Society in 1975 and adopted the slogan 
“L-5 in 1995.” A particularly attractive group of space activists, one of their 
members wittily opined that they intended to “disband the Society in a mass 
meeting at L-5.”9 The space settlement mission also received a major boost 
from numerous science fiction and science fact writers, among them Arthur 
6. “For Space BuE-National Space Institute,You Can Join,” Popular Science (May 1976): 73. 
7. Wernher von Braun, “Crossmg the Last Frontier,” Collier’s (22 March 1952): 24-29, 72-73. See 
also Ernst Stuhlinger and Frederick I. Ordway 111, Wernher von Braun, Crusaderfor Space:A Biographical 
Memoir (Malabar, E Robert E. Krieger Company, 1994). 
8. Gerard K. O’Nedl,‘‘The Colonization of Space,” Physics Today 27 (September 1974): 32-40; Gerard 
K. O’Neill, The High Frontier: Human Colonies in Space (New York William Morrow, 1976); Peter E. 
Glaser, “Energy fiom the Sun-Its Future,” Science 162 (1968): 857-860; Peter E. Glaser, “Solar Power 
via Satellite,” Astronautics &Aeronautics (August 1973): 60-68; Peter E. Glaser,“An Orbitmg Solar Power 
Station,” Sky and Telescope (Aprd 1975): 224-228. 
9. Michael A. G. Michaud, Reaching for the High Frontier: The American Pro-Space Movement, 1972-84 
(NewYork: Praeger, 1986), pp. 57-102. 
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C. Clarke, who popularized O’Neill’s concept for colonies in space.’O The 
strongly utopian impulse present in the O’Neill movement found voice in the 
words of aerospace writer T. A. Heppenheimer. “On Earth it is difficult for 
. . . people to form new nations or region[s] for themselves. But in space it 
will become easy for ethnic or religious groups, and for many others as well to 
set up their own colonies,” Heppenheimer wrote. “Those who wish to found 
experimental communities, to try new social forms and practices, will have 
the opportunity to strike out into the wilderness and establish their ideals in 
cities in space.”“ 
O’Neill’s vision of practical and profitable colonies in space found an 
audience in many quarters of NASA even as it did in the larger pro-space 
movement. He received funding from NASA’s Advanced Programs Office- 
but only $25,00O---to develop his ideas more fully. Senior NASA officials 
such as Administrator James C. Fletcher and Ames Research Center Director 
Hans Mark encouraged his efforts. At the same time, some discredited his 
vision of colonies in space as hopelessly utopian.” 
In the summer of 1975, NASA officials took O’Neill’s ideas seriously 
enough to convene a study group of scientists, engineers, economists, and 
sociologists at the Ames Research Center, near San Francisco, to review 
the idea of space colonization, and followed it up with a study the next 
summer. Surprisingly, they found enough in the scheme to recommend it. 
Although budget estimates of $100 billion in then-year dollars accompanied 
the colonization project, the authors of this study concluded, “in contrast to 
Apollo, it appears that space colonization may be a paying proposition.” For 
them, it offered “a way out from the sense of closure and of limits which is now 
oppressive to many people on Earth.” The study recommended an international 
project led by the United States that would result in the establishment of a 
space colony at L-5. Most importantly, and decidedly utopian in expression, 
the study concluded: 
The possibility of cooperation among nations, in an 
enterprise which can yield new wealth for all rather than a 
conflict over the remaining resources of the Earth, may be far 
more important in the long run than the immediate return of 
energy to the Earth. So, too, may be the sense of hope and of 
10. Arthur C. Clarke, Rendezvous with Rama (NewYork: Bantam Books, 1973). 
11 .T. A. Heppenheimer, Colonies in Space (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1977), pp. 279-280. 
12. Ths would be completely consistent m t h  their ideology. See Roger D. Launius, “A Western 
Mormon in Washington, D.C.: James C. Fletcher, NASA, and the Final Frontier,” Pa& Historical Review 
64 (May 1995): 217-241; Hans Mark, The Space StationA Personaljourney (Durham, NC:Duke University 
Press, 1987);“Colonies in Space,” Newsweek (27 November 1978): 95-101. 
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new options and opportunities which space colonization can 
bring to a world which has lost its  frontier^.'^ 
O’Neill publicized these findings exhaustively, but with political will for an 
aggressive space effort at low tide in the latter 1970s, nothing came of it.14 
The utopian impulse has been strong in the history of the pro-space 
community since that time and has manifested itself in numerous quarters 
and by various advocates. The libertarian viewpoint of Rick Tumlinson 
and the Space Frontier Foundation clearly evokes a utopian rnindset.l5 The 
commitment of Lyndon LaRouche to space colonization also bespeaks 
a utopian vision for the future modeled on his unique political and social 
ideals.16 At some level, the rise of a conservative space agenda in the last two 
decades of the 20th century represented a utopian impulse as well, oriented 
as it is toward a celebration of the ideology of progress. The placement of the 
history of the Strategic Defense Initiative/“single stage to orbit” (SSTO)/ 
space colonization effort in the context of the United States’ well-documented 
political “right turn” may represent the central thrust of space policy since the 
1980s. The foundation and growth of this conservative space policy agenda 
has been well-documented in several historical works. Its linkage to various 
space advocacy groups, conservative futurists such as Gerry Pournelle, and 
space-power advocates such as Pete Worden ensured that conservative space 
advocates were able to manipulate the political system to achieve funding for 
their technological goals. At sum, they were intent on remaking both this 
world and outer space into a utopia of their own design.17 
13. Richard D. Johnson and Charles Holbrow, eds., Space Settlements:A Design Study in Colonrzation 
(Waslungon, DC: NASA SP-413, 1977), pp. 27-28, a study sponsored by NASA Ames, American 
Society for Electrical Engineering (ASEE), and Stanford University in the summer of 1975 to look at 
all aspects ofsustamed life in space. See also John Bdlingham,Wdliam Gdbreath, Gerard K. O’Neill, and 
Brian O’Leary, eds., Space Resources and Space Settlements (Washington, DC: NASA SP-428,1979). 
14.The latter half of the 1970s might best be mewed as a nadir in human space exploration, wlth 
the Apollo program gone and the Shuttle not yet flying. See Louis J. Halle, “A Hopeful Future for 
Mankind,” Foregn AJam 59 (summer 1980): 1129-1 136. 
15. See k c k  N. Tumhnson, “Why Space? Personal Freedom,” Message 6 of the Fronner Fdes, 
1995, http://www.space-frontrer.ovg/frontierfi~es.~~ml (accessed 11 April 2001); k c k  N. Tumhnson, “The 
Foundanon C r e d e O u r  View of the Fronher,” Part 4 of 4, Frontier Files, 1995, http://www.space- 
S/ontier.org/S/ontierfiles. htnzl (accessed 1 1 April 2001). 
16. See Lyndon H. LaRouche, The LaRouche-Bevel Program to Save the Nation: Reversing 30Years of 
Post-Industrial Suicide (Leesburg,VA: Independents for Economc Recovery, 1992). See especially chap. 
11, “Frontier in Space,” pp. 88-100. 
17.Tlus subject has been discussed in Andrew J. Butrica, Single Stage to Orbit: Politics, Space Technology, 
and the Questfor Reusable Rocketry (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hophns, 2003), andW D. Kay, “Space Pohcy 
Redefined: The Reagan Admimstrahon and the Commerciahzanon of Space,” Business and Economic 
History 27 (fall 1998): 237-247. 
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While the quest for utopia in space has been implicit rather than explicit, 
there has never been any question but that the long-term objective ofspaceflight 
is human colonization of the cosmos. Virtually all models for the future of 
spaceflight have at their core human expansion beyond Earth. This model for 
human colonization of the cosmos was first developed in the 1950s, honed to a 
fine edge in later years, and carried to its logical conclusion by many in the more 
recent past. Promises in space of a bountiful future, in which all have enough 
resources to live a rewarding life, where there is unlimited economic potential, 
where peace and justice reign for all, and where the perfectibility of humankind 
is expected are all utopian sentiments. In addition, allusions to spaceflight as 
an attribute of human destiny and the hearkening back to a positive American 
frontier experience also stimulate visions of idyllic, perfect places.” 
There is also a basic belief, utopian at its base, that spaceflight offers 
the only hope for the continuation of the human race. Asteroids or nuclear 
holocaust or environmental degradation or even a supernova all spell eventual 
doom for this planet and all who reside here. Astronaut John Young-veteran 
of Gemini, Apollo, and Space Shuttle missions-believes that the truly endan- 
gered species on Earth are humans. The only way to escape is to leave. The 
idea of a series of arks containing the living creatures of Earth is especially 
appealing since Americans so often conceptualize of themselves as called apart 
to “redeem” the world. Time is short, and every day brings humankind closer 
to destruction.” 
Because of spaceflight’s critical role in human colonization beyond Earth, 
it was logical that the early enthusiasts would always envision space exploration 
with humans at the center. For them, it made no sense to send robots as 
surrogates. We had to go ourselves because our ultimate purpose was to move 
outward. And, of course, humans did so with resounding success, landing on 
the Moon only 12 years after the launch of the first Earth-orbital satellite. 
Having reached the conclusion that human destiny requires movement 
outward from Earth and colonization of the solar system and, ultimately, the 
cosmos, the next question revolves around how it is advocated before the larger 
public. What rationales have been advanced in support of the grand design of 
human spaceflight? How effective have they been in garnering support for this 
great adventure? 
18.Whde I do not want to overstate this case, I beheve it is a very real aspect of the current spaceflight 
agenda of a cadre of “true behevers.” I have emphasized ths  part of the story in the period since 
the 1970s in “Perfect Worlds, Perfect Societies.The Persistent Goal of Utopia in Human Spaceflight,” 
Journal of the British Interplanetary Sonety 56 (September/October 2003): 338-349. 
19. John W. Young to Steve Hawley et al.,“Why the Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars 
Must Be Accelerated,” 9 March 2001, John Young Fde, folder 18552, NASA Historical Reference 
Collechon, Washington, DC. 
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FIVE RATIONALES FOR SPACEFLIGHT 
From the defining event of Sputnik in 1957, five major themes have been 
used to justify a large-scale space exploration agenda. None of them explicitly 
advocate the human colonization of space-although that theme is implicit 
throughout-and none even hint at the larger utopian objective, despite its 
fundamental presence within the spaceflight community. The five themes are 
as follows: 
1) Human destiny/survival of the species. 
2) Geopolitics/national pride and prestige. 
3)  National security and military applications. 
4) Economic competitiveness and satellite applications. 
5) Scientific discovery and understanding. 
Those themes have continued to motivate American space policy from 
the very beginning of the Space Age to the present. Specific aspects of these 
five rationales have fluctuated over time but remain the primary reasons for the 
endeavor. Indeed, there are no more nor no less than these five basic rationales. 
Human Destiny/Survival of the Species 
The first and most common rationale for spaceflight is that an integral 
part of human nature is a desire for discovery and understanding. In essence, it 
is human destiny to explore, to learn, and to absorb new knowledge and new 
territories into the human experience. With the Earth so well known, space 
exploration advocates argue, explcration and settlement of the Moon and Mars is 
the next logical step in human exploration. Humans must question and explore 
and discover or die, advocates for this position insist. It is the “final fkontier,” and 
Americans have always responded well to their fkontiers. 
When speaking and writing of these possibilities, many space advocates 
explicitly use the language of the “Frontier Thesis,” described for America 
in Frederick Jackson Turner’s famous 1893 essay. Turner’s “Frontier Thesis” 
is perhaps the most influential essay ever read at the American Historical 
Association’s annual conference. It has exerted a powerful force in the 
historiography ofthe United States, in no small measure because ofits powerful 
statement of American exceptionalism and its justification of conquest. Turner 
took as his cue an observation in the 1890 U.S. census that the American 
frontier had, for the first time, closed. He noted, “Up to our own day American 
history has been in a large degree the history of the colonization of the Great 
West. The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the 
advance of American settlement westward explain American development.” 
He insisted that the frontier made Americans American, gave the nation its 
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democratic character, and ensured the virtues of self-reliance, community, and 
the promise ofjustice. He noted that cheap or even free land provided a “safety 
valve” that protected the nation against uprisings of the poverty-stricken and 
malcontented. The frontier also produced a people with “coarseness and 
strength . . . acuteness and inquisitiveness, that practical and inventive turn 
of mind . . . [full ofl restless and nervous energy . . . that buoyancy and 
exuberance which comes with freedom.” It gave the people of the United 
States, in essence, virtually every positive quality they have ever possessed.” 
Repeated use of the frontier analogy for spaceflight, with its vision of 
a new land and a new and better society, has given the American public a 
distinctive perspective on spacefaring. It always tapped a vein of rich ideological 
power. The symbolism of the frontier has been critical to understanding how 
Americans have viewed themselves since at least the end of the 19th century, 
and perhaps much longer. It conjured up an image of self-reliant Americans 
moving westward in sweeping waves of discovery, exploration, conquest, 
and settlement of an untamed wilderness. And in the process of movement, 
the Europeans who settled North America became an indigenous American 
people. The frontier concept has always carried with it the ideals of optimism, 
democracy, and right relationships. 
It also summoned in the popular mind a wide range ofvivid and memorable 
tales of heroism, each a morally justified step toward the modern democratic 
state. While the frontier ideal reduced the complexity of events to a relatively 
static morality play, avoided matters that challenged or contradicted the myth, 
viewed Americans moving westward as inherently good and their opponents as 
evil, and ignored the cultural context of westward migration, it served a critical 
unifying purpose for spaceflight advocates. Those persuaded by this metaphor 
(and many have been) recognize that it summons them not only to recall past 
glories, but also to undertake-or at least to acquiesce in-a heroic engagement 
under the ideal with the forces of social, political, and economic injustice.” 
Turner’s image of the American frontier has been an especially evocative 
and somewhat romantic popular theme for proponents of an aggressive 
space program. The popular conception of “westering” and the settlement of 
the American continent by Europeans has been a powerful metaphor for the 
propriety of space exploration and has enjoyed wide usage by supporters of space 
exploration. It hearkens back to the American West and the frontier in speaking 
of what might be gained in the unknown of space. But more important, it calls 
20. Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” The Frontier in 
21. See Richard Slotkin, Gunzghfer Nation:The Myth of the Frontier in Tienfiefli-Century America (New 
American Hictory (NewYork: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1920), pp. 1-38. 
York Atheneum, 1992). 
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upon the adventurousness of the American people and offers the promise of a 
utopian change in society as it moves to a new, untainted place where it could 
remake society. Such has always been the siren call of the frontier myth. 
From Captain James T. Kirk’s soliloquy-“Space, the final frontier”-at 
the beginning of each Star Trek episode to President John F. Kennedy’s 1962 
speech about setting sail on “this new ocean” of space, the exploration and 
colonization allusion has been a critical component of space program promotion. 
Astronaut, then Senator, John Glenn captured some of this tenor in 1983 when 
he summoned images of the American heritage of pioneering and argued that 
the next great frontier challenge was in space. “It represents the modern frontier 
for national adventure. Our spirit as a nation is reflected in our willingness 
to explore the unknown for the benefit of all humanity, and space is a prime 
medium in which to test our mettle.”22 
Quintessential American novelist James A. Michener also applied this 
frontier analogy to the space program. In two articles in Omni magazine in the 
early 1980s, he explicitly compared the space program to the Anglo-American 
westward movement of the 19th century. He described the American sense 
of pioneering and argued that the next great challenge in this arena is space. 
“A nation that loses its forward thrust is in danger,” he commented; “the way 
to retain it is exploration.” In an eloquent and moving way, he argued for the 
American space program as the logical means of carrying out exploration. 
One of these articles had the ironic title of “Manifest Destiny,” a blatant 
hearkening to the ideology of continental expansion that gained preeminence 
in the 1840s. Michener argued that it is the American destiny to explore and 
colonize, and space is the next logical place to do this. His statement presents 
an eloquent and moving defense of America’s human space program in all its 
 permutation^.^^ 
NASA Administrator for nine years in the 1970s and 1980s, James C. 
Fletcher was especially attracted by the analogy of the American frontier. A 
Caltech Ph.D., he guided NASA during the critical period of redefining the 
space program at the conclusion ofApollo and for three years after the Ckullenger 
accident. But for all his hardheaded practicality, for all his understanding 
of science, he was enthralled with the frontier allusion and made specific 
connections to his pioneering ancestors in Utah. He commented: 
History teaches us that the process of pushing back frontiers on 
Earth begins with exploration and discovery and is followed by 
22. John Glenn,Jr.,“The Next 25:Agenda for the U.S.,” IEEE Spectrum (September 1983): 91. 
23. James A. Michener, “Looking toward Space,” Omni (May 1980): 58. See also James A. Mchener, 
“Mmfest Deshny,” Omni (Aprd 1981): 48-50,102-104. 
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permanent settlements and economic development. Space will 
be no different . . . . Americans have always moved toward new 
frontiers because we are, above all, a nation of pioneers with an 
insatiable urge to know the unknown. Space is no exception to 
that pioneering spirit.24 
The frontier myth’s accessibility, coming with its utopian imagery, has served 
the pro-space movement well. Casting decisions on projects as facilitating the 
opening of this frontier has enormous appeal and has been used repeatedly since 
the launch of Sputnik. 
But invoking Frederick Jackson Turner has become increasingly coun- 
terproductive for anyone who appreciates postmodern multicultural society. 
Historians appropriately criticize Turner’s approach as excessively ethnocentric, 
nationalistic, and somewhat jingoistic. His rhetoric excludes more than it 
covers, failing to do justice to diverse western people and events. Yale historian 
Howard R. Lamar believes the Frontier Thesis emphasizes an inappropriate 
discontinuity between a mythical rural past and an urban-industrial future. 
Thus, it is unsuitable as a guide for understanding the present or projecting the 
future. Some scholars also discount its central safety-valve proposition. It may 
have applied in antebellum America, when many did “go West,” they suggest, 
but failed to hold after the Civil War as the prospect of migration moved 
beyond the reach of urban slumdwellers and others because of a lack of funds 
for farming and transportation. In fact, later settlers, mostly the children of 
farmers, arrived !Gam the fringes of existing settlements. Despite the criticism, 
the Frontier Thesis has had lasting appeal, in no small measure because it tells 
Americans how perfect they could become and offers an easily understandable 
if simplistic explanation for why that is the case. It is a small wonder that 
the Frontier Thesis would find service among those advocating an aggressive 
space exploration program!25 
President George W. Bush also supported space exploration as a human- 
destiny program in his 14 January 2004 announcement of a new vision for NASA. 
He stated that NASA would return to the Moon and eventually send astronauts 
to Mars. Doing so, as stated in the White House release on this subject, was 
human destiny: 
24. James C. Fletcher, “Our Space Program Is Already Back on Track,” USA Today (28 July 1987); R .  
Scott Lloyd,“NASA Head IsVeteranTeacher,” Salt Lake City (UT) Church News (25 May 1986). 
25. See John Mack Faragher, Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner:The Signijcance of the Frontier in American 
History, and Other Essays (NewYork Henry Holt, 1994);Allan G. Bogue, Frederick Jackson Turner: Strange 
Roads Going Down (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998); Ray M e n  Bdhngton, America? 
Frontier Heritage (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974). 
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America’s history is built on a desire to open new frontiers 
and to seek new discoveries. Exploration, like investments in 
other Federal science and technology activities, is an investment 
in our future. President Bush is committed to a long-term space 
exploration program benefiting not only scientific research, but 
also the lives ofall Americans. The exploration vision also has the 
potential to drive innovation, development, and advancement 
in the aerospace and other high-technology industries.26 
In explicitly raising the issue of the space frontier, the President followed a 
long succession of advocates who invoked the happy metaphor of America’s 
westward expansion to support his idea of human destiny. 
If human destiny is a positive attribute that generally finds resonance 
among spaceflight advocates and the general public, there is also a terrifying 
aspect to this rationale. The flip side of the human-destiny argument is that 
humanity will not survive if it does not become multiplanetary. Carl Sagan 
wrote eloquently about the last perfect day on Earth, before the Sun would 
fundamentally change and end our ability to survive on this planet.27 In their 
astrobiology book, The Liji and Death ofplanet Earth, Peter Ward and Donald 
Brownlee describe the natural life cycle of stars such as our Sun and the planets 
that circle them. They describe several possible scenarios for the end of life 
on Earth. Life on Earth will definitely end when the Sun, having used up too 
much of its hydrogen will become a red giant star and heat the Earth until 
every living thing, no matter how deep underground, is dead.28 
While this will happen billions of years in the future, any number of 
catastrophes could end life on Earth beforehand. A much earlier and quite 
likely way for life (or at least life as we know it) to end is the way life almost 
ended 65 million years ago when either an asteroid or a comet crashed into 
the Earth. The consequences of this collision caused the extinction of the 
dinosaurs and probably two-thirds of all life on Earth at that time. Enough 
life survived the harsh environmental aftermath and gave rise to mammals, a 
highly adaptable species that even survived the last Ice Age. 
In 1992, a noted scientist spoke to the American Astronautical Society on 
the subject “Chicken Little Was Right.” The scientist claimed that humans had 
a greater chance ofbeing killed by a comet or asteroid falling from the sky than 
dying in an airplane crash. This is true; mathematical calculations confirm 
26. White House Press Release, “President Bush Announces New Vision for Space Exploration 
27. Carl Sagan, Cosmos (NewYork: Random House, 1980), pp. 231-232. 
28. See Peter D.Ward and Donald Brownlee, The L$e and Death ofplanet Earth: How the New Science 
Program,” 14 January 2004, http://www. whitehouse.gov/infocus/space/# (accessed 30 December 2004). 
ofAstrobiology Charts the Ultimate Fate of Our World (NewYork Henry Holt and Co., 2002). 
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that every individual faces a I-in-5,000 chance of being killed by some type of 
extraterrestrial impact. Throughout history, asteroids and comets have struck 
Earth, and a great galactic asteroid probably killed the dinosaurs. An object 
probably only 6 to 9 miles wide left a crater 186 miles wide in Mexico’s Yucatan 
Peninsula. This reality entered most people’s consciousness in July 1994, when 
humans for the first time witnessed the devastating impact of a large Near- 
Earth Object (NEO) into one of the planets in the solar system when Comet 
Shoemaker-Levy 9 crashed into Jupiter with spectacular results.29 
With time, a comet or meteoroid will again hit Earth with disastrous 
consequences. Efforts to catalogue all Earth-crossing asteroids, track their 
trajectories, and develop countermeasures to destroy or deflect objects on a 
collision course with Earth are important, but to ensure the survival of the 
species, humanity must build outposts elsewhere. Astronaut John Young said 
it best, to paraphrase Pogo, “I have met an endangered species, and it is us.”30 
Geopolitics/National Pride and Prestige 
In addition, geopolitics and national prestige have dominated so many of 
the spaceflight decisions that it sometimes seems trite to suggest that it has been 
an impressive rationale over the years. Yet thkre is more to it than that, for while 
all recognize that prestige sparked and sustained the space race of the 1960s, 
they fail to recognize that it continues to motivate many politicians to support 
NASA’s programs. John F. Kennedy responded to the challenge of the Soviet 
Union by announcing the Apollo decision in 1961, and that rivalry sustained 
the effort. Kennedy put the world on notice that the U.S. would not take a back 
seat to its superpower rival. As John M. Logsdon commented, “By entering the 
race with such a visible and dramatic commitment, the United States effectively 
undercut Soviet space spectaculars without doing much except announcing its 
intention to join the ~ontest.”~’ Kennedy said in 1962 that “we mean to be a part 
of it [spaceflight]-we mean to lead it. For the eyes of the world now look into 
space, to the moon and to the planets beyond, and we have vowed that we shall 
29. K. Zahnle and M. M. Mac Low,“The Collision ofJupiter and Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9,” Icarus 108 
(1994): 1-17; Paul W. Chodas and Donald KYeomans, “The Orbital Mohon and Impact Circumstances 
of Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9,” in International Astronomical Union (MU) Colloquium 156: Proceedings of 
the Space Telescope Science Institute Workshop (held in Baltimore, MD, 9-12 May 1995), ed. Keith S. Noll, 
Harold A.Weaver, and Paul D. Feldman (NewYork Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1-30. On 
the mass extinchon of the dinosaurs, see Walter Alvarez, T Rex and the Crater of Doom (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1997). 
30. John W.Young, “The Big Picture: Ways to Mitigate or Prevent Very Bad Planet Earth Events,” 
Space Times: Magazine ofthe American Astronautical Society 42 (November/December 2003): 22-23. 
31. John M. Logsdon,“An Apollo Perspective,” Astronautics GAeronautics (December 1979): 112-1 17, 
quotation horn p. 115. See also John M. Logsdon, T h e  Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the 
National Interest (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology [MIT] Press, 1970). 
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not see it governed by a hostile flag of conquest, but by a banner of freedom and 
peace. We have vowed that we shall not see space filled with weapons of mass 
destruction, but with instruments of knowledge and under~tanding.”~~ Apollo 
was a contest of wills, of political systems, of superpowers. And the United 
States had to win it. Lyndon Johnson summed this up well with his assertion, 
“Failure to master space means being second best in every aspect, in the crucial 
area of our Cold War world. In the eyes of the world first in space means first, 
period; second in space is second in e~erything.”~~ 
Through the decade of the 1960s, prestige dominated much of the 
discussion of Apollo, even penetrating to the popular culture. Actor Carroll 
O’Connor perhaps said it best in an episode of All in the Family in 1971. 
Portraying the character ofArchie Bunker, the bigoted working-class American 
whose perspectives were more common in our society than many observers 
were comfortable with, O’Connor summarized well how most Americans 
responded to the culture of competence that Apollo engendered. He observed 
that he had “a genuine facsimile of the Apollo 14 insignia. That’s the thing 
that sets the US of A apart from . . . all them other 1ose1-s.”~~ In very specific 
terms, Archie Bunker encapsulated for everyone what set the United States 
apart from every other nation in the world: success in spaceflight. At a 
basic level, Apollo provided the impetus for the perception of NASA as a 
culture of competence, one of the great myths emerging from the lunar 
landing program. 
The United States went to Moon for prestige purposes, but it also built 
the Space Shuttle and embarked on the space station for prestige purposes as 
well. The turning point for Richard Nixon’s decision to proceed with the 
Space Shuttle for post-Apollo spaceflight came in August 1971 when Caspar 
Weinberger wrote an impassioned memorandum to the President that not to 
do so “would be confirming in some respects, a belief that I fear is gaining 
credence at home and abroad: That our best years are behind us, that we are 
turning inward, reducing our defense commitments, and voluntarily starting to 
give up our super-power status, and our desire to maintain world superiority.” 
Weinberger appealed directly to the prestige argument by concluding, “America 
should be able to afford something besides increased welfare, programs to 
repair our cities, or Appalachian relief and the like.” In a handwritten scrawl on 
32. President John E Kennedy, “Address at Rice Umversity on the Nation’s Space Effort,” 12 
September 1962, Houston, TX, John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Boston, MA, avadable o n h e  at 
http://www.rc rrmb.edu/ifklibrury/J091262.htm (accessed 27 October 2002). 
33. Lyndon B. Johnson, quoted in Walter A. McDougall, “Technocracy and Statecraft in the Space 
Age: Toward the History of a Saltation,” American Hutoricul Review 87 (October 1982): 1010-1040, 
quotation from p. 1025. 
34. “Carroll O’Connor Obituary,’’ on Morning Editton (National Pubhc Radio program), 22 June 
2001.This report by Andy Bowers IS avadable onhne at http://www.npr.org (accessed 2 July 2001). 
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Weinberger’s memo, Richard Nixon indicated, “I agree with Cap.”35 Prestige 
also entered into the decision in one other way. Nixon was also unwilling to 
go down in history as the President who gave away the nation’s leadership 
in the exploration of space and ended the practice of flying astronauts, and a 
decision against the Shuttle, in his mind, would have done both.36 
. . . ,  . 
An object lesson in the role of humans ip space exploration. Charles Conrad, Jr., 
Apollo 12 commander, examines the robotic Surveyor Ill spacecraft during the second 
extravehicular activity (EVA-2) in 1969. The Lunar Module (LM) Intrepdis in the right 
background. This picture was taken by astronaut Alan L. Bean, Lunar Module pilot. 
The lntrepidlanded on the Moon’s Ocean of Storms only 600 feet from Surveyor Ill. 
The television camera and several other components were taken from Surveyor Ill and 
brought back to Earth for scientific analysis. Surveyor Ill soft-landed on the Moon on 
19 April 1967. Interestingly, microbes from Earth on the Surveyor spacecraft survived 
in hibernation during a three-year stay on the lunar surface and revived upon return to 
Earth. This suggests the resilience of life in the harsh environment of space. (NASA 
JSC photo no. AS72-48-7136) 
35. CasparW.Weinberger to President kchard M. Nixon, ma George Shultz,“Future of NASA,” 12 
August 1971,White House, kchard M. Nuton, President, 1968-1971 File, NASA Historical Reference 
Collection, Washington, DC. 
36. John Erlichman interview,Washmgton, DC, by John M. Logsdon, 6 May 1983, NASA Historical 
Reference Collection, Washington, DC. See also George M. Low, NASA Deputy Admrustrator, to 
James C. Fletcher, NASA Admnistrator, “&ems of Interest,” 12 August 1971, and James C. FIetcher, 
NASA Adrmnistrator, to Jonathan Rose, Special Assistant to the President, 22 November 1971, both in 
Fletcher Correspondence, folder 4247, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC. 
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Prestige also played a key role in the decision to build a space station. At 
a 1 December 1983 meeting in the White House, NASA Administrator James 
M. Beggs asked President Ronald Reagan to approve his agency’s space station 
plans. Beggs stressed the space station’s potential contribution to the leadership 
of the United States on the world’s stage. He knew that Ronald Reagan had 
long been concerned with a perceived withering of American prestige vis-&vis 
the Soviet Union. The station, he argued, would help to quell that declension. 
But as the punch line for the briefing, Beggs hit Reagan between the eyes with 
a photo of a Salyut space station overflying the United States. He emphasized 
that the Soviet Union already had this modest space station and was planning 
a larger orbital facility. Should not the United States have one as well? Reagan 
agreed it 
Prestige will ensure that no matter how difficult the challenges and over- 
bearing the obstacles, the United States will continue to fly humans in space 
indefinitely. In the aftermath of the Columbia accident on 1 February 2003 that 
took the lives of seven astronauts, when it appeared that all reason for human 
spaceflight should be questioned, no one seriously considered ending the program. 
Instead, support for the effort came from all quarters. Even President George W. 
Bush, who had always been silent on spaceflight before, stepped forward on the day 
of the accident to say that “the cause in which they died will continue. Mankind 
is led into the darkness beyond our world by the inspiration of discovery and the 
longing to understand. Our journey into space will go 
Of course, there is a positive aspect to this prestige that is very present 
throughout the age of spaceflight. One might call this pride, which aims to 
make Americans feel good about what they are doing. There is a genuine 
excitement and interest in space science/technology that the human spaceflight 
program produces. This is not new, and it remains critical to understanding 
this rationale for spaceflight. One might ask, as John Krige recently did, “How 
many people would come to the National Air and Space Museum [NASM] 
if it was just the NAM, and why are the human in space objects the ones that 
attract the most a t t e n t i ~ n ? ” ~ ~  As Krige asserts, the prestige factor disguises a 
critical foreign policy component in all of these human spaceflight programs. 
National leaders supported Apollo, the Space Shuttle, and the space station 
efforts not on their merits, but on the image they projected. Their initial 
37.“RevlsedTallung Pomts for the Space Stahon Presentahon to the President and the Cabinet Councd,” 
30 November 1983, with attached “Presentahon on Space Stahon,” 1 December 1983, Reagan/NASA 
Correspondence, folder 12766, NASA Historical Reference Collechon,Washngton, DC. 
38. Statement by President George W. Bush, The Cabinet Room, 2:04 p m. eastern standard time 
(EST), 1 February 2003, in Bush, George W, folder 18262, NASA Historical Reference Collechon, 
Washington, DC. 
39. John Krige to author, e-mall message,“Space Rationales,” 2 February 2005. 
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and continued support rested on the value they offered not as instruments 
of science, military prowess, economics, or the like, but on their usefulness 
as icons mobilized to buttress America’s position in the world. Accordingly, 
despite some truly significant accomplishments, they have been in no small 
measure symbolic for the majority of those observing them. That is certainly 
not all bad, and one might say essentially the same thing about the United 
States’ nuclear arsenal during the Cold War. The missiles and strategic bombers 
served to deter the Soviet Union, offering a symbolic threat more than one 
in reality since the doomsday scenarios their use would unleash were too 
devastating to ~ontemplate .~~ Might this be a powerful enough motivation to 
continue human spaceflight indefinitely? 
The fundamental importance of human spaceflight as an instrument of 
U.S. foreign policy-which is not necessarily identical with national prestige 
and geopolitics but is closely allied-should not be mislaid in this discussion. 
It served, and continues to do so, as an instrument for projecting the image 
of a positive, open, dynamic American society abroad. What of the good will 
generated by the United States in opening spaceflight to foreign astronauts 
during the Shuttle era? What about the significance of binding allies more 
closely to the United States through numerous international efforts ranging 
from robotic missions to the International Space Station? The foreign policy 
dimension of international human spaceflight should not be underestimated. 
National Security and Military Applications 
Another rationale for spaceflight has involved national defense and military 
space activity. From the beginning, national leaders sought to use space to ensure 
U.S. security from nuclear holocaust. In October 1951, Wernher von Braun 
proposed in the pages of Popular Science the building of a space station because 
“the nation which first owns such a bomb-dropping space station might be in 
a position virtually to control the earth.”41 In 1952, a popular conception of 
the U.S.-occupied space station showed it as a platform from which to observe 
the Soviet Union and the rest of the globe in the interest of national security. 
As the editors of Collier’s magazine editorialized, “The U.S. must immediately 
embark on a long-range development program to secure for the West ‘space 
superiority.’ Ifwe do not, somebody else will . . . . A ruthless foe established on 
a space station could actually subjugate the peoples of the world.”42 
40.There has been an enormous amount of historical literature on ths  Subject. See especially Fred 
Kaplan, The Wizardr of Armugeddon (Stanford, C A  Stanford Unlversity Press, 1991); Herman Kahn, 
Thinking about the Unthinkable (NewYork:Touchstone Books, 1985); Paul S. Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early 
Light:American Thought and Culture at the Dawn ofthe AtomicAge (NewYork Pantheon Books, 1985). 
41. “Giant Doughnut is Proposed as Space Station,” Popular Science (October 1951): 120-121. 
42. “What Are We Waiting For?” Collier’s 129 (22 March 1952): 23. 
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Early in the 1950s, the U.S. military recognized that space represented the 
new high ground and that they had to control it. Numerous defense officials 
referred to space as the high seas of the future. The nation that could exploit the 
potential benefits of this ultimate strategic high ground for military purposes 
would dominate the rest of the world. The nation’s goals for space dominance 
have revolved since that time around four interrelated strategic issues: 
1) Space is a geographic location like air, land, and sea. Any national 
security capabilities for these other regions must be replicated in space. 
The Department of Defense, therefore, must control the use of space 
and defend its military and civil assets from foreign attack. 
2) A strong national security presence in space is vital, even during times 
of peace. Military strategists long have maintained that those nations 
most successful at controlling the seas are the same nations that tend 
most to succeed politically and economically. Space is becoming the 
seas of the future. 
3 )  Space must be dominated during wartime. That requires that the U.S. 
be prepared to protect U.S. access to space while denying its enemies’ 
access to space. It also means that the U.S. must be capable of exploiting 
the space regime, especially preferred orbits and missile lanes. 
4) National security requires that the United States enhance space resources 
for a variety of Earth-oriented missions: command, control, communi- 
cations, and intelligence (C31); early warning; weather forecasting; navi- 
gation; antisatellite; space-to-ground attack; and missile defense.43 
The US. military also argued for a human capability to fly in space 
for rapid deployment of troops to hot spots anywhere around the Earth, but 
they never managed to convince the political leadership of the nation and, 
despite periodic attempts, never gained a human military mission. The human 
spaceflight enterprise also gained energy from Cold War rivalries in the 1950s 
and 1960s as international prestige, translated into American support from 
nonaligned nations, found an important place in the space policy agenda. 
Human spaceflight also had a strong military nature during the 1980s, when 
astronauts from the military services deployed reconnaissance satellites into 
Earth orbit from the Space Shuttle. A human military presence in space promises 
to remain a prospect for national security well into the 21st century.44 
43. Bryan Johnson, “Pohhcal Economy-The Mihtary Use of Space,” 14 May 1999, http://www. 
44. See Roger D. Launius, Space Stations: Base Camps to the Stars (Waslungon, DC: Srmthsonian 
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As it stands, the military has employed space-based and space-transiting 
resources for more than 40 years. The major systems include the following: 
* Ballistic missiles. 
* Reconnaissance satellites, both imagery and signals intelligence. 
Navigational satellites, the Global Positioning System. 
Weather and communications satellites. 
0 Early-warning satellites. 
* Ballistic missile defense. 
Collectively, these resources have been enormously important in winning 
the Cold War and ensuring American preeminence at the dawn of the 21st 
century.45 No one questions the legitimate role of space resources in the 
security of the United States. Indeed, the national defense space budget of the 
United States exceeded NASA‘s space budget in 1982 and has far outdistanced 
its spending since that time. In fiscal year 2003, for example, the Department 
of Defense’s spending on space was $19.39 billion, while NASA’s space budget 
was $14.36 
Economic Competitiveness and Satellite Applications 
The fourth rationale of economic competitiveness and commercial 
applications has provided another reason for engaging in spaceflight. Satellite 
communications is still the only truly commercial space technology to be 
developed in the more than 45 years since the beginning of the Space Age in 
1957. It generates billions of dollars annually in sales of products and services. 
The first inkling of what this business might look like appeared in the fall of 
1945 when a then-obscure RAF electronics officer and member of the British 
Interplanetary Society, Arthur C. Clarke, wrote a short article in Wireless 
World that described the use of satellites in 24-hour “geosynchronous” orbits 
some 26,000 miles above the Earth to distribute television programs.47 
Perhaps the first person to evaluate both the technical and financial possi- 
bilities of satellite communications was John R. Pierce of AT&T’s Bell Labs. 
In the mid-l950s, he argued that a communications “mirror” in space would 
be worth as much as a billion dollars. His estimate was conservative. Following 
45. See Everett Carl Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopoliticr in the SpaceAge (Portland, O R  Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2001); M. Mowthorp,“U.S. W t a r y  Space Policy, 1945-1992,” Space Policy 18 (February 2002): 
25-36; Roger Handberg, ‘‘Review Article: Military Space Policy: Debating the Future,” Astropoliticr 2 
(spring 2004): 79-89. 
46. Aeronauticz and Space Report of the President, Fiscal Year 2003 Activities (Washington, DC: NASA 
NP-2004-17-389-HQ, 2004), p. 139. 
47. Arthur C. Clarke, “Extra-Terrestrial Relays: Can Rocket Statlons Give World-Wide Radio 
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Pierce’s leadership, in 1960 AT&T filed with the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) for permission to launch a communications satellite as an 
e~per iment .~~ This shocked the Kennedy administration, many of whose senior 
officials believed that AT&T was seeking to extend its telephone monopoly into 
the “new high ground” of space.They did not approve, and the U.S. government 
scrambled to implement a new regulatory environment, something that cheered 
AT&TS telecommunications rivals if not AT&T itself. Accor&ngly, NASA was 
directed to enter the fray in developing this new technology, and in 1961, it 
awarded contracts to RCA and Hughes Aircraft to build communication 
satellites, Relay and Syncom. Both, government officials believed, would help 
offset AT&T’s technological lead in the field. This policy succeeded. By 1964, 
two AT&T Telstars, two Relays, and two Syncoms had operated successfully 
in space and technological “know-how” had been transferred to companies 
other than AT&T. 
At the same time and largely for similar reasons, the Kennedy admini- 
stration sponsored the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. This law created 
the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), with ownership &vi- 
ded 50-50 between the general public and the various telecommunications cor- 
porations. Later, COMSAT became the American manager of an emerging global 
system known as the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium 
(INTELSAT) formed on 20 August 1964. On 6 April 1965, COMSAT’s 
first satellite, Early Bird, was launched from Cape Canaveral. Global satellite 
communications had begun.49 From a few hundred telephone circuits in 1965, 
the INTELSAT system rapidly grew to become a massive organization providmg 
millions of telephone circuits. And the costs persistently declined, making 
the backers of this technology appear geniuses. Whereas customers had paid 
as much as $10 per minute using older, cable-based technology, the new 
satellites reduced costs to less than $1 per minute.50 Even before this time, 
government officials realized they had a “winner” on their hands. In 1964, 
NASA Administrator James E. Webb asked his staff, “How did we get so 
much communication satellite technology for so little money?”51 His question 
was not satisfactorily answered by his NASA lieutenants, but space commerce 
48. This story is well told in David J. Whalen, The Origins of Satellite Communications, 1945-1965 
(Washmgton, DC: Smthsoman Inshtution Press, 2002). 
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has been dominated by satellite communications, and Webb and his successors 
have ballyhooed it ever since. The sale of all components associated with 
satellite communications-development, launch, operations-surpassed $100 
billion a year in the first part of the 21st century. 
There may be other commercially viable space-based industries that will 
prove lucrative, but they do not yet exist. Many believed that the Landsat Earth 
remote sensing efforts of the 1970s and since would turn into a commercial 
activity, but it failed to gain a market despite its significance as a scientific effort. 
More recently, remote sensing of various types and for a multitude of activities 
may be on the verge of takeoff, but this remains to be seen. Many observers 
point to the growth of space-based navigation as another economically viable 
activity, but they tend to omit the fact that the constellation of satellites-the 
Global Positioning System (GPS)-is provided gratis by the Department of 
Defense, and without this critical infrastructure, it is problematic that much 
commercial activity would be fo r thc~ming .~~  
In recent years, the economic rationale has become stronger and even 
more explicit as space applications become increasingly central for maintaining 
United States global economic competitiveness. Ronald Reagan’s presidential 
administration especially emphasized enlarging the role of the private sector, 
and its priorities have remained in place thereafter. For instance, in the 
context of space access, the American political right argued an ideology of 
progress aimed at private development of space-access technology. This led 
to changes in the government environment, especially regulations that eased 
authorizations for launch services, and in the encouragement of private rocket- 
development projects. Such success stories as the Pegasus air-launched booster 
for small payloads built by Orbital Sciences, Inc., emerged from this cauldron of 
entrepreneurship. Even such projects as the X-33/VentureStarTM, begun in 1995, 
used a public-private partnership model between NASA and Lockheed Martin, 
with each contributing to the development of a small suborbital vehicle that 
could demonstrate the technologies required for a n  operational SSTO launcher. 
The X-33 project had an ambitious timetable to fly by 2001, but instead, NASA 
canceled the program without flying any hardware.53 
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One of the key initiatives in this effort for human spaceflight is tourism, a 
major aspect that envisages hotels in Earth orbit and lunar vacation packages. In 
1995, Patrick Collins, Richard Stockmans, and M. Maita undertook a market 
study on the potential demand for space tourism for the National Aerospace 
Laboratory in Tokyo, Japan. In the first actual market research of its type, they 
suggested that space tourism services would be very popular both in North 
America and Japan, the two leading economies in the world. Overall, 60 
percent of the people surveyed “want to visit space for themselves” and were 
interested in traveling to space for a vacation. Accordingly, the authors found 
that a market of 1 million passengers per year paying $10,000 per person 
would generate revenues of $10 billion per year. Thus the market potential of 
space tourism is somewhat similar to that of the C ~ n c o r d e . ~ ~  Adding fuel to 
this belief, NASA engineer Barbara Stone opined at a 1996 conference that 
“studies and surveys world-wide suggest that space tourism has the potential 
to be the next major space business.”55 
Several futurists believe that by the year 2030, there will be space tourists 
taking their vacations, albeit exceptionally expensive ones, in low-Earth orbit. 
Market studies suggest that there are more than 1,000 people per year willing to 
spend $1 million each for a weekend in space. Even at multimillion-dollar prices, 
it could become a billion-dollar-per-year business, space economist Patrick 
Collins believes, and could grow significantly in the future. If the cost of a space 
vacation dropped to about $25,000 per person, the number of people making 
the flight would rise to about 700,000 each year, he predicts. This represents a 
revenue stream of $17.5 billion per year.56 
The industry is already beginning to see the first space tourists, as Dennis 
Tito pioneered the way by spending 3 week in April 2001 on the International 
Space Station (ISS). In so doing, advocates of space tourism believed that he 
has challenged and overturned the dominant paradigm of human spaceflight: 
national control of who flies in space overseen with a heavy hand by NASA 
and the Russian Space Agency. Dennis Tito’s saga began in June 2000 when 
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he signed a deal with MirCorp to fly aboard a Soyuz rocket to the Russian 
space station Mir. MirCorp acted as Tito’s broker with the Russian space firm 
Energia, which owned both Mir and the rocket that would get Tito into space. 
While MirCorp had grandiose plans for operating a space station supporting 
tourists and commercial activities, they failed to obtain the venture capital 
necessary to make it a reality. Despite these efforts, MirCorp failed to raise 
enough money to keep Mir in orbit, and the Russians announced in December 
2000 that they would deorbit the space station. 
This forced Tito to look elsewhere for a trip into space, and he negotiated 
a deal with the Russians fly aboard a Soyuz rocket to the International Space 
Station. While the cash-starved Russian Space Agency was happy to make 
this deal, no one bothered to discuss it with any of the international partners 
building ISS. A meltdown in public relations ensued, and NASA led the 
other partners in a rebellion that reached high into the political systems of the 
United States and Russia. NASA tried to persuade Tito to postpone his flight 
in February 2001, ostensibly to undergo two months of additional training 
before flying in October, but really to win time to convince the Russians not 
to allow Tito to fly to ISS. NASA and the other international partners building 
ISS argued that this slippage was paramount because of safety considerations 
on orbit. Ever a cagey gamester, Tito saw the trap and refused. He forced a 
confrontation with NASA at the gates of Johnson Space Center in March, 
where he planned to undergo training in preparation for an April 2001 flight. 
NASA lost that argument and was crucified by space enthusiasts for trying to 
block access to space for ordinary tourists. The Johnson Space Center acting 
Director at the time, Roy W. Estess, reflected a year later that he and his 
staff did not handle the Tito episode well and would have been better off to 
embrace the effort, as always ensuring the safety of the mi~sion.’~ 
With that one incident in Houston, Tito became a cause cClGbre among 
space activists and NASA haters, who viewed him as the vanguard of a new 
age of space for everyone. Space psychologist Albert A. Harrison summarized 
the beliefs of many when he opined that “tourism is one of the world’s largest 
industries and Russia’s sale of a twenty million-dollar space station ticket to 
Dennis Tito represents but the first attempt to pry open the door for civilians 
in space. (Is there an irony that the Russians are the entrepreneurs prying open 
the door for space tourism while the Americans try to preserve a government 
m o n o p ~ l y ? ) ” ~ ~  A Space.com Web site visitors poll taken in early May 2001- 
which did not represent a random sample by any means but suggested where 
57. Estess interview, 25 June 2002. 
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the space enthusiasts came down on the issue-showed that 75 percent of 
respocdents supported Tito’s flight, 24 percent believed he should not have 
flown, and 1 percent were ~ n d e c i d e d . ~ ~  
Tito would not allow anything or anyone to stand in his way, and many 
space activists cheered as he thumbed his nose at “big, bad NASA” to take his 
week-long vacation on the ISS at the end ofApril 2001. In making his way over 
the objections of NASA, Tito may have paved the way for other millionaires to 
follow. South African millionaire Mark Shuttleworth also flew aboard ISS in the 
fall of 2001, without the rancor of the Tito mission. Others may make similar 
excursions in the future, either paying their own way or obtaining corporate 
sponsorships. Space policy analyst Dwayne A. Day does not believe this is the 
best way to open the space frontier. He wrote, “Now that Tito has flown, it will 
not be the Earth-shattering precedent that space enthusiasts hoped for . . . . 
[Ils it any easier for the average citizen to raise $20 million in cash and buy a 
seat on a Soyuz than it is to get a Ph.D. in engineering and join the astronaut 
corps? No. Far from opening a frontier, Tito’s flight symbolizes just how out 
of reach space remains for the common 
The flight of Dennis Tito offers an ambivalent precedent for the opening of 
spaceflight to the average person. Space tourism seems only a little closer today, 
even with the ISS, than it did in earlier eras. If there is a way to bring down the 
cost of access to space, then this dynamic may change, but until then, it does 
not much matter how many space stations are in orbit. Without a convenient, 
safe, reliable, and less costly means to reach them, little will change.61 Once less 
expensive access to space is attained, an opening of the space frontier may take 
place in much the same way as the American continental frontier emerged in the 
19th century, through a linkage ofconrage and curiosity with capitalism. As it does 
so, the role of the government should become less dominant in space. NASA will 
continue research and development for space systems and carry out far-reaching 
space science activities. But widespread human spaceflight should become the 
province of the commercial sector in the first half of the 21st century. 
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In addition to the ISS efforts of Tito and Shuttleworth, to help make 
space tourism a reality, Peter Diamandis publicly announced the “X Prize” 
project at a gala dinner in St. Louis, Missouri, on 18 May 1996. Designed to 
encourage private space investment, the X Prize offered $10 million to the 
first team that could launch a privately funded space vehicle into a suborbital 
trajectory twice within a two-week period. It had to be capable of carrying 
a pilot and two passengers more than 100 kilometers above the Earth. At 
the kickoff, numerous commentators linked the X Prize to the prospects for 
space tourism. NASA Administrator Daniel S. Goldin attended this event 
and said, “I hope my grandson who is 2 years old will be able to go on a trip 
to a lunar hotel.” Of course, in October 2004, Burt Rutan’s entry into the 
X Prize competition, SpaceShipOne, successfully claimed the prize. He and his 
benefactor, Microsoft billionaire Paul Allen, received numerous accolades for 
this accomplishment, including Time magazine’s award for “coolest invention” 
of the year.62 
Does the success of SpaceShipOne signal an opening of a new commercial 
space market? Brian Berger, writing for Space.com, made this observation on 
29 December 2004: 
The dream of opening space to the general public was 
given a tremendous boost in 2004 with SpaceShipOne’s 
prize-winning suborbital jaunt and congressional legislation 
to help establish a space travel industry in the United States. 
But even the biggest champions of commercial spaceflight 
acknowledge that a vital space tourism market is still years 
from becoming reality.63 
It remains to be seen whether these efforts signal a new and exciting possibility 
of future space tourism. There are many questions yet to be answered, ranging 
from safety to economic viability to legal restrictions. While there have been 
some interesting developments in the last few years, much has yet to happen 
before space tourism finds realization; it remains a tantalizing possibility for 
the first half of the 21st century. 
Scientific Discovery and Understanding 
Finally, there exists the ideal of the pursuit of abstract scientific knowledge- 
learning more about the universe to expand the human mind-and pure science 
and exploration of the unknown will remain an important aspect of spaceflight 
62. Chris Taylor and Kristina Dell,“The Sky‘s the Limit,” Time (29 November 2004): 62. 
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well into the foreseeable hture. This goal clearly motivates the scientlfc probes 
sent to all of the planets of the solar system save Pluto. It propels a wide range 
of efforts to explore Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn projected for the early part of the 
21st century.64 It energizes such efforts as the James Webb Space Telescope, which 
promises to revolutionize our knowledge of the universe through, among other 
possibilities, the imaging of Earth-like planets around other stars. 
And from the beginning, science has been a critical goal in spaceflight. 
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 that created the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) stated that its mandate included 
“the expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere 
and space.” This idea has continually drawn verbal and fiscal support, but 
knowledge for its own sake has proven less important than the pursuit of 
knowledge that enables some practical social or economic payoff.65 
Even the Apollo missions to the Moon, certainly inaugurated as a Cold 
War effort to best the Soviet Union and establish the United States as the 
preeminent world power, succeeded in enhancing scientific understanding.‘j6 
The scientific experiments placed on the Moon and the lunar soil samples 
returned through Project Apollo have provided grist for scientists’ investigations 
of the solar system ever since. The scientific return was significant, even though 
the Apollo program did not answer conclusively the age-old questions of lunar 
origins and evolution. For example, the origin of the Moon is still a subject of 
considerable scientific debate, but because of the harvest from lunar exploration 
during the Apollo era, currently the most accepted theory is that the Moon 
was formed by debris from a massive collision with the young Earth about 4.6 
billion years ago. Prior to the study of the Apollo lunar rock and soil samples 
in the 1970s, however, confusion ruled among scientists about lunar origins as 
competing schools battled among themselves for dominance of their particular 
viewpoint in the textbooks. Indeed, determining the Moon’s origins became 
the single most significant scientific objective of Project Ap0ll0.~~ 
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Through a laborious polling of lunar scientists in the mid-l990s, the staff 
of the Curator for Planetary Materials Office at the Johnson Space Center, 
Houston, Texas, compiled a list of the top 10 scientific discoveries made as a result 
of the Apollo expeditions to the Moon. Collectively, they describe the current 
state of knowledge about this fascinating astronomical The quest for 
knowledge about the Moon continues. In the 1990s, more than 60 research 
laboratories throughout the world continued studies of the Apollo lunar samples. 
Many analytical technologies, including some that did not exist in 1969-1972, 
when the Apollo missions returned the lunar samples, were being applied by a new 
generation of ~cientists.~~ 
In the case of Apollo, and many others both before and since, a linkage 
between the spirit and need of scientific inquiry and the spirit and need for 
exploration served as strong synergetic forces for human spaceflight. This 
synergy arose explicitly in the National Research Council’s 2005 study, Science 
in NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration. It asserted: “Exploration is a key step in 
the search for fundamental and systematic understanding of the universe around 
us. Exploration done properly is a form of ~cience.”’~ As commentator David 
West Reynolds has noted, “Space probes like Voyager, Hubble, and Sojourner 
can accomplish space exploration as well as space science when they send back 
compelling images that can be appreciated by the public. Space science is at its 
best when it offers new vista along with its valuable data.”71 
The performance of scientific experiments on the Space Shuttle and the 
science program envisioned for the ISS demonstrate the same positive linkages 
at the beginning of the 21st century. Without question, the Space Shuttle has 
served as a significant test bed for scientific inquiry.While the program was not 
conceptualized as a science effort-rather it was a technology demonstrator 
and workhorse for space access-it has been used as a platform for all manner 
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In an instance of irony of the first order, astronaut Dale A. Gardner, having just 
completed the major portion of his second EVA in three days, holds up a “For Sale” 
sign during STS-51A in 1984. While he was probably referring to the two satellites, 
Palapa B-2 and Westar 6, that they retrieved from orbit, the sign speaks volumes 
about the lack of a compelling rationale for human spaceflight. On-orbit services 
provided a reason to send humans into space, but it was very much an approach that 
was not economically viable, as each Shuttle mission was estimated to cost a t  least 
$400 million, whereas a normal satellite and launch services cost less than half of 
that. (NASA JSC photo no. 5lA-104-0491 
of microgravity and space science enterprises. President Nixon, announcing 
the decision to build the Space Shuttle in 1972, minimized its scientific role. 
Instead, he argued that it was “the right step for America to take, in moving out 
from our present beach-head in the sky to acheve a real working presence in 
space-because the Space Shuttle will give us routine access to 
Even so, the Space Shuttle has been a useful instrument in the hands of 
scientists. Each of its more than 100 flights has undertaken some scientific 
experiments, ranging from the deployment of important space probes to other 
planets, through the periodic flight of the European-built “Spacelab” science 
72. As an example of the scientific activities undertaken on the Shuttle see Kenneth Souza, Guy 
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module, to a dramatic set of Earth observations over a 20-year period.73 One 
example of a momentous science experiment, among others that might be 
offered, is the flight of the ItalianTethered Satellite System, designed to investigate 
new sources of spacecraft power and ways to study Earth’s upper atmosphere, 
on STS-75 in 1996. It demonstrated that tethered systems might be used to 
generate thrust to compensate for atmospheric drag on orbiting platforms such 
as the International Space Station. Deploying a tether towards Earth could place 
movable science platforms in hard-to-study atmospheric zones. Tethers also 
could be used as antennas to transmit extremely low-frequency signals able 
to penetrate land and seawater, providing for communications not possible 
with standard radio. In addition, nonelectrical tethers may be used to generate 
artificial gravity and to boost payloads to higher orbits.74 
Of course, some astoundingly significant scientific discoveries have resulted 
h m  robotic missions. But, if the purpose of spaceflight is to create a perfect 
society elsewhere, this necessitates human migration as its core activity. There 
would be very little reason to limit spaceflight to robotic explorers in this 
context. Robots might be useful servants-even the modern equivalent of slaves 
making our lives luxurious-but scientific understanding that might be gained 
by satellites remote from Earth would be decidedly less important than human 
spaceflight since the goal is migration. Second, while we seek to migrate into 
space as a method of ensuring human survival, such a goal is essentially a utopian 
dream based on expedition myths, and the popular culture treatment of robotics 
wholly failed to anticipate the degree to which we could send surrogates to 
do our work. This situation led to specific policy decisions and programs that 
focused on human spaceflight as the core function of the endeavor. 
Many scientists believe that robotic spaceflight is the sine qua non of the 
Space Age, to the exclusion of a human presence.This is a dichotomy that began 
with the launch of the first missions into space and has been a perennial debate 
ever since. If anything, it has grown even more heated as robotic spacecraft have 
advanced in capability over time. Homer E. Newell, who directed NASA? space 
science program between 1958 and 1973, commented on this problem during 
the Apollo program: 
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The most spectacular aspects of space exploration in that last 30 years have been 
accomplished by robotic probes to other planets of the solar system. Here in the 
Spacecraft Assembly and Encapsulation Facility-2 (SAEF-2). Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
workers are closing up the metal "petals" of the Mars Pathfinder lander in 1996. The 
small Sojourner rover is visible on one of the three petals. On 4 July 1997, Pathfinder 
soft-landed on the Martian surface and provided spectacular imagery and important 
scientific data about the red planet's past. Among other findings, scientists learned 
that Mars had once been a watery planet. (NASA JPL photo no. 96PC-11301 
For space science one of the most difficult problems 
of leadership, both inside and outside NASA, concerned the 
manned spaceflight program. Underlying the prevailing dis- 
content in the scientific community regarding this program 
was a rather general conviction that virtually everything that 
men could do in the investigation ofspace, including the moon 
and planets, automated spacecraft could also do and at much 
lower cost. This conviction was reinforced by the Apollo 
program's being primarily engineering in character. Indeed, 
until after the success ofApollo 11, science was the least ofApollo 
engineers' concerns. Further, the manned project appeared to 
devour huge sums, only small fractions of which could have 
greatly enhanced the unmanned space science pr0gram.7~ 
The scientists viewed the debate over human versus robotic space missions in 
part as a zero-sum game. The expansive costs of human spaceflight might be 
75. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere, p. 290. 
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more effectively utilized for scientific purposes by sending only robots. They 
perceived ineficiency, redundancy, and enormous costs to keep astronauts alive 
as waste, and with only a small percentage of that funding, they believed they 
could accomplish so much. 
The internecine warfare between advocates of human exploration and 
colonization of regions beyond Earth and the supporters of spaceflight for 
scientific purposes grew more heated as time passed. Space science leaders such 
as Homer Newell, Lloyd Berkner, and John E. Naugle established the science 
element ofspaceflight during the 1960s and achieved stunning success in gaining 
a significant percentage of the NASA budget each year for those activities, 
usually about 25 to 30 percent. Using that funding, throughout the 1960s they 
created meaningful missions yielding useful scientific data and, in the process, 
established a community of scientists dedicated both to NASA and to robotic 
missions.”j For example, by 1967, NASA had 942 scientists from 297 institutions 
involved as investigators in its various science projects. In 1996 alone, it flew 
121 experiments on spacecraft and 99 sounding rockets. As Homer Newell 
reported, “In 1966 we evaluated 366 proposals for flight experiments, 248 of 
which were selected for flight. An additional 1,329 unsolicited proposals for 
SR&T work were At some level, as these statistics suggest, NASA 
co-opted some of the opposition to human spaceflight by, in effect, placing 
scientists on its payroll. Indeed, some NASA officials have expressed anger 
at University of Iowa astrophysicist James A. Van Allen’s persistent criticism 
of human spaceflight as ungratefulness for all of the space agency’s support 
over the years. One told a group of NASA public affairs officers in 1996 that 
“NASA made Van Allen, and now all he does is condemn us.’’78 
Space science missions remain one of the most visible and popular aspects 
of the spaceflight agenda. While some of the work requires a human presence, 
usually to undertake scientific experiments aimed at understanding the bio- 
medical aspects of long-duration spaceflight, most of it is done exceptionally 
well by robotic explorers. The stunning success of a succession of missions to 
Mars, as well as to other places, demonstrates this beyond all doubt. No one 
questions the value of scientific space missions, but many question the necessity 
of placing humans aboard spacecraft undertaking those scientific efforts. 
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HISTORY AND THE SEARCH FOR RELEVANCE 
Of the five rationales that may be advanced in support of spaceflight, 
the human dimension is the only part that is seriously questioned. Military, 
economic, and scientific efforts in space, many observers have concluded, do 
not require human missions beyond the Earth. Even though the possibility of a 
human presence might be desirable in the future-such as in the case of space 
tourism, certain types of scientific inquiry, and a possible human military 
presence-thus far, reasons for humans in space to support these activities 
have remained elusive. Only the human destiny/survival of the species and 
the national prestige and geopolitics agendas require humans to fly in space. 
Not all are persuaded by these rationales to expend the considerable resources 
necessary to continue them. This especially occurred in the aftermath of the 
Columbia accident of 1 February 2003, with the grounding of the Shuttle fleet 
while an investigation of the cause of the accident took place and the fleet 
could be retrofitted to overcome the cause of the accident. Initially, NASA 
leaders promised to return to flight in the fall of 2003. Most observers believed 
that was unrealistic and possibly motivated by a “can-do” agency’s optimism 
and bravado. Then it slipped into 2004 and finally to the middle 2005 as the 
Agency’s engineers found more and more that needed to be fixed in the aging 
fleet of orbiters. At the same time, the price tag associated with the Shuttle’s 
return to flight ~limbed.7~ 
The accident called into question long-term assured human access to 
space. After more than four decades of human spaceflight, this problem is 
now thornier than ever because of the Shuttle’s grounding and compounded 
every day that the fleet remains inactive. Is the United States as a nation 
willing to endure a period of several years when humans do not fly in space 
like we did between the time of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in 1975 
and the first Shuttle mission in 1981? Are American citizens willing to end 
human spaceflight altogether? The answer to both of these questions for most 
Americans is probably ‘‘no,” but while the support for human spaceflight is 
broad, it does not seem to be very deep. 
Many Americans hold seemingly contradictory attitudes on human space 
exploration. Most are in favor of the human exploration and development 
of space and view it as important but also believe that federal money could 
be well spent on other programs. This relates closely to empirical research 
on other aspects of public policy. The American public is notorious for its 
willingness to support programs in principle but to oppose their funding 
79. Richard 0. Covey et al.,“Interim Report: Return to Flight Task Group,”20 January 2004, NASA 
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at levels appropriate to sustain them. Most are also in favor of NASA as an 
organization but are relatively unfamiliar with the majority of its activities 
and objectives and sometimes question individual projects. It is a little like 
how the overlanders traveling to Oregon in the 19th century described the 
Platte River on the Great Plains: “a mile wide and an inch deep.” Americans 
appreciate and support-in principle-human spaceflight and recognize the 
astronauts as heroes but believe it is overly expensive. So what do we do for 
the future? It seems uncertain at present.” 
Are these sufficient rationales to sustain human spaceflight indefinitely? 
Only time will tell. The first three rationales have not up to now required a 
human presence to be effective, but the last two have been used repeatedly 
to justify an aggressive human spaceflight agenda. The last two rationales- 
the human destiny/survival of the species and national prestige/geopolitics 
arguments-have been salient from the beginning of the Space Age. As John 
M. Logsdon, the dean of space policy, recently wrote: 
Most public justifications for accepting the costs and risks 
of putting humans in orbit and then sending them away from 
Earth have stressed motivations such as delivering scientific 
payoffs, generating economic benefits, developing new tech- 
nology, motivating students to study science and engineering, 
and trumpeting the frontier character of the U.S. society. 
No doubt space exploration does provide these benefits, but 
even combined, they have added up to a less-than-decisive 
argument for a sustained commitment to the exploratory 
enterprise. The United States has committed to keeping 
humans in space, but since 1972 they have been circling the 
planet in low-Earth orbit, not exploring the solar system. The 
principal rationales that have supported the U.S. human 
spaceflight effort to date have seldom been publicly articulated. 
And those rationales were developed in the context of the 
U.S.-Soviet Cold War and may no longer be relevant.’l 
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Indeed, over time, the traditional arguments have become less powerful as drivers 
of support for the space program. Since the age of Apollo in the early 1970s, 
most Americans have taken human spaceflight as a reality that is unchanging 
but treated the NASA efforts to fiy the Space Shuttle and build a space station 
as necessary rather than desirable. No national commitment to a multibillion- 
dollar investment for this effort ever took place. Instead, the effort proceeded on 
inertia not unlike that seen in many other public policy sectors where there is 
no perceived crisis. 
SECTION I1 
HUMAN AND ROBOTIC EXPLORATION 

INTRODUCTION 
o one realized it initially, but the intricate linking of humans and N machines in spaceflight has been one of the most significant aspects 
of the endeavor. While humans have always been viewed as preeminent in 
spaceflight, the technology they employed-either in piloted spacecraft or in 
semiautonomous robots-proved critical to space exploration. This section 
explores the relationship between humans and machines in the evolution 
of spaceflight. The three essays consider strikingly different approaches to 
analyzing the human-machine interface in space exploration. 
The chapter by Howard E. McCurdy, a senior space policy historian, 
addresses the classic debate over the primacy ofhumanversus robotic spaceflight. 
He finds that the development of spaceflight technology always outstripped 
the slow evolution of human spaceflight, despite the overwhelming excitement 
associated with the human element. Virtually no one in history succeeded in 
making meaningful predictions about this discrepancy. For example, when 
Arthur C. Clarke envisioned geosynchronous telecommunications satellites 
in 1945, he believed that they would require humans working on board to 
keep the satellite operational. In such a situation, it is easy to conceive of the 
motivation that led people like Clarke and Wernher von Braun to imagine the 
necessity to station large human crews in space. Some of the most forward- 
thinking spaceflight advocates, in this instance, utterly failed to anticipate 
the electronics/digital revolution then just beginning. Humans, spaceflight 
visionaries always argued, were a critical element in the exploration of the 
solar system and, ultimately, beyond.’ 
With the rapid advance of electronics in the 1960s, however, some began 
to question the role of humans in space exploration. It is much less expensive 
and risky to send robot explorers than to go ourselves. This debate reached 
saliency early on and became an important part of the space policy debate by 
the latter 20th century. This has led many scientists and not a few others to 
question its merits. In the summer of 2004, esteemed space scientist James 
A. Van Allen asked the poignant question, “Is human spaceflight obsolete?” 
He commented: 
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My position is that it is high time for a calm debate on 
more fundamental questions. Does human spaceflight continue 
to serve a compelling cultural purpose and/or our national 
interest? Or does human spaceflight simply have a life of its 
own, without a realistic objective that is remotely commen- 
surate with its costs? Or, indeed, is human spaceflight now 
obsolete? . . . Risk is high, cost is enormous, science is insig- 
nificant. Does anyone have a good rationale for sending 
humans into space?’ 
The response offered is one that emphasizes human colonization on other 
planets, moons, and asteroids. As one observer who went by the pseudonym 
Hans L. D. G. Starlife noted on an Internet discussion list where Van Allen’s 
arguments arose: 
Sure, if it’s all about science, you can always raise these 
questions. But it’s not, and it never has been-whatever the 
scientists themselves try to make us believe. The human 
expansion into space is about totally different things-although 
like many times before, it isn’t fully apparent until we can see 
it in the light of history . . . . 
In a very long-range perspective, it’s easy to see that these 
ventures, simply make up the path of evolution for Human 
civilization, not much different from how biological evolution 
works. Indeed, Human spaceflight is precisely what Van Allen 
argues it’s not: it does and should have a life of its own. Now is 
the time to once and for all to SEPARATE the case for Human 
spaceflight with the case for science. These are two different 
agendas-both worthwhile-and sometimes crossing their 
paths, but having their own sets of motives and  rationale^!^ 
Indeed, for people of this persuasion, spaceflight is all about making human 
civilization anew, making ic in the mold of the best ideas of those who are 
founding settlements beyond Earth. It is, and in reality always has been, about 
creating a technological utopia. 
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McCurdy finds that while this debate over primacy in space missions 
has intensified with time, it does not really consider the core issues at play in 
space policy. As he notes, the human-robotic debate leaves unaddressed the 
manner in which humans and machines might become even more tightly 
linked in future spaceflight activities. McCurdy comments that “the classical 
visions of human and robotic spaceflight as presented in the popular culture 
contain instabilities likely to lessen the future influence of these visions. The 
emerging alternatives are quite exotic and beyond the mainstream of current 
thinking, yet interesting to contemplate. They may or may not occur. Their 
consideration, nonetheless, helps to enlarge the contemplation of the directions 
that future space exploration might take.” 
In essence, McCurdy suggests that the old paradigm for human exploration- 
ultimately becoming an interstellar species-is outmoded and ready for 
replacement. He specifically looks to the future of humans and robots in space 
and suggests that a posthuman cyborg species may realize a dramatic future 
in an extraterrestrial environment. This form of speculative futurism in a 
postbiological universe in which humans may become more robotlike may 
seem inappropriate for some historians. A question that might be considered is 
whether or not McCurdy has abandoned traditional modes of argumentation 
and analysis in favor ofpolitical commentary. A related question might focus on 
whether there even is a traditional mode of argumentation. Regardless of the 
answers to these questions (and those answers are highly idiosyncratic), there is 
no question but that McCurdy’s essay is highly stimulating and provocative. 
Alternatively, Slava Gerovitch’s essay on “Human-Machine Issues in 
the Soviet Space Program” takes a much more traditional historical approach 
of narrating the evolution of relationships in the Soviet space program 
between humans and machines. He finds that from the early days of human 
spaceflight in the Soviet Union, a debate raged between the pilots/cosmo- 
nauts and the aerospace engineers over the degree of control held by each 
group in human-rated spacecraft. The engineers placed much greater empha- 
sis on automatic control systems and sought to reduce drastically the role 
of astronauts on board a spacecraft. These space engineers often viewed 
the astronaut as a “weak link” in the spacecraft control system. Of course, 
the question of whether machines could perform control functions better 
than people became the subject of a considerable internal controversy. The 
cybernetics movement attempted to undermine the existing hierarchies of 
knowledge and power by introducing computer-based models and decision- 
making mechanisms into a wide range of scientific disciplines. By focusing 
on the debate over the nature and extent of on-board automation in Soviet 
spacecraft, Gerovitch illuminates a fascinating world of divergent professional 
groups within the Soviet space community and how they negotiated their 
place and their priorities in the system. 
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Finally, “Human and Machine in the History of Spaceflight,” by David A. 
Mindell, argues for a new research agenda in the history of human spaceflight 
that moves beyond the virtual catechism of retelling of a specific myth and in 
that retelling performing a specific purpose. Much of this work has been not 
so much history as it has been “tribal rituals, meant to comfort the old and 
indoctrinate the young.’” He notes that “a series of questions about human/ 
machine interaction in the history of spaceflight can open up new research 
avenues into what some might think is a well-worn historical topic . . . . The 
humadmachine relationship, as a meeting point for the social and technical 
aspects of a system, provides access to a variety of other aspects of space history 
that are otherwise difficult to integrate.” 
Collectively, these three essays provide a window into a unique area for 
consideration in the history of spaceflight. All are intellectually, artistically, 
and historically sound. All make important contributions to the history of 
human spaceflight and its relationship to robotics and space technology. All 
offer stimulating conclusions to be pondered, accepted, rejected, or revised as 
appropriate. 
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CHAPTER 3 
OBSERVATIONS ON 
THE ROBOTIC VERSUS HUMAN ISSUE 
IN SPACEFLIGHT 
Howard E. McCurdy 
ince the beginning of the Space Age, people have debated the merits of S human versus robotic flight. Some have argued for automated activities or 
what many-without apparent reference to the presence of women in space- 
term “unmanned” flight. Astrophysicist James A. Van Allen, designer of the 
experiment package for the first U.S. orbital satellite, insists that the whole 
history of spaceflight provides “overwhelming evidence that space science is 
best served by unmanned, automated, commandable spacecraft.”’ Historian 
Alex Roland maintains that “for virtually any specific mission that can be 
identified in space, an unmanned spacecraft can be built to conduct it more 
cheaply and reliably.”* 
To supporters of human spaceflight, such arguments are misplaced. 
The relative effectiveness of humans and robots seems irrelevant to people 
whose primary objective remains the movement of humankind into space. 
When asked to justify his upcoming lunar voyage, astronaut Neil Armstrong 
explained that “the objective of this flight is precisely to take man to the moon, 
make a landing there, and r e t ~ r n . ” ~  From that point of view, human spaceflight 
provides its own justification. Robots serve as precursors to human flight, not 
as substitutes for it. Even if robots were more effective, advocates of human 
flight would not rely entirely upon them. The whole purpose of spaceflight is 
to prepare humankind to migrate off of the Earth and into the cosmos. 
This essay presents a series of observations regarding the relative merits of 
the longstanding historical debate over human and robotic flight; it is speculative 
in nature and suggestive of future scholarship. It is also provocative and ten- 
tative. And it is an important debate. In many ways, the human and robotic 
1. JamesVan Allen,“Space Station and Manned Flights Raise NASA Program Balance Issues,”Aviah‘on 
2.Alex Roland,“NASA’s Manned Space Nonsense,” NewYork Times (4 October 1987): sec. 4, p. 23. 
3. Apollo 11 crew premission press conference, 5 July 1969, 2:OO p.m., Apollo 11 mission file, 
Week G Space Technology (25 January 1988): 153. 
NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC. 
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perspectives present the two principal visions that motivate space exploration. 
The first anticipates the widespread migration of humans off the Earth’s surface, 
while the latter emphasizes the advantages of scientific discovery. 
In its speculative sections, the essay anticipates the manner in which the 
human versus robotic issue might change as space exploration matures. If 
cosmic exploration continues over the timespans anticipated by its advocates, 
changes in the dominant visions are probably inevitable. For many years, 
the robotic vision has stood as the sole alternative to the dominant vision of 
human spaceflight articulated by early advocates such as Wernher von Braun. 
This essay suggests that the classical visions of human and robotic spaceflight 
as presented in the popular culture contain instabilities likely to lessen their 
future influence. Two emerging alternatives are quite exotic and beyond the 
mainstream of current thinking, yet interesting to contemplate. They may 
or may not occur. Their consideration, nonetheless, helps to enlarge the 
contemplation of the directions that future space exploration might take. 
CLASSICAL APPROACHES TO SPACE EXPLORATION 
One of the most influential visions of spaceflight, prepared before humans 
entered space, appeared in the 22 March 1952 issue of Collier’s magazine. 
Accompanying an article by Wernher von Braun, a two-page panorama 
prepared by Chesley Bonestell artistically illustrates human activity in low- 
Earth orbit. From a point of view well above the Isthmus of Panama, the 
viewer receives an enticing vision of small space tugs transporting astronauts 
between a winged space shuttle and a large, rotating space   tat ion.^ 
Visions of space exploration, often initiated in science fiction and 
articulated in popular outlets, shape public policy. They generate public 
interest, help place exploration on the governmental agenda, and prepare the 
citizenry for concrete proposals. Especially in the United States, the popular 
culture of space exploration has played a significant role in determining the 
types of activities public officials have sought to acc~mplish.~ Not by accident 
did the members of the 1986 National Commission on Space choose to begin 
their report with a reproduction of the famous Bonestell diorama, juxtaposed 
with a Robert McCall painting of the actual facilities6 
Less well recalled is an object in the painting that Bonestell placed 
between the winged shuttle and the 250-foot-wide space station. The cylin- 
4.Wernher von Braun, “Crossing the Last Fronher,” Collier’s (22 March 1952): 24-25. 
5. See Howard E. McCurdy, Space and the American Imagination (Washington: Smithsonian 
6. National Commission on Space (Thomas 0. Paine, chair), Pioneering the Space Frontier (New 
Institution Press, 1997). 
York: Bantam Books, 1986). 
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drical object, surrounded by three astronauts, is an orbiting space telescope. 
Von Braun explained that the telescope would operate in a robotic fashion, 
without humans on board, since “the movements of an operator would disturb 
the alignment.”7 The panorama contains both human and robotic elements, 
yet the presence of a facility that anticipated the Hubble Space Telescope is not 
well remembered. 
As is typical of images transmitted through popular culture, people 
selectively emphasize elements of the motivating material. The elements that 
emerge typically resonate with traditions and ideas popular at that time, being 
so familiar as to require little explanation. The early use of frontier analogies 
to explain space exploration is a preeminent example of this tendency. The 
editors at Collier’s titled the accompanying article “Crossing the Last Frontier.” 
Building transportation systems to transport people to the equivalent of 
frontier stations resonated well with the pioneering experience from which 
Americans had only recently emerged. 
The inclusion of an orbiting telescope helped von Braun justify the 
presence of humans in this new frontier. What are astronauts doing to the 
remotely controlled observatory, and why is it orbiting near the space station? 
Given the existing state of technology for collecting images from space, von 
Braun explained, humans would be needed to retrieve and change the film. 
As is typical of motivating visions, the expectations made powerful by 
reference to analogies from the past can be made weak by their encounter with 
the future. It is a familiar pattern. A vision of the future emerges and becomes 
part of the popular culture when it resonates so well with the experience of 
people contemplating a common past. To the extent that the vision is rooted 
in old and inapplicable analogies, or fails to account for developments yet to 
fully emerge, it acquires instabilities likely to plague its accomplishment. 
The people who popularized the dominant vision of human spaceflight 
failed to anticipate technical developments that would make the conduct 
of robotic activities much easier than anticipated. Von Braun believed that 
astronauts would be needed to change the film in space telescopes. Arthur C. 
Clarke thought that astronauts would be needed to operate communication 
satellites. Producers ofthe classic 1950 film Rocket&@ X-Mreinforced a popular 
misconception when they announced that radio waves from control stations 
on Earth would not be able to reach a spacecraft bound for Mars, thereby 
requiring a thinking presence on all missions into the celestial realm.’ 
7. Von Braun,“Crossing the Last Frontier,” p. 72. 
8. Arthur C. Clarke, “Extra-Terrestrial Relays: Can Rocket Stations Give World-wide Radio 
Coverage?” Wireless World (October 1945): 305-308; Kurt Neumann, Rocketship X-M (Kippert, 
1950). 
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Generated at the midpoint of the 20th century, the dominant visions 
helping to define the impending Space Age failed to anticipate the manner 
in which electronic technology would expand robotic capabilities. The 
anticipated difficulties of operating remotely controlled telescopes and satellites 
provided a major justification for the presence of human crews. Real advances 
in remote sensing, solid-state transistors, and deep space communications 
allowed robotic flight to advance well beyond initial expectations and more 
rapidly than human flight. 
What appears to be a failure ofanticipation may in large measure arise from 
a failure of vision, a subtle but important distinction. A failure of anticipation 
implies an inability to foresee (one could say imagine) future events. Vision, 
as the term is commonly employed, represents a process in which imagination 
is joined with forces that motivate people to accept the dream? 
It is my contention that both the human and robotic space visions con- 
tain elements that make them attractive when viewed as continuations of 
past traditions. The visions do not fare as well when contemplated from the 
perspective of emerging trends. In essence, the dominant human and robotic 
visions account for the past more effectively than they address the future. This 
explanation requires an historical survey of the human and robotic visions, 
especially as they appear in popular culture, and some speculation about future 
developments. 
HISTORY AND THE HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT VISION 
The vision of human spaceflight is a familiar one. It begins with brave 
souls venturing in small ships through difficult substance to distant lands. 
Voyages of discovery produce scientific insights, including the identification of 
new species. Scientific gain, however, did not provide the ultimate motivation 
for new voyages. Settlers and entrepreneurs followed the early expeditions, 
extending technological civilization into new realms and distant lands. 
Familiar analogies for the spacefaring vision are easy to find. Rocket 
ships are the equivalent of sailing vessels that cross terrestrial seas and flying 
machines that plow through the air. Space stations and extraterrestrial bases 
serve as the 2lst-century equivalent of forts on the outer edges of settlement, 
providing sanctuaries from hostile forces as well as departure points for places 
beyond. The expectation of extraterrestrial life grows out of the manner in 
which the leaders of terrestrial expeditions returned with samples of strange 
life-forms from the lands they explored. Extraterrestrial colonies are portrayed 
as pioneer settlements, with their promise of fresh starts and the abandonment 
of old ways. 
9. See John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996). 
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The power of the human spaceflight visions rests on a set of mutually 
compatible images, drawn from the recent (and frequently romanticized) 
memory of terrestrial events. Space offers a realm in which humans can continue 
the centuries-old tradition of terrestrial exploration. It allows nations to 
demonstrate their technological prowess and provides new lands for settlement 
and exploitation. It satisfies the apparent human need for human migration. It 
promotes the utopian belief that life will be better in newly created settlements 
beyond the reach of the “old world.” These are familiar images, not hard to 
An iconic image seen everywhere, this photograph shows Gemini astronaut Edward 
H. White II on 3 June 1965, when he became the first American to step outside his 
spacecraft for a “spacewalk.” For 23 minutes, White floated and maneuvered himself 
around the Gemini spacecraft while logging 6,500 miles during his orbital stroll. The 
astronaut as central figure in space exploration has dominated imagery since before 
the beginning of the Space Age, but is it an accurate depiction of the future? (NASA 
JSC photo no. S65-30433) 
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explain to an often inattentive public. It is not hard for the average person to 
understand what is meant by space as “this new ocean” or new initiatives as 
“pioneering the space frontier.”1° 
The human spaceflight vision arose during the first half of the 20th 
century, at a time when the opportunities for terrestrial exploration of the 
traditional sort seemed to be winding down. The rise ofthe human spacefaring 
vision with the nearly simultaneous decline of the heroic age of terrestrial 
exploration was not coincidental. The spacefaring vision offered an opportunity 
to continue the virtues thought to accompany terrestrial exploration and 
settlement in a new realm. Few developments had more influence on the 
popular acceptance of space exploration in the mid-20th century than the 
recent memory of terrestrial expeditions crossing Earthly lands and seas. 
Intensive promotion of space exploration began just as the heroic era of 
terrestrial exploration came to a close. The latter is generally marked by the 
1929 expedition of Richard E. Byrd to Antarctica, the first such incursion to 
substitute fully modern technology for dependence upon human skills. Byrd’s 
expedition followed a series of polar expeditions that depended heavily upon 
the personal qualities of their human leaders. Among these were the efforts of 
separate parties led by Roald Amundsen and Robert Scott to reach the South 
Pole during the Antarctic summer of 1911-12 and the survival of the Trans- 
Antarctic Expedition of 1914 led by Ernest Shackleton. Both Amundsen and 
Scott reached the South Pole, but Scott and his four companions perished on 
the return voyage. Trapped in the polar ice, Shackleton led the crew of the 
Endurance on a 17-month odyssey that remains one of history’s greatest stories 
of human triumph over extreme adversity. The polar expeditions followed a 
century marked by similarly heroic expeditions such as those led by Meriwether 
Lewis and William Clark and John Wesley Powell in the American West, 
Henry Morton Stanley in Africa, and the astonishingly influential voyage of 
Charles Darwin as the ship’s naturalist on the HMS Beagle. 
Expeditions in the heroic mold followed a well-established formula. 
Expedition leaders operated autonomously, without the technology necessary 
to maintain regular contact with their sponsors or home base. Typically, the 
public did not learn of their expeditions’ achievements until the leaders 
emerged from isolation and reported their findings through lectures and 
10. Loyd S. Swenson, James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A 
History of Project Mercury (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4201, 1966), about connecting two distant 
points within the universe; National Commission on Space, Pioneering the Space Frontier. The term 
“this new ocean” is derived from “this new sea,” a phrase employed by John F. Kennedy’s “Address 
at Rice University in Houston on the Nation’s Space Effort,” 12 September 1962, in U.S. President 
(1961-1963 Kennedy), Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: john  F. Kennedy, 1962 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 373. 
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publications. In nearly all cases, the public did not know whether the members 
of the expedition under way were dead or alive. Cut off from their sponsors 
and home port, members of terrestrial expeditions were obliged to rely on 
their own skills to repair equipment and gain sustenance from local resources. 
Given the conditions they faced, expedition leaders depended upon human 
ingenuity rather than machine technology to survive and complete their 
discoveries. Terrestrial expeditions in the heroic tradition served as an 
expression of the power of humans to overcome natural obstacles without 
resorting to the conveniences of the industrializing world. 
Such traditions provided the inspiration for the vision of human space- 
flight that gained popular acceptance during the middle years of the 20th 
century. Between 1950 and 1954, Wernher von Braun prepared a series of 
plans for the exploration of the Moon and Mars that recounted the heroic 
expeditions of preceding centuries. His proposal for a Mars mission was 
especially impressive. It called for a flotilla of 10 ships, guided by a 70-person 
crew, departing on a 30-month voyage. To prepare their landing site, pilots 
would descend in one of the ships to the polar ice cap of Mars-the only 
surface thought to be sufficiently smooth to permit a skid-assisted landing. 
From there, the crew would commence a 4,000-mile trek in pressurized trac- 
tors over unfamiliar terrain to the Martian equator, where they would bulldoze 
a landing strip for additional craft. Commenting on the attractive power of such 
schemes, von Braun remarked, “I knew how Columbus had felt.”*’ 
Von Braun’s vision dominated popular presentations of the spacefaring 
vision during the mid-20th century. The image of winged spaceships, orbiting 
space stations, lunar expeditions, and voyages to Mars reappeared in the earliest 
long-range plans of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The 
vision remained the dominant paradigm for human spaceflight from the 1961 
decision to go to the Moon through the 2004 presidential call for a return 
to the lunar surface and expeditions to Mars.I2 Yet this vision was already 
outdated in terrestrial terms when it first appeared. 
Beginning with the Byrd expedition to Antarctica in 1929, expedition 
leaders came to rely much more on machines than on human heroics to 
11. Quoted in Daniel Lang,“A Reporter at Large:A Romantic Urge,”NewYorker 27 (21 Aprd 1951): 
74. See also Wernher von Braun, The Mars Project (Champagn: Umversity of Illinois Press, 1991); von 
Braun wlth Cornehus Ryan,“Can We Get to Mars?” Collier’s (30 Aprd 1954): 22-28; von Braun,“Man 
on the Moon:The Journey,” Collier’s (18 October 1952): 52-60; Fred L.Whpple and von Braun,“The 
Exploration,” Collier’s (25 October 1952): 3-8. 
12. NASA Office of Program Planning and Evaluation, “The Long Range Plan of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration,” 16 December 1959; Space Task Group, The Post-Apollo 
Space Program: Directtonsfor the Future (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, 1969); 
NASA, “President Bush Delivers Remarks on U.S. Space Policy,” news release, 14 January 2004. 
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accomplish their goals. Byrd and his compatriots brought three airplanes and 
an aerial camera to Antarctica, which they flew over the South Pole. They 
brought 24 radio transmitters, 31 receivers, and 5 radio engineers, which 
they used to maintain communication with the outside world. The Byrd 
expedition, like others that followed, replaced the need for exceptional heroics 
with a dependence upon machines. 
Basic plans for human spaceflight embodied language that recounted the 
spirit of heroic exploration. This occurred in spite of the program’s obvious 
dependence upon machines of the sort that had caused the heroic tradition to 
disappear on Earth. The earliest astronauts were portrayed as heroic explorers 
even though they were selected to be mostly passive passengers on spacecraft 
treated more like guided missiles than ships at sea. Winged spaceships and large 
space stations proved much harder to construct than airplanes and frontier 
forts, notwithstanding the relative simplicity of their terrestrial analogies. 
Human space missions were controlled extensively from the ground, thereby 
forgoing the heroic tradition established by ship captains at sea. 
Hence, the vision of human spaceflight was outmoded in terrestrial terms 
30 years before it began. Yet spaceflight advocates clung to it, a testament to its 
motivating power. Much of its persistence arose from a supporting feature- 
the belief in American exceptionalism and the ability of space activities to 
maintain it. 
The doctrine of American exceptionalism has appeared in a number of 
forms. Alexis de Tocqueville noted how conditions in New World settlements 
promoted innovation and a spirit of cooperation. This insight reappeared in the 
writings of 20th-century social scientists such as the historian Louis Hartz and 
the political scientist Aaron Wildavsky. Hartz traced American exceptionalism 
to the absence of rigid class distinctions such as those that dominated feudal 
arrangements in Europe. The doctrine achieved its most influential form in 
the frontier thesis promulgated by Frederick Jackson Turner in 1893. Jackson 
traced what he saw as the distinctive characteristics of American society to 
the presence of open land on a continental frontier. From this perspective, 
inquisitiveness, inventiveness, individualism, democracy, and equality grew 
out of the experience of founding new settlements free from the persistence 
of old  arrangement^.'^ 
Turner’s thesis has been dismissed by academic historians, yet it continues 
to possess special appeal to people unschooled in the nuances of historical 
13 Alexls de Tocquevdle, Democracy in America (New York Random House, 1994); Louis Hartz, The 
Liberal Tradition in America. an Interpretation ofAmerican Political Thought Since the Revolution (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, 1955); Aaron B.Wddavsky, The Rise ofRadical Egalrtarianrsrn (Washington, DC.American 
Umversity Press, 1991); Frederick JacksonTurner,“The Sigmficance of the Frontier in American History,” 
in Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner, ed. John M. Faragher (NewYork: Henry Holt, 1994). 
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research. The gap between academic intellectualism and popular opinion is 
in few places more pronounced than in the advocacy of human spaceflight. 
Human spaceflight advocates repeatedly cite the importance of “new frontiers” 
in sustaining the values of American exceptionalism. 
At its heart, American exceptionalism is a utopian doctrine closely asso- 
ciated with the belief that people can improve the human condition by moving 
to new lands. Much of the interest in transforming Mars into an inhabitable 
sphere and establishing other space colonies arises froin the utopian belief that 
life gets better when humans are allowed to start anew. The settlement schemes 
of space advocates such as Gerard O’Neill and Robert Zubrin embrace utopian 
themes, as does the work of science fiction writers such as Ray Bradb~ry.’~ 
Academic historians point out that distinctive characteristics such as those 
valued by space advocates can arise from a number of cultural conditions and 
that the association of frontier life with values such as equality and indi- 
vidualism ignores actual events. Such criticism has had little effect on the 
popular promotion of human spaceflight. Its advocates continue to emphasize 
American exceptionalism and its linkage to the opportunities provided by the 
space frontier. Given the cultural history of the United States, this is a 
particularly appealing doctrine to the descendants of European settlers. The 
thought that the United States is becoming more like countries of the “old” 
world simply increases the interest in recreating conditions thought to make 
America unique. 
The theory of American exceptionalism and its association with frontier 
life is dubious history. Whatever controversy it engenders as a historical doc- 
trine, however, is overshadowed by the biological issues involved. Humans are 
a remarkably well-suited species for terrestrial migration. In fact, the ability of 
humans to adapt to a very wide range of terrestrial conditions through their 
tool-making capabilities may be the most distinguishing characteristic of the 
species as an earthly life-form. That adaptation has taken place on a terrestrial 
surface marked by a specific gravity condition, a protective atmosphere, and 
a magnetic field that shields earthly life-forms from cosmic violence. None of 
those conditions exist in outer space. Nearly all of the biological advantages 
that humans possess for Earthly migration disappear as they move away from 
the Earth. One pair ofauthors likens the use ofhuman tool-making capabilities 
to overcome cosmic conditions to the thought that a fish might be able to 
survive on land if it had the ability to surround itself with a bubble of water.I5 
14. Gerard K. O’Nedl, The High Frontier: Human Colonies in Space (NewYorkWilliam Morrow, 1976); 
Robert Zubrin, Entering Space: Creating a Spacefaring Civilization (NewYork Jeremy P.Tarcher/Putnam, 
1999); Ray Bradbury, The Martian Chronicles (NewYork: Bantam Books, 1950). 
15. Manfred E. Clynes and Nathan S. Kline, “Cyborgs and Space,” Astronautics (September 
1960): 29-33. 
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Early experience suggests that the ability of humans to transport conditions 
favorzble to the maintenance of life in outer space is severely limited. 
Accomplishments during the first half century of spaceflight have not 
favored human spaceflight. The human space endeavor has not kept pace 
with expectations. The inspirational value of elaborate visions such as those 
contained in the 1969 report of the Space Task Group or the popular film 
2001: A Space Odyssey far exceeded the capacity of humans to achieve them. 
The relatively uninspiring tasks of constructing near-Earth space stations and 
reusable spacecraft have taken far longer and cost far more than anticipated. 
With the exception of the landings on the Moon, human spaceflight has 
turned out to be much harder than people standing at the beginning of the 
Space Age envisioned it to be. 
In practical terms, humans will probably return to the Moon and visit 
Mars. By necessity, they may rendezvous with nearby asteroids. They may 
establish Martian bases of the sort found at the Earth’s South Pole, for reasons 
of scientific inquiry and national prestige. Their ability to populate Mars or 
other local spheres is debatable, and the idea that humans in large numbers 
may undertake interstellar journeys using conventional spacecraft is more 
doubtful still. 
The human spaceflight vision is likely to end at Mars or some nearby 
place in the inner solar system. Ultimately, the human spaceflight vision will 
disappear because it is an old vision, tied to past events that become more 
distant with each succeeding generation. The spacefaring vision helped people 
standing at the midpoint of the 20th century express their loss at the passing 
of the heroic age of terrestrial exploration. Such nostalgia is likely to hold less 
appeal as new generations and developments emerge. 
ROBOTS IN SPACE 
While attractive in a number of respects, the robotic spaceflight alterna- 
tive suffers from many of the same difficulties as the human flight paradigm. 
On  the surface, as its advocates insist, robots may seem better suited to space- 
flight than human beings. Yet as cultural phenomena, the robotic perspective 
similarly draws its motive force from social movements located in a rapidly 
receding past. The image of robotics contained in those movements fails to 
account for many new developments in technology. 
The term “robot” is taken from the Czech word vobota. In its purest 
form, it refers to statute labor or compulsory service of the type demanded 
of European peasants. In feudal Europe, aristocrats required peasants to work 
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This image represents the epitome of the NASA perspective that humans and robots 
will explore the solar system together. Here Sojourner, the Mars Pathfinder rover of 
1997 named after former slave and famous abolitionist Sojourner Truth, is visited 
many years after its mission by a descendant of its namesake in this artist's rendering 
by Pat Rawlings. Sojourner the rover paved the way for those that followed. (NASA 
image no. S99-04192) 
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without remuneration for limited periods of time in the fields of noblemen. 
The Czech playwright Karel Capek used the term in a 1921 play, R.U.R. 
(Rossum’s Universal Robots) to characterize mandatory factory work that 
was tedious and unrewarding. In Capek’s play, factory work is performed not 
by people but by biologically produced human substitutes who are engineered 
to complete their work more efficiently than human counterparts.“j 
Therein lies the fundamental difficulty with robotics as a social phe- 
nomenon. Robots are viewed as machine-age products designed to serve as 
human substitutes. To anyone vaguely familiar with industrial-age technology, 
the implications are obvious. At the least, robots serve in the master-servant 
relationship characteristic of Edwardian times. At the worst, they are slaves. 
The concept of slavery or involuntary servitude was well understood 
during the early stages of the industrial revolution. The practice of slavery 
existed scarcely a generation before the advent of wide-scale industrialization 
in America, and social commentators criticized the practices that tended to 
create “wage slavery” in industrial plants. Nineteenth-century law treated slaves 
as property without the rights accorded citizens of the United States, while 
factory practices treated workers as elements of production interchangeable 
with machines. 
As servants or slaves, robots are not expected to possess human or sentient 
qualities. Even where robots take the physical form of human beings, they 
remain machines. The ultimate trust in the ability of humans to control robots 
forms the basis for Isaac Asimov’s three laws of robotics, first elucidated in a 
1942 story titled “Runaround”: 
A robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction, 
allow a human being to come to harm . . . . A robot must obey 
the orders given it by human beings except where such orders 
would conflict with the First Law. . . . A robot must protect 
its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict 
with the First or Second Laws.” 
In the dominant fictional depiction of their relationships in space, robots 
commonly serve as companions to humans engaged in various extraterrestrial 
activities. This approach is well represented by robots such as Asimov’s QT- 
1 from his early short story “Reason,” Lieutenant Commander Data from 
Star Trek: the Next Generation, and the high-strung C3PO and the astromech 
16. Peter Russi, ed., Toward the Radical Center: A Karel Capek Reader (Highland Park, NJ: Catbird 
17. Isaac Asimov, I, Robot (New York: Random House, 1950), p. 37. 
Press, 1990). 
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R2D2 of Star Wars fame. In the realm of fiction, Space Age robots exist to 
extend the capabilities of humans who travel alongside them. This creates a 
fundamental contradiction in the use of robots for space activities. If robots 
are merely machines, they can be treated as subhuman objects. They can be 
sent on perilous missions and programmed to perform their duties without the 
opportunity for earthly return, requirements that would never be permitted 
for expeditions with humans on board. At the same time, developments in 
robotics promise ever-increasing levels of sophistication-even to the level 
that they become sentient beings. 
In the fictional setting, exploitive treatment of robots is rarely regarded as 
ethical. Even if robots are machines, humans treat them in considerate ways. 
Thoughtfulness for the “feelings” of robots grows directly out of misgivings 
regarding the treatment of factory workers, servants, and slaves. In a direct 
retelling of the Dred Scott case, writers for the Star Trek episode “The Measure 
of a Man” question whether the android Data should be treated as property 
or a human being. Data is a machine, albeit one that resembles a human 
being, and as such can be reassigned by a commander under the regulations 
governing the disposal of Federation property. Dred Scott was a 19th-century 
slave who sued in U.S. courts to maintain his freedom on the grounds that 
he was being reassigned from a state in which slavery was illegal into one 
which still permitted its practice. The Supreme Court ruled in 1857 that the 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution applicable to Scott were the ones that dealt 
with the property rights of owners rather than the personal rights of citizens, 
thereby helping to precipitate the Civil War. The Judge Advocate General in 
the Star Trek episode issues a contrary opinion. Data may be a machine, the 
jurist rules, but he has the right to be treated like a person.’* 
Social commentators find themselves caught between their insistence 
that robots are merely machines and the necessity of treating them with 
respect. In his classic work Do Androids Dream $Electric Sheep?, Philip K. Dick 
contemplates the morality oflocating and shutting down wayward robots. (The 
story formed the basis for the classic 1982 science fiction film Blade Runner.) 
In a retelling of the fugitive slave law, the novel deals with android servants 
who escape from their masters on Mars and attempt to hide on Earth. To 
encourage emigration to Mars, the government grants each settler a personal 
android servant which becomes the emigrant’s private property. The androids 
attempt to escape and sometimes murder their masters. The circumstances 
posed by the novel, Dick admits, duplicate the conditions of the Nat Turner 
rebellion in the pre-Civil War American South. 
18. Robert Scheerer, “The Measure of a Man,” Star Trek: The Next Generation, 13 February 1989, 
production 135, Paramount Pictures. 
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Dick eventually concludes that the androids are merely machines. They 
are worthy of careful treatment, as would be the case with any piece of 
expensive equipment, but are not persons in the conventional use of that term. 
Answering the title of his book, Dick concludes that androids would not 
dream of electric sheep unless they were programmed to do so, nor would 
they assign any particular value to the experience unless so in~tructed.’~ 
Isaac Asimov wrestled with the same conundrum throughout his literary 
career. On the one hand, he railed against what he termed the “Frankenstein 
complex”-the tendency of writers to produce stories about robots gone bad. 
Nearly every robot story Asimov read as a young person presented “hordes of 
clanking murderous robots.” The basic story, he observed, was “as old as the 
human imaginat i~n.”~~ Humans who attempted to improve their condition 
through invention, like Icarus who flew too close to the Sun, were penalized 
by the gods. In a similar manner, humans who invented exceptional machines 
would be punished by their creations. Asimov absolutely rejected that point 
of view. All technologies, from fire to the automobile, possess dangers when 
misused. To Asimov, that did not justify their abandonment. 
Robots were merely machines, Asimov insisted. Some aspects of their opera- 
tion might prove faulty but were always subject to improvement.SaidAsimov ofhis 
robotic creations: “I saw them as machines-advanced machines-but machines. 
They might be dangerous but surely safety factors would be built in.”21 
At the same time, Asimov could not resist the temptation to treat his 
creations anthropomorphically. He gave them human faces and human emo- 
tions and human needs. In one of his most famous robot stories, “Bicentennial 
Man,” Asimov describes a robot that wants to become a person. Originally 
programmed to work as a household servant, the robot acquires artistic 
sensitivity through an error in the plotting of what Asimov terms its positronic 
pathways. Over a period of nearly 200 years, the robot replaces its machine 
parts with human prosthetics and wins its freedom. Yet it does not possess a 
human brain, a distinction that Asimov characterizes as “a steel wall a mile 
high and a mile A human brain is subject to irreplaceable decay. The 
price for becoming human, Asimov declares, is eventual death. It is a price 
that the robot is willing to pay. 
The conceptual challenges of resolving the treatment of robots in prac- 
tice are not as farfetched as they may seem. Throughout the early stages of 
19. Philip K. Dick, D o  Androids Dream $Electric Sheep? (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968). 
20. Isaac Asimov, Gold: T h e  Final Science Fiction Collection (New York: Eos, 2003), pp. 192, 193, 
21. Ibid., p. 195. 
22. Isaac Asimov, Robot Visions (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1991), p. 287. The story first 
196. 
appeared in 1976. 
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the space program, humans allowed robots little autonomy. Robots operated 
under tight constraints and remote control. With the advent of planetary 
rovers, robots were allowed higher degrees of freedom. Should robots ever be 
used for interstellar investigation, they will require autonomous operating 
capability. They will need the capability to repair themselves without human 
intervention and possibly the ability to reproduce their parts. 
The extent to which this will require the treatment of robots as sentient 
beings is as yet unknown. From a strictly industrial-age point of view, they 
will remain machines. Industrial thinkers like Frederick Taylor treated humans 
like machinery with interchangeable parts. Why would someone who adopts 
industrial-age thinking assign a higher status to intelligent equipment? A 
necessary requirement of space exploration, however, is the disappearance of 
organizational doctrines rooted in a pure mechanistic point of view. Space 
exploration requires organizational techniques that promote exceptionally 
high levels of creativity, reliability, and interactive complexity. It requires 
electronic equipment, most notably computers, whose basic conception rests 
more in the postindustrial age than the industrial. The traditional, assembly- 
line mentality that characterized the early industrial revolution is no longer 
appropriate for space travel, neither from an organizational nor a technological 
point of view. 
Yet this is the very point of view around which the doctrine of robotics 
revolves. As a cultural phenomenon, robotics is rooted in an industrial-era 
vision of machinery and the period of human servitude from which it emerged. 
Whatever one may think about the technical advantages of unmanned 
spaceflight, its origins as a cultural doctrine are as traditional as those associated 
with human cosmic travel. The latter draws its force from romantic images of 
terrestrial exploration and frontier settlements; the former finds its potency in 
the fascination with machines that characterized the early industrial revolution 
and an idealized image of master-servant relationships. 
The limitations of the robotic perspective are apparent in the seeming 
inability of its advocates to imagine such machines operating without direct 
human control. Very few of the robot stories prepared by Isaac Asimov present 
robots working alone. One notable exception is “Victory Unintentional,” in 
which three incredibly hardy robots visit an invidiously hostile civilization on 
the planet Jupiter preparing for space The Jovians mistakenly identify 
the robots as human emissaries from Earth and, convinced that the Earthlings 
are indestructible, decide to abandon their spacefaring plans. The story departs 
so radically from Asimov’s standard robot fare that he excluded it from his 
collection of I ,  Robot tales. 
23,“Victory Unintentional” was published in the August 1942 issue of Super Science Stories. 
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The standard robot story involves machines working alongside human 
beings. The television series Lost in Space that ran from 1965 to 1968 featured a 
large robot that one critic characterized as a metal version of the canine Lassie, 
another popular television show from that period.24 The Robinson family 
treated the robot as a member of the family, much like an intelligent pet. In 
The Day the Earth Stood Still, the alien portrayed by Michael Rennie travels 
with a robot named Gort who serves as the ship’s chief medical officer and a 
ruthless enforcer of the extraterrestrial doctrine of arms control. 
The official NASA policy for the use of robots in space exploration remains 
one of complementary capability When pressed to comment on the virtues of 
manned and unmanned spaceflight, NASA? leaders repeat the dominant vision 
that it will be “robots and humans together.”25 
The treatment of robots in fiction is not unlike that accorded animals in 
space. The first animal to orbit the Earth, a Russian dog named Laika, was 
allowed to die in space. In a 1953 proposal for the use of monkeys to test living 
conditions on board a “baby space station,” Wernher von Braun suggested 
that the animals be euthanatized before reentry using “a quick-acting lethal 
gas.”26 To a certain extent, this recalled the polar practice wherein expedition 
members ate their dogs as the animals’ usefulness for transport declined. Such 
treatment was not enforced upon the chimpanzees that tested conditions in 
NASA’s Mercury space capsules before humans climbed in. The chimpanzees 
returned home, as did most of the subsequent Russian dogs to fly in space. 
In spite of their lower status as flight subjects, these animals were accorded 
appropriate respect. They came to be treated more like sentient beings. 
Visionaries like Asimov predicted the widespread use of robots as personal 
servants by the end of the 20th century. His initial robot story, titled “Robbie,” is 
set in NewYork City in the year 1998, a time by which Asimov anticipated the 
mass production of robotic servants for service on Earth and in space. People like 
Asimov anticipated a new machine age dominated by intelligent robots. In fact, 
the machine age departed. In its place, the postindustrial era appeared. In spite 
of his abiding interest in the workings of his robots’ “positronic brains,” Asimov 
wholly failed to anticipate the advent of personal computers and information 
networks that have come to characterize the postindustrial era. 
Early images of computers in popular space literature are similar to those 
accorded mechanical robots. Sophisticated computers acquire a sense of their 
own existence and often behave in a roguish fashion. In the classic film and 
24. “Robot B9 from Lost in Space,” http://wwwjeffbots.com/b9robot.html (accessed 10 July 2004). 
25. See, for example, NASA, “Humans, Robots Work Together to Test ‘Spacewalk Squad’ 
26. Wernher von Braun with Cornelius Ryan, “Baby Space Station,” Collier’s (27 June 1953): 40. 
Concept,” news release 03-227, 2 July 2003. 
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novel 2002: A Space Odyssey, the HAL-9000 computer attempts to seize control 
of the ship and kills all but one member of the crew. It resists the efforts of the 
remaining astronaut to disconnect it. The notion that humans might construct 
computers so advanced that they acquire self-awareness appears frequently in 
fictional and popular treatments of the subject. 
Robots have already been used to explore the solar system. They have 
returned samples from the Moon, and they will likely return samples from 
Mars. They will closely inspect other planets and their moons. They will rove, 
dig, possibly swim, and explore. They have and will continue to reach the 
outer limits of the local solar system. 
As a philosophy of exploration, nonetheless, robotics is full of contradic- 
tions and outdated metaphors. It remains a machine-age concept in a cybernetic 
world. Machine-age philosophies are fundamentally concerned with control, 
both in large organizations and the design ofprocesses such as the assembly line. 
As with Asimov’s three laws, the means of control are rooted in jurisprudence. 
Rules remain the primary means of control under the machine philosophy. 
Yet rules are largely inappropriate to the cybernetic models associated with 
postindustrial processes and information networks. The dominant metaphor 
for the cybernetic world is the brain, with its qualities of redundancy and 
creative problem solving. 
Robots will surely continue to explore the local solar system. They may 
develop sufficient capacities to explore regions beyond. Such capabilities, as 
in the field of artificial intelligence, may lead to sentient qualities of the sort 
currently found in science fiction. Developing levels of self-consciousness, 
they might even come to think of themselves as superior beings. This is 
not guaranteed, but one cannot rule out the possibility. If this occurs, such 
robots would probably be treated with ever-increasing degrees of respect and 
kindness. This is the Asimov vision-sophisticated machinery with sentient 
characteristics operating under human control treated in a humane manner. 
The scenario is farfetched, but one that would pose no basic difficulty to the 
expanded use of robots for space explora t i~n .~~ 
A darker alternative exists. It is the vision presented in fictional devices 
such as Blade Runner and the behavior ofthe HAL-9000 in 2001. Humans might 
treat such creations inhumanly. In BZade Runner, biologically manufactured 
robots are programmed to die after four years of operation. Having achieved 
self-consciousness, they understandably object to this policy. The HAL-9000 
computer does not want to be shut off either. This scenario, while entertaining, 
seems flawed in a number of ways. It requires humans to treat intelligent 
27. Some theorists believe that this is a given. See Ray KurzweiI, The Age of Spiritual Machines: 
When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence (New York: Penguin, 2000). 
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robots like slaves, a philosophy not too compatible with the guiding moral 
doctrines of the postindustrial world. It also suggests that humans would use 
advanced technology to build robots. As will be seen in a following section of 
this paper, a more likely scenario is that humans would use such technology 
to improve themselves. If humans ever develop the technology to construct 
biologically derived androids, they will by necessity acquire the technology to 
recreate themselves. That is a more profoundly interesting possibility. 
Nonetheless, the image of intelligent but angry robots is not an impossi- 
bility. Humans are capable of great kindness toward their creations, but also 
great cruelty. The image of the mad robot attracts great interest because it says 
something cogent about human behavior. The concept of machines as slaves 
may be outmoded, but the worldwide traffic in humans pressed into forms of 
slavery continues. 
In practical terms, the robotic vision will be weighed against the advan- 
tages and disadvantages of alternative schemes. This is inevitable. In that 
respect, the robotic vision, with its traditional quality, may have difficulty 
competing with approaches that better fit modern technological and cultural 
developments. One of the most challenging alternatives arises out of the 
developments in the increasingly strange world of astrophysics. 
ASTROPHYSICS AND 
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPACE PROGRAM 
Recount for a moment the framework for the observations presented in 
this essay. To a substantial degree, the vision of space travel is a blank tablet onto 
which its advocates project images drawn from their own hopes for the culture 
at large. By necessity, those images change as actual ventures encounter reality. 
They also change as new generations of people project fresh hopes and cultural 
beliefs onto the space tableau. As reality intrudes and old cultural fascinations 
fade, so may old visions. This often encourages advocates to draw selectively 
what appear to be new ideas from old images-statements and visions not fully 
recognized until the new visions begin to take form. 
One of the most pervasive expectations of the early 20th century held 
that Mars and Venus would turn out to be habitable planets not far different 
from the Earth. This expectation, presented in works both scientific and 
fictional, fueled much of the public interest in human spaceflight. Spaceflight 
enthusiasts hoped to fly to Mars and Venus and discover new life. Revelation of 
their inhospitable nature did not destroy that expectation so much as redirect 
it. Beginning in the last decade of the 20th century, much of the interest in 
habitable objects began to shift toward extrasolar planets. 
The variance between the proximity of the inner planets of the local 
solar system and the challenges of reaching extrasolar spheres is extreme. 
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One can speculate on the manner by which this reality, joined with the 
continuing search for habitable objects, may affect the spaceflight vision. One 
commentator, proceeding from the mathematics of probabilities, estimates 
the average distance between life-supporting planets within the Milky Way 
galaxy to be about 50 light-years. (This is the estimated distance to planets 
on which life as we understand it might live. The average distance between 
planets possessing complex or intelligent life-forms may be substantially more.) 
Fifty light-years is merely an estimate-the actual number is unknown at this 
time. Nonetheless, it does illustrate the nature of the reality. 
A typical voyage from Earth to Mars, using a fast-transit approach, covers 
about 500 million kilometers (300 million miles). This is the route followed 
by the robots Spirit and Opportunity that arrived at Mars in 2004. The 
difference between a fast-transit voyage to Mars and a journey of 50 light-years 
is a factor of 1 million. The two robots took seven months to reach Mars; a 
similar journey to a planet really capable of supporting human life might take 
500,000 years. Regardless of the accuracy of the underlying estimate (it could 
be wrong by a factor of lo), the resulting distances pose a substantial barrier 
to people embracing the traditional vision of space exploration. 
The energy requirements for crossing such distances are prodigious in the 
extreme. Fictional space captains may zip around the galaxy at warp speed, 
but serious proposals for interstellar flight have been confined to fractions 
in the 10 to 20 percent of light-speed range. Accelerating spacecraft to such 
velocities would require energy sources as yet undeveloped, such as fusion 
power or antimatter drives. For human flight, it would also require very large, 
multigenerational spacecraft. The people who began any such a voyage would 
not live to see its completion.’’ 
The substantial engineering challenges involved in interstellar transit 
have forced its most serious advocates to emphasize robotic payloads. Even 
so, robotic expeditions suffer severe restrictions. A proposal by members 
of the British Interplanetary Society for a 50-year expedition to Barnard’s 
Star promised a scientific payload with the impressive mass of 500 tons. The 
energy requirements needed to accelerate the robotic payload to one-eighth 
light speed proved so prodigious, however, that no fuel remained to help 
the spacecraft slow down. The expedition pian, named Project Daedalus, 
called for the spacecraft to zip past its destination at interstellar speeds. NASA 
executive George Mueller attempted to resolve this difficulty in his proposal 
for a 25-year voyage to Alpha Centauri 3,  powered again by antimatter drive 
and achieving a peak velocity of two-tenths light speed. Assuming sufficient 
28. O n  the technologies of this type of spaceflight, see Yoji Kondo, ed., Interstellar Travel G Multi- 
Generational Space Ships (Burlington, Ontario: Apogee Books, 2003). 
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fuel for deceleration, the resulting calculations left room for a robotic payload 
that weighed just 1 
The practical challenges of traveling to nearby solar systems, whether with 
human or robotic payloads, well exceed those of local flight. Concurrently, 
popular interest in the machine-age social issues that helped to spawn robotic 
dreams has declined. Might some other approach prove more compatible 
with the personal experiences of postindustrial people, while at the same time 
offering a better solution to practical difficulties of interstellar contact? 
Such an approach exists-and if the combination of personal imagination 
and practical reality affecting previous spacefaring visions continues to foster 
new ones, it could create a significant variation in the classic human versus 
robotic debate. The new vision could arise from that pervasive symbol of 
postindustrial life, the computer. As noted in the previous section, the use 
of personal computers is as widespread as people in the early 20th century 
believed the employment of robots would be. The computer is as compatible 
with the electronic thinking that dominates the postindustrial age as the 
fascination with rockets and other machines was with the industrial. 
A method for achieving light-speed velocities with very low energy 
requirements exists within the world of electronics. In 1974, astronomers Frank 
Drake and Carl Sagan aimed the Arecibo Radio Telescope at the globular 
star cluster M-13 and dispatched a binary code message at light speed. When 
properly deciphered, the message contained diagrams depicting a human 
being, the chemical makeup of Earth life, and the position of the home planet 
in the solar system. Sagan estimated that the chances of communicating with 
a civilization residing in the 100,000-star cluster were 50-50. Since the star 
cluster resides outside of the Milky Way galaxy, however, any return message 
traveling at light speed will not arrive for 48,000 years. 
Civilizations capable of communicating in the electromagnetic spectrum 
may exist much closer to the Earth. During the 1970s, space advocates proposed 
a $20-billion government-funded listening system called Project Cyclops. In 
support of the initiative, NASA Administrator James Fletcher told a gathering 
of engineers that the Milky Way galaxy “must be full of voices, calling from 
star to star in a myriad of tongues.” Fletcher was a lay minister in the Church 
ofJesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which subscribes to the theological doctrine 
that God has created a plurality of worlds populated with human beings.30 
29. Alan Bond and Anthony R. Martin, “Project Daedalus: The Mission Profile,” in “Project 
Daedalus-The Final Report of the BIS Starship Study,” ed. A. R. Martin,jBIS:journal ofthe British 
Interplanetary Society (Supplement, 1978): 537-542; George Mueller, “Ammatter & Distant Space 
Flight,” Spaceflight 25 (May 1983): 104-107. 
30. James C. Fletcher, “NASA and the ‘Now’ Syndrome,” NASA brochure, text from an address 
to the National Academy of Engineering, Washington, DC, November 1975, p. 7, NASA Historical 
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The prospect of spending billions of dollars on an approach to space 
exploration departing so radically from the traditional human and robotic 
vision sunk the initiative. Bereft of public funding, advocates sought pri- 
vate contributions for what became known as the Search for Extraterrestrial 
Intelligence (SETI) .31 
Technical developments of a practical nature may cause future lawmakers 
to fund extrasolar investigations. Propelled by widespread interest in the 
discovery of extrasolar planets, NASA officials have recommended the creation 
of space telescopes capable of recording light waves reflected from such objects. 
Beginning in the last decade ofthe 20th century, astronomers began confirming 
the presence of planets orbiting nearby stars using indirect means, such as 
variations in the positions of central stars as would be produced by orbiting 
spheres. More than 100 planets were discovered in the first decade of observa- 
tion. Space-based telescopes utilizing the technology of interferometry could 
capture images ofsuch bodies. This would require a large number oftelescopes, 
flying in formation, assembling light waves from nearby solar systems in such 
a manner that the electromagnetic waves from the central star nullify each 
other. The bright glare from the central object would disappear, revealing the 
reflected light from objects orbiting the central star. 
NASA officials created a hint of what such a technology might produce 
in 2003 when they aimed the Mars Global Surveyor toward the inner solar 
system and captured an image ofEarth some 86 million miles away. The image 
shows Earth half lit. Cloud cover is clearly visible. With small adjustments in 
technology, the color of the seas appeared. Spectral studies of such an image 
would reveal water vapor, free oxygen, and trace amounts of methane and 
carbon dioxide-signatures of a planet populated with living beings. 
Space scientists would like to know how many such spheres occupy 
the stellar neighborhood and the fraction of such bodies that might support 
complex life. Inspection through the electromagnetic spectrum is a far more 
efficient means of locating such bodies than the random dispatch of very large 
spacecraft with extraordinarily large energy requirements. Given 2lst-century 
technologies, the electromagnetic spectrum would prove superior to human 
and robotic flight for investigations outside of the local solar system. 
Where this may lead is as yet unknown. It is a history that has not yet 
occurred. Nonetheless, the confluence of social interest and practical reality 
suggests that it might form the basis for an alternative vision of considerable 
continuedfrom the previous page 
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power. At the present time, it is relatively undeveloped-but no more so than 
the conventional reality of spaceflight remained until its popularization during 
the mid-20th century. 
The electromagnetic space program anticipates possible communication 
at or even exceeding light speeds. The possibility of such developments has 
caused some people to contemplate the manner in which electromagnetic 
communication might be combined with traditional interest in human spaceflight. 
In 1985, one of the principal proponents of the Search for Extraterrestrial 
Intelligence, Carl Sagan, presented a draft of a science fiction novel to physicist 
Kip Thorne. Sagan suggested that Earthlings searching through the elec- 
tromagnetic spectrum might discover devices that would cause objects to 
evade the cosmological limits imposed by conventional space and time. In the 
novel and film, titled Contact, the plans for such a device are supplied through 
a radio message received from outer space. The device, in Sagan’s original 
draft, allowed humans to create a black hole. Thorne, who was completing a 
book on black holes and hyperspace, suggested that Sagan instead employ a 
series of wormholes.32 
The laws of quantum gravity, Thorne observes, require that nature 
produce “exceedingly small  wormhole^."^^ A wormhole is a short tunnel 
connecting two distant points within the universe, moving outside the four 
dimensions that humans conventionally experience. Theory suggests that 
wormholes disappear as soon as they appear, but Thorne speculates that a 
technologically advanced civilization might employ the laws of quantum 
gravity to hold a wormhole open long enough to travel through it.34 In this 
respect, fantastic tales in which children drop into rabbit holes or step through 
wardrobes and emerge in other worlds might provide the cultural inspiration 
for 2lst-century space travel. 
In Sagan’s novel, engineers construct a device that creates an access 
point to an exit located in the vicinity of Vega some 26 light-years away. 
This cosmological tunnel provides access to additional passageways leading 
throughout the galaxy. Raised on the conventional image of space exploration, 
Sagan cannot resist the temptation to dispatch a human crew through the 
transit device. In the book, five individuals travel in a dodecahedron to Vega 
and beyond. Movie producers simplified the narrative to a single passenger, 
the central character played by actress Jodie Foster. 
32. Kip S. Thorne, Black Holes G Time Warps (New York W. W. Norton, 1994), pp. 483-484; Carl 
Sagan, Contact:A Novel (NewYork Simon and Schuster, 1985). Sagan continued to refer to the tunnel 
as “the black hole, if that was what it really was,” p. 335. 
33. Thorne, Black Holes G Time Warps, p. 55. 
34. Michael S. Morris and Kip S. Thorne, “Wormholes in spacetime and their use for interstellar 
trave1:A tool for teaching general relativi~,”Americunlournal OfPhysiCs 56 (May 1988): 395-412. 
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In his book and a series ofaccompanying articles, Thorne explores whether 
a wormhole might be used for communication or transport of the conventional 
sort. Unlike a black hole, whose force would stretch and destroy any conven- 
tionally arranged object or message that entered it, a wormhole provides some 
possibility of transit. “We do not understand the laws of quantum gravity well 
enough to deduce . . . whether the quantum construction of wormholes is 
possible,” Thorne observes. Nonetheless, physicists do understand how such a 
wormhole, if one were constructed, might be held open “by threading it with 
exotic material.”35 
Viewed from the perspective of conventional spaceflight, visions of 
electromagnetic communication and shortcuts through space and time are 
certainly strange. So far, no significant public funds have been provided for 
such activities. Yet the possibility of studying extrasolar planets is no more 
fantastic today than space travel seemed to a public raised on images of Martian 
canals and Buck Rogers in the early 20th century, and advances in modern 
physics continue to produce startlingly strange results. No one can predict 
with certainty where such developments might lead. The history of space 
travel does suggest, however, that prevailing visions depend considerably upon 
public interests and technological reality. 
A POSTBIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The other alternative perspective on space travel is so strange that it 
makes the discussion of wormholes and extraterrestrial communications 
appear commonplace by comparison. For many years, NASA leaders have 
insisted that humans and robots will explore space together. The other 
alternative suggests that humans and machines will do more than travel 
together. As a result of space travel, they might merge into what Steven Dick 
has characterized as a “postbiological universe.”36 
A curious discussion surrounding the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence 
provided the reality check helping to motivate this perspective. In assessing 
the possibility of contacting extraterrestrial beings, Frank Drake prepared a 
formula that famously calculated the number of communicative civilizations 
that might exist within the Milky Way galaxy at the present time. The final 
parameter in the equation measures the average length of time that a 
communicative civilization survives. The parameter, labeled L, imposes a 
paradox raised by the physicist Enrico Fermi. If the value of L is small-on the 
35. Thorne, Black Holes G Time Warps, p. 498. 
36. Steven J. Dick, “They Aren’t Who You Think,” Mercury (November-December 2003): 18-26; 
Dick, “Cultural Evolution, the Postbiological Universe and SETI,” InternationalJoumal ofAstrobiology 2, 
no. 1 (2003): 65-74. 
100 CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
order of a few hundred years-then the predicted number of civilizations 
capable of communicating with one another in the Milky Way at any time 
rapidly approaches “one.” In other words, humans are alone-and destined 
soon to revert to some pretechnological state. 
Conversely, suppose that the value of L is very large. Given the age of 
the universe and the history of stars, the first technological civilizations could 
have emerged 3 billion years ago. Those that managed to survive infancy 
could have endured for hundreds of millions of years. The potential age of 
technological civilizations existing at the present time might range from 1 to 3 
billion years.37 Therein arises the paradox. Given the amount of time required 
for interstellar travel relative to the parameter L, intelligent extraterrestrials 
should already be here. Since this does not appear to be the case, it follows on 
the basis of the Drake formula that the longevity of technological civilizations 
must be very small. This is very disappointing to people anticipating a lengthy 
lifespan for human culture. 
The fault, however, may lie in the formula. Drake’s formula contains 
no parameter for the probability that the beings creating a technological 
civilization may evolve into something else. Yet this possibility has been 
raised repeatedly by science fiction writers. Many have foreseen the arrival of 
mutated life-forms, often as a result of horrible wars. H. G. Wells described 
a world full of Morlocks and Eloi in The Time Machine, while Pierre Boulle 
predicted the rise of intelligent chimpanzees in Planet Ofthe Apes. In his early 
science novel Orphans ofthe Sky,  Robert Heinlein allows the alterations to 
occur on an intergenerational spaceship bound for the Alpha Centauri star 
system. Succeeding crew members become mutants that dwell in the ship’s 
core and simple farmers who, blissfully unaware that they live on a giant 
spaceship, occupy the outer 
In the works of Arthur C. Clarke, similar transformations occur. Unlike 
other authors, Clarke presents such transformations in a uniformly positive 
way. To Clarke, space travel provides access to technologies that transform 
biological creatures into more immortal, spiritual beings. This optimistic 
vision forms the principal theme in Clarke’s fictional work. It appears in 
Childhood’s End, one of his first novels, in which alien beings oversee the 
total transformation of the human race. It reappears in Rendezvous with Rama, 
in which the extraterrestrial creators of a gigantic starship have long since 
37. Mario Livio, “How Rare Are Extraterrestrial Civlzations, and When Did They Emerge?” 
AstrophysicalJournal 51 1 (20 January 1999): 429-431; N. S. Kardashev, “Cosmology and Civilizations,” 
Astrophysics and Space Science 252 (1997): 25-40. 
38. H. G. Wells, The Time Machine (London: Everyman, 1995); Pierre B o d e ,  La plane’te des singes, 
translated by Xan Fielding as Planet ofthe Apes (New YorkVanguard Press, 1963); Robert A. Heinlein, 
Orphans ofthe Sky:A Novel (NewYork: Putnam, 1963). 
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evolved into a higher spiritual form. Most significantly, it dominates the central 
narrative in Clarke’s classic novel and screenplay, 2001: A Space Odyssey. In 
that story, an alien monolith provides a passageway for the transformation of 
the sole surviving astronaut on a deep space mission. The astronaut enters a 
passageway generated by the monolith and reappears as a “star child” with 
supernatural powers. 39 
From a cultural perspective, the transformations Clarke presents contain 
a message quite familiar to human beings. Clarke’s characters achieve forms 
of immortality through space travel. Practically every human culture and 
nearly all religions contain messages about resurrection, typically achieved 
through some sort of physical dying and rebirth. Most space advocates are 
reluctant to discuss the possibility of physical transformation through space 
travel, perhaps out of a desire to appear scientifically sober. To the extent 
that visions of space travel rest upon a foundation of cultural expectations, 
however, few expectations are more widespread than those concerning the 
desire for immortality through some sort of physical transformation. 
The existence of those expectations has provided the cultural foundation 
for a modern movement known as “transhumanism.” This rather strange 
philosophy is a product of conversations taking place largely on the Internet. 
Transhumanism is “a radical new approach to future-oriented thinking” 
that utilizes advances in science and technology “to eliminate aging and 
greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacitie~.”~’ 
Transhumanists believe that advances in computer capacity and nanotechnology 
will allow genetic change to occur very soon-possibly within the 21st 
century. The result, they believe, will be a “posthuman” species as superior to 
homo sapiens as humans are to the primates. The new species will survive for 
very long periods of time, perhaps approaching immortality. 
Transhumanism is not a movement focused on space travel, although its 
applications to that endeavor are readily apparent. If humans or the species they 
produce are able to live under the severe condtions and extraordinarily long 
periods of time required for interstellar travel, many of the barriers to extended 
journeys would disappear. Physical modifications beneficial for space travel might 
include induced hibernation, a staple element in science fiction stories.41 It could 
extend to physical alterations experienced by humans born on worlds with 
different gravities. Extraordinary lifespans would change the human perspective 
39. Arthur C. Clarke, Childhood’s End (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1953); Clarke, 
Rendezvous with Rama (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973); Clarke, 2001: A Space 
Odyssey (New York: New American Library, 1968). 
40. Nick Bostrom, “The Transhumanist FAQ,” October 2003, http://www. transhumanixm.ovg/ 
resources/faaq.html (accessed 5 January 2005). 
41. See Stanley Kubnck, 2001: A Space Odyssey (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1968); Gordon Carroll, 
David Giler, and Walter H a ,  Alien (20th Century Fox, 1979). 
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of time and might allow the completion of lengthy interstellar voyages within a 
single generation. Combined with new insights into the structure of the universe, 
it might allow reconstructed beings to move through space in ways that humans 
could not survive. Given sufficient time, posthumans or their descendants might 
fulfill the science fiction dream of space travel by experiencing near immortality. 
As is typical of such movements, the new approach has motivated current 
generations to rediscover words and works not previously emphasized under 
conventional visions. A leading approach within the transhumanist movement 
envisions the merging of human and machine parts. The resulting creatures 
are known as cyborgs, a term originally presented in a 1960 paper by Manfred 
Clynes and Nathan Kline on the challenges of space travel. Clynes and Kline 
suggested a number of modifications to the human body that would allow 
some of the basic requirements of extraterrestrial survival to take place 
automatically. They proposed induced hypothermia as a means of reducing 
energy requirements, drugs that might combat weightlessness, and an inverse 
fuel cell that would take the place of lungs.42 
Cyborgs appear frequently in science fiction stories. The concept received 
popular attention in a 1972 novel by Martin Caidin that formed the basis 
for the television series The Six Million Dollar Man. A number of Star Trek 
episodes feature cyborgs, and the 1996 Star Trek movie First Contact presents 
an extraterrestrial life-form known as “the Borg.” Part organic, part machine, 
the Borg are insectlike creatures that share a single mind.43 
A person no less notable than Robert Goddard contemplated methods 
for transporting creatures through space in something other than their current 
bodily form. To assure the continuation of Earthly life, he recommended that 
distant spheres be seeded with what he termed protoplasm, dispatched on one- 
way journeys from Earth to distant spheres. Over time, the material would 
evolve into Earthly life-forms. Goddard suggested that the spacecraft also 
transport the accumulated knowledge of humankind “in as light, condensed, 
and indestructible a form as possible.”44 Goddard’s proposal anticipated the 
development of microtechnologies and discovery of human DNA, which were 
unknown at the time. Lying so far from conventional visions of space travel, 
Goddard’s speculations on interstellar flight received much less attention than 
his work on rocketry, but they could be selectively rediscovered if interest in 
transhumanistic space travel appears. 
42. Clynes and Kline, “Cyborgs and Space.” 
43. Martin Caidin, Cybovg: A Novel (New York: Arbor House, 1972); Glen A. Larson et al., 
The Six Mtllion Dollar Man (Silverton and Universal Production for the American Broadcasting 
Company [ABC], 1973-78); Rick Berman, Star Trek: First Contact (Paramount Pictures, 1996). 
44. Esther C. Goddard, ed., and G. Edward Pendray, assoc. ed., Tne Papers of Robert H. Goddard, vol. 3 
(NewYork McGraw-Ha Book Co., 1970), p. 1612. 
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In his discussion of postbiological civilizations, Steven Dick refers to the 
work of the British philosopher Olaf Stapledon, who wrote science fiction 
novels and essays during the first half of the 20th century. Speaking of homo 
supiens, Stapledon, in a classic 1948 address to the British Interplanetary Society, 
insisted that maintenance of the human physical form need not provide the 
ultimate justification for space travel. Rather, he emphasized the preservation of 
what he called the ‘‘spiritual experience” of being human. Stapledon surmised 
that the process of adapting humans to fit alien environments might prove easier 
given sufficient time than carrying Earthly conditions and unaltered humans to 
distant objects. Stapledonian thinking, as Dick describes it, takes into account 
“the evolution of biology and culture” alongside the process of space travel over 
very long time periods.45 The works of Stapledon and those of the early-20th- 
century philosopher J. D. Bernal, on which he drew, are considered ‘‘classics” in 
a modern movement that did not exist when the works first appeared.46 
In a half-serious sort of way, Steven Dick uses the postbiological per- 
spective to solve the Fermi paradox. People searching for extraterrestrial 
civilizations listen for radio transmissions of the sort produced by human 
technology. Radio and television signals from Earth, however, are hardly 100 
years old. As noted above, an extraterrestrial civilization mastering advanced 
technologies might have survived for billions ofyears. Over those time periods, 
such creatures would have evolved either naturally or through self-imposed 
means. As Dick notes, the transformation could have produced beings that no 
longer communicate through the electromagnetic spectrum. Fulfilling one of 
the ultimate spacefaring dreams, they might have attained a form of spiritual 
or electronic immortality. 
The ultimate result of many such evolutionary sequences is hard to 
imagine. It might result in the modification of biological creatures into forms 
more suitable for living under conditions beyond their home planet. It might 
result in species that prefer not to be confined to wet, rocky spheres. Perhaps 
such species prefer to communicate over vast distances at speeds that seem 
sluggish to homo supiens with traditionally short lifespans. Over lengthy periods 
of time, the iterations might produce creatures with little resemblance to species 
from which they emerged. Referring to such creatures on other planets, Dick 
observes, “It is entirely possible that the differences between our minds and 
theirs is so great that communication is impossible.” His comments are equally 
applicable to new forms that might someday arise from Earthly life.47 
45. Olaf Stapledon, “Interplanetary Man?” in An Olaf Stapledon Reader, ed. Robert Crossley 
(Syracuse, N Y  Syracuse University Press, 1997), p. 234; Dick, “Cultural Evolution, the 
Postbiological Universe and SETI,” p. 65. 
46. J. D. Bernal, The  World, the Flesh, and the Devil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1969; original publication, 1929). 
47. Dick, “Cultural Evolution, the Postbiological Universe and SETI,” p. 72. 
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CONCLUSION 
The original vision that helped to motivate the first phase of space travel 
favored human over robotic flight. Completion of the human spaceflight vision, 
with its winged spaceships, orbiting space stations, lunar bases, and planetary 
expeditions, proved more difficult than anticipated. During the same period, 
robotic activities overcame many of the technical obstacles expected to retard 
that approach. In spite of its rapid development, however, robotic technology 
did not supplant human activities. On balance, the two approaches achieved a 
state of approximate parity after one-half century of cosmic flight. 
Scientists and engineers provided a vivid demonstration of the relative 
status of robotic and human flight during the 2004 debate over the repair 
of the Hubble Space Telescope. Rarely does a single flight activity permit 
a direct, head-to-head comparison between human and robotic approaches. 
More often, the debate arises in the context of different missions, such as 
the choice between the replacement of an aging Space Shuttle and the desire 
to launch another robotic probe to the outer  planet^.^' In 2004, however, a 
special group from U.S. National Academy of Sciences reported on the relative 
merits of robotic and human spaceflight approaches to the task of servicing 
the batteries and gyroscopes on the 14-year-old Hubble Space Telescope. The 
group concluded that a robotic mission was not inherently superior but would 
probably involve more time and risk than an astronaut-guided repair. Further 
analysis suggested that the robotic mission would cost as much a Shuttle flight 
for the same purpose.49 
Exploring the relative advantages of human and robotic flight in a manner 
similar to the calculations performed for the Hubble rescue mission is a 
productive avenue for future research. So is a reexamination of the underlying 
visions. As the generation of space advocates raised on the pioneering paradigm 
of human flight is replaced by young people raised in the computer age, the 
underlying cultural interests in space exploration may shift. Few people have 
attempted to study the manner in which a generation shift could affect the 
supporting visions of spaceflight possessed by the public at large. 
So faqneither the human nor the robotic approach has achieved a command- 
ing advantage over the other. Both continue to receive substantial support. 
Human space travel has fallen well short of the original vision, and robotic 
48. See James A. Van Allen, “Space Science, Space Technology and the Space Station,” ScientGc 
American 254 (January 1986): 32-39. 
49. Committee on the Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of the Hubble Space 
Telescope, Space Studies Board, Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, National Research 
Council, Assessment of Options for Extending the Llfe o f  the Hubble Space Telescope: Final Report 
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2005). See also U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Science, Hearing Charter, “Options for Hubble Science,” 2 February 2005. 
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flight has exceeded initial expectations. Such observations, however, rest on a 
remarkably short base of practical experience and public perspectives, especially 
when viewed in cosmic terms. Over much longer timespans, the situation as 
it presently exists will probably change and do so in fundamental ways.These 
changes are not well represented in the current human versus robotic debate. 
Ultimately, the classic human versus robotic debate fails to capture the full 
scope of the space endeavor because it fails to account for time. Time will present 
new opportunities, new visions, and new generations with hfferent dreams to 
fulfii. The tra&tional human versus robotic controversy will suffer as time passes 
because it is essentially rooted in the past. Whatever technical merits guide the 
two points of view, the cultural context of both perspectives draws upon social 
movements that no longer play a dominant role in terrestrial affairs. 
Seen from the perspective of the past, the human spaceflight movement 
resides in a utopian vision of Earthly activities that romanticizes events such 
as the settlement of the North American continent by Europeans and the 
“golden age” of terrestrial exploration. Even if the motivating events did 
occur as described by advocates of space travel-which is doubtful-they are 
not easily transferred to the reality of space. 
Robotic flight does not fare much better. An analysis of the social com- 
mentary on robotics sets that movement squarely in the context of the industrial 
revolution and the disappearance of involuntary servitude. Support for robotics, 
especially as it appears in science fiction, arises from the utopian belief that 
industrial-age machines can be engineered to work like obedient servants, toiling 
alongside humans and relieving them of the need to perform dangerous or 
tedious space activities. This outlook is well expressed by the early belief that 
space robots would take the form of androids-machines in human form 
performing human work. In general, however, robotic spacecraft have not 
adopted the human form.When urged to propose a robot for the Hubble repair, 
NASA officials eschewed plans for an androidlike Robonaut in favor of a 
mechanism that looked like aTransformers toy. A concept under development at 
NASA’s Johnson Space Center, Robonaut is an automated device with the arms, 
torso, and head of an astronaut. It looks like a human being. NASA officials 
instead suggested a design based on the Canadian-built Special Purpose Dexterous 
Manipulator (Dextre) designed for the International Space Station.” 
The industrial age, with its emphasis upon machines that perform human 
functions like lifting and digging, encouraged the contemplation of robots 
that did the work of human beings. The industrial age, however, has been 
50. NASA, “Robonaut,” http://robonaut,jsc.nasa.gov (accessed 5 January 2005); Francis Reedy, 
“Hubble: Robot to the Rescue?” Astronomy, 12 August 2004, http://www.astronomy.com/asy/dt$aulf. 
aspx?c=aGid=2377 (accessed 5 January 2005). 
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supplanted by the postindustrial, with its emphasis upon electronic networks 
and computers. This may encourage popular interest to move away from space 
robots as human substitutes toward machines of a different sort. In the future, 
such machines might take the form of elaborate space telescopes that rely upon 
electromagnetic techniques to investigate extraterrestrial phenomena, cosmic 
listening posts, or even devices built to evade the conventional notions of 
space and time. 
At the highest level, the human versus robot debate fails to account for 
changes in the species who frame it. People who envision the ultimate purpose 
of space activity anticipate its continuation over extraordinarily long periods. 
Commenting on the necessity of spaceflight, Robert Goddard noted that 
homo sapiens would need to move once “the sun grows colder,” an event not 
likely to occur for billions of years. Setting a shorter but nonetheless epochal 
timeframe, astronomer Carl Sagan predicted that the galactic collisions that 
destroy species every 10 to 30 million years would force human migration. 
“Such a discussion may seem academic in the extreme,” Goddard remarked, 
noting the very long time periods involved. Yet people who investigate space 
tend to think in cosmological terms. The ultimate choice, concluded Sagan, 
“is spaceflight or e~tinction.”~’ 
The introduction of very long periods of time creates a dynamic situation 
not extensively analyzed in the traditional human versus robot debate. A species 
that survives long enough to overcome solar destruction would certainly 
undergo genetic modification. This could occur gradually, or the species might 
acquire the means to reengineer lifeforms, including its own, in ways that 
make space travel more accessible. Either way, changes will occur over the 
periods of time during which space enthusiasts hope to prosper and survive. 
Under such conditions, reconsideration of original expectations is inevita- 
ble. The human and robotic visions that motivated the first half century of 
spaceflight may continue to play a powerful role, especially for the exploration 
of the solar system. Yet it would be foolish to assume that they will be the only 
visions to ever inspire public policy and captivate public attention. 
Rather than view the progress of space exploration as a two-sided contest 
between humans and robots, it is probably wise to consider what other visions 
might emerge. The history ofspace exploration suggests that motivating visions 
arise from social outlooks and the tempering influence of physical reality. This 
chapter has reviewed the human and robotic spaceflight visions and, from this 
perspective, speculated on the type of visions that might motivate future space 
activities. What arises is something more than the conventional two-sided 
debate-a future with perhaps four points of view. 
51. Goddard and Pendray, eds., Papers ofRobert H.  Goddard, vol. 3, p. 1612; Carl Sagan, Pale Blue 
Dot: A Vision of the Human Future in Space (New York: Random House, 1994), p. 327. 
CHAPTER 4 
HUMAN-MACHINE SSUES IN 
THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM’ 
Slava Gerovitch 
n December 1968, Lieutenant General Nikolai Kamanin, the Deputy Chief I of the Air Force’s General Staff in charge of cosmonaut selection and training, 
wrote an article for the Red Stay, the Soviet Armed Forces newspaper, about the 
forthcoming launch of Apollo 8. He entitled his article “Unjustified Risk” and 
said all the right things that Soviet propaganda norms prescribed in this case. 
But he also kept a private diary. In that diary, he confessed what he could not 
say in an open publication.“Why do the Americans attempt a circumlunar flight 
before we do?” he asked. Part of his private answer was that Soviet Spacecraft 
designers “over-automated” their spacecraft and relegated the cosmonaut to 
the role of a monitor, if not a mere passenger. The attempts to create a fully 
automatic control system for the Soyuz spacecraft, he believed, critically delayed 
its development. “We have fallen behind the United States for two or three 
years,” he wrote in the diary. “We could have been first on the Moon.”2 
Kamanin’s criticism was shared by many in the cosmonaut corps who 
described the Soviet approach to the division of function between human and 
machine as “the domination of a~tomata.”~ Yet among the spacecraft designers, 
1. I wish to thank David Mindell, whose work on human-machine issues in the U.S. space program 
provided an important reference point for my own study of a parallel Soviet story. Many ideas for this 
paper emerged out of discussions with David in the course of our collaboration on a project on the 
history of the Apollo Guidance Computer between 2001 and 2003, and later during our work on a 
joint paper for the 2004 annual meeting of the Society for the History of Technology in Amsterdam. 
I wish to express my gratitude to Asif Siddiqi and Valentina Ponomareva for sharing their insights 
into the hstory of the Sovlet space program, as well as copies of relevant archval documents. I am 
also indebted to Stanislav Marchenko, Georgii Prns, Viktor Przhiyallcovsky, Irina Solov’eva, Vlammr 
Syromatmkov, Iurii Tiapchenko, Iurii Zybin, and the staff of the Archive for Scientific and Techmcal 
Documentation in Moscow for providmg invaluable help with my research. I am especially thankfd to 
John L. Goodman for h s  detded comments on early versions of this paper. 
2. Nikolai Kamanin, Skrytyr kosrnos, vol. 3, 2967-2968 (Moscow: Novosti kosmonavtiki, 1999), 
p. 335 (12 December 1968). 
3.  Georgii Beregovoi, as quoted in Valentina Ponomareva, “Nachalo vtorogo etapa razvitiia 
pilotiruemoi kosmonavtiki (1965-1970 gg ),” in lssledovanrra p o  rstorii 1 teoni razvrtira avratsronnoi i 
raketno-kosmrcheskoi tekhnrki, vyp. 8-10, ed. Boris Raushenbakh (Moscow: Nauka, 2001), p 166. 
108 CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
a different point of view prevailed. They regarded the high degree of auto- 
mation on Soviet spacecraft as a remarkable achievement. The leading control 
system designer Boris Chertok, for example, praised the implementation of fully 
automatic docking on Soyuz, in contrast to the human-mediated rendezvous 
procedure on Apollo. “We did not copy the American approach,” he argued, 
“and that proved to be one of the strengths of Soviet cosm~nautics.”~ 
The historiography of the Soviet space program has devoted little attention 
to on-board automation, treating it largely as a narrow technical issue.Yet the 
intensity of debates within the Soviet space program over the &vision of control 
functions between human and machine, both in the design phase and during 
spaceflights, indicates that the issue has fundamental importance. The success or 
failure of specific missions often depended on crucial control decisions made by 
the crew, the on-board automatics, or the ground control. The correctness and 
timeliness of such decisions critically depended on the integration of human 
decision-makers into a large, complex, technological system. 
The problem of on-board automation, which tied together the interests 
of different professional groups, provides a window into the internal politics 
of the Soviet space program. Recent scholarship on the Soviet space program 
has largely been devoted to biographies, organizational history, and policy 
analysis, emphasizing the competition among different design bureaus and the 
lack of a coherent government p01icy.~ While most accounts focus on only one 
of the relevant groups-the cosmonauts, the engineers, or the policy-making 
community-a study of human-machine issues illuminates the roles of all major 
professional groups within the Soviet space program. Aviation designers, rocket 
engineers, human engineering specialists, and cosmonauts had very different 
assumptions about the role of the human on board a spacecraft. A study of the 
actual division of function between human and machine on board would help 
us understand the role of these groups in shaping the Soviet space program. 
The issue of on-board automation is also closely linked to the definition of 
the cosmonaut profession.Debates on the relative importance ofcosmonauts’skills 
as pilots, engineers, or researchers reveal the connections between technological 
choices, professional identity, and the social status of cosmonauts.The seemingly 
4. Boris E. Chertok, Rakety i lrudi, vol. 3, Goriachie dni kholodnoi voiny, 3rd ed. (Moscow: 
Mashinostroenie, 2002), p. 393. 
5. For recent biographies, see Iaroslav Golovanov, Korolev: Fakty i m$y (Moscow: Nauka, 1994); 
James Harford, Korolev: How One Man Masterminded the Soviet Drive to Beat America to the Moon (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997). For analysis of the inner workings of space policy-making and 
institutional conflicts, see William P. Barry, “The Missile Design Bureaux and Soviet Piloted Space 
Policy, 1953-1974” (Ph.D. diss., Oxford Universlty, 1995); Roger D. Launius, John M. Logsdon, 
and Robert W. Smith, eds., Reconsidering Sputnik: Forty Years Since the Soviet Satellite (Amsterdam, 
Netherlands: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000); Asif A. Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet 
Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4408,2000). 
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The original 1960 group of cosmonauts is shown in May 1961 at the seaside port of 
Sochi. The names of many of these men were considered state secrets for more than 
25 years. Sitting in front, from left to right: Pavel Popovich, Viktor Gorbatko, Yevgeniy 
Khrunov, Yuri Gagarin, Chief Designer Sergey Korolev, his wife Nina Koroleva with 
Popovich’s daughter Natasha, Cosmonaut Training Center Director Yevgeniy Karpov, 
parachute trainer Nikolay Nikitin, and physician Yevgeniy Fedorov. Standing the second 
row, from left to right: Aleksey Leonov, Andrian Nikolayev, Mars Rafikov, Dmitriy Zaykin, 
Boris Volynov, German Titov, Grigoriy Nelyubov, Valeriy Bykovskiy, and Georgiy Shonin. 
In the back, from left to right: Valentin Filatyev, Ivan Anikeyev, and Pavel Belyayeu. 
Four cosmonauts were missing from the photograph: Anatoliy Kartashov and Valentin 
Varlamov had both been dropped from training because of injuries; Valentin Bondarenko 
died in a training accident a few months before; and Vladimir Komarov was indisposed. 
I. Snegirev took the original photo. (NASA photo no. cosrnonaurs0ll 
technical problem of on-board automation raises larger questions of the nature 
and purpose of human spaceflight. An examination of different approaches to 
human-machine issues uncovers competing visions of spaceflight as a piloting 
mission, an engineering task, or a research enterprise. 
Comparative studies of the American and Soviet aerospace industries 
have addressed the role of the national context in space engineering.6 Soviet 
space program participants often regarded the U.S. as the paragon of a “human- 
centered” approach to spacecraft design. A leading spacecraft designer, for exam- 
6 .  See Stephen J. Garber, “Birds of a Feather? How Politics and Culture Affected the Designs 
of the U.S. Space Shuttle and the Soviet Buran” (master’s thesis, Virginia Institute of Technology, 
2002); Leon Trilling, “Styles of Military Technical Development: Soviet and U.S. Jet Fighters, 
1945-1960,” in Science, Technology, and the Military, ed. E. Mendelsohn, M. R. Smith, and P. 
Weingart (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 155-185. 
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ple, remarked “‘Americans rely on the human being, while we are installing 
heavy trunks of triple-redundancy  automatic^."^ A closer look at both American 
and Soviet space programs through the prism of on-board automation reveals 
a more complex picture. By exploring the arguments of internal debates, the 
diversity of engineering cultures, and the negotiations among various groups 
favoring different approaches to automation, one could critically reexamine the 
stereotype of fixed “national styles” in space engineering. 
In this essay, I shall review a number of human-machine issues raised at 
different phases in the Soviet space program from the early 1960s to the late 1970s. 
From my perspective, the problem of on-board automation was not a purely 
technical issue, but also a political issue-not in terms of big politics, but in terms 
of “small” politics, local politics. My approach is to examine how technological 
choices were shaped by power relations, institutional cultures, and informal 
decision-malung mechanisms, and how these choices, in turn, had significant 
ramifications for the direction of the Soviet space program and ultimately defined 
not only the functions of machines, but also the roles of human beings. 
I will argue that the Soviet approach to the problem ofon-boardautomation 
was neither fixed nor predetermined; it evolved over time and diversified across 
different institutions and projects. Instead of a single, dominating approach, 
we find a series of debates, negotiations, and compromises. In my view, the 
division of function between human and machine on board had much to do 
with the division of power on the ground among different groups involved 
in the debates over automation. I will illustrate how these episodes can be 
taken as entry points into larger historical issues about politics, organization, 
and culture of the Soviet space enterprise. Finally, I will suggest directions for 
further research into this subject. 
AUTOMATION ON VOSTOK: 
TECHNOLOGICAL, DISCIPLINARY, AND MEDICAL FACTORS 
The first spacecraft-the Soviet Vostok and the American Mercury-were 
both fully automated and were flight-tested first in the unpiloted mode. Yet 
there was one important difference: the astronaut on board had a wider range 
of manual control functions than the cosmonaut. This can be illustrated by a 
simple comparison of the control panels of Vostok and Mercury. The Vostok 
panel had only 4 switches and 35 indicators, while the Mercury instrument 
panel had 56 switches and 76 indicaton8 There were only two manual control 
7. Chertok, Rakety i liudi, vol. 3, p. 257. 
8. For a comparison of the technical parameters of manual control panels on American and Soviet 
spacecraft, see Georgii T. Beregovoi et al., Eksperimentalno-psikhologicheskie issledovaniia v aviatsii i 
kosmonavtike (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), pp. 62-63. 
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functions that a cosmonaut could perform in case of emergency: orientation of 
the spacecraft into correct attitude and firing of the retrorocket for descent? 
The range ofmanual control functions available to and actually performed 
by American astronauts was much wider. They could override the automatic 
system in such essential tasks as separating the spacecraft from the booster, 
activating the emergency rescue system, parachute release, dropping the main 
parachute in case of failure and activating the second parachute, correcting 
the on-board control system, and many other functions not available to Soviet 
cosmonauts.1° 
Different authors have offered a number of explanations for the Soviet 
reliance on automation in the case of Vostok: 
1) High reliability ofautomatic control: Soviet rockets could lift greater weights, 
and therefore the Soviets could install redundant sets of automatic 
equipment to ensure its reliability. 
2)  Disciplinary bias o f  rocket engineers: Unlike American space engineers, 
who came from the aviation industry, Soviet spacecraft designers drew 
on specific engineering traditions in rocketry, and they were not 
accustomed to assign humans a significant role on board. 
3 )  Health and safety concerns: There existed doubts about the cosmonaut’s 
mental and physical capacity to operate the spacecraft in orbit. 
Some of these explanations do have a grain of truth. Yet they mostly reflect 
partisan positions in internal Soviet debates over the proper division of control 
functions between human and machine. 
The first, ‘‘technological” explanation is most favored by spacecraft design- 
ers, who view it as an “objective” basis for automation. Indeed, the Vostok 
rocket could lift to the orbit a 4.5-ton spacecraft, while the Americans could 
launch only 1.3 to 1.8 tons. Using this extra weight, the argument goes, 
the Soviets could afford to build redundant, more reliable systems and to 
construct a fully automatic spacecraft, while the Americans were forced to 
delegate some of the functions to the astronaut on board. The space journalist 
Iaroslav Golovanov wrote: “The American astronaut had to work more than 
the Soviet cosmonaut because the weight of Vostok was more than twice 
9. Valentina Ponomareva, “Osobennosti razvitiia pilotiruemoi kosmonavtiki na nachal’nom 
etape,” in Iz istorii raketno-kosmicheskoi nauki i tekhniki, vyp. 3, ed. V. S. Avduevskii et al. (Moscow: 
IIET RAN, 1999), pp. 132-167; Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo, p. 196. 
10. Robert B. Voas, “A Description of the Astronaut’s Task in Project Mercury,” Human Factors 
(July 1961): 149-165. 
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the weight of Mercury, and this made it possible to relieve [the cosmonaut] of 
many in-flight tasks.”” 
Interestingly, this argument only suggests an explanation for the need 
for a broad range of manual control functions on Mercury, while the Soviet 
preference for complete automation is assumed as a natural solution. Those 
who used this argument clearly took it for granted that automatic systems 
were inherently more reliable than human control. Indeed, most Vostok 
designers viewed the cosmonaut on board as a weak link, a source of potential 
errors. The leading integration designer Konstantin Feoktistov openly told 
the cosmonauts, for example, that “in principle, all the work will be done by 
automatic systems in order to avoid any accidental human errors.”12 
In fact, it is by no means obvious why should one use weight reserves to 
install redundant sets of equipment instead of building a more flexible and 
sophisticated manual control system. Soviet space designers admitted that the 
on-board equipment that they were supplied with was so unreliable that 
installing extra sets was the only way to ensure an acceptable risk of failure. Boris 
Chertok acknowledged that the Americans were able to make a much better 
use of their weight reserves than the Soviets. He wrote: “The weight of Gemini 
was only 3.8 tons.Vostok weighed almost a ton more, andvoskhod 2 almost 2 
tons more than Gemini.Yet Gemini surpassed the Vostoks and the Voskhods in 
all  respect^."'^ Gemini had a rendezvous radar, an inertial guidance system with 
a digital computer, a set of fuel cells with a water regenerator, and many other 
types of on-board equipment that the first Soviet spacecraft lacked. 
The second, “disciplinary” explanation is often put forward by cosmo- 
nauts, who tend to blame the “overautomation” of Soviet spacecraft on the 
professional background of rocket engineers. According to the space historian 
and former cosmonaut candidate Valentina Ponomareva, “In the United 
States space technology developed on the basis of aviation, and its traditional 
attitude toward the pilot was transferred to space technology. In the Soviet 
Union the base for the space enterprise was artillery and rocketry. Rocketry 
specialists never dealt with a ‘human on board’; they were more familiar with 
the concept of automatic control.”14 This argument assumes that the Soviet 
space program was a culturally homogeneous assembly of rocket engineers. 
In fact, Chief Designer Sergei Korolev, under whose leadership Vostok was 
11. Golovanov, Korolev, p. 604. A similar argument is presented in Ponomareva, “Osobennosti 
razvitiia,” p. 144. 
12. Quoted in Vladimir Komarov, Workbook No. 39, 1961, Gagarin Memorial Museum, Town 
of Gagarin, Russia, http://hrst.mit.edu/hrs/apollo/soviet/documents/doc-komarov39.pdf (accessed 21 
April 2005). 
13. Chertok, Rakety i liudi, vol. 3, pp. 256-257. 
14. Ponomareva, “Osobennosti razvitiia,” p. 161. 
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constructed, had come into rocketry from aeronautics; in the 1920s and 1930s, 
he had designed and tested  glider^.'^ His deputies, leading spacecraft designers 
Pavel Tsybin and Sergei Okhapkin, had previously been prominent aircraft 
designers. Heated debates over the division of function between human and 
machine often broke out within the space engineering community, and the 
opponents in those disputes were not necessarily divided along the lines of 
their disciplinary background. For example, in July 1963, when the leadership 
of Korolev’s design bureau discussed various options for lunar exploration, it 
was the aviation designer Pavel Tsybin who advocated the use of automatic 
spacecraft, and it was the rocket designer Mikhail Tikhonravov who insisted 
on the development of piloted spaceships.16 Tikhonravov also argued in favor 
of making Vostok controls completely manual.” 
Soviet cosmonauts with aircraft piloting background in private tended 
to blame rocket engineers, nicknamed “artillerymen,” for any design flaws. 
For example, during her training as a cosmonaut, Valentina Ponomareva 
noticed that yaw and roll in the hand controller on the Vostok spacecraft were 
rearranged as compared to a typical aircraft hand controller. Fellow cosmonauts 
told her that it was “because artillerymen had built it.”18 As it turned out, the 
controller was developed by specialists from the Air Force Flight Research 
Institute, which specialized in aviation control equipment. Yaw and roll were 
rearranged because the controller itself was positioned differently (which, in 
turn, was the result of a different position of the cosmonaut as compared to 
the aircraft pilot). Moreover, since spacecraft could rotate in all directions, 
yaw and roll in some cases simply changed places. There was no conspiracy of 
“artillerymen” here; it was aviation specialists who designed manual control 
and information display equipment for Soviet spacecraft.” 
The third, “medical” explanation often cited Soviet doctors’ concern 
that the cosmonaut’s mental and physical capacities might be impaired during 
the flight.20 In fact, although doctors did study the issue of the cosmonaut’s 
health and working capacity in orbit, they were not pushing for automation. 
On the contrary, the leading physician, Vladimir Yazdovskii, was in favor of 
expanding the range of Yuri Gagarin’s tasks on the first human flight, while 
15. See Golovanov, Korolev. 
16. Vasilii Mishin, diary, 22 July 1963, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, 
17. Ponomareva, “Osobennosti razvitiia,” p. 147. 
18. Valentina Ponomareva interview, Moscow, 17 May 2002, http://hrst.mit.edu/hrs/apollo/soviet/ 
interviewhterview-ponomareva. htm (accessed 21 April 2005). 
19. Yurii Tiapchenko, “Information Display Systems for Russian Spacecraft: An Overview,” 
trans. Slava Gerovitch, http://hrst.mit.edu/hrs/apollo/soviet/essays/essay-tiapchenkol. htm (accessed 21 
April 2005). 
DC. 
20. Ponomareva, “Osobennosti razvitiia,” p. 145. 
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A pensive Yuri Gagarin is in the bus on the way to the launchpad on the morning of 12 
April 1961. Behind him, seated, is his backup, German Titov. Standing are cosmonauts 
Grigoriy Nelyubov and Andrian Nikolayev. Gagarin began his cosmonaut training 
in 1960, along with 19 other candidates. On 12 April 1961, Gagarin lifted off in the 
automated Vostok 1 spacecraft, and after a 108-minute flight, he parachuted safely to 
the ground in the Saratov region of the USSR. As the first human to fly in space, he 
successfully completed one orbit around Earth. After his historic flight, Gagarin became 
an international symbol for the Soviet space program, and in 1963, he was appointed 
Deputy Director of the Cosmonaut Training Center. In 1966, he served as a backup 
crew member for Soyuz 1, and on 17 February 1968, he completed a graduate degree 
in technical sciences. Tragically, during flight training in a UTI-MiG-I5 aircraft on 27 
March 1968, Gagarin was killed when his plane crashed. (NASA photo no. GagarinOll 
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Chief Designer Sergei Korolev insisted that Gagarin should limit his actions 
to visual inspection of on-board equipment and should not touch any controls. 
Korolev’s cautious approach may have been prompted by the responsibility 
placed on him by the political authorities. It was Nikita Khrushchev himself 
who on 3 April 1961, just a few days before Gagarin’s flight, at a meeting of 
the Presidium of the Party Central Committee, raised the question about the 
cosmonaut’s working capacity and psychological stability in orbit. Korolev 
had to give his personal assurances.21 Not relying entirely on the disciplining 
force of cosmonaut’s written instructions, spacecraft designers took some 
technological measures to prevent any accidental damage from the cosmonaut’s 
actions in case he did lose his psychological stability. They blocked the manual 
orientation system for reentry with a digital lock. There was some debate 
whether to give the combination to the cosmonaut or to transmit it over the 
radio in case of emergency, and eventually they decided to put the combination 
in a sealed envelope and to place it on board so that the cosmonaut could open 
it in an emergency.22 
In the end, Soviet officials decided to give Gagarin a “broader” set of 
functions, such as checking equipment before launch, writing down his 
observations and instrument readings in the on-board journal, and reporting 
those over the radio. As doctors explained, keeping the cosmonaut busy would 
help deflect his attention from possible negative emotions during g-loads and 
weightles~ness.~~ 
None of the three popular explanations-the reliability of redundant 
automatics, the disciplinary bias of rocket engineers, and the uncertainty about 
human performance in orbit-provides an unequivocal argument in favor of 
automation. All three aspects of the problem of automation-technological, 
disciplinary, and medical-involved debates and negotiations, whose outcome 
was not predetermined from the very beginning. 
21. Nikolai Kamanin, Skrytyi kosmos, vol. 1, 1960-1963 (Moscow: Infortekst, 1995), pp. 23 
(diary entry of 2 March 1961), 43 (diary entry of 4 April 1961). 
22. As it turned out, two people independently told Yuri Gagarin the combination before 
the launch so that he would not have to waste time on opening the envelope in case of real 
emergency. See Boris E. Chertok, Rakety i liudi, vol. 2, Fili-Podlipki-Tiuratam, 3rd ed. (Moscow: 
Mashinostroenie, 2002), pp. 428-429. r 
23. Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo, p. 264. 
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VOSTOK DUAL USE: 
MILITARYICIVILIAN AND AUTOMATIUMANUAL 
Recently published materials suggest another explanation for the Soviet 
reliance on automation in the design ofVostok, an explanation that emphasizes 
the social shaping of technology. It suggests that the military context played a 
decisive role in defining civilian technologies in the Soviet space program. 
Vostok was designed at the Experimental Design Bureau No. 1, led by 
Chief Designer Sergei Korolev, as an add-on to its main specialty, ballistic 
missiles. In November 1958, the Council of Chief Designers discussed three 
alternative proposals for a new spacecraft: an automatic reconnaissance satellite, 
a piloted spacecraft for a ballistic flight, and a piloted spacecraft for an orbital 
flight. The reconnaissance satellite designers pushed their proposal, stressing 
its primary importance for defense. This clearly had an appeal to the military, 
the Design Bureau’s main customers. A rival group, led by the integration 
designer Konstantin Feoktistov, decided to support their proposal for a piloted 
spacecraft for an orbital flight with what he called a “tactical maneuver”: they 
claimed that their piloted spaceship could be converted into a fully automatic 
spacecraft and used as a reconnaissance satellite, which would be able to return 
to Earth not just a small container with film, but a large capsule with the entire 
camera set. This promised to kill two birds with one stone! Feoktistov drafted 
a proposal for a piloted spacecraft in the guise of an automatic reconnaissance 
satellite and submitted it to the Military-Industrial Commission of the Soviet 
Council of Ministers. Some officials became suspicious when they noticed, 
for example, that the presumably automatic satellite was equipped with a set 
of communication devices, and they inquired, “Who is going to talk over 
this radio? The photo cameras?”24 But Feoktistov was able to fend off such 
suspicions, and his proposal was approved. 
At this early stage, the competition between automatic satellites and 
piloted spaceships was resolved by making piloted ships also fully automatic 
so that they could be flown in both piloted and unpiloted modes. Since the 
first Soviet piloted spacecraft had to serve a dual purpose-both military and 
civilian-its controls also had to be dual, both automatic and manual. 
Only having a fully automatic spacecraft at hand, spacecraft designers began 
carving out a role for the cosmonaut to play. By early 1960, Boris Raushenbakh’s 
department at the Experimental Design Bureau No. 1 completed its design of 
the automatic control system, and after that, they began working on manual 
control.That is, the issue here was not the automation of certain functions of 
a human pilot, but the transfer of certain functions from an existing automatic 
system to a human pilot. What really needs an explanation is not why Vostok 
24. Konstantin Feoktistov, Traektoriia zhizni (Moscow: Vagrius, ZOOO), p. 62. 
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was automated, but why it had a manual control system at all. Its purposes w-ere 
to back up the automatic system in case of malfunction, to expand the window 
for controlled descent, and, most importantly, to provide psychological support 
to the cosmonaut. As Raushenbakh put it,“The cosmonaut must be convinced 
that even if ground control equipment and the on-board automatic system fail, 
he would be able to ensure his safety himself.”25 
While Gagarin had to limit his in-flight activity to monitoring and report- 
ing, during subsequent Vostok flights, the cosmonauts successfully tested the 
manual attitude-control system and performed other duties and experiments. 
In particular, they tested the human ability to carry out military tasks. 
Korolev had previously suggested that the piloted version of Vostok could be 
used “to exterminate [enemy] satellite^."^^ Tests performed by the cosmonauts 
Nikolaev and Popovich on Vostok 3 and Vostok 4 demonstrated that the 
human was “capable of performing in space all the military tasks analogous 
to aviation tasks (reconnaissance, intercept, strike). Vostok could be used for 
reconnaissance, but intercept and strike would require the construction of 
new, more advanced spacecraft.” From this information, Kamanin concluded 
that “man can maintain good working capacity in a prolonged spaceflight. 
The ‘central character’ in space is man, not an automat~n.”~’ 
T H E  VOSKHOD 2 MISSION: 
THE COSMONAUT TAKES CONTROL 
While the cosmonauts believed that the first spaceflights had demonstrated 
the human ability to perform in orbit, the engineers largely interpreted the same 
events as confirming the high reliability of automatic systems. Soviet engineers 
initially viewed the automatics and the cosmonaut not as a single, integrated 
system, but as two separate, alternative ways to control a spacecraft.They sought 
ways to make the automatic control system independently reliable, rather than 
trying to optimize interaction between human and machine.The probabhty of a 
system malfunction that would require resorting to manual control seemed 
remote, and the manual control system did not seem to have primary importance 
for spacecraft designers. So when they redesignedvostok for a three-men crew 
(thevoskhod mission) and later for a spacewalk (thevoskhod 2 mission), it was the 
manual control system that got short shrift.To fit in all the new equipment, the 
designers had to move the main instrument panel and the optical sight from the 
25. Aleksei Eliseev, Zhizn-kaplia v more (Moscow: Aviatsiia i kosmonavtika, 1998), p. 15. 
26. Sergei Korolev, “Tezisy doklada PO kosmosu,” June 1960, Russian State Archive of the 
27. Kamanin, Skrytyi kosmos, vol. 1, pp. 174 (diary entry of 13 September 1962), 149 (diary entry 
Economy (RGAE), f. 298, op. 1, d. 1483,l. 246. 
of 16 August 1962). 
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front to the left side, and the hand controller was also moved.28Additional technical 
measures were taken to ensure the reliability of the automatic control system, and 
yet when a life-threatening emergency occurred during the Voskhod 2 flight in 
March 1965, only the cosmonauts’ ingenuity and skill saved their lives. 
When the Voskhod 2 crew-the commander, Pave1 Beliaev, and the 
first “spacewalker,” Alexei Leonov-were preparing for descent, the automatic 
attitude-correction system failed. Because of an error in the mathematical 
model, the automatics decided that the orientation engines were malfunctioning 
and shut them down. Without proper orientation, the firing of the retrorocket 
was automatically blocked, threatening to leave the crew stranded in the orbit. 
After some deliberation, the ground control ordered the cosmonauts to perform 
manual orientation, which was the only option available at that point. 
To use the manual system, however, was no easy task. Because of a peculiar 
cabin layout, the optical sight and the hand controller were located to the left of 
the commander’s seat, rather than in front of it.The cosmonauts could not look 
through the sight or operate the controller while remaining in their seats. Both 
cosmonauts had to unbuckle their seatbelts and leave their seats. Beliaev also had 
to take off his space helmet because he could not bend his neck in it. He had to 
lie down across both seats, since only while lying down could he use both hands 
to operate the manual controls. In the meantime, Leonov crawled under his seat 
and was holding Beliaev by his torso, since in zero gravity, Beliaev tended to float 
away and block the optical sight.After the orientation, the cosmonauts needed to 
fire the retrorocket. But before firing it, they had to return to their seats to balance 
the spacecraft, and they lost 30 or 40 seconds.They spent a few more seconds 
doublechecking the orientation and then fired the retrorocket. As a result of these 
delays, the spacecraft overshot its destination.The crew landed in the middle of a 
thick forest, and before a rescue team was able to reach them, they had to spend 
two nights on the snow, hiding in their space capsule from hungry wolves.29 
The Voskhod 2 story also provided an interesting test case for assigning 
responsibility for various errors to human or machine. The investigating 
commission noted that the flawed spacecraft design made it impossible for the 
crew to control the ship manually without leaving their seats, and at the same 
time, it criticized the crew for violating the rules. In the final report, however, 
the criticism of spacecraft design was dropped in exchange for removing the 
criticism of the crew.3o 
28. Eliseev, Zhizn’, p. 46. 
29. Boris E. Chertok, Rakety r Iiudr, vol. 4, Lunnara gonka (Moscow: Mashinostroenie, 2002), 
p. 418; Eliseev, Zhrm’, p. 58; Nikolai Kamanin, Skrytyi kowtos, vol. 2, 1964-1966 (Moscow: 
Infortekst, 1997), p. 190 (diary entry of 22 April 1965); Ponomareva, “Osobennosti razvitiia,” pp. 
157-158; Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo, p. 458. 
30. Kamanin, Skrytyi kosrnos, vol. 2, pp. 197 (diary entry of 8 May 1965), 199 (diary entry of 13 
May 1965). 
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DESIGNING A COSMONAUT FOR SOYUZ 
The second-generation Soviet spacecraft, Soyuz, was designed for a much 
wider range of missions than Vostok, including Earth-orbit rendezvous and 
docking. The problem of an efficient division of function between human and 
machine on Soyuz became the subject of a heated, if closely contained, debate 
within the Soviet space community. Two groups-the spacecraft designers 
and the cosmonauts-had very different perspectives on this issue. Briefly put, 
their positions were as follows. 
The spacecraft designers argued that on-board automation had clear advan- 
tages. It allowed 1) to test piloted spacecraft in the unpiloted mode, thereby 
reducing time and expense on ground tests and increasing flight safety; 2) to 
lower eligibility criteria and reduce training time for cosmonauts; 3)  to correct 
errors in flight.31 The engineers were willing to assign the cosmonauts a 
backup function but preferred to keep the automatic mode as nominal. 
The cosmonaut corps, on the other hand, tended to view the automation 
of control functions as excessive and hampering the “progress” of human 
spaceflight. They argued that a human operator would increase the reliability 
and effectiveness of a space mission. They especially stressed the human ability 
to act in unexpected situations, to cope with equipment failures, and to 
perform in-flight repairs. They argued that full automation alienated the pilot 
from his craft. They insisted that instead of fitting the human into an existing 
technological system, one must design human activity first and then determine 
specifications for the technological components of the system.32 
The Soviet space program’s organizational structure (or lack thereof) 
gave the spacecraft designers a decided advantage over the cosmonauts in such 
internal disputes. The Soviet space program was not supervised by a central 
government agency like NASA, but was scattered over a large number ofdefense 
industry, military, and academic institutions. The chief contractor for Soyuz- 
Korolev’s Experimental Design Bureau No. 1-exercised unprecedented con- 
trol over the course of the space program. Korolev himself, in particular, 
played a central role in decision-making on a whole range of issues going 
far beyond engineering, such as spacecraft procurement, cosmonaut training, 
crew selection, programming of missions, and ground flight control.33 It was 
31. Vladimir S. Syromiatnikov, 100 rasskazov o stykovke i o drugikh prikliucheniiakh v kosmose i na 
Zemle, vol. 1, 20 let nazad (Moscow: Logos, 2003), p. 83. 
32. See Beregovoi et al., Eksperimentalno-psikhologicheskie issledovaniia, pp. 192, 270; Ponomareva, 
“Nachalo vtorogo etapa”; Ponomareva, “Osobennosti razvitiia.” 
33. O n  Korolev, see Golovanov, Korolev; Harford, Korolev; Boris V. Raushenbakh, ed., S.P. 
Korolev i ego delo: suet i teni v istorii kosmonavtiki (Moscow: Nauka, 1998). In the eyes of Korolev’s 
continued on page 50 
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the engineers’ vision of the proper division of function between human and 
machine that was largely implemented in the Soviet space program. 
Soyuz designers recognized that manual control would “make it possible 
to get rid of a number of complex pieces of equipment and to simplify automatic 
control systems.”34 Compared to Vostok, they significantly broadened the 
range of manual control functions, but these new functions involved not so 
much piloting as monitoring numerous on-board systems and dealing with 
equipment malfunctions. A Soyuz cosmonaut was a different type of cosmo- 
naut, an engineer more than a pilot. 
On the Soyuz program, requirements for the skills of the crew, selec- 
tion criteria for the cosmonaut corps, and the very professional identity of 
cosmonauts began to change. The first group of Soviet cosmonauts that flew 
on Vostoks was selected from among young fighter pilots, who had little 
engineering background and modest flight experience compared to the 
more educated and experienced test pilots selected for the Mercury astronaut 
Sergei Korolev chose fighter pilots because of their universal skills 
as pilots, navigators, radio operators, and gunners.36 On a two- or three-seat 
Soyuz, these functions could now be divided among the crew members, and 
narrow specialists, more skilled in one task than another, could be brought 
on board. 
But there was also another, more important factor that precipitated a shift 
in the cosmonaut professional identity. In the decentralized organizational 
structure ofthe Soviet space program, spacecraft design and cosmonaut training 
were institutionally separated: the design and production of spacecraft was 
conducted under the Ministry of General Machine-Building, and cosmonaut 
training was the responsibility of the Air Force. As a result, the cosmonauts 
had very little input in spacecraft design. They pointed out that in the aviation 
industry, experienced pilots were regularly consulted during the design phase, 
while the cosmonaut pilots were entirely left out of spacecraft design.37 The 
engineers recognized the problem but came up with a different solution for 
it. Vasilii Mishin, who replaced Korolev as Chief Designer after his death, 
argued that “design solutions can only be checked [in flight] by highly qual- 
continuedjom page 49 
subordinates, he was truly omnipotent. For example, Feoktistov claimed that crucial decisions 
concerning the Soviet space program were made “not by the Party Central Committee or the 
Soviet government, but by Korolev and [the defense industry leader Dmitrii] Ustinov (and often by 
Korolev alone), and later they managed, one way or another, to obtain a retroactive endorsement 
through an official decree” (Feoktistov, Traektoriia zhizni, pp. 36-37). 
34. Vasilii Mishin, quoted in Kamanin, Skryfyi kosrnos, vol. 2, p. 368 (diary entry of 17 August 
1966). 
35. Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo, p. 246. 
36. Gherman S. Titov, “30 let spustia,” Aviafsiia i kosmonavtika, no. 8 (1991): 26. 
37. Chertok, Rakefy  i liudi, vol. 4, p. 149. 
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ified specialists directly involved in designing and ground testing of the space- 
craft.”38 Thus, instead of involving cosmonaut pilots in spacecraft design, he 
proposed to train space engineers as cosmonauts and to let them test new 
systems in flight. 
Soon, Mishin took practical steps toward changing the composition of the 
cosmonaut corps. In May 1966, the Experimental Design Bureau No. 1 set up 
a flight-methods department for the training of a civilian group of “cosmonaut 
testers.”39 This rapidly led to an open confrontation with Air Force officials, 
who defended their monopoly on cosmonaut selection and training. Wielding 
his influence with the Soviet leadership, Mishin threatened that only engineers 
and scientists would fly and that training at the Air Force Cosmonaut Training 
Center would be simplified or dispensed with alt~gether.~’ Eventually, a 
compromise was worked out by which a typical Soyuz crew would include 
one military pilot as mission commander, one civilian engineer, and one flight 
researcher, in whose seat military and civilians would alternate.41 
As spacecraft designers began to enter the cosmonaut corps, they intro- 
duced elements of engineering design into the planning of cosmonaut activity. 
The control system engineer and cosmonaut Alexei Eliseev, who took part in a 
spacewalk during the Soyuz 4-Soyuz 5 mission, applied a genuine engineering 
skill in designing a step-by-step procedure for the spacewalk, specifying the 
actions and code words for every crew member. This procedure was recorded 
on a 4-meter-long scroll of paper.42 The Experimental Design Bureau No. 
1 set up a special department, which designed cosmonaut activity so that it 
conformed to the logic ofon-board automatics. Control system designers worked 
in close contact with human engineering specialists, who conceptualized the 
spacecraft control system as a “cybernetic ‘human-machine’ system.”43 Adapting 
the cybernetic conceptual framework, they viewed control as a system function 
that could be performed by both human and machine. Human engineering 
specialists described the cosmonaut as a “living link’”4 in a human-machine 
system and analyzed this “link” in terms borrowed from control theory and 
information theory-the same terms that applied to the other, technical links 
38. Quoted in Kamanin, Skrytyi kosmos, vol. 2,p. 368 (diary entry of 17 August 1966). 
39. Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo, p. 566. 
40. Chertok, Rakety i liudi, vol. 3, p. 242. 
41. Eliseev, Zhizn’, p. 165. 
42. Ibid., p. 91. 
43. V. G .  Denisov, “Nekotorye aspekty problemy sochetaniia cheloveka i mashiny v slozhnykh 
sistemakh upravleniia,” in Problemy kosrnicheskoi biologii, ed. N. M. Sisakian and V. I. Iazdovskii, vol. 
2 (Moscow: Nauka, 1962), p. 54. 
44. V. G. Denisov, A. P. Kuz’mmov, and V. I.  Iazdovskii, “Osnovnye problemy inzhenernoi 
psikhologii kosmicheskogo poleta,” in Problerny kosmicheskoi biologii, ed. N. M. Sisakian and V. I. 
Iazdovskii, vol. 3 (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), p. 77. 
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in that system: delay time, perception speed, reaction speed, bandwidth, and 
so They discussed how efficiently a human operator could perform the 
functions of a logical switchboard, an amplifier, an integrator, a differentiator, 
and a computer.46 Spacecraft designers avoided using the word “pilot” and 
preferred the term “spacecraft guidance operator.’”’ The cosmonaut had to fit 
into an existing technological system, and human performance was effectively 
evaluated in machine terms. 
One of the main criteria for cosmonaut selection was the ability to carry 
out precisely programmed actions.48 Subsequent training was geared toward 
turning the human into a perfect machine. Spacecraft designers took to the 
heart a piece of advice given by Igor’ Poletaev, a leading Soviet cybernetics 
specialist. He argued that the way to avoid human error was to train the 
human to operate like a machine. He wrote: “The less his various human 
abilities are displayed, the more his work resembles the work of an automaton, 
the less [the human operator] debates and digresses, the better he carries out 
his task.”49 The cosmonaut training manual explicitly stated that “the main 
method of training is repetiti~n.”~’ Yuri Gagarin recalled how the cosmonauts 
were “getting used to every button and every tumbler switch, learned all 
the movements necessary during the flight, making them auto ma ti^."^' The 
Vostok 5 pilot Valerii Bykovskii was praised in his character evaluation for 
“the high stability of automation of 
The cosmonauts began to resent what they perceived as “excessive 
algorithmization” of their activity. They argued that the strict regulation of 
cosmonauts’ activity on board forced them “to work like an automaton” and 
stripped them of the possibility to plan their actions on their 
45. Denisov, “Nekotorye aspekty,” p. 55. 
46. P. K. Isakov, V. A. Popov, and M. M. Sil’vestrov, “Problemy nadezhnosti cheloveka v 
sistemakh upravleniia kosmicheskim korablem,” in Problemy kosmicheskoi biologii, ed. N. M. Sisakian, 
vol. 7 (Moscow: Nauka, 1967), p. 6. 
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SOYUZ FLIGHTS: DIVIDING LORY AND RESPONSIBILITY 
BETWEEN HUMAN AND MACHINE 
Several emergency situations that occurred during Soyuz missions 
underscored the crucial importance of human-machine issues for spacecraft 
control. As the boundary between human and machine functions was often 
blurred, so was the responsibility for error. While accident investigators tended 
to assign the responsibility for error to either human or machine, failures 
were often systemic. In an emergency, rigid control schemes often had to be 
reconsidered and human and machine functions had to be redefined. Ground 
flight controllers frequently stepped in, further complicating the division of 
responsibility between human and machine. Ultimately, what often decided 
the success of the mission was not how much or how little the cosmonauts did, 
but how well they were integrated into the control system, which included 
both the on-board automatics and mission control. 
In April 1967, the Soyuz 1 mission had to be aborted after multiple equip- 
ment failures, and the cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov successfully performed 
manual attitude correction with an ad hoc method invented during the flight. 
Yuri Gagarin, who served as a CAPCOM on that mission, told the leading 
control system designer, “What could have we done without a human? Your 
ion system proved unreliable, a sensor failed, and you still don’t trust cosmo- 
nauts! ”54 In the end, yet another automatic system-the parachute release- 
failed, and this time, the cosmonaut had no manual means to override it. The 
spacecraft hit the ground at full speed, and Komarov died. 
In October 1968, the cosmonaut Georgii Beregovoi on Soyuz 3 attempted 
a manual rendezvous, but he misread the target vehicle indicators and failed to 
approach the target. Engineers regarded this as a clear human error, yet Nikolai 
Kamanin, responsible for cosmonaut training, pointed out that the actual manual 
control system on board in certain respects differed from the version installed on 
a ground simulator and that the cosmonaut did not have adequate time to adjust 
to zero gravity. “I did not find my place within a human-machine structure,” 
admitted Beregovoi. He complained that the hand controllers were too sensitive, 
sending the spacecraft into motion at the slightest touch: “This is good for an 
automaton, but it creates extra tension for a human.”55 Kamanin interpreted 
this incident as a systemic failure, rather than simply a human operator error: “If 
even such an experienced test pilot [as Beregovoi] could not manually perform 
the docking of two spaceships, this means that the [manual] docking system is 
too complex to work with in zero gravity.’”‘ 
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Now engineers had to prove that their manual control system was actually 
operable. Chief Designer Vasilii Mishin insisted on trying manual docking 
on the Soyuz 4-Soyuz 5 mission in January 1969, even though his boss, the 
Minister of General Machine-Building, Sergei Afanas’ev, pressured him to 
resort to the proven automatic docking system.57 This time the engineers 
made sure that the cosmonauts received more than sufficient training on the 
ground. The cosmonaut Vladimir Shatalov had performed 800 simulated 
dockings in various regimes on a ground simulator before he successfully 
carried out manual docking of Soyuz 4 and Soyuz 5.58 Later, for other trainees, 
the requisite number of simulated dockings was reduced to 150.59 
In August 1974, the Soyuz 15 crew attempted an automatic rendezvous 
with the Salyut 3 station, but the automatic system malfunctioned, misjudging 
the distance to the target and producing an acceleration thrust instead of 
retrofire. This led to a near collision of the spaceship with the station. Another 
attempt at automatic approach resulted in another dangerous flyby. The crew 
suggested to make a third attempt at docking in the manual regime, but ground 
control did not give permission, due to the low level of remaining propellant. 
The crew had to return to Earth without completing their mission.60 
After the flight, heated debates erupted over the question whether the 
main responsibility for the failed mission should be assigned to human or 
machine. Engineers argued that the cosmonauts should have recognized the 
malfunction immediately and should have resorted to manual control. Officials 
responsible for cosmonaut training replied that this particular type of 
emergency had not been included in the list and that the cosmonauts had not 
been trained for it. The investigation was further complicated by the fact that 
this failure occurred just a year before the scheduled docking of Soyuz with 
Apollo. The American side, worried about the reliability of the Soviet rendez- 
vous system, requested an explanation of the Soyuz 15 incident.61 Thus, despite 
an obvious failure of the automatic docking system, the Soviets preferred to 
put the blame squarely on the cosmonauts-for not shutting down the 
malfunctioning system after the first failure.62 Both cosmonauts were officially 
reprimanded and never flew into space again. 
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Rather than being an exclusively human or machine failure, the Soyuz 15 
mission illustrated another system failure: a failure to integrate the crew in the 
control loop in a human-machine system.The crew was kept in “cold reserve,” 
passively monitoring the operations of the automatic docking system. When this 
system failed, the crew was not ready to take over control operations quickly. 
Although the engineers switched the blame to the crew, it was the engineers’ 
design of the control system that placed the crew in the role of passive observers. 
Engineers tacitly admitted that the failure of the Soyuz 15 mission had roots 
in the overall organization of rendezvous control, including the role of ground 
control. A special operational group was created as part of Mission Control to 
develop procedures for automatic and manual rendezvous in various emergency 
situations and to provide real-time recommendations for the flight director.63 
After that incident, cosmonaut pilots were assigned responsibility for manual 
approach from the distance of 200 to 300 meters. In a few years, however, this 
rule was subjected to a severe test. In October 1977, the Soyuz 25 crew made 
an attempt at manual docking with the Salyut 6 station, and when the spacecraft 
almost touched the station, they suddenly realized that they were facing the 
“bottom” of the station, instead of the docking port. They quickly turned away 
from Salyut 6 and made several more docking attempts, all ofwhich failed. Having 
spent much propellant, Soyuz 25, in the end, did not even have enough fuel to 
back up from the station and remained in close proximity to it for several 0rbits.6~ 
As it turned out, what the cosmonauts perceived as the “bottom” of the station 
was in fact the docking port. Soyuz 25 approached the station from a slightly 
different angle than was expected, but the cosmonauts were never trained on a 
ground simulator to recognize the station from that angle. A “conditional reflex” 
they acquired during incessant training on the simulator prevented them from 
recognizing the correct position of the station.65 Although the error was rooted 
in the inadequate simulator design, the cosmonauts bore their part of the blame. 
For the first time, the cosmonauts did not receive the honor of the Hero of the 
Soviet Union, but were awarded “only” the Order of Lenin.66 Mission planners 
decided never again to send all-rookie crews into space. Most importantly, it was 
decided to make the nominal docking regime automatic, and the cosmonauts 
were allowed to take over manual control only in case of failure of the automatic 
sy~tem.~’ The prolonged struggle for the right to control docking between 
human and machine began to shift in favor of the latter. 
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T H E  ROLE OF GROUND CONTROL 
The norms of cosmonaut activity included not only following the tech- 
nical protocol of interaction with on-board equipment, but also following 
the social protocol of subordination to their superiors on the ground. Framing 
the whole issue as human versus machine is somewhat misleading. The real 
issue here was not so much the division of function between human and 
machine, but the division of power between the human on the ground and the 
human on board. 
Boris Chertok acknowledged that the growing complexity of space tech- 
nology warranted a greater role for the human operator, but his idea of human 
participation was to involve “not just an individual, but an entire colle~tive,”~~ 
meaning the flight controllers and specialists on the ground. As a result, Soviet 
designers adopted the principle that they have followed to this day: all critical 
systems had three independent lines of control: automatic, remote (from the 
ground), and manual.69 Control during the three main stages of the flight- 
reaching the orbit, orbital flight, and reentry-was automatic; instructions to 
switch programs between the stages were given either from the ground or 
manually by the cosmonaut. The cosmonaut, however, had to obtain permis- 
sion from the ground for any critical action. The cosmonaut training manual 
clearly stipulated that “all most important decisions are made by Mission 
Contr01.”~’ The real control of the mission remained in the hands of engineers: 
either through the automatic systems they designed or through their design 
and management of cosmonaut activity. 
The need to obtain clearance from Mission Control sometimes delayed 
critical actions until it was too late. For example, in October 1969, the Soviets 
planned a complicated orbital maneuver with three spacecraft: Soyuz 7 and 
Soyuz 8 attempted a rendezvous, while Soyuz 6 was to capture the event on 
camera. Unfortunately, the automatic approach system on Soyuz 8 failed. At 
that moment, the two ships were about 1,000 meters from each other, and the 
cosmonauts asked permission to attempt manual approach. While the crew 
awaited permission from the ground, the ships drifted apart to the distance of 
about 3,000 meters, and manual approach was no longer an option. The next 
day, through orbital maneuvers, the ships were brought within 55 feet from each 
other, but without any means to determine their relative velocities, all attempts 
at manual approach also failed.7l The crews had to return to Earth without 
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completing their mission. Nikolai Kamanin subsequently bitterly remarked in 
his private diary: “Everything [on the Soyuz] is based on the assumption of a 
flawless operation of automatics, and when it fails, cosmonauts are left without 
reliable means of And yet the responsibility for the failed mission 
was placed on the c0smonauts.7~ Boris Chertok later admitted, however, that 
the designers were to blame for overestimating human capabilities and for not 
providing adequate training on simulators for the situation of failure of the 
automatic approach ~ystem.7~ 
On more than one occasion, cosmonauts faced the dilemma: to follow the 
rules and fail the mission or to take risks and break the rules. Some preferred to 
break the rules and save the mission. Another emergency that occurred during 
the Voskhod 2 flight in March 1965 is a case in point. After completing his 
historic spacewalk, the cosmonaut Alexei Leonov reahzed that his spacesuit 
ballooned, his arms and legs did not even touch the inside, and he was unable 
to reenter the airlock. He was supposed to report all emergencies to the ground 
and wait for instructions. He later recalled: “At first I thought of reporting what 
I planned to do to Mission Control, but I decided against it. I did not want to 
create nervousness on the ground.And anyway I was the only one who could 
bring the situation under control.”75 Perhaps, he calculated that instructions from 
the ground could be delayed because of various bureaucratic procedures and the 
possible reluctance of some decision-makers to take responsibility, and it would 
be unwise for him to spend his limited oxygen supply waiting for them. Leonov 
turned a switch on his spacesuit, drastically reducing the internal air pressure, 
which allowed him to regain control of his movements. Once he broke one rule, 
he decided that he would not make things worse by breaking another, and he 
climbed into the airlock headfirst, in violation of an established procedure. 
The Voskhod 2 crew-Alexei Leonov and Pave1 Beliaev, both military 
pilots-were trained to follow the rules and to obey orders from the ground. 
After more than 150 training sessions on a spacewalk simulator, Leonov was 
said to have brought his skills “to the point of automatic perf~rmance.”~~ Yet 
in a real emergency, Leonov had to perform actions for which he was not 
trained, to violate explicit rules concerning entry into the airlock, and to make 
decisions without consulting Mission Control. In other words, his mission 
was successful precisely because he did not act like a perfect machine. 
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THE PARADOX OF DISCIPLINED INITIATIVE 
Space engineers believed that flight safety would be best guaranteed by 
comprehensive automation and by strict following of instructions by the crew, 
but the cosmonauts pointed out that it was often necessary to break the rules 
in case of emergency. The engineers often viewed any departure from the 
standard procedure as a “human error,” while it was precisely this ability to 
deviate from the standard path that made human presence on board so valuable 
in an emergency situation. Perhaps the main difference between human and 
machine in a human-machine system is that the machine fails when it does 
not follow preset rules and the humans fail when they do not recognize that 
it is time to break the rules. 
Valentina Ponomareva, a member of the first women’s cosmonaut group, 
summed up the cosmonauts’ vision of the unique human role on board as 
follows: 
In addition, the cosmonaut must possess such qualities as curi- 
osity and the ability to break rules . . . . Regulations work well 
only when everything goes as planned . . . . The ability to act 
in extraordinary situations is a special quality. In order to do 
that, one has to have inner freedom . . . the ability to make 
non-trivial decisions and to take non-standard actions. In an 
extreme situation the very life of the cosmonaut depends on 
these q~alities.7~ 
Despite her high qualifications as an engineer and a pilot and her excellent 
test marks, Ponomareva was not selected for the first woman’s flight, and she 
never got a chance to fly. Her independent-mindedness most likely played a 
role here. 
Sonja Schmid, in her study of Soviet nuclear power station operators, 
observed a similar contradiction in the way the operators were viewed by 
nuclear reactor designers: both as a “weak link” and as a “reliable cog in the 
Both spacecraft designers and nuclear engineers viewed the human 
operator as part of technology, which must always function according to 
the rules, and at the same time, they expected the operators to show human 
qualities such as initiative and inventiveness. 
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This need for the cosmonauts to be both obedient and creative, to follow 
the rules and to break them, one might call “a paradox of disciplined initiative.” 
In my view, this paradox reflects one of the fundamental contradictions of 
the Soviet approach to spacecraft control (and perhaps to social control and 
government in general). 
THE LUNAR PROGRAM: 
A TURN TOWARD MANUAL CONTROL 
The lunar race further complicated the debates over the human role on 
board. Lunar mission profiles did not allow ground stations to effectively 
control the entire flight, and the division of control functions between human, 
on-board automation, and ground control had to be reevaluated. Initially, 
it was decided to give the cosmonauts an unusually high degree of control 
over their spacecraft. Alexei Leonov, who initially trained for a circumlunar 
mission, recalled that “we had to be able to perform every aspect of the flight 
manually in case the automatic system failed.”79 Later on, the internal politics 
of the Soviet lunar program began to erode this principle. 
From the very beginning, the Soviet lunar program suffered from the lack of 
coordination, internal rivalries, duplication of effort, and fracturing of resources. 
Initially, the heads of two rival design bureaus-Sergei Korolev and Vladimir 
Chelomey-divided the lunar pie more or less equally: Korolev worked on 
a lunar landing project, while Chelomey developed a rocket and a spacecraft 
for a circumlunar fhght. After Khrushchev’s ouster in October 1964 and the 
subsequent shakeup in the upper echelons of Soviet power Chelomey lost some 
of his political support, and Korolev eventually wrestled the circumlunar flight 
project away from him. In October 1965, a government decree assigned Korolev 
the responsibility for the development of the 7K-L1, a new spacecraft designed 
specifically for a circumlunar flight, later publicly named Zond. 
One major hurdle in the Soviet lunar program was eliminated: all work 
on lunar spacecraft was now concentrated in one organization, Korolev’s 
- design bureau. Yet the circumlunar flight and the lunar landing remained two 
separate projects with different goals, independent work schedules, different 
booster rockets, separate ground infrastructures, and two different types of 
spacecraft, the L l  and the L3. The addition of the circumlunar project to 
Korolev’s tasks stretched the resources of his design bureau and messed up the 
lunar landing project schedule. The circumlunar project was given immediate 
priority in order to complete it by the 50th anniversary of the Great October 
Revolution in November 1967. 
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Social and political factors influenced the lunar program down to the very 
technical level. Korolev had to split the responsibility for the development of the 
control system for the L1 spacecraft with the organization led by his old friend 
Nikolai Pilyugin.As a result, Pilyugin developed the automatic control system for 
course corrections and reentry, while Korolev assumed responsibility for manual 
rendezvous control.80 The cosmonaut functions on board were thus limited by 
the division of spheres of responsibdity of different design organizations. 
The L1 crew consisted of two cosmonauts, whose duties included checking 
all on-board systems in Earth orbit and then orienting the spacecraft toward the 
Moon. For the first time in the Soviet piloted space program, the L1 control 
system included a digital computer, the Argon-1 1. This computer was part of 
the automatic control system designed by Pilyugin, and cosmonauts had no 
access to it.” The manual control system included a digital computing device 
called Salyut 3, which was not reprogrammable; it gave the cosmonauts fixed 
options for selecting one of the preset programs. According to the control panel 
designer,YuriTiapchenko, the L1 panel was a step backward in comparison with 
Soyuz: “The functions of cosmonauts were reduced to the simplest operations 
of entering commands and controlling their execution in accordance with flight 
instructions and the orders issued by ground control.”82 
In 1967-1968, the Soviets made eight attempts to launch L1 on a circumlunar 
mission in the unpiloted mode. Only one mission performed a circumlunar flight; 
all missions were fraught with numerous failures which might have been fatal to 
a human crew. After the successful Apollo 8 mission in December 1968, the L1 
program lost its political rationale, and after another failed L1 mission in January 
1969, the plans for a piloted flight were suspended. Eventually the program 
was canceled without a single attempt for a piloted flight. The cosmonauts 
unsuccessfully petitioned the Soviet political leadership for continuation of the 
piloted circumlunar program.83 The only completely successful L1 mission that 
would have returned the crew safely to Earth took place on 8 August 1969.The 
passengers on the spacecraft were four male tortoises. Two cosmonauts, Alexei 
Leonov and Oleg Makarov, participated in the mission as ground operators.84 
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That flight took place already after Apollo 11. The Soviet lunar landing 
project, known as Nl-L3, lost its political rationale too, but Chief Designer 
Mishin continued lobbying for it, given the amount of funding and effort 
already invested in it, and the project was kept afloat for a few more years. 
The Soviet lunar landing project was based on a lunar orbit rendezvous 
scheme similar to Apollo. Because of the limits on the rocket lifting power, 
however, the weight of the Soviet lunar lander had to be roughly one-third 
of the weight of the Apollo lander. For this reason, the Soviets planned to 
send only two cosmonauts on the lunar mission: one cosmonaut landing 
on the Moon and the other staying on the lunar orbital ship. Severe weight 
limitations forced Soviet designers to give the cosmonauts a much wider range 
of functions. In particular, to reduce the bulk of docking equipment and to 
eliminate extra dockings, the engineers proposed to transfer the cosmonaut 
from the orbital ship to the lander and back via spacewalk.*’ 
Lunar landing was planned to be fully automatic with partial manual 
backup.86 Using an on-board computer, a cosmonaut could process information 
from various sensors, evaluate the condition of the lander according to prepro- 
grammed algorithms, and choose specific actions. Most importantly, the 
cosmonaut could manually select a landing site on the’lunar surface and give 
instructions to the computer to produce required landing maneuvers.*’ Lunar 
landing required extraordinary performance from the cosmonaut: on the 
Apollo lunar landing module, two astronauts had 2 minutes to make a landing 
decision, while on the Soviet lander, a single cosmonaut would have only 15 
to 20 seconds.88 
Cosmonauts underwent intensive training, both on simulators and on 
helicopters, simulating lunar landing. They performed helicopter landings 
with the engines cut off, a very difficult and dangerous o p e r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Gradually, 
however, Chief Designer Vasilii Mishin began to limit the responsibilities 
of the pilot, placing greater emphasis on automatic systems. This may have 
had something to do with Mishin’s plans to assign a greater role to civilian 
cosmonauts, engineers from his own design bureau. Cutting on manual control 
functions made it possible to reduce cosmonaut training time, and civilian 
cosmonauts, who generally had less training than military pilots, could now 
compete with the pilots for the lunar landing mis~ion.’~ 
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The growing degree ofautomation on the L3 alarmed the cosmonaut pilots. 
Alexei Leonov, who trained for lunar landing, commented that “according to 
the fight plan the automatic system took precedence”; the cosmonauts were 
allowed to resort to manual control only in case of failure of the automatic 
system. “I had argued,” continued Leonov, “that, as commander ofa spacecraft, 
what I needed once a flight was in progress was as little communication as 
possible from the ground-since it served mainly to distract me from what I 
already knew was necessary-and only manual, not automatic, control.”g1 
The lunar landing program suffered from a series of setbacks during the 
failed launches of the giant N1 booster. The last attempt was made in 1972, 
and soon the program was terminated. The cosmonauts had hoped that they 
might have a chance to fly the lunar spacecraft during a series of Earth-orbit 
test flights in 1970-71. The financial difficulties that besieged the Soviet lunar 
program, however, forced Mishin to eliminate lunar orbiter test flights and 
to test only the lunar lander, and just in the unpiloted mode. During three 
tests in Earth orbit, the lunar lander successfully simulated a lunar landing, 
two liftoff operations with the primary and backup engines, and an entry 
into lunar orbit. The automatic control system worked perfectly?’ Whether 
manual controls would have worked remains unknown. The Soviets kept 
the existence of their piloted lunar program secret for 25 years. Instead, they 
cultivated the myth that exploring the Moon with automatic probes was their 
one and only goal. 
DEFINING THE COSMONAUT PROFESSION 
The seemingly technical issue of on-board automation raised a larger 
question of the nature and purpose of human spaceflight. The debates over 
automation reflected three competing visions ofspaceflight: a piloting mission, 
an engineering task, and a research enterprise. 
The first cosmonaut group was composed of military pilots, and they used 
their growing prestige and political influence to maintain their monopoly on 
spaceflight. In May 1961, shortly after his historical first flight, Yuri Gagarin 
sent a letter to the Chief Marshal ofAviation, A. A. Novikov, arguing that “only 
pilots are capable of carrying out spaceflights. If others want to fly into space, 
they must learn to fly aircraft first. Aviation is the first step to   pace flight."^^ 
91. Scott and Leonov, Two Sides ofthe Moon, p. 189. 
92. Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo, pp. 734-736. 
93. Quoted in Kamamn, Skrytyi kosmos, vol. 1, p. 57 (diary entry of 25 May 1961). Later on, Gagarin 
seemed to have changed h s  opimon and supported the first civhan engineers who joined the cosmonaut 
corps; see Georgu Grechko,“Iz-za hubvi k kmo ia chut’ ne prozeval polet v kosmos!” Vechernri Omsk, no. 
11 (1 1 February 2004), http://epizodsspace.testpilot.~/bibl/intervy/grechko3.html (accessed 21 Aprd 2005). 
HUMAN-MACHINE ISSUES IN THE SOVIET MANNED SPACE PROGRAM 133 
Two N1 Moon rockets appear on the pads at Tyura-Tam in early July 1969. Highly 
automated, the N1 was designed for the Soviet space program’s human lunar missions. 
In the foreground is booster number 5L with a functional payload for a lunar-orbiting 
mission. In the background is the IMI ground-test mock-up of the N1 for rehearsing 
parallel launch operations. After takeoff, the rocket collapsed back onto the pad, 
destroying the entire pad area in a massive explosion. (NASA photo no. nljulyl969) 
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When, in 1962, Korolev for the first time raised the question of including 
engineers in space crews, Kamanin called this “a wild idea.”94 The military 
pilots strongly objected to the waiver of “harsh physical tests” for engineers, 
insisting that the pilots were “the real veterans in the [cosmonaut] corps.”95 
A Deputy Minister of Defense said bluntly that “we will select cosmonauts 
only from among robust young fellows from the military. We don’t need those 
ninnies from civilian science.”96 Kamanin eventually realized the need for a 
compromise and began lobbying for the inclusion of civilian specialists. 
Space engineers, for their part, insisted that they had a legitimate claim 
for a spacecraft seat. Boris Chertok explained: “We, engineers who designed 
the control system, believed that controlling a spacecraft is much easier that 
controlling an aircraft. All processes are extended in time; there is always 
time to think things over . . . . A good engineer can control a spaceship as 
well as a pilot, if there are no obvious medical ~bject ions.”~~ The engineer- 
cosmonaut Konstantin Feoktistov compiled a chart comparing the professions 
of the cosmonaut and the pilot and tried to show that piloting skills were 
unnecessary aboard a spacecraft, but Kamanin interpreted the same chart in 
the opposite way.98 
Engineers argued that their presence on board would have dual benefit: a 
better handling of emergency situations during the flight and a better design 
of spacecraft resulting from their flight experience. The engineer-cosmonaut 
Alexei Eliseev reasoned that, as space technology was becoming more and more 
complex, it would be impossible to write down instructions for all conceivable 
emergencies. A situation may arise in which only spacecraft designers on 
board would be able to find the right solution. He also suggested that “one 
could design on-board equipment for the cosmonauts only with their own 
participation. Only people who carry out spaceflights can give competent 
assessments and recommendations with regard to the convenience of use of 
various types of on-board eq~ ipmen t . ”~~  Instead of involving cosmonaut pilots 
in the design process, however, the engineers believed that they themselves 
should be included in space crews. In April 1967, the engineer-cosmonaut 
Oleg Makarov met with Chief Designer Vasilii Mishin and proposed a list of 
measures aimed at changing the role of humans on board. Makarov argued 
that an engineer must be included in every space crew; that crews must study 
on-board equipment at the design and production sites, not just on simulators; 
94. Kamanin, Skrytyi kosnzos, vol. 1, p. 105 (diary entry of 19 April 1962). 
95. Scott and Leonov, Two Sides of the Moon, p. 146. 
96. Kamanin, Skrytyi kosnzos, vol. 1, p. 210 (diary entry of 17 January 1963). 
97. Chertok, Rakety i Ziudi, vol. 3, pp. 237, 242. 
98. Kamanin, Skrytyi kosntos, vol. 3, p. 210 (diary entry of 8 April 1968). 
99. Eliseev, Zhirn’, pp. 28, 164. 
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and that cosmonauts must be given the right to take over control in case of 
malfunction of automatic systems.’OO 
Kamanin realized that engineers-turned-cosmonauts might soon replace 
the military pilots whose training he oversaw. In February 1965, he ordered 
to organize eight research groups at the Cosmonaut Training Center focused 
on the following problems: military use of spacecraft; space navigation, life- 
support and rescue systems; telemetry equipment; scientific orbital stations; 
circumlunar flight; lunar landing; and weightlessness. Each group would 
study the assigned problem, formulate the Center’s positions on specific issues, 
and defend those positions before scientists and designers.”’ While spacecraft 
designers were claiming a seat on board, the cosmonauts began to claim a seat 
at the designer’s workstation. 
In the 1970s, with the introduction of orbital stations, mission engineers 
began playing an ever-growing role in spaceflight. Long-duration missions 
required such skills as equipment maintenance and repair, observation, and 
research much more than piloting, which was limited to docking, undocking, 
and keeping the station in the correct attitude. Although pilots were tradition- 
ally appointed mission commanders, flight engineers began to demand more 
authority in decision-making. The engineer-cosmonaut Georgii Grechko 
summed up the engineers’ sentiment as follows: “The time of pilots among 
cosmonauts is passing. In any case, they are no longer the main agents of the 
exploration of the Universe. ‘Our’ era, the era of mission engineers is 
dawning.”lo2 Grechko’s discussion of these controversial issues with his com- 
mander, the pilot Yurii Romanenko, during their mission on the Salyut 6 
station quickly turned into a heated argument. Eventually, Grechko had to 
flee into another compartment of the station to avoid violent confrontation. 
Maintaining a complex orbital station with its long-term life-support 
systems devoured most of the cosmonauts’ time on board, raising questions 
about the relative costs and benefits of human flight. The engineer-cosmonaut 
Valentin Lebedev calculated that during a five-day work week, two cosmonauts 
spent 111 hours on supporting themselves. Only 9 hours were left for scientific 
research. “The station is crewed just for the sake of those nine  hour^.''^^^ In an 
interview given after his retirement, Vasilii Mishin similarly estimated that 
in space, most of a cosmonaut’s time on board was spent on preparations for 
takeoff and landing, on physical exercise, and on sleep: “Only 20 percent of 
100. Mishm, diary, 30Apnl 1967. 
101. Kamanin, Skrytyi kosmos, vol. 2, p. 134 (diary entry of 2 February 1965). 
102. Georgii Grechko, Start v neizvestnost’ (Moscow: Pravda, 1989), chap. 2. 
103. Valentin Lebedev, “U nas velikaia strana. Reshat’ ee problemy predstoit novomu pokoleniiu,” 
Osnova (Naro-Fominsk), no. 26 (28 May 2004), http://eprrodsspace.testpilot.ru/brbl/intervy/lebedevl. 
html (accessed 21 April 2005). 
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a cosmonaut’s time was spent on really productive work.” He concluded that 
the cosmonaut profession as such did not exist and that, at present, piloted 
flights were “entirely ~nnecessary.”~~~ 
Konstantin Feoktistov proposed to solve the problem of inefficiency of 
human spaceflight though automation. “A man assigned to cope only with 
control functions is an unjustifiable luxury,” he argued. “No craft is designed to 
carry dead weight. It must have a payload that performs a kmd of useful work. 
This can be, for example, research.” He proposed to make spacecraft control 
“simple and executable without high skills and during a minimum time” to 
allow scientists and engineers to fly space missions. “Every operation that can be 
automated on board a spaceship should be automated,” concluded Feokti~tov.”~ 
Boris Chertok simdarly viewed automation as the way to 6-ee up the crew from 
routine functions: “Taken the high degree of automation on Vostok, an even 
higher degree on Zenit, and totally marvelous automation on future generations 
of spacecraft, the human on board must engage in research, reconnaissance, 
and  experiment^."'^^ Feoktistov argued that valuable scientific data could be 
obtained only if scientists were included in space crews. “Scientists can develop 
their own experimental agenda, prepare their own instruments and equipment 
. . . . Cosmonauts [who lack scientific training] do not have this expertise.They 
are trained for specific mechanical operations: to turn something on, to switch 
something off, to monitor equipment, etc. If scientists come to space, scientific 
research would be more prod~ctive.”’~~ Long debates over the question whether 
scientists should be allowed on board were resolved in favor of a “professional 
cosmonaut,” an engineer or a pilot, who would receive some scientific training 
and conduct experiments on board in consultation with scientists on the 
ground. The most the scientists were able to achieve was the privilege of drect 
communication with the cosmonauts in orbit.’O* 
The problem ofprofessional identity of the cosmonaut-a pilot, an engineer, 
or a scientist-proved inextricably connected with the question of on-board 
automation. If the first cosmonaut pilots tried to wrestle control functions from 
the machine, later on, cosmonaut researchers preferred to delegate equipment 
service functions to automatic systems to f?ee up their own time for experiments 
and observations. As Valentin Lebedev put it, “Man is not an appendix to a 
machine. Man is not made for the flight, but the flight is made for man.”’09 
104. Vasilii Mishin, “I Contend That There Is No Cosmonaut Profession” (English title), 
105. Quoted inViktor D. Pekehs, Cybernetic Medley, trans. Oleg Sapunov (Moscow: Mir, 1986), p. 287. 
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107. Konstantin Feoktistov, “‘Aliaska’ v kosmose,” Voronezhskie vesti, no. 27 (2 July 2003), http:// 
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AUTOMATION IN CONTEXT 
This brief overview of human-machine issues in the Soviet space program 
indicates that instead of the binary opposition of manual versus automatic 
control, we encounter complex human-machine systems, in which both 
humans and machines depend on one another; manual and automatic functions 
are not necessarily fixed, but may be redefined during the flight, and human- 
machine interaction on board becomes part of a vast remote-control network. 
“Automatic” control operations have some degree of human input, and 
“manual” control is always mediated by technology. Determining how these 
lines are negotiated in specific instances provides a glimpse into the internal 
politics and professional cultures within the space program. 
On-board automation appeared as both an instrument and a product of 
local politics in the Soviet space program. The debates over the proper degree 
of automation were tied to the definition of cosmonauts’ skills as either pilots 
or engineers. Here, technology, professional identity, and social status were 
closely intertwined. Soviet cosmonauts were “designed” as part of a larger 
technological system; their height and weight were strictly regulated, and 
their actions were thoroughly programmed. Soviet space politics, one might 
say, was inscribed on the cosmonauts’ bodies and minds, as they had to fit, 
both physically and mentally, into their spaceships. 
The existing historiography largely interprets the Soviet approach to 
human-machine issues as complete reliance on automation. I believe this view 
misses several important aspects of the story. First, it downplays the intensity 
of internal debates over the role of the cosmonaut on board. Engineers 
with their technical notions of reliability, cosmonauts with their piloting 
aspirations, human engineering specialists with their formulas for optimal 
division of function between human and machine, industry executives with 
their aversion to risk-taking, political leaders with their sober calculations of 
political gains and risks-all these groups had their input in these disputes. 
The Soviet approach to on-board automation did not appear to have been 
predetermined; it was developed, refined, and often reshaped in the course of 
these debates. 
The Soviet approach to automation was never fixed; it evolved over 
time, from the fully automated equipment of Vostok to the semiautomatic 
analogue control loops of Soyuz to the digital systems of later generations of 
Soyuz. The role of the cosmonaut also changed, from the equipment monitor 
and backup on Vostok to the versatile technician on Soyuz to a systems 
integrator on later missions. 
The Soviet approach also changed across various space projects running 
in parallel. In the late 1960s, while Soyuz was still largely controlled by 
on-board automatics or by ground operators, the Soviet lunar ships were 
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designed to give the crews a much higher level of autonomy and control 
over their missions. 
The Soviet approach was also flexible in another sense: the division 
of function between human and machine was not fixed, but was often 
renegotiated during the flight. Ground flight controllers played a crucial role 
in deciding whether the crew would be allowed to assume manual control. It 
is important, therefore, to examine not just the division of technical functions, 
but also the division of authority between the human on the ground and the 
human on board. 
This analysis suggests that a human-machine system is not a simple dot on 
a straight line between total automation and complete manual control. This 
system is not defined by a simple numerical subdivision of function between 
human and machine. The efficiency of a human-machine system depends 
on the degree of integration of the human into the technological system, 
including its social infrastructure. Some space missions failed not because the 
range of manual functions was too narrow, but because the cosmonauts did 
not have the authority to use specific functions or because they were not 
“in the l00p” for a timely receipt of crucial information. The efficiency of 
a human-machine system depends on whether the human in the system can 
play a truly human role, to have both the authority and the responsibility for 
decision-making. If a cosmonaut is trained to be a perfect automaton, his 
nominal role may increase, but this would be achieved at the cost of losing his 
unique human quality-not to act like a machine. 
DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Human-machine issues in the Soviet space program touch upon three 
large areas of historiography: 1) social history of automation, 2) sociopolitical 
and cultural history of the Soviet Union, and 3 )  comparative studies of the 
American and Soviet space programs. 
In the history of technology, automation has traditionally been viewed as 
a technological implementation of management control resulting in workers’ 
de-skilling and disempowerment.l10 A study of automation in the Soviet space 
program reveals a more complex story, in which cosmonauts do not simply lose 
their piloting skills, but adapt to the evolving technological system, making 
themselves indispensable in emergency situations. A third element-the 
ground controllers-also enters the equation, reframing the automation issue: 
110. See David Noble, “Social Choice in Machine Design: The Case ofAutomatically Controlled 
Machine Tools,” in The Social Shaping of Technology, ed. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman 
(Buckingham, U.K.; Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1985), pp. 161-176. 
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instead of a simple binary choice of automatic versus human control, one faces 
a complex organization in a network of multiple remote-control interactions, 
mediated by both humans and machines. A study of human-machine issues 
may provide a new framework for analyzing the social aspects of automation 
in complex technological systems. 
Political historians of the Soviet Union have placed the space program in 
a larger political context, stressing the growing role of technocracy during 
the Cold War on both sides of the Iron Curtain.”’ Cultural historians have 
recently focused on the formation of cultural norms and Bolshevik identity 
in various periods of Soviet history.”’ The debates over human-machine 
issues provide a window into the cultural norms and identity of Soviet engi- 
neers and cosmonauts during the Cold War. Further studies could identifl 
different political and cultural trends within the broad category of “technical 
intelligentsia,” the backbone of Soviet technocracy; examine the interplay of 
engineers’ and pilots’ cultures in the cosmonaut profession; and also explore 
the tensions between the popular cultural image of the cosmonaut and the 
cosmonauts’ own professional id en tit^."^ 
Comparing the American and Soviet space programs through the prism 
of automation would help challenge the stereotype of fixed “national styles” 
in engineering. David Mindell’s study of human-machine issues in the U.S. 
space program provides a thorough analysis of the internal debates between 
American pilots and space  engineer^."^ In both the American and the Soviet 
cases, different approaches to automation are not predetermined, but emerge 
out of local negotiations, contingent on the range of available technological 
alternatives, space policy priorities, and specific configurations ofpower. What 
is often perceived as a “natural” technological choice emerges as a historically 
contingent product of political, socioeconomic, and cultural forces. 
After the successful circumlunar mission of Apollo 8, Nikolai Kamanin 
wrote in his private diary that this flight had confirmed “the primary role of 
11 1. See Andrew JohnAldrin,“Innovahon, the Scientists and the State: Programmatic Innovation and 
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the spacecraft crew in such experiments. Automata can be a hundred times 
more perfect than man, but they can never replace him”-particularly, stressed 
Kamanin, in the human space race. “From a larger perspective, our designers are 
probably right in their intention to create fully automated piloted spaceships,” 
he admitted. “Perhaps in the future, when communism triumphs over the 
entire planet, people will fly into space on such ships. But in our time one 
must not forget about the severe struggle between two opposing ideologie~.””~ 
For Kamanin, the human role on board was the central issue of the space race, 
and the space race a central issue of the Cold War. A challenge for historians 
is to use analysis of human-machine issues in spaceflight as an entry point into 
larger questions of modern automation, Cold War, and space history. 
115. Kamanin, Skrytyi kosmos, vol. 3, p. 348 (diary entry of 28 December 1968). 
CHAPTER 5 
HUMAN AND MACHINE IN
THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
David A. Mindell 
stronaut Michael Collins,who orbited the Moon onApollo 11, remembered 
A b .  eing inspired as a young man by the dashing figure of the barnstormer 
pilot Roscoe Turner. “Roscoe had flown with a waxed mustache and a pet 
lion named Gilmore,” Collins remembered wistfully; “we flew with a rule 
book, a slide rule, and a computer.” Before being selected for the project that 
would change his life and the world, Collins remembered feeling caught 
between “the colorful past I knew I had missed and the complex future I did 
not know was coming.”’ Collins captures an aspect of the history of spaceflight 
little attended to by historians: the relationship between human and machine. 
In two sentences, he helps us understand spaceflight and place it within 20th- 
century American history and the history of technology. 
Roscoe Turner’s career peaked just a few decades before Collins’s, but the 
two seemed worlds apart.Turner, dubbed “Aviation’s Master Showman,” stunted 
and barnstormed his way from rural America into Hollywood in the 1920s and 
1930s. He had little training and even less formal education.Yet he self-fashioned 
himself as a colorful character,sporting a waxed mustache and a made-up uniform 
from a nonexistent military in w l c h  he never served. He was married in the 
cockpit of his Curtiss Jenny and flew his giant Sikorsky S-29 airplane, dressed up 
as a German bomber, in Howard Hughes’s film Hell’s Angels. As Collins noted, 
Turner, under the sponsorship of the Gilmore oil company, flew with his pet lion 
of the same name.Turner embodied the showy, excited world of aviation in its 
“golden age” of transition from dangerous curiosity to commercial service.2 
This was the world that inspired Collins to enter aviation, but by the time 
he had arrived professionally, a great deal had changed. Nearly all astronauts 
had college degrees in engineering, some had graduate degrees, and they had 
served as test pilots. The technology had changed as well, from simple biplanes 
1. Michael Collins, Carrying the Fire: an Astronaut’sJourneys (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2. Carroll V. Glines, Roscoe Turner: Aviation’s Master Showman (Washington, DC: Smithsonian 
1974), pp. 16-17. 
Institution Press, 1995). 
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to the complex, high-performance jets Collins had flown. Collins contrasts 
Turner’s pet lion with his “rule book, a slide rule, and a computer.” No longer 
was aviation a world of display and reckless adventure. No longer was the 
pilot the only master of his craft. Now he shared his authority with flight 
rules, calculations, and, increasingly in the 1950s, automatic flight controls 
and computers (not to mention controllers on the ground). At the start of the 
space program, it seemed to Collins that the world was becoming bureaucratic, 
technical, and quantitative, with some loss of the pilot’s “white scarf” image. 
Collins’s comments serve as a starting point for examining this critical issue 
in the history of spaceflight: the relationship between humans and machines. 
BETWEEN HUMAN AND MACHINE 
Human versus machine-it is not a new story. Indeed, it is one of the 
great narratives of the industrial world. American history and culture are 
replete with human-machine conflicts and comparisons. In the Civil War, 
the crew of the ironclad warship Monitor thought themselves well protected 
by iron armor, but that mechanical contrivances diminished the glory and 
heroism of their performance in ~ o m b a t . ~  The mythical John Henry won 
a race with a steam drill at the cost of his life. Factory workers complained 
that mechanical assembly lines and Frederick Winslow Taylor’s “Scientific 
Management” turned them into unthinking automatons. New combinations 
of human and machine appeared in the 20th century, from the robots of Fritz 
Lang’s silent film classic, Metropolis, to the gas masks and artificial limbs of 
World War 1. Aviation, the technology born with the new century, celebrated 
the human-machine relationship as never before. Perhaps the most significant 
of the Wright brothers’ innovations was their recognition that an airplane was 
not a stately ship to be guided by a detached human hand, but an active beast, 
controlled by an intensely focused, skilled human pilot.4 
From these diverse histories and technologies, we can distill a few funda- 
mental threads. A good place to begin is the idea of skill. Skill is a common 
enough notion in everyday life, but also a key to understanding the human- 
machine relationship. On one hand, skill is highly personal-it is practical 
knowledge; it implies a certain amount of cleverness, perhaps expertise, and 
we often think about it as residing in our bodies, particularly our hands (e.g., 
3 .  David A. Mindell, War, Technology, and Experience aboard the USS Monitor (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins, 2000). 
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The epitome of human and machine interfaces, this device was formally known as the 
MASTIF, or Multiple Axis Space Test Inertia Facility, and was located in the Altitude 
Wind Tunnel in 1959. It was built a t  Lewis Research Center, now John H. Glenn 
Research Center, in Cleveland, Ohio, and was designed to train astronauts to regain 
control of a tumbling spacecraft. (NASA photo no. C1959-52233) 
“manual skills”). On the other hand, skill is also deeply social-it is not 
inborn, but acquired, as distinct from an innate quality like talent. Skill implies 
training-the time and effort to learn and master a skill, often with the help of 
another person. Skill has a social dimension: it garners respect, and the more 
skill you are perceived to have, the more prestige you seem to earn. 
Skilled workers include surgeons, carpenters, and waiters. Obviously, not 
all skills are equal. Some are more respected than others, and hence there tend 
to be social and economic differences between their practitioners. Skill also 
sets people apart. The word itself comes from an Old Norse word meaning 
distinction or dgeevence, ideas that remain integral to today’s meaning.5 For any 
5. Oxford English Dictionary, etymology for skill. 
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skill, some people have it and some people don’t. The very notion of skill 
implies a social group, possibly even an elite. When people with common 
skills come together, they often form societies, set standards, create and uphold 
traditions. They also police the boundaries of who is in and who is out, and for 
high-status skills, this makes them professions.6 Most would agree that surgeons 
are professionals, but are carpenters, or waiters? 
Skills often develop in relation to particular technologies: a blacksmith’s 
skills, for example, are only valuable within a particular mode of production. 
As technologies change, the skills change as well, sometimes generating 
social conflicts. For example, as numerically controlled machine tools were 
developed in the 1950s, some saw them as eliminating the need for skilled 
machinists. Indeed, the skills required of a machinist did change-and began 
to require intimacy with numbers and computers as much as with metals and 
cutting speeds, which favored certain people, or groups of people, over others. 
The important thing to realize is that technology does not just “change” of 
its own accord-it is changed by particular people for particular reasons at 
particular times. In the 20th century, those people were increasingly engineers, 
who sought to build more “skill” into machines and hence to reduce the 
requirements on the people who ran the machines, the operators. When those 
changes derived form computers, they became known as “automation,” and 
they went hand in hand with social changes. Historians of technology, by and 
large, have focused on ideas of de-skilling without attending to the contingent 
nature of the skills themselves.’ 
In an earlier book, Between Human and Machine, I examined human- 
machine relationships surrounding technologies of control in the first half of 
the 20th century.* During that time, engineers began to understand the idea 
of thefeedback loop and began to study the skills of human operators according 
to new principles of control theory. They saw that humans operated machines 
much like automatic regulators or thermostats-sensing an “error” between 
the “actual” state of the machine and its “desired” state and directing the 
machine to close the gap between the two. In the course of that work, it 
became clear that aviation had always been a rich site of human-machine 
interaction, and the Apollo landings were in some sense the culmination of 
the mid-20th-century history of feedback, control, and computing. 
Consider the history of instrument flying. When pilots were flying in 
clouds, they lost the cues from the outside world that allowed them to keep 
6 .  Andrew D. Abbott, The System of Professions: A n  Essay on the Division $Expert Labor (Chicago: 
7. David F. Noble, Forces ofProduction: A Social History oflndustrial Automation (New York: Alfred 
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an airplane level, hence their feedback loops broke down (they went unstable). 
New instruments like directional gyros and artificial horizons replaced the 
natural cues with technological substitutes, and with some training, the pilots 
could use their indications as feedback and “fly blind.” Of course, a machine 
could also close this feedback loop, and by no coincidence, the advent of 
automatic pilots and instrument flying occurred in the same period. Some pilots 
initially objected to the decline of pilots’ “seat of the pants” or “intuitive” 
flying skills, and instrument flying remains today a compromise between pilot 
control and ground control. The new technology did change the nature of 
piloting, but it also allowed pilots new professional prestige and the ability to fly 
through bad weather on long-range commercial routes. Skill, prestige, training, 
professionalism, and new technologies are tightly coupled; change one element, 
and the others evolve as well, though not necessarily in predicable ways. 
During World War 11, the engineering of feedback control systems led 
to the emergence of digital computing and its associated sciences. The idea 
of a “computer” as a general-purpose information system emerged from a 
number of applications (like radar and gunfire control) which considered 
human operators and control systems as mathematical calculation. The post- 
World War I1 rise of Norbert Wiener’s “cybernetics” captured the sense that 
control and communications were intimately linked with the characteristics 
of human operators and emphasized the blurring boundaries between human 
and ma~h ine .~  Wiener’s conception, however, elaborated on developments in 
a variety of engineering fields, particularly aviation. 
From its origins, aviation was centrally concerned with the relationship of 
human and machine. The Wright brothers, by emphasizing the importance of 
control, created not simply a flying machine, but its human counterpart-the 
skilled pilot. From the moment Wilbur first flew, this new professional was 
born.” But what kind of person would a pilot be? A variety of models were 
proposed: soldier, athlete, adventurer, explorer, factory worker, engineer, 
ship’s captain.” Which dominated at any given time depended on how the 
machines were designed, who piloted them, and their social position. 
Under a project sponsored by the Sloan Foundation and the Dibner 
Institute in the late 1990s, a group ofstudents and I began collecting documents, 
conducting interviews, and defining the boundaries of these issues in manned 
spaceflight. That project also brought on Slava Gerovitch and supported his 
early work on the Soviet program that he presents so ably in this volume. 
9. Norbert Wiener Cybernetics; or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, 2nd 
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Building on the history in Between Human and Machine, I began by asking a 
series of questions about professional identity and its relationship to machinery 
in human spaceflight: 
Who is in control (human in the cockpit, machine in the cockpit, 
human on the ground)? 
Who is the pilot/astronaut (i.e., social background and status)? 
Who or what else is in the loop (eg., copilots, ground controllers, 
instruments, computers)? 
What is his (or her) training/education (military, university, voca- 
tional, etc.)? 
* What skills are required (e.g., manual skills, mathematics, design, 
physical strength)? 
How are they trained (e.g., classrooms, flight training, simulators, 
experience) ? 
How are tradeoffs made between manual and automated tasks? 
Who is responsible for a successful flight, the astronauts or the engineers 
and controllers on the ground? 
Who is blamed for failure? 
What is the role of computers and automation aboard the spacecraft 
(automatic pilot, monitoring for failure, primary flight controls)? 
Who is at risk? 
* What level of prestige do the astronauts enjoy (e.g., national heroes 
versus faceless operatives)? 
Some of these questions repeatedly arise in discussions and debates about 
human spaceflight. Others reappear throughout the history but are rarely 
addressed explicitly. Together, they allow us to make connections in the history 
of human spaceflight that have not previously been made, to understand 
historical dynamics, and to open up new research areas and ask new questions. 
Examining the human-machine relationship in human spaceflight enables us 
to move beyond the dichotomies of “robotic versus human” to better understand 
the nature of the human role when it is present, and its interaction with, rather 
than replacement by, machinery. It also allows us to integrate a variety of historical 
perspectives into narratives of spacefight: risk, safety, automation, social relation- 
ships, project politics, public perception, gender roles, and cultural iconography. 
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THE CASE OF APOLLO 
A f d  exploration of human-machine relationships in spaceflight is outside 
the scope of this paper. Rather, I look at the example of Apollo tc support my 
claim for the larger historical importance of the theme. As defining technological 
moments of the 20th century, the Moon landings embodied the cooperation 
of human and machine and the tensions that cooperation embodies. As 
Michael Collins articulated, the individuals involved had experienced radically 
different eras in the history of aviation and spaceflight in close proximity (a 
mere four decades kom Lindbergh’s flight to Apollo 11). The project spanned 
the transition from analogue to digital computers, from crude simulators to 
full virtual environments, from analogue cockpits to digital fly-by-wire. Apollo 
also provides a unique case, because it combines technical complexity and 
accomplishment with political and cultural significance--hence we can trace 
the importance of the human operator from the White House into the machine 
code, from the public’s TV screens to the astronaut’s &splays. While Apollo 
exemplifies these issues, human-machine relationships resonate throughout the 
history of spaceflight, from early science fiction to the new Mars rovers. 
Ironically, the human-machine relationship in Apollo has been largely 
ignored by historians, although much ofthe existing literature offers tantalizing 
clues for a larger picture. Existing histories of Apollo are nearly all project- 
oriented-they begin at Apollo’s beginning and end at its end. Other than in 
memoirs as personal background, little is said about Apollo’s connection to 
larger currents in the history of technology in the 20th century. Such narratives 
reinforce the project’s self-image as something coherent in itself and apart 
from, outside of, contrary to, other forces in American culture. The histories 
that do provide context tend to be politically or culturally oriented and don’t 
delve into the machines themselves, the people who built and operated them, 
or what they meant. Additionally, these histories, certainly the more recent 
ones, tend to be based on the familiar, public accounts of the Apollo program, 
or interviews with participants conducted many years afterward. Hence they 
tend to solidify the canonical narrative of the project around key themes and 
events: Kennedy’s visionary decision, the frenetic engineering efforts, the 
heroism and skill of the astronauts, the tragic fire, the triumph of Apollo 11, 
the drama of Apollo 13, etc.12 
Yet the human-machine relationship, even when synthesized from the 
existing literature, reveals a different view. From the beginning of Apollo, the 
12. Two examples are Charles Murray and Catherine BIy Cox, Apollo: The Race to the Moon (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1989) and Andrew Chaikin, Man on the Moon: The Voyages ofthe Apollo 
Astronauts (New York: Viking, 1994). 
148 CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
relative importance of humans and machines was under debate. James Webb 
argued that the decision to go to the Moon “can and should not be made 
purely on the basis of technical matters,” but rather on “social objectives” of 
putting people into space. He and Robert McNamara argued that “it is man, 
not merely machines, in space that captures the imagination of the world.”13 
Presidential science adviser Jerome Wiesner famously opposed a manned lunar 
program because its scientific goals did not justify the cost. In a close reading 
of the debates leading up to Kennedy’s decision, we see an implicit distinction 
between “exploration,” which is manned, and “science,” which has a higher 
prestige value among intellectuals but is best conducted rem~tely.‘~ 
Nevertheless, when the decision was made to go to the Moon, there would 
clearly be a significant human role. Kennedy’s 1961 mission statement, “to send 
a man to the moon and return him safely to earth,”15 was simple, focused, and 
included its own schedule. It was also impossible, by definition, to accomplish 
with a fully automated system. But what role would the astronauts play? 
1 .The Test Pilots 
Apollo came after a decade when the human role in flight had been both 
celebrated and questioned. The Air Force had struggled with the advent of 
unmanned missiles to complement its beloved fighters and bombers. As a new 
elite profession emerged, that of the test pilot, airmen were questioning their 
own role in flight in general, and in spaceflight in particular. Even in the late 
1950s, it was not clear who the new spacefarers would be, what skills they 
would require, and what social prestige (or derision) they might enjoy. 
Tom Wolfe, of course, captured some of this anxiety in The Right S t u ~  
While not scholarly history, the book and subsequent film made sufficient 
impact in the public imagination that we should consider it here. Focusing 
on the Mercury program, Wolfe correctly identifies the roots of the astronaut 
culture in the flight-testing world centered on Edwards Air Force Base. He 
portrays test pilots as reckless risk-takers, cowboys who could not fit into the 
traditional professional molds for pilots and who made a living pushing aircraft 
to their limits, often at the cost of their lives. Perhaps some of them were, and 
they did place themselves at risk, but Wolfe’s image misses the essential feature 
of the profession: although skilled craftsmen, intimate with the feel of their 
13. Webb, quoted in John Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the MOON: Project Apollo and the Natiorzal 
Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 90, 125. 
14. Wiesner Committee, “Report to the President-Elect of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space,” 
10 January 1961, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC. 
15. John F. Kennedy, “Urgent National Needs,” Congressional Record-House (25 May 1961), 
p. 8276 (text of speech can be found in the speech files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, 
Washington, DC). 
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aircraft, test pilots worked in a scientific mode. Their goal was to collect data. 
As the historian Richard Hallion has written, “A research airplane essentially 
uses the sky itself as a laboratory.”’6 Increasingly over the course of the 20th 
century, what it meant to be a test pilot was not only one trained in flying 
airplanes, but also one trained in engineering. 
Test pilots were always in close touch with controllers on the ground (a 
feature of flight testing carried to extremes in Apollo).Test pilots understood not 
only how an airplane flew, but also why it flew.Again to quote Michael Collins, 
A test pilot, more than any other type of aviator, must be 
objective. It is all right for a squadron pilot to fall in love with 
his airplane; it is all he has to fly, and he might just as well 
enjoy it because it has already been designed . . . . The test 
pilot cannot fall into this trap . . . he must carefully analyze 
the possible uses to which an airplane might be put and judge 
it a~cordingly.’~ 
Note that in this passage, Collins emphasizes the judgment of the test 
pilot-the “pilot opinion,” which he must provide as part of the research data. 
In addition to their cockpit skills, test pilots were also professional storytellers, 
experts at narrating and recounting their experiences in precise, formal 
language. Yet the hero of Wolfe’s account is Chuck Yeager-an older breed, 
not college-educated, and without a career-long interest in flight engineering. 
Nevertheless, despite its limitations, The Right Stuff does draw attention to 
the relationships between machine control and professional identity that were 
woven throughout the Mercury program. 
Looking more seriously at the test pilots’ profession reveals even greater 
historical coherence within Apollo. Much of the time the test pilots flew new 
aircraft was spent evaluating “stability and control” and “flying qualities,” two 
engineering areas that focused on the match between human and machine. 
Indeed, this area was pioneered by Robert Gilruth and his group at Langley, 
which subsequently formed the Space Task Group and the Manned Spacecraft 
Center (MSC).18 The Society for Experimental Test Pilots (SETP) formed 
in 1955, and for the rest of the decade, the group concerned itself with the 
appropriate role of the pilot-at first in high-performance aircraft with 
computerized control systems, and then in the space program. One founding 
member of the SETP would go on to become an astronaut: Neil Armstrong. 
16. Richard Hallion, Test Pilots: The Frontiersmen ofFlight, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Smithsonian 
17. Ibid., p. 238. 
18. Renamed Johnson Space Center (JSC) in 1973. 
Institution Press, 1991), pp, 101, 143. 
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2. Systems Thinking and the Role of the Human 
The SETP crystallized the anxiety of pilots in general, especially as they 
faced the development of unmanned aircraft and ballistic missiles. These 
technologies not only emerged outside the culture of piloting, they sprang 
from a new group of engineers: the systems men. Several authors have written 
of the conflict of cultures that occurred in Apollo between the aeronautics- 
oriented culture of Langley and Edwards and the systems-oriented culture of 
the West Coast contractors, embodied in managers like Joe Shea.19 Looking 
more deeply at the roots of systems thinking, however, helps connect the 
project to broader currents and clarifies the alternate view to the tight human- 
machine coupling advocated by the pilots. 
World War I1 coalesced systems thinking in several arenas. In response 
to technical problems of radar and automatic gunfire control, engineers began 
to see that all components of a system needed to be understood together, 
rather than as glued-together components. Engineers now conceptualized 
their machines as integrated systems with feedbacks and dynamics, where the 
behavior of each part helped determine the behavior of the whole. 
By 1950, these ideas and techniques began the self-conscious era of 
systems thinking. The Oxfoyd English Dictionary shows that uses of the term 
system exploded after 1950, including systems engineering, systems analysis, systems 
dynamics, general systems theory, and a host of others. Each field had its own 
innovators, its own emphasis, and its own home institutions and professions, 
but they shared common concerns with feedback, dynamics, flows, block 
diagrams, human-machine interaction, signals, simulation, and the exciting 
new possibilities of computers.20 
The management aspects of systems engineering formalized in the mid- 
1950s, when the Air Force stretched its resources to quickly build an intercon- 
tinental ballistic missile (ICBM). In the Atlas missile project, management began 
to move beyond the model that had dominated the aviation industry for decades. 
Aircraft had always been composed of large numbers of components from a 
variety of subcontractors, coordinated by the prime contractor, who built the 
airframe. With a project like Atlas, dynamics, interconnection, and coordination 
became the dominant aspects of the project, so airframe companies, with their 
emphasis on structures and manufacturing, lost their central role. Rather, 
engineers with management experience, comfort with mathematical abstraction, 
19. Murray and Cox, Apollo: The Race to the Moon; Stephen Johnson, The Secret of Apollo: Systems 
Management in American and European Space Progr ims (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2002); Howard 
E. McCurdy, Inside N A S A :  High Technology and Organizational Change in the U.S. Space Program 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1993). 
20. Louis B. Ridenour, Radar System Engineering, vol. 1 of Radiation Laboratory Series (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1948); Harry Goode and Robert Machol, Systems Engineering: A n  Introduction to the 
Design $Large-scale Systems (New York: McGraw Hill, 1947). 
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and insight into dynamics and control coordinated the project. The technical 
change entailed a social shift; as historian Thomas F? Hughes has written, “the 
airfi-ame was [now] merely a platform to carry complex, electronic guidance 
and fire control sy~tems.”~’ 
Innovators in Cold War systems engineering had their roots at General 
Electric and AT&T, via the aviation industry. Simon Ram0 had cut his teeth 
at GE and Hughes Aircraft and earned a Ph.D. at Caltech. His friend Dean 
Wooldridge came out of Bell Labs. In 1953, the two left Hughes Aircraft 
Corporation to found a systems engineering contractor, Ramo-Wooldridge, 
that soon became the TRW Corporation and did systems engineering for 
the Atlas project. Together with the Air Force’s Western Development Division, 
they coordinated contractors and scheduling and oversaw the project’s integra- 
tion.The Navy had a similar project to build a ballistic-missile-firing submarine 
named Polaris. Here the Navy’s “Special Projects Office” performed the 
systems engineering function.22 
Ram0 became a promoter of systems engineering, which he defined as 
“the design of the whole from the design of the parts.” As Ram0 wrote, 
Systems engineering is inherently interdisciplinary because its function is 
to integrate the specialized separate pieces of a complex of apparatus and 
people-the system-into a harmonious ensemble that optimally achieves the 
desired end.”23 Atlas included a system of materials, logistics, computers, and 
ground support, and the missile itself was a system. 
In Atlas, Polaris, and other large projects of the 1950s, systems engineering 
meant coordinating and controlling a variety of technical and organizational 
elements, from contract specifications to control systems, from computer 
simulations to deployment logistics. The approaches were diverse, but they 
shared a common set of assumptions about how the world might be understood 
in abstract, quantitative terms, and modeled with a series of feedbacks, flows, 
and dynamics. 
Computers, both analogue and digital, figured prominently in the image 
and the practice of these systems sciences.They could simulate systems and make 
predictions about the system’s behavior in an uncertain environment. Social 
systems could be modeled with similar techniques as technical systems. Both 
the computer and the analysts themselves carried the prestige and authority of 
science: providing dispassionate, expert advice free of political influence. For the 
“ 
21. Thomas P. Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998). 
22. Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in 
Government (Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press, 1972); Benjamin Pinney, “Projects, 
Management, and Protean Times: Engineering Enterprise in the United States, 1870-1960” 
(Ph.D. diss., MIT, 2001). 
23. For a history of systems thinking in the Atlas project, see Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus, chap. 
3. Simon Ramo is quoted on p. 67. 
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strategy to work, the system engineer required a certain amount of authority, a 
fact that was not lost on the participants-They sold systems engineering as an 
authoritative, scientific way to transcend “politics” (whether public or military- 
industrial) with the outside neutrality of the expert. Systems engineering thus 
elevated the “systems men” to a new level of prestige, creating a new niche for 
engineers as educated managers of large projects and budgets. 
3. X-15 Human and Machine 
The successes ofAtlas and Polaris gave the systems experts, their companies, 
and their worldview credibility with the armed services. Furthermore, the 
expertise they built up in rocketry meant they would be intimately involved 
in any efforts to send humans into space. For the pilots, however, the systems 
men could represent a threat-they had engineered a fleet of Air Force weapons 
that had no pilots at all, and their abstract, analytical approach to engineering 
could seem to crowd out the “human factor.” These issues came to the fore as 
the test pilots began to contemplate spaceflight. 
When the pilots of the SETP reacted to the rise of unmanned missiles, 
they also reacted to the rise of the social group that built them. In 1960, an 
author in the SETP Proceedings derided 
the great millennium of concentrated effort to design man 
out of the cockpit to make room for bigger and better “black 
boxes.” There was much gnashing of teeth and waving of 
arms but alas, the day of the “icy B.M.” was upon us. No one 
wanted the pilot around.24 
The “icy B.M.” is a wonderful triple entendre, referring to an ICBM, the 
computers of IBM, and a scatological reference to a missile. 
One SETP test pilot actually argued that the ICBM was a transitional 
technology, soon to be replaced when technology allowed humans to pilot 
the rockets: “The era of the large intercontinental ballistic missile is merely 
a phase the duration of which is a matter of speculation but the demise of 
which is nonetheless certain.”25 Indeed, the Air Force had initiated the X-20 
“Dyna-Soar” program, a kind of manned orbital space bomber to orbit the 
Earth. Air Force publicity for the X-20 repeatedly emphasized the man in the 
loop and that reentry could only be accomplished as a product of human skill. 
Despite the presence of numerous new technologies, the Air Force declared, 
“In the end, it takes the cool hand of a skilled pilot to bring his glider in for a 
24. W. T. Armstrong, “Where do we go from here?” Cockpit 4 (May 1965): 7. 
25. A. W. Blackburn, “Flight Testing in the Space Age,” SETP Quarterly Review 7, no. 3 (fall 
1957): 17, 10-11. 
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conventional landing. . . this Dyna Soar project puts an emphasis on the pilot, 
on the mun”26 (emphasis original). 
While Dyna-Soar was eventually canceled, another program emerged that 
sought to demonstrate the importance of human skill for manned spaceflight. 
The X-15 is of course the best-known of the famous X-planes, but when viewed 
through the lens of the human-machine relationship, the X-15 takes on great 
importance for Apollo. In addition to hypersonics, much of the purpose of the X- 
15 was to evaluate the human role in spaceflight, particularly for reentry, which 
was considered so dynamic and difficult that it required a human controller. A 
detailed exploration of these issues is outside the scope of this paper, but roughly 
half of the publications arising out of the X-15 related to control systems, the 
role of the pilot, or human-machine interface~.~’When an X-15 was donated 
to the Smithsonian, for example, the press release for the donation read, “One 
of the major goals of the program which has been most richly achieved was 
to explore the capabilities and limitations of the human pilot in an aerospace 
vehicle.” And of course, the conclusion was that “the broad positive finding 
of the program is clear; the capability of the human pilot for sensing, judging, 
coping with the unexpected, and employing a fantastic variety of acquired skills 
remains undiminished in all of the key problem areas of aerospace flight.”28 For 
all of its contributions to hypersonics and related sciences, a major legacy of the 
X-15 is that of putting human pilots in space and ensuring them a place in the 
cockpit in future space missions. As it turned out, the skill of reentry was easily 
mastered, with the help of redundant automated systems. The pilot’s primary 
function evolved to be a monitor, a systems manager, coordinating a variety of 
controls as much as directly controlling himself. 
As a result of his work on the X-15, Neil Armstrong and colleagues 
conducted a series of simulations which showed that a human pilot could stabilize 
a multistage vehicle under manual control straight off the launchpad. The pilots 
saw the tests, and the data they produced, as critical support for the role of the 
human pilots in orbital operations. Armstrong concluded that the pilots should 
be allowed to fly the Saturn rocket off the launchpad. He and the simulation 
26. U.S.Air Force, This is Dyna-Soar, film included in CD-ROM published with Dyna-Soar: Hypersonic 
Strategic Weapons System, ed. Robert Godwin (Burlington, Ontario: Apogee Books, 2003). 
27.W H. Stillwell, ed., X-15 Research Results (Washington, DC: NASA, 1965). The most complete 
and prominent example of these is Robert G. Nagel and Richard E. Smith,“An Evaluation of the Role 
of the Pilot and Redundant Emergency Systems in the X-15 Research Airplane,” SETP Newsletter 6 
(September-October 1962): 12.The SETP publication is a summary ofthe full study by the same author, 
“X-15 Pilot-in-the-loop and redundant/emergency systems evaluation,” Technical Documentary 
Report No. 62-20, Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards AIK Force Base, CA, October 1962, NASA 
Dryden Archives L2-5-1D-3. For a personal account, see Mdton O.Thompson, A t  the Edge 4Space:The 
X-  15 Flight Program (Washmgton, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992). 
28. X-15 news release, Edwards Flight Research Center (FRC), 27 April 1969. Reprinted in 
Goodwin, X-15 Mission Reports, pp. 393-394. 
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engineers argued that pilots could adequately operate the simulation under high 
g forces-as long as they were provided with adequate information displays to 
guide their control. “As a passenger, he [the pilot] can be very expensive cargo; 
but as an integral part of the control loop of the vehicle, he might add materially 
to the reliability and flexibility of the launch maneuver.” Citing the earlier work 
on flying qualities and aircraft stability, they acknowledged that “the piloting task 
for these vehicles is certainly more exacting than that of operational aircraft.” The 
simulated rocket was inherently unstable, though just how unstable depended on 
the amount of fuel it contained and on the external environment. “There is no 
reason to assume that the pilot cannot control the launch of multistage vehicles 
. . . it appears to be highly desirable to initiate investigations of the use of the pilot 
in the control loop of the launch of Saturn boosters.”29 
Armstrong had done other similar tests as well-he flew an aircraft in 
such a way as to simulate the trajectory of an aborted launch in the Dyna- 
Soar. Milt Thompson participated in a similar series of trials designed to show 
that pilots could manually fly the Titan booster into orbit with the Dyna-Soar 
vehicle on top. “This was a very controversial issue,” Thompson recalled; 
“the booster designers had been using automatic control and guidance systems 
from day one. In their minds it was the way to 
The role of the pilot in complex space missions was on the table: the pilots 
had already lost a battle with the advent of the ballistic missile, in their view 
little better than a dangerous, unpiloted drone. Would the giant space rockets 
then under construction be like ballistic missiles, taking a mere “payload” up 
for a ride, or human-guided machines, directed by keen eyes and hands that 
could aim it into orbit? Would the X-15 be the way of the future or a forgotten 
sidelight on a ballistic future? 
In the end, they would not fly the rockets off the pad. They would not 
put the spacecraft into orbit. They would not point toward the Moon and fly 
there. They would not manually enter lunar orbit, and they would not fly 
the return to Earth or fly the reentry. These things were all accomplished by 
computers. What, then, would the astronauts do? They would, in conjunction 
with a computer, control docking in space, and the lunar landing, and they 
would monitor and engage various systems throughout the flight. These would 
be the tasks to showcase human performance and skill and make Apollo a 
human endeavor. 
29. E. C. Holleman, N. A. Armstrong, and W. H. Andrews, “Utilization of the Pilot in the 
Launch and Injection of a Multistage Orbital Vehicle” (presented at the 28th annual meeting of the 
Institute for Aeronautical Sciences, NewYork, NY, January 1960); N.A.Armstrong and E. C. Holleman, 
“A Review of In-Flight Simulation Pertinent to Piloted Space Vehicles,” North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) 
Report #403, July 1962. 
30. Thompson, At the Edge of Space, p. 119. 
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The Apollo spacecraft would not be built by the people who built the 
capsules for Mercury and Gemini, but by North American Aviation and the 
engineering team that built the X-l5.The first contract of the Apollo program, 
however, would not be for a giant rocket, nor for an exotic space vekicle, but for a 
guidance system and a digital computer.The contract went to the Instrumentation 
Laboratory at MIT, under the direction of aviation pioneer Charles Stark Draper. 
Draper’s men and women spent the 1950s building guidance systems for nuclear 
missiles. They had built computers before, but only for automatic systems.They 
had never built a computer with an interface for a human user. 
RETHINKING APOLLO 
Using the lens of human-machine relationships, and their prior and 
subsequent histories, allows us to rethink Apollo and investigate new aspects 
of the famous project. Now we can consider Apollo through the lens of 
computing, through training, and through simulation. Each of these topics 
reveals a project different from the one in the traditional accounts, but one 
contiguous with larger historical phenomena and with the evolving human- 
machine relationships of subsequent decades. 
In the end, it was not heroic astronauts alone who made the flights to the 
Moon.They shared their decisions with ground controllers, as well as a small 
group of software engineers who accompanied them in the form of computer 
programs that complemented the astronauts’ every move. The computer design 
and the software then emerged to reflect a philosophy of automating the flights 
and aiding the pilots in critical functions and at critical moments, while not 
actually replacing them. In the end, the astronauts “flew” a very small part of 
the mission by hand, but that included the critical lunar landing. Even there, the 
astronauts flew the lander indirectly-their joystick actually controlled a software 
program, which then controlled the vehcle, what today we call fly-by-wire. 
While the flight technology was being developed, NASA faced a problem: 
How do you teach astronauts to land on the Moon? How do you train people 
to do something that has never been done before? Training can be understood 
as developing the match between human and machine. Again, the human- 
machine relationship points us toward a much-neglected aspect of the history 
of spaceflight: simulation. Flight simulators had been built since the 1930s, but 
to teach pilots how to fly airplanes that already existed, under conditions that 
were well understood. For the X-15, engineers began building simulators for 
an airplane before it flew, before it was built, before it was even designed.31 
Apollo took those lessons to heart. 
31. G. L. Waltman, Black Magic and Gremlins: Analog Flight Simulations at NASA’s Flight Research 
Center (Washington, DC: NASA SP-2@@@-452@,2@@@). 
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All of the human spaceflight missions of the United States require close human 
support from outside the spacecraft. Here is an overall view of the Mission Control 
Center (MCC) in Houston, Texas, during the Gemini 5 flight in 1965. Note the screen 
at the front of the MCC that is used to track the progress of the Gemini spacecraft. 
(NASA photo no. S65-286601 
Apollo simulated everything. There was a simulator for Moon walking, for 
picking up rocks, for escaping a fire on the launchpad. The critical simulators, 
however, replicated the spacecraft themselves, simulating not only the physics 
of their flight, but their internal workings as well. For months before the fhght, 
the astronauts virtually lived inside these strange machines, flying to the Moon 
under a great variety of conditions, simulating every conceivable kind of failure. 
Of course, the simulators were built around computers, at first analogue and 
later dgital. But the machines of the time could not replicate the subtle visual 
cues required for a perfect landing. Instead, NASA engineers built elaborate, 
finely painted replicas of the Moon and “flew” tiny cameras above the surface 
to provide accurate images of the Lunar Module’s final approach (techniques 
to be replicated just a few years later in the making of George Lucas’s Stur 
Wars). Inside the simulated spacecraft, the astronauts used the real guidance 
computer, programmed with real programs, and became acclimated to their new 
environment. In the actual lunar landings, the astronauts frequently commented 
on the simulation, comparing their real experiences to those fabricated in 
the laboratory. A history of the use of simulation in the space program and its 
significance for hture technology has yet to be written. 
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Not all simulators were equally virtual. One actually flew, using real 
gravity and flight dynamics to mimic the lunar lander. Early in the program, a 
group of NASA engineers who had worked on the X-15 thought up a vehicle 
that would use a special jet engine to cancel out five-sixths of the Earth’s 
gravity, and would thus fly as though it were on the Moon, which had one-sixth 
g. The result was the Lunar Landing Research Vehicle, or LLRV, nicknamed 
“the flying bedstead” because of its extraordinarily strange appearance (later 
renamed the LLTV, with “training” replacing “research”). In addition to its jet 
engine, it used a variety of steam jets to control attitude and position, so when 
it flew, it hissed white jets of steam and whistled like a calliope. The vehicle 
was complex, unruly, and dangerous. Three of the six built had spectacular 
crashes; one almost killed Neil Armstrong before his famous flight. NASA 
wanted to cancel the program, thinking it too risky to the precious astronauts. 
But when Armstrong returned from the Moon, he insisted that the vehicles 
remain in use, for they provided the closest approximation of the actual Moon 
landing. The “flying simulator” further blurred the boundary between real 
and virtual flight and proved a valuable rehearsal for the human-machine 
system that would land on the 
Simulation is but one arena where focusing on the human-machine 
relationship sheds new light on the history. Numerous decisions in Apollo 
concerned the human-machine relationship in some degree. The famous LOR 
decision placed great emphasis on human skill in docking and rendezvous. The 
decision to include three astronauts had to do with how human roles would be 
allocated. The three were originally dubbed “Pilot,” “Co-pilot,” and “Systems 
Engineer” but were later changed to “Commander,” “Command Module 
Pilot,” and “Lunar Module Pilot,” ensuring that all would be “pilots” even 
though the “Lunar Module Pilot” would only fly the craft as a backup (and 
did not train in the LLRV). Decisions about in-flight maintenance and repair 
traded off human repair skills against mechanical and electronic reliability. 
Critical functions like navigation could be handled entirely within the capsule 
but ended up being provided largely by ground stations. 
During the actual missions, several key events brought the human- 
machine issues to the forefront. The “program alarm” in the final minutes 
of the Apollo landing required human intervention, and the landing ended 
under manual control, with great success. The incident set off a behind-the- 
scenes debate about who was to blame. The press reported it as a bug in the 
32. Christian Gelzer, ed., “LLRV History” (unpublished manuscript, NASA Dryden History 
Office, 2004). See also “Minutes of Meeting, Flight Review Board, Lunar Landing Training 
Vehicle,” University of Houston, Clear Lake, 12 January 1970, Apollo Chronological File, NASA 
Historical Reference Collection, for a detailed discussion of why the astronauts found the LLTV 
valuable. 
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program (a concept soon to enter popular discourse). MIT engineers pointed 
out that the astronauts had forgotten to turn off a piece of equipment that was 
feeding extraneous data to the computer and causing it to overload. Others 
could point to a problem with procedures that did not correctly direct the 
astronauts. NASA, by contrast, narrated the landing as the victory of a skilled 
human operator over fallible automation-a result that highlighted the heroic 
goals of the program. Who was at fault is less important than the terms of the 
debate, as the tensions between humans and automated systems refused to go 
away, even in the triumphant moments of the program. 
Other events in the remaining Apollo flights continued to highlight the 
tensions between the computer, its software, and its human operators. During 
Apollo 8, astronaut Jim Love11 mistakenly pushed a button that erased the 
computer’s memory-committing an error that NASA swore would never 
happen. In Apollo 12, the spacecraft was struck by lightning soon after liftoff, 
causing the system to reboot (imagine if they were running Microsoft!). 
During Apollo 14, the computer was reprogrammed in flight to help save 
the astronauts from a sticky abort button. Overall, the computers performed 
extremely well, and the astronauts spent as much (or more) time on the 
missions monitoring and managing the computer as they did actually “flying” 
the spacecraft. Yet on every single landing, for one reason or another, the 
pilots overrode the automatic systems and landed with their hands on the 
stick. Manual control of the landings allowed NASA and the public to see the 
flights as a human accomplishment rather than an automated one. 
AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 
This essay, of course, cannot provide an exhaustive history of the human- 
machine issues that came to play in Apollo. It merely makes the case that a series 
of questions about human-machine interaction in the history of spaceflight 
can open up new research avenues into what some might think is a well-worn 
historical topic, and indeed these are the kinds of questions I’m currently 
exploring for a book on Apollo. Research directions include a close reading of 
the astronaut memoirs, building on Michael Collins’s revealing comments, to 
see how they narrated their own relationships to the computers and how they 
recalled the human-machine issues in retrospect. I’m also looking carefully at 
the decisions about how much to automate the landings, how that automation 
was actually implemented, and at the various parties (engineers, astronauts, 
managers, etc.) who engaged in the process. Analyzing the actual operations 
of the flights sheds light on how the human operators performed and what 
they actually did during the flights. 
Of course, these issues extend well beyond Apollo. One can ask about the 
early planning and decisions on the Space Shuttle and what role pilots played 
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The Space Shuttle cannot be flown without a human pilot; it is the first piloted 
spacecraft of the United States that has no capability for automated flight. This fisheye 
view of the Space Shuttle Atlantis is seen from the Russian Mir space station during 
the STS-71 mission. (NASA photo no. STSO71-741-004) 
in developing a spacecraft with a “piloted” reentry. In light of their lost bid 
to manually fly the Saturn rocket off the pad, the Shuttle decision appears as 
a victory where pilots again assert their authority and express their love for 
winged aircraft. Despite the X-15’s initial emphasis on the skill required for 
reentry, only one Shuttle flight has been flown manually from reentry: flight 
number 2 of Columbia, flown by former X-15 pilot Joe Engle from Mach 25 to 
the ground. Despite the presence of automated landing systems, every single 
Shuttle flight has ended with a manual landing. 
The human-machine relationship, as a meeting point for the social and 
technical aspects of a system, provides access to a variety of other aspects 
of space history that are otherwise difficult to integrate. The iconic role of 
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astronauts as American heroes was critically dependent on their roles (real and 
perceived) in actual piloting ofthe missions. We can study how such public and 
political imperatives were incorporated, along with technical considerations, 
into the actual design of control systems and, conversely, hew the technical 
characteristics of those systems shaped and constrained the public imagery 
(there was a good technical argument for not allowing the astronauts to fly 
the Saturn off the pad). 
As Slava Gerovitch has explored in his essay in this volume, social and 
power relationships between different groups involved in the projects- 
astronauts and ground controllers, engineers versus managers, different groups 
within a program-manifest themselves in the design of the control systems. 
Training, as a method of matching of human to machine, is a place where 
these relationships begin to form, and simulation-as the artificial creation of a 
human experience or technical system-points to the increasingly blurred line 
between “real” and “virtual” in our own world. Such a discussion naturally 
leads into gender history because the issue of the astronaut’s control is also an 
issue of masculinity. Pay attention to how often ‘‘manliness” and “sissyness” 
(especially in jest) arise in conversations about technology and spaceflight, 
and one realizes that (consciously or unconsciously) gender is never far from 
operators and designers of control systems. One Apollo guidance engineer still 
professes his aversion to the use of the term “software” as unmanly. 
Beginning with Apollo, and continuing during the 1970s (and certainly 
into the future), the professional identity of astronauts began to expand-from 
the exclusive focus on test pilots to scientists and engineers (and even teachers 
and politicians), with new job titles like “mission specialist” and “payload 
specialist,” coupled with social expansions beyond White men. I recently asked 
an astronomer-astronaut how much he used his scientific judgment while in 
orbit-“Not at all,” he quickly replied. Most of his time had been spent 
following well-established procedures to deploy and operate other people’s 
experiments. Under such conditions, what is the necessity for scientific 
training, or for human presence at all? Still, that same astronaut acknowl- 
edged that being able to “speak the same language” as the scientists on the 
ground proved an important part of his job. Clearly, some level of tacit 
knowledge, social interaction, and common vocabulary played an important 
role in space operations (as it did for the CAPCOMs talking to their fellow 
pilots in Apollo). 
It should be possible to do an ethnographic study of space operations 
examining skill, training, professional identity, automation, divisions of power, 
and other aspects of human-machine relationships. Where, exactly, are 
humans in space exercising judgment, tacit knowledge, and creativity? How 
would the results differ for scientific versus technical operations? Mission 
transcripts, combined with interviews and a deep analysis of operations, 
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would provide a solid basis for answering these and related questions. Even a 
cursory look at the Apollo lunar science operations presents rich material, as 
the astronauts conducted a variety of activities from deploying instruments 
to collecting samples (where, precisely, did “exploration” occur?). Such an 
ethnographic analysis, if rigorously done, would have important implications 
for engineering design, training, mission planning, and safety. It would also 
likely generate insights into the operation of other complex technical systems 
whose operations are rarely as well documented or as accessible as those of 
human spaceflight. 
Such research into the human-machine aspects ofspaceflight will also help 
clarify the tensions in human spaceflight between ‘‘science” and “exploration.” 
George Bush’s January 2004 speech used the word “exploration” more than 
25 times, while mentioning “science” only once or twice. In the documents 
and debates leading up to Kennedy’s Apollo decision, the assumption is that 
“exploration” is manned and “science” is remote or unmanned, and these 
debates have continued until the present day. What are the critical differences 
between science and exploration? Exploration, of course, has a long history, 
although when it has been brought to bear on spaceflight it has tended to take 
the form of hagiography more than critical analysis. As Steven Pyne’s essay in 
this volume wonderfully demonstrates, however, the large literature in history 
and the history of science has a great deal to offer current debates. Exploration 
often includes science, but usually as one component of a broader agenda, 
and not usually the most important one. For the sake of argument, we might 
make this oversimplified distinction: science is about collecting data to learn 
about the natural world, whereas exploration expands the realm of human 
experience. Sometimes the two overlap, but not always. Exploration has 
always had significant components of state interest, international competition, 
technical demonstration, public presentation, national and professional identity, 
and personal risk. Seen in this light, the prominence of these elements in 
Apollo seems less an anomaly than sensible in an historical context. 
Again, the science versus exploration dichotomy bears on human-machine 
relationships. McCurdy and Launius provide excellent examples in this volume: 
Admiral Byrd’s use of mechanical aids (i.e., aircraft) in exploring Antarctica 
raised questions of heroism, manliness, and professional identity. Similar issues 
arise in ocean exploration today, especially as the role of manned submersibles 
is questioned in the face of remote-and autonomous-vehicles. Again, the 
debates over technology often refer to professional identity: are you a real 
oceanographer if you don’t descend to the seafloor? Are you a real explorer if 
you never actually set foot in a new world? Must one physically “be there” to 
be an explorer? How do professional identities adapt to technological change? 
My goal here is not to advocate for either side in the debates about 
whether we should be sending people into space. Rather, I’m arguing that a 
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scholarly, historical understanding of the human-machine relationship will 
help to clarify the terms of the public debate. And precise, informed public 
debate is critical if we are to commit significant resources to future projects. 
I’ll close with a recent anecdote that captures the richness, interest, and 
relevance of human-machine relationships in spaceflight. In the spring of 2004, 
the Explorer’s Club of New York City held its 100th annual dinner. At this 
glitzy, black-tie affair, a few thousand people stuffed into the grand ballroom 
of the Waldorf Astoria. The club has always included scientists, but also a 
panoply of mountain climbers, Navy captains, pilots, sailors, divers, trekkers, 
photographers, not a few astronauts, and a host of wannabe adventurers. 
At this event, on the stage, were some of the “greatest of the great” who 
rose in turn to give inspiring speeches about their own experiences and the 
importance of exploration. Bertrand Piccard, heir of the great Swiss exploring 
family, recounted his balloon circumnavigation of the world. Buzz Aldrin 
spoke about his journey to the Moon and advocated for a return to the Moon 
and a venture to Mars. Sir Edmund Hilary recounted the feeling of his first 
steps on the top of Everest. 
The evening’s last speaker was Dr. Steven Squyres of Cornell, the chief 
scientist of the project that had recently landed two robotic rovers on the 
surface of Mars. I leaned over to my friend and whispered, “This ought to be 
interesting, because the rest of those guys have actually gone places, where 
Squyres has done all of his work remotely, from a darkened room.” A moment 
later, Squyres got up there, on the heels of these great explorers, in front of 
thousands ofpeople, and said (I paraphrase), “I must say I’m a little intimidated, 
because all of these people have actually gone somewhere, whereas I’ve done 
my work from darkened rooms in Ithaca and Pasadena.” But he then gave an 
account of his and his group’s remote, robotic exploration of Mars that easily 
matched the others in excitement and inspiration. He explained how they 
“live” on Mars, for months at a time, through technologies of remote, virtual 
presence. He also made a plea for the importance of sending people to Mars, 
based on the scientific insight a field geologist would generate by actually 
“being there.” Here, as in so many other instances, science, exploration, 
technology, and professional identity were intertwined, and understanding 
those relationships is critical not only for the history and future of human 
spaceflight, but is key to the essence of human-machine relationships, the 
coupling of the social and technological, at the core of our modern world. 
SECTION I11 
NASA AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS 

INTRODUCTION 
n achieving its mission over the last 50 years and in pursuit of a variety of I goals, NASA has had complex interactions with a large number of external 
groups.This section discusses three of the most important: the aerospace industry, 
the Department of Defense, and the international space community. With a few 
notable exceptions, historians have often submerged these relationships as they 
concentrated on the internal problems, acbevements, and themes of the Agency 
itself. NASA’s relations with any one of these entities would be an enormous 
topic in its own right; each author in this section has adopted particular case 
studies that duminate key issues. 
In the first paper, Philip Scranton aims to enhance our understanding of 
the often contentious interaction between NASA and industry, which has been 
crucial in designing, testing, and building the hardware necessary to achieve 
the Agency’s mission.’ This essay gives a vivid accounting of the complexity 
of the space enterprise at a level that few people outside the space community 
contemplate. This complexity involves not only the operational relationsbps 
between NASA and its prime contractors, but also those among the primes and 
their thousands of subcontractors, among the subcontractors and the “sub-subs,” 
and so on down the line, all part of the aerospace industry at increasingly diffuse, 
but real, levels. Scranton points out that while there was (and is) much contention 
among those in the contracting community, historically all stood together against 
what they perceived as excessive NASA meddling and oversight.Yet somehow, 
it all worked (usually) in the end. Drawing on his own work on the fabrication 
of the Mercury spacecraft; on Bart Hacker and James Grimwood’s history of the 
Gemini program, On the Shoulders .f Titans;2 and on Joan Bromberg’s NASA and 
the Space Industry, Scranton shows the astonishing array of questions that arise 
when one considers concrete hstorical cases. 
Beyond his analysis of the problems, Scranton suggests five frameworks for 
research that might increase our understanding of the relations between NASA 
and industry, technology and organization, practice and process, and design and 
production.Two existing frameworks are Stephen Johnson’s study of the systems 
management approach in The Secret oJApoZlo and Howard McCurdy’s sociological 
approach to organizational culture exemplified in Inside NASA.3 Scranton also 
1. NASA has sponsored one study of the Agency’s relationship with the aerospace industry, but there 
is considerably more work to be done on the subject. See Joan L. Bromberg, N A S A  and the Space 
Industry (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 1999). 
2. Barton 6. Hacker and James M. Grimwood, On the Shoulders ofTitans:A History ofProject Gemini 
(1977; reprmt,Washmgton, DC: NASA SP-4203,2002). 
3. See Howard E. McCurdy, Inside N A S A :  High Technology and Organizational Change in the US. 
Space Program (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 1993); Stephen B. Johnson, The Secret ofApollo: Systems 
Management in American and European Space Programs (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 2002). 
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proposes that analytical tools be used fiom the fields of social construction of 
technology, management theory, and anthropology to attack these problems. 
Scranton hopes for a shift in the writing of NASA history in what he 
sees as a long-overdue direction: the little-understood world of production 
for NASA. “Retelling NASA stories from the drafting room and shop floor 
outwards, from the bottom up,” he concludes, “has the potential to reorient a 
universe of NASA-centric histories.” He formulates a large number of questions 
that constitute a research program to this end. 
Scranton’s essay does not address the Department of Defense, but since 
the 1980s, DOD has funneled even more money into the space industry than 
NASA (their respective space budgets were on the order of $19 bdl’ ion versus 
$14 bdlion in 2003). Even before NASA was formed in 1958, DOD, with its 
growing stock of ballistic missiles, realized the importance of space for military 
reconnaissance. In the interservice competition to create a scientific satellite 
for the International Geophysical Year (IGY, 1957-58), the Navy’s Vanguard 
program was given the go-ahead, but it was the Army, with a modified Jupiter C 
ballistic missile, that launched Explorer 1 on 31 January 1958, the first successful 
American satellite in the wake of Sputnik. The opening of the Space Age was 
accompanied by intense discussion as to whether the nation’s space program 
should be military or civilian. NASA’s birth signaled the decision for a civilian 
agency, but the proper role for military and civilian space programs has been 
debated ever since. 
Peter Hays, a policy analyst with 25 years of service in the Air Force, 
focuses on three key issues and time periods to illuminate NASA-DOD 
relations. In the first issue, organizing to implement the American space vision 
in the 1950s, he finds three major activities with bureaucratic interests that 
endure today: moving the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) into NASA, 
consolidating DOD space activities under the Alr Force, and establishing the 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Once the ABMA was transferred to 
Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, in September 1960, after 
a protracted struggle, the Army was officially out of the space business; DOD 
space activities were concentrated in the Air Force. Not trusting reconnaissance 
satellites to the Au Force, however, President Eisenhower formed what is now 
known as the NRO in late 1960. DOD and NRO activities became increasingly 
classified under President Kennedy, a situation that led to widely divergent public 
and congressional perceptions of the NASA and military space programs and 
also made the writing of mditary space history dependent on declassification. 
Hays’s second issue is the rationale for human spaceflight in the early space 
program, in particular the competition between NASA and the Air Force for 
human spaceflight missions. In this competition, NASA was decidedly the winner; 
the Air Force was rebuffed on its Dyna-Soar effort by the end of 1963 and its 
Manned Orbiting Laboratory by 1969 (after $1.4 billion in expenditures). 
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These early interactions among NASA, DOD, and NRO provide deep 
background for Hays’s third issue, the development of the Space Shuttle, 
which provided “the most focused, longest running, and most intense interplay 
among these organizations . . . the single most important factor in shaping their 
interrelationships.” As Hays shows and others have suggested before him, in 
selling the Shuttle project to Congress and the President, and especially once 
the decision was made that the Shuttle was to be the nation’s primary launch 
vehicle, NASA needed DOD support and DOD needed NASA to launch its large 
spy satellites4 The Air Force component of DOD was essential in determining 
Shuttle payload and performance criteria and is credited with saving the program 
during the Carter administration when Vice President Mondale and the Office 
of Management and Budget tried to cut it. It was the Air Force that successhlly 
argued that four Shuttles were needed.The price exacted from NASA was mission 
priority for DOD. Yet, because it did not control the Space Shuttle program, the 
Air Force was never very enthusiastic about it.And in the aftermath of Challenger, 
the Space Transportation Policy underwent a seismic shift, with the Air Force and 
NRO once again returning largely to expendable launch vehicles. For historians 
and policy analysts, the Space Shuttle program provides an unparalleled window 
on the relations among NASA, DOD, and NRO. Hays concludes that it is “an 
excellent illustration of the general I r  Force ambivalence over the military 
potential of space and military man-in-space as well as evidence of the lack of 
clear and accepted doctrinal guidance on these issues.” 
In the third chapter in this section,John Krige asks an intriguing question: 
why does the most powerful nation on Earth for the last 50 years want or need 
international space cooperation? As he points out, some have argued that space 
cooperation was used in the Cold War era and should continue to be used now, 
under changed circumstances, as an instrument of foreign policy in which to 
foster and gain allies. But, he notes, blind international cooperation exacts a price: 
there is a tension among sharing technology, not compromising national security, 
and remaining industrially competitive. He argues that sharing technology in the 
interests of international cooperation makes no sense, historically or practically, 
unless one opens the “black box” of the interaction of technology and foreign 
policy: “It is crucial to focus on what specific technologies might be available 
for sharing in the pursuit of specific foreign policy objectives, rather than- 
as so often happens-to simply lump technology and foreign policy into an 
undifferentiated whole.” Historians must study international collaboration at 
this fine-grained level, he insists, if the analysis is to be robust. 
4. See Dwayne A. Day, “Invitation to Strugg1e:The History of Civd-Mditary Relations in Space,” ~fl 
John M. Logsdon, gen. ed., Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History ofthe US .  Civil Space 
Program, vol. 2, External Relationships (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4407,1996), esp. pp. 263-270. 
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In his essay, Krige takes his own advice by analyzing a particular case of 
attempted technology transfer: themid-1960s desire by the Johnson administration 
to collaborate with Western Europe, particularly with the European Launcher 
Development Organisation (ELDO), on a civilian satellite launcher. This desire 
was based on the belief that such cooperation would strengthen European 
unity, close the technology gap between the United States and Europe, and 
divert ELDO resources from the technology of nuclear weapons delivery by 
using them in space instead. NASA and the State Department particularly 
argued the last point: that by sharing launch technology with ELDO, including 
documentation on the Atlas-Centaur upper stage that would allow European 
satellites to reach geosynchronous orbit, they would discourage other nations 
from applying resources to national military programs. In opposition to this 
desire for cooperation were American national security and business interests. 
In particular, some felt that American technology transfer might actually benefit 
the French nuclear weapons program in terms of its delivery system. Others 
pointed out that the technology transfer might confer commercial advantage 
to certain countries in terms of competition with INTELSAT, the worldwide 
communications satellite consortium under U.S. control via COMSAT. Although 
NASA and the State Department argued for a finer analysis and a case-by-case 
study rather than the blunt instrument of national security memoranda, in the 
end, the argument for relaxing constraints on technology transfer lost. Krige 
explains the reasons, which are deeply rooted in historical events. 
Krige suggests that historically, the protection of national security and 
national industry interests always prevails over foreign policy considerations. His 
insights into the connections between space and foreign policy open up a new 
direction in space history and the history of this component of foreign policy. 
By no means do the aerospace industry, the Department of Defense, 
and international relations exhaust even the general categories of NASA's 
external activities. Other interagency activities, such as interactions with the 
State Department and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOM);  university relations, as championed by former NASA Administrator 
James Webb and some of his successors; public and community relations, always 
important to NASA's image; and congressional relations, so essential to hnding, 
raise their own unique questions as subjects of historical analysis. Nevertheless, 
taken together, this section highlights how multifaceted NASA history is, as well 
as how very much remains to be done in a large number of areas and from a 
variety of new perspectives. 
CHAPTER 6 
NASA AND THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
CRITICAL ISSUES AND RESEARCH PROSPECTS 
Philip Scranton 
T h e  X-15 was [Harrison] Storms’ airplane as much as it was anybody 
else’s airylane. A lot o f  other people could lay claim to it. T h e  theorists 
at NACA [National Advisory Committeefor Aeronautics] had actually 
laid out the basic lines and drawn up the specijcations. Some of these 
people thought of tNorth American’s] Storms and his ilk as “tin benders,” 
lowly contractors who simply hammered out the hardware to match the 
vision of the scientists. Bu t  this wasn’t hardware. This  was jewelry. 
-Mike Gray, Angle cfAttack 
A s  costs rose, schedules slipped. O n e  source of delay was attempted 
improvements . . . . T h e  Gemini Program Office was less than happy 
with the course of events . . . . N o t  only was GPO being bypassed in the 
process that approved changes Lockheed wanted to make, but the project 
ofjce was not always even told what those changes were. 
-Bart Hacker and James Grimwood, On the Shoulders of Titans 
[Reassignment to] Spacecraft Assembly and Test brought me totally down 
to reality-down and dirty with the thousands ofphysical details that had 
to be pevfectly crafted, installed, verified, and documented, and face toface 
with the earnest, hard-working men and women who strove to do their 
very best to build a spacecraft that would land men on the Moon and bring 
them back safely . . . . I had seen the effort and concentration by hundreds 
ofskilled craftsmen that was needed to make engineering orders or program 
decisions take shape in fact, not jus t  on paper. 
-Thomas J. Kelly, Moon Lander 
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n concluding his 1999 essay review of recent works in NASA history, I Northeastern University’s W. D. Kay noted that however thorough these studies, 
they “wind up saying very little about the behavior of the private contractors who 
actually built the rockets, probes, and satellites. With rare exceptions that almost 
always involve catastrophes . . . the internal worlungs of the nation’s aerospace 
contractors never receive anywhere near the level of scrutiny routinely accorded 
to NASA.” Tipping his hat to Roger Bilstein’s Stages to Suturn as a “happy excep- 
tion” to this pattern, he added his concern that silences on the industrial front 
obstructed assessment of credit, blame, and “accountabil~ty..” In this regard, Kay 
hoped that aerospace companies would disclose the sources that would docu- 
ment their “role(s) in shaping the U.S. space program,”’ but at least for Mercury, 
Gemini, and Apollo, mountains of industry documents have been preserved in 
NASA files and NARA archives, awaiting our attention. Perhaps this essay will 
encourage scholars to plunge into them bearing questions and agendas that will 
enrich our appreciation for the business of building space technologies. 
During its first years, NASA reluctantly discarded the NACA’s “we build 
it here” philosophy, abandoning its predecessor’s approach for an emphasis on 
design and supervision, project management, and performance review.’ Rapidly, 
then durably, the Agency paid out 90 percent of its budget allocations to contrac- 
tors, chiefly private-sector firms, for engineering, fabrication, testing, redesign, 
certification, and ~hipment.~ These industrial enterprises and their hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of subcontractors, constituted the aerospace industry, which 
commenced in the 1950s chiefly as a series of projects, then divisions, within 
well-known aircraft companies: North American, Martin, Lockheed, Boeing, 
Douglas, and McDonnell, supplemented by specialists in electrical or chemical 
technologies and products (GE, Th i~ko l ) .~  Given the NASA History Office’s 
charge to research Agency plans, programs, and performance, it is understand- 
1. W. D. Kay, “NASA and Space History,” Technology and Cultnre 40 (1999). 120-127. A number of 
titles partly addressing Kay’s concerns appeared later than his January 1999 pubhcation; some of them 
wlll be discussed below. 
2. George Mueller, NASA’s Apollo director, indicated that in the 1950s, NACA depended on the 
An- Force to do fabrication contracting for them, thus beginning the shift to externahzation (NASM 
Oral History Project, Mueller Interview No. 4,15 February 1988, p 13, avadable at http //www.nasm. 
si edu/research / d s h / T R A N S C P T / M U E L L E R 4  HTM). 
3. Howard McCurdy, Inside N A S A :  H g h  Technology and Organizational Change in the U S .  Space Program 
(l3altimore. Johns Hopkins, 1993), p. 39. Some of this was interagency transfer, I presume, as ABMA 
budt some launch vehicles and assembled others, but the bulk of it was fundmg to private enterprises. 
4. Over hme, the number of prime contractors shrank decisively through a series of mergers and 
acquisitions, notably the creahon of McDonnell Douglas (1967) and its amdgamahon with North 
American Rockwell’s Aerospace Division in a Boeing-led merger during the 1990s. Marnn acquired 
American Marietta in the 1960s, then merged a generanon later w t h  Lockheed, yieldmg Lockheed 
Martin in 1994. The rising cost of aerospace projects (and of mlitary aircraft development) and the 
uncertainty of profitabhty made fadure on a multidon-dollar bid extremely painful and made 
continued on the next page 
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able that histories to date have fostered far greater appreciation for NASA’s 
managerial, political, and mission-related achievements and conflicts than for its 
contractors’ struggles to fabricate and qualify spaceflight technologies. Hence 
the epigraphs aim to evoke multiple dimensions of manufacturing for NASA- 
the tensions between Agency managers/designers and onsite corporate program 
directors; the extravagant demands spaceware placed on engineering and pro- 
duction capabilities (“jewelry”); the perennial need for improvements and fixes; 
that work‘s impact on costs, schedules, and communication; and the substantive 
gap between management/engineering plans and the grinding detail work on 
shop floors and in clean rooms across Ameri~a.~ 
To rephrase this somewhat, an enhanced understanding of industrial 
practice in relation to NASA projects could benefit from sustained attention 
to four core but interrelated themes: 1) initial designing and building of tech- 
nological artifacts; 2) testing, redesigning, and reworkinglrefabricating such 
artifacts; 3 )  alliances among and contests between contractors, as well as con- 
tractors’ collaboration with or challenges to NASA units; and 4) approaches to 
conceptualizing complex contracting and managerial relationships in the pro- 
duction of “edge” technologies. Exploring these will help expose their layers 
and nested problem sets as this discussion moves toward sketching examples 
which illuminate recurrent situations, some elements of change over time, and 
key persistent features of the environment for fabricating aerospace innova- 
tions. In addition, this essay will briefly review aspects of the literature con- 
cerning aerospace production for NASA, will mention preliminary findings 
from my work with Mercury spacecraft fabrication records, and will close by 
offering a set of potential research questions in this area. 
NASA AND INDUSTRY FOUR CORE ISSUES 
1) Initially designing and building aerospace artifacts. 
The iconic NASA artifacts werelaunch vehicles and their payloads (manned 
capsules, satellites, observatories, etc.), yet a significant class of artifacts never 
experienced the rigors of the extraterrestrial environment (launch apparatus, 
testing and simulation devices, ground support and tracking/communications 
equipment, and much more). LVhile being integral to NASA’s ability to reach 
continued3om the previous page 
consohdations gradually more attractive. See Joan Bromberg, NASA and the Space Industry (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopluns, 1999), pp. 12-13. 
5. The epigraphs reference what Howard McCurdy terms the “first generation” of NASA, the 
era through 1970.That’s the only era about which I can profess anything like detailed knowledge, 
principally as a result of serving as the Lindbergh Char at NASM (2003-04) and doing archival 
research at NARA’s Fort Worth branch and at NASA Headquarters on the design and fabrication of 
the Mercury spacecraft. 
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space and, not infrequently, reusable,6 they stood earthbound. Ground equip- 
ment, whatever its complexity, arguably faced fewer “unknowns” than that 
which was launched, suggesting two distinct lines of design and production 
dynamics. Moreover, as will be indicated below, some aerospace technologies 
were “merely” complex, whereas others severely “stretched” technological 
capabilities, another line of differentiation which could profitably be cross- 
compared with the launched and the grounded artifacts’ development. 
Nonetheless, virtually all these technological artifacts were custom- 
designed and purpose-built, although NASA leaders at times urged contractors 
to use “off-the-shelf” components or items proven in use during earlier projects. 
The design process was intricate and NASA-led in the early years, at times 
contentious, and staggeringly demanding in engineering effort and precision. 
Building was likewise intricate but was contractor-led (with the exception ofthe 
Army Ballistic Missile Agency rockets and a few others) and NASA-supervisedl 
-critiqued, while being staggeringly complex in project management, quality 
control, and shop-floor detail-and yes, often contentious as well. 
Moreover, beneath the level of large-object systems (rockets, capsules, 
launch sites, etc.), complexities in design and building animated the production 
of components, the parts for components, and the spatial/operational strategies 
for assembly and integration of components into functional systems (electrical 
power, fuel delivery, instrumentation) before the further integration of those 
systems into the large objects. Occasions for error abounded, as all historians of 
NASA know well, and the challenges of detecting errors’ causes varied dramati- 
cally--from simply identif+g a faulty fuse to reassembling the shattered parts 
of an exploded Redstone. 
The engineering implications of failures were plain: “whenever something 
broke, we redesigned it.”7 The managerial implications were more ambiguous, for 
NASA officials, contractors’ personnel, subcontractors, veteran Air Force project 
managers (much involved in NASA efforts), as well as for advocates and critics of 
the space program, in and out of government. Parts, component, and large-object 
failures were expected, yet they could (and did) derange budgets, stall schedules, ini- 
tiate blame games, and hazard careers. Tom Kelly’s transfer to Spacecraft Assembly, 
noted in the third epigraph, was a stark demotion triggered by a dismaying array of 
leaks in the first Moon lander Grumman had proudly delivered to Cape Kennedy, 
a shock that led him to a fresh learning curve’ and leads us to theme two. 
6. Unlike everything launched before the Shuttle era. On the Shuttle as the first reusable space 
vehicle, see Diane Vaughan, “The Role of the Orgarmation in the Production of Techno-Scientific 
Knowledge,” Social Studies of Science 29 (1999): 919. 
7. Inside N A S A ,  p. 32. 
8. Thomas J. Kelly, Moon Lander: How We Developed the Apollo Lunar Module (Washington, DC: 
Smithsonian, 2001), pp. 165-171.Thn demorakahon is noted by Stephen Johnson in The Secret of 
Apollo (Baltunore: Johns Hophns, 2002), pp. 145-146. 
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2) Redesigning, testing, and reworking aerospace artifacts. 
In aerospace design and fabrication, three “rules” might be regarded as 
near universals: a) “the distance between paper and product is greater than you 
think,” b) “nobody gets it right the first time,” and c) “learn that fiilure is your 
Cciend.” These are applicable in part because space manufacturing has to meet 
more demanding environmental tests than any other category of production.’ 
Zero gravity, temperatures verging on absolute zero, the vacuum of space, launch 
vibrations and postlaunch rocket oscdlations (pogo-ing), combustion instability, 
the complex interdependencies of functional systems, and the impossibility of 
most in-mission fixes combined with other hazards to render manufacturing for 
NASA launches a high-risk, high-stress task. Testing, particularly of components 
and subsystems, routinely revealed shortcomings in materials, workmanship, 
capability, or durability, mandating redesign, indeed often multiple redesigns.” 
“Fixes” themselves could create new problems-e.g., a redesigned part impinging 
more on a nearby component than the prior version, now radiating vibrations 
that unsettle its neighbors’ instrumentation. Recognized insufficiencies in a system 
could trigger a higher-order redesign (classically, realization that fuel cell reliabdity 
was uncertain, yielding a shift to batteries),” which then entailed rethinking system 
integration. Occasionally, interprogram redesigns affected the large objects, which 
tended to present a stable exterior appearance. For example, the Mercury capsule’s 
system components were largely located in the interior space of the “tin can,” 
crowding one another and the astronaut.They were maddening to adjust or repair 
(getting at a failed part in one system usually involved removing elements of 
another, adding possibihties for error and failure). However, in the larger Gemini 
capsules, designers modularized functional systems (all key parts located together, 
insofar as was possible) and removed them outside the astronauts’ operating space, 
mahng them accessible from the exterior of the capsule for maintenance.” 
9.The “ru1es”are ofmy devising, derived &om (not quoted &om) primary sources. Likewise, the “more 
demanding” claim is arguable, though not pursued here. Comparable, but somewhat less demanding, 
envlronments for production, in my view, involve nanotechnologies, biotechnologies, deep underwater 
artifacts (nuclear submarines), and cryogemc or ArctdAntarchc processes/places. At the press con- 
ference observing the Mercury Project’s closure, McDonnellS Walter Burke asserted: “The problem 
of designing and making work this complex group of systems is one whch [required] and did get a 
degree of attention to detad far surpassing [any] that has ever been evident in any mdustrial effort up to 
date.”A newsman thoughdully countered that Adrmral kckover might challenge that claim (transcript, 
Mercury Project Summary Conference, box 1 ,“Mercury Final Conference,”September-October 1963, 
entry 196-Subject Files, NASA, Johnson Space Center Fdes, NARA RG255). 
10. As Mission Control’s Gene Kranz summarized, “If you were successful, the concept was labeled 
brdliant, and you could focus your energies on the next step, the next set of unknowns. If you had 
problems, you found them early and somehow made time to fix them whde keeping on schedule. If 
you faded, a lot of expensive hardware was reduced to junk and the schedule shattered” (Gene Kranz, 
Failure Is  Not an Option, NewYork: Simon & Schuster, 2000, p. 210). 
11. Kelly, Moon Lander, pp. 83-84. 
12. Barton Hacker and James Grimwood, On the Shoulders o f  Titans: A History o f  Project Gemini 
(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4203,1977), pp. 33-34. 
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In this context, experienced contractors understood that NASA’s or their 
own engineers’ blueprint designs represented a preliminary set of parameters 
for manufacturing, given the multiple uncertainties of testing and use and 
the unknown unknowns (unk-unks) that could wreak havoc. at any point.13 
Thousands of engineering design changes would flow through every large- 
object project, ripping holes in budgets, but ironically reinforcing the con- 
fidence of NASA staff and contractors’ engineering and production teams. 
“As a part of their culture, NASA employees came to believe that risk and 
failure were normal” and that the anticipation of failure led to its a~oidance.’~ 
Hence the salience of acknowledging the long road from sketch to artifact, the 
necessity of iterative design and testing, and the value of welcoming failures 
(though obviously not fatalities). 
3) Contests and alliances betweedamong contractors and NASA units. 
One could hardly do better for a starting point in thinking about managerial 
relationships in high-performance technological production and operation than 
to revisit W. R. Scott’s classic formulation of three central issues: 
We expect technical complexity to be associated with structural 
complexity or performer complexity (professionalization); techni- 
cal uncertainty with lower formalization and decentralization of 
decision making; and intevdependence with higher levels of coordi- 
nation. Complexity, uncertainty, and interdependence are alike in 
at least one respect: each increases the amount of information that 
must be processed during the course of a task performance.Thus 
as complexity, uncertainty, and interdependence increase, struc- 
tural modifications need to be made that will either 1) reduce 
the need for information processing, for example by lowering 
the level of interdependence or lowering performance standards; 
or 2) increase the capacity of information processing systems, by 
13. A concise evocation of the “unk-unks” (famously referenced in a 12 February 2002 press 
conference by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld) can be found inTom Kelly’s analysis of the Apollo 
Lunar Excursion Module’s (LEN) history. Having completed a prelimnary design study for Grumman, 
Kelly’s partner Tom Samal opined “‘I’ll bet the real Apollo won’t look hke any of the vehicles we’ve 
studied.’. . .‘Why do you say that? Don’t you think we’ve done a good job,’ I challenged. [Samal replied,] 
‘Our study was okay as far as it went, but I’m sure we’vejust probed the obwous.There’s stdl so much 
we don’t know about how to fly to the Moon.’ I had to agree w t h  that. ‘You’re right. We don’t even 
know yet what we don’t know”’ (Kellx Moon Lander, p. 16). 
14. McCurdy, Imide NASA, pp. 62-65. For me, at least, it is not clear, in practice, with what rehabhty 
anticipation of failure does lead to its avoidance, or indeed how one would know/measure/analyze this. 
T h s  may be one of those rarely voiced articles of faith that I have elsewhere referred to as”fabr1cations.” 
See Phhp Scranton, “Cold War Technological Complexltles: Budding American Jet Engines, 1942-60” 
(unpublished paper presented at SHOT Annual Meenng, Amsterdam, October 2004). 
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increasing the [flow and carrying] capacity of the hierarchy or by 
legitimating lateral connection among participants. l5 
Todd La Porte and Paula Consolini appropriated this conceptualizing statement 
as foundational for their studies of “hugh-reliability organizations,” working a 
counterpoint to the normalization of complex technology/system failures evi- 
dent in Charles Perrow’s analyses.16 Having done workplace studies, they argued 
that with enough attention to detail, procedure, and training, complex organiza- 
tions can and do manage to handle high-risk situations without catastrophic 
consequences. Yet the situations their air traEc controllers and aircraft carrier 
landmg technicians mastered were characterized by long-term stable technolo- 
gies, high-volume repetitions, and thus a restricted, known set of risk-enhancing 
conditions and emergency-inducing variables (chiefly technical failures and cas- 
cading climate problems). Though they partook of Scott’s three core features, 
NASA production and operations did not fit thu high-reliability stabilization 
framework, for these were nearly unique phenomena, lacked technological sta- 
bility, lacked mastery-inducing repetitions, and thus confronted hazard condi- 
tions and variables that could not be fully comprehended, much less defended 
against by backups and redundancies.” 
One implication of this difference was that for technological, economic, 
organizational, and cultural reasons, contracts proved blunt instruments 
for regulating the production and operational relationships between NASA 
and its contractors, much less among NASA and primes on one hand and 
thousands of subcontractors (and sub-subs) on another.’* Technically, the 
15. W. R .  Scott, Organrzationr: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems, 2nd ed. (Englewood Ch&, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1987), quoted in Todd La Porte and Paula Consohni, “Worlung in Prachce But Not 
in Theory: Theoretical Challenges of “High-Rehabhty Organizations,”Journal of Pubhc Admrnistration 
Research and Theory 1 (1991): 30. 
16. Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents, rev. ed. (Princeton: Princeton Unwersity Press, 1999). 
17.Vaughan points out that although the Shuttles were reusable, thus superficially identical among 
exishng craft and from mssion to mssion, in actuality,“no two shuttles were alike; after each mission, 
the several NASA/contractor work groups made hundreds of changes, so the techca l  artifact was 
different for each launch” (Vaughan, “Role,” p. 919). 
18. In a heroic but doomed effort to “prehct changes in NASA satellite contracts,” two management 
analysts secured a NASA grant in the early 1970s and profiled the contract changes for 21 satelhte 
projects. Seeking a prechctive formula, they ignored engineering changes below the contract change 
level (Engineering Change Requests, or ECRs, versus Contract Change Proposals, or CCPs [CCPs 
were often large-scale shifts in design, whereas ECRs usually were changes in indwidual components]), 
identified mean change costs as $100 K-$300 K, and struggled to find somethmg to regress.Yet they 
&d offer an empirical table that suggests the econormc foundation for contests and alliances. Focused 
on 21 contracts between 1959 and 1968,it showed that in the course ofthe first 10 contracts (195942), 
final costs were 5.1 times imtlal contract figures on average, though in the final 10 contracts (1964-68), 
this multiplier fell to 2.1. However, final costs were eshmated in half the latter 10, as perhaps cost data 
continued on the next page 
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endless Engineering Change Requests that testing and use generated meant 
routine contests both over the need for and design ofreconfigured components, 
checkout routines, etc., and over who would bear the costs. Economically, as 
well, changes (due to incapacities or aimed at improving capabilities) escalated 
program expenses and generated NASA-corporate alliances between firms 
when both faced congressional appropriations hurdles. Primes and subs fought 
over late deliveries and defective products yet stood shoulder to shoulder 
against persistent NASA “meddling,” “intrusive oversight,” or “p~l ic ing.”~~ 
Varied patterns of clashing cultures stretched back to the space program’s 
earliest days, when, in the course of new and massive contracting for Mercury 
spacecraft, the inheritance by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) and 
NASA of “management by detail” from NACA/Peenemiinde ran head-on 
into McDonnell’s pride in engineering creativity and independence. Long a 
principal Air Force aircraft supplier, McDonnell expected a continuation ofthe 
arm’s-length, consultative style of contract relations crafted over two decades. 
Instead, NASA designers and managers, who had never held responsibility for 
a major technologically novel project, locked horns repeatedly with industry 
specialists who had done so.’’ Later, when NASA Administrator James Webb 
geared up for Apollo in 1963 by reorganizing the Agency’s top management, 
those he brought in had substantial experience in Air Force ballistic missile 
program management and industrial military contracting (George Mueller, 
Air Force Generals Samuel Phillips and Edmund O’Connor, and the legendary 
Joseph Shea).’l Webb evidently recognized that at NASA, “nobody knew 
how to do program management or work with industry on large programs.”” 
continuedfrom the previous page 
remaned incomplete at the time of their article’s composiQon.The declme in the overrun due to con- 
tract changes does suggest better specificatlons in the latter period. See Wdham Stephenson and Bruce 
Berra,”Predichng Changes in NASA Satellite Contracts,” Management Science 21 (1975): 626-637, table 
on p. 629. Regarding Apollo, “what began as a $400 d o n  contract would top out at $4.4 bdhon a 
decade later. But everybody knew t h ~ s  going in.All of the Apollo bids were smoke and mrrors, because 
[in 19621 nobody knew what they were tallung about” (Gray, Angle $Attack, p. 120). 
19. Regarding the Shuttle booster,Vaughan observes that NASA saw ‘‘Marshall engmeermg’s role” as 
“pohcingThioko1; to find fault, to idenhfy mstakes, to make sure the contractor abided by the contract” 
(Vaughn,“Role,” p. 920).The issue is not that this was not appropriate, but that it was inadequate and 
ineffectual. 
20. Joan Bromberg inhcated that NASA core leaders feared loss of design control and shoddy work 
by companies given too much authority. See Bromberg, N A S A  and the Space Industry, pp. 40, 43. See 
also McCurdy, Inside N A S A ,  pp. 38-42, which includes t h  gem on p. 41:“In one celebrated instance, 
contract workers at what became the Kennedy Space Center went out on strike because the von Braun 
team would not let them alone.The workers were accustomed to Air Force practice, w l c h  involved 
httle direct supervision.” 
21. Shea took personal responsibdity for the Apollo fire chaster and resigned from NASA in July 
1967 (Kelly, Moon Lander,p. 161). 
22. McCurdy, Inside N A S A ,  p. 92. 
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McCurdy’s judgment on the results of this reorientation is clear: “NASA’s 
success in achieving the goals of the Apollo program was due in large measure 
to the tension between the Air Force approach to program management and 
NASA’s traditional technical 
Organizational structures did create platforms for alliances, however 
fraught with tension, as well as for clashes. Industry and Agency engineers with 
similar specialties and backgrounds worked through problem sets in spaces far 
distant from policy-making and budget authorizdtions. For example, Space 
Task Group and McDonnell collaborated in depth to create Project Orbit, the 
huge vacuum chamber in which an entire Mercury capsule could be tested in 
as close to space conditions as was then feasible. Later, on the Lunar Lander 
project, NASA and Grumman co-staffed the Change Control Board to assess 
modifications and manage configuration (modeled on Air Force practice) .24 
4) Conceptualizing contracting relations and production on tech- 
nology’s edges. 
Although these first three items hardly exhaust the potential list of 
themes linking NASA and industry, technology and organization, practice 
and process, design and production, it is worth pausing here for a moment 
to consider the possible conceptual tools and theoretical frameworks with 
which scholars can map this terrain in ways that increase our understanding. 
Two existing frameworks stand out, at least in my view: Stephen Johnson’s 
close analysis of systems management’s rise to dominion in NASA pro- 
grams, drawing on Weber, Drucker, and the literature of “knowledge man- 
agement,” and Howard McCurdy’s sociological approaches to organizational 
culture at NASA and its transformations. Johnson’s work focuses closely on 
the struggle to achieve rational control over projects and heighten reliability 
through devising and enforcing rigorous procedures. McCurdy reaches into 
the extrarational world of the beliefs and assumptions that underlie (and at 
23. Ibid. See also Mike Gray,Angle ofAttack: Harrison Storms and the Race to the Moon (NewYork: Norton, 
1992), pp. 50-52. On p. 50, for example: “Most of [NASA’s] key people were creative iconoclasts hke 
Maxime Faget, conceptual thinkers used to a hands-on approach in wluch they personally supervised 
every detail . . . . Now they were being asked to create the largest technical orgarmation of all time.” 
24. Johnson, Secret, p. 128; Kelly, Moon Lander, p. 102. By contrast, the Apollo program’s “powerhl 
Change Control Board,” created in 1967 after the astronauts’ deaths, seems to have been entirely 
NASA-staffed, w t h  George Low making final decisions on “changes proposed by NASA or the prime 
contractors” (Kelly, Moon Lander, p. 163). Johnson discusses the collaborative style of early NASA- 
industry management more fully in Secret, pp. 116-120. Superficially, that is, without specific research 
into the issue, it appears to me that collaborative NASA-industry design and engineering waned and 
NASA surveillancdpolicing increased over time, perhaps a s h f t  triggered by the January 1967 deaths of 
White, Grissom, and Chaffee, as might be inferred flom Johnson’s review of the postaccident managerial 
shifts and conflicts (Secret, pp. 146-150). Ifthere was such a shift, was it confined to manned space issues, 
or did it generahe across all NASA projects? 
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times undermine) practices, offering a dramatically different perspective. Both 
focus primarily on the Agency, as would be expected, leaving ample room for 
pursuing questions about the industry and production side of the spacefaring 
equation.25 
Three other perspectives, which grapple with practice at the “local” 
level, strike me as potentially valuable, particularly in thinking about indus- 
trial matters: 
1) Adapting the social construction of technology (SCOT) framework to 
encompass ways in which emergent organizations, much like “unruly” 
technologies, can become “uncertainty multipliers,” a notion Diane 
Vaughan has applied convincingly to “the NASA/contractor organi- 
zation” for the Shuttle.26 
2) Exploring management theorists’ conceptualization of the interplay 
between rationality and irrationality within organizations, and its 
relation to collateral inquiries into organizational disorder and its 
implications. 27 
3)  Developing research questions in relation to work and technology, 
based on anthropologists’ concern for “situated practice” and “com- 
munities of practice.”28 
The provocative potential of Vaughan’s perspective can be quickly sensed 
in her opening remarks to a recent discussion paper on organizations and 
techno-scientific knowledge: 
25. Johnson, Secret, pp. 1-3; McCurdy, Inside N A S A ,  pp. 163-164. Johnson also includes an instructive 
comparison w t h  the European space agencies (European Space Research Orgamsatlon [ESRO]/ELDO, 
Secret, chaps. 6 and 7) but does not appear to have dehvered on one sipficant point. He ends chap. 5 
(speaking of the period around 1970) with “The dsadvantages of systems management would become 
apparent later . . .” (pp. 152-153), but so far as I can tell, no dscussion of disadvantages appears in the 
remaimng sections of his study. There may be other theoretlcal frameworks well exemplified in NASA 
literature, but I’m not yet f d a r  with them. Both McCurdy and Johnson undertake the explanation 
of NASA’s “decline” and the resurgence of mssion failures/disasters two decades after Apollo. 
26.Vaughan,“Role,” pp. 916-919.Vaughn’s inspirations flowed from Clifford Geertz, Charles Perrow, 
and the “situated action” group (n. 27), as well as from the STS and science studm hteratures (see 
“Role,” pp. 935-936, nn. 2-5, 17). 
27. Nils Brunsson, The Irrational Organization: Irrationality as a Basis for Otganizational Action and 
Change (New York: Wdey, 1985); Massimo Warglien and lMtchael Masuch, The Logic of Otganizational 
Disorder (Berhn: deGruyter, 1996), esp. the ehtors’ introductlon and chapters by Bruno Bernard, Erhard 
Friedberg, and Nils Brunsson. 
28. Lucy Suchman, Plans and Situated Actions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), John 
Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, The Social Llfe o f  Information (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 
2000); Julian Orr, Talking About Machines (Ithaca: Cornell Umversity Press, 1996); Christlan Heath and 
Paul Luff, e&., Technology in Action (Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press, 2000); Enenne Wenger, 
Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning and Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press, 1998). 
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I begin by drawing on organization theory to illustrate the 
central paradox oforganizations: namely, that the characteristics 
usually associated with the bright side of organizations- 
the structures and processes designed to assure certainty, 
order knowledge, and stabilize operations, thereby making 
coordinated activity possible-also have their dark side- 
the capacity to generate uncertainty, disordered knowledge, 
instability and unanticipated outcomes . . . . [Tlhis paper 
targets the conjunction of organization and technology that 
affected the production of knowledge and knowledge claims 
on a routine basis [at NASA]. The paradox is illustrated by 
showing the variable effect of the NASA organization on the 
production of techno-scientific knowledge: 1) the production 
of disordered and uncertain knowledge on a daily basis; and 2) 
the fact-hardening mechanisms in place to convert disorder to 
order when a collective decision was necessary.29 
Where Johnson sees systems management as generating reliability and certainty, 
by tracing Challenger and other failures to a relaxation of detail di~cipline,~’ 
Vaughan sees the ghost as inherent in the great machine and penetrates deeply 
enough into the everyday life of techno-science to establish that “disordered 
knowledge is a byproduct of the very organizational mechanisms designed to 
control it.” “Structure creates pockets of meaning systems-distinctive local 
knowledges . . . -that are by definition contradictory . . . . Structure [also] 
obscures, so that actions occurring in one part of an organization cannot, for the 
most part, be observed by people in other parts.” Her work echoes in organiza- 
tional/knowledge terms Perrow’s critique of technical complexity, urging that 
scholars acknowledge that everyday practices and relations have dangerously 
ambivalent implications for organizational and technical outcomes.31 
If so, recognizing that nonrational dimensions to organizational and tech- 
nical practice are routinely yet unevenly present in all action situations can be 
a valuable step. Nils Brunsson has memorably underscored the presence and 
significance of nonrational dimensions of organizational practice, especially in 
regard to innovation. From his perspective, planning creativity is as fruitless as 
creating a random search for a technical fault, precisely because different 
modalities of thought and practice inform decision-making versus action- 
29.Vaughan, “Role,” pp. 914-915. 
30. Johnson, Secret, pp. 228-229, and n. 9, pp. 275-276. McCurdy debits such disasters in fair measure 
to the attrihon of NASA’s classic high-performance “techmcal culture,” rising risk aversion, and a 
politicized intolerance for fdure (Insrde NASA, chaps. 5 and 6). 
31 .Vaughan, “Role,” p. 916, both quotations; Perrow, Normal Accidents. 
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taking. Agents need perennially to be aware that overreliance on rationality 
can generate stalemates, just as overreliance on intuition and enthusiasm can 
yield chaos. One central insight Brunsson’s exploration of the “irrational orga- 
nization” offers is that agreement on goals makes conflict difficult to under- 
stand in complex environments, whereas failed conflict resolution (organization 
change) can generate “social deadlock,” the outcome when “a group of people 
have arrived at a situation which satisfies none of them but which they are 
unable to change.”32 The relevance of these conceptualizations to analyzing 
patterns of and changes in NASA-contractor relations is hard to miss.33 
Third, in their anthropology of work and practice, Julian Orr, Lucy 
Suchman, and their colleagues undertake to reemphasize the importance of 
informal structures and relations, and of the knowledge and routines they 
generate, to organizational activity. As Scott noted, even conceptualizations 
of organization-technology relations that stress contingency, hence situation/ 
place and history “overlook the importance ofinformal structures as a response 
to uncertainty and complexity.” These are bottom-up processes or, perhaps 
better, integrative linkages: 
Rather than augmenting hierarchies, they minimize ver- 
tical distinctions, and rather than creating new, specialized 
lateral roles and relations, they encourage more direct, face-to- 
face communications among any or all participants as required. 
Decision making and the exercise of control become more 
decentralized, and organizational roles less f~ rma l i zed .~~  
32. Brunsson, Irrational Otganrzation, pp. 27,97, 111. By bringing the irrational into the picture of 
“normal action,” Brunsson generates an array of striking (and testable) insights, namely, “efficiency 
seldom goes hand in hand with flexibdity” (p. 4); it is “important to recognize that decisions can emst 
without actions and actions mthout decisions” (p. 21); and that in high-risk situations, those under- 
taking to reduce uncertainty are “speculators in success’’ and those trying to lower the stakes at risk 
are “speculators in fadure” (p. 52). The psychological dimensions of organizational action are key for 
Brunsson, and these cannot be reduced to rational propositions. 
33. Here’s one minor story that shows the power of the nonrational in NASA-business rela- 
tionships. In early 1963, NASA and North American representatives met 15 hours a day, six 
days a week in Houston to “hammer out a specific agreement on what North American was 
going to build and what NASA was going to pay for” in the Apollo program. Yet the NASA 
team was woefully underexperienced in negotiating contracts. As a NASA designer reflected, 
“We ought to have known better at the very outset . . . . Not any one of [our] technical guys 
knew a damn thing about costing. They had no basis to negotiate anything. We locked them 
up in these rooms [with North American managers and lawyers] and most ofthem came out mortal 
enemies. That  set a feeling that lasted a long time” (Gray, Angle of Attack, p. 144, emphasis added). 
34. W. R. Scott, Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems, 3rd ed. (Englewood C h 6 ,  NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1992), pp. 248-249, both quotations. An excellent ethnography based on this approach is 
Julian Orr’s TalkingAbout Machines. For a broader perspechve, see Robert J.Thomas, What Machines Can’t 
Do: Politics and Technology in the Industrial Enterprise (Berkeley: Unwersity of Cahforrua Press, 1994), and 
Thomas Davenport, Susan Cantrell, and Robert Thomas, “The Art of Work,” Outlook journal, January 
2002, http. //w. accenture.com/xd/xd. asp?it=enwebGxd=ideas%5Coutlook%5C 1.2002%5Cart.xml. 
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In American corporations and state agencies, uncertainty generates manage- 
rial hunger for top-down control, but few managers can master the mas- 
sive knowledge requirements for its exercise, especially in situations where 
knowledge is emergent and distributed widely, as in complex contracting/ 
subcontracting environments. Moreover, as Vaughan emphasized, the com- 
pressiodreduction of vast bodies of information and the structural inability of 
capturing situated practice can readily transform control over uncertainty into 
a generator of illusion and disorder.35 
NASA AND INDUSTRY Two KEY STUDIES 
In identifying the themes and conceptual packages just outlined, both the 
insights and the silences of previous research bearing on production for NASA 
proved crucial. Thus far, works by Johnson, Kelly, McCurdy, and Vaughan 
have been emphasized; here, I’d like to consider the legacy of studies by Bart 
Hacker and Jim Grimwood (Gemini) and Joan Bromberg (NASA and space 
industries). First, however, a visit to the shop floor from Mike Gray’s and 
Roger Bilstein’s Saturn booster studies will set the stage for underscoring 
the extravagant technical demands and necessities for innovation that infused 
production for NASA. 
The Apollo program’s Saturn artifacts were the largest rockets fabricated 
in the U.S. in the 1960s (perhaps ever). Yet creating their components was 
enormously difficult; consider, for example, the propellant tanks for the rocket’s 
lightweight S-2 first stage. Huge (reportedly three railway freight cars could 
be placed inside them) yet fragile (they couldn’t be fabricated horizontally, but 
had to be built upright), they presented unprecedented challenges in welding. 
“At a time when a flawless weld of a few feet was considered miraculous, the 
S-2 called for a half mile of flawless welds.” Moreover, the components for the 
tank’s dome-“immense pie-shaped wedges of aluminum eight feet wide at 
the bottom and twenty feet from there to the apex”-were elaborate spatial 
forms, “a spherical curve from side to side and a complex double ellipsoid 
from the base to the apex.” Given that no techniques existed for accurately 
machining such shapes, called gores, North American used explosive forming. 
Technicians placed the alloy blank on a forming die at the bottom of a 60,000- 
35. Vaughan, “Role,” pp. 926-934. This involves what Vaughan terms “fact-hardening,’’ and the 
procedures for acheving it here rely substantially on the exclusion of qualitauve information. As she 
notes,“Indeterminacy creates a closure problem.” This is resolved by generating quantitatively structured 
documents and pubhc consensus. “The documents . . . assert consensus through the matter-of-fact tone 
of the formal mode of discourse, afTirming the reality they assert to both the auhence and the author. 
An addiuonal factor that binds people to their actions is ‘going public.’ When a person participates in 
and is identified publicly with a decision, that person WIII resolve inconsistencies to produce attitudes 
consistent with that choice.” Quotations are &om pp. 929 and 930. 
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gallon water tank, then set off a cluster of carefully placed charges on the 
surface. In an instant the force carried through/by the water pressed the blank 
into the die-form (trimming followed) .36 These segments in turn were welded 
by “a new kind of a machine”: 
[Tlhe assemblers . . . were looking at a seam that followed a 
constantly changing curve over a twenty foot run, and the 
junction between the [gores] would have to match precisely 
to within a hundredth of an inch . . . . [Tlhe ultimate solution 
looked a little like a Japanese footbridge-a heavily reinforced 
bow-shaped truss that spanned the width of the dome and 
carried beneath it a precision track on which the welding 
machine traveled. The gear-driven welding head, its speed 
controlled by mathematical formulae, rolled ever so slowly up 
these rails carrying a tungsten electrode that precisely melted 
the metal on either side of the joint.37 [See photo opposite; the 
footbridge welder is visible at the upper left.] 
Thus were intricate demands addressed. Routinely for builders, no obvious 
means lay available to satisfy the interactive realities of technical complexity, 
technical uncertainty, and component interdependencies in production for 
NASA, thus propelling organizational frustration and technological creativity. 
This pattern is evident in each of the two other studies noted above, to which 
we now turn. 
Industry-NASA relationships are especially prominent in the first 10 
chapters of On the Shoulders of Titans, the segment authored by Bart Hacker. 
Like a number ofjet engine projects a decade earlier, Gemini was the result of 
an effort to redesign an existing complex technological artifact, the Mercury 
capsule. By early 1961, James Chamberlain, Space Task Group’s head of 
Engineering and Contract Administration, determined largely on his own 
initiative that the Mercury spacecraft needed a redesign “from the bottom 
up,” and thus spent part of February in St. Louis going over possible revisions 
with McDonnell engineers. Modularizing systems that in Mercury “had been 
stacked like a layer cake” such that “components of [any] one system had to be 
36. Gray, Angle $Attack, pp. 154155. 
37. Ibid., p. 156.This sequence is also carefully reported by Bdstein in considerably greater detad. See 
Roger Bdstein, Stage3 to Saturn (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4206,1980; reprint, Gainesvdle: University 
Press of Florida, 2003), pp. 212-222 (page citations are to the reprint edioon). For several of the hard- 
core technological issues, see W. J. Reichenecker and J. Heuschkel, NASA Contributions toJoinrng Metal 
(Washtngton, DC: NASA Technology Utilizahon Division, NASA SP-5064, 1967). This pubhcation 
includes references to a number of North American reports, as well as reports from Marshall, Pratt & 
Whitney, Kaiser Alununum, and others.The figure is drawn from Bdstein, Stages, p. 221. 
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Gores being welded to bulkheads for the S-ll stage of the Saturn V. (Source: Roger 
Bilstein, Stages to Saturn [Washington, DC: NASA SP-4206, 1980; reprint, Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 20031, p. 2271 
scattered about the craft” would “reduce manufacturing and checkout time,” 
Chamberlain argued. Yet as Hacker summarized, “making it better meant 
making it over.” Once Chamberlain and McDonnell’s William Blatz collated 
the redesign elements, they went before the Capsule Review Board, which 
“seemed staggered by the scope of the changes presented to them” in June.38 
As in jets, what started as a fix, or more accurately, a vector for refining the 
artifact, morphed into a largely new device, yet here still a one-man capsule. 
McDonnell engineers, led by Walter Burke, were the agents who outlined 
and pushed for the two-man spacecraft, however, as it was the builders 
who “were pressing for a more radical effort.” Indeed, in undertaking the 
preliminary design work, “McDonnell had not felt obliged to wait until its 
contract had been amended to provide the extra funds. The company spent 
its own money,” which generated “a good deal of respect in NASA circles.” 
As major spacecraft contract changes arose in order to expand its size, handle 
38. Hacker, Titans, p. 33-45 
184 CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
modularization, and create a docking system and (initially) ejections seats, 
expectations for reusing Mercury technologies in the new developmental 
trajectory faded as steadily as the project drove forward. This momentum and 
focus on industry relations were aided by an organizational arrangement which 
provided the Gemini Project Office and Chamberlain “a degree of autonomy,” 
enabling them “to deal directly with McDonnell and Air Force Space Systems 
Division” for capsules and boosters respectively. Chamberlain reported only 
to Marshall Space Flight Center Director Gilruth, chiefly providing him work 
in process reviews and discussions from coordination meetings, “Gemini’s 
central management device.”39 Thus far, an organizational device giving 
Chamberlain singular authority (how unusual? with what exact options? 
how evaluated by Headquarters and by McDonnell?) and decisive redesign 
innovations from industry engineers and engineering managers facilitated 
Gemini’s emergence.40 
However, a series of technological disappointments, cost escalations, and 
budget controversies soon caused massive headaches. In some measure, these 
derived from the fact that McDonnell “developed and built only the spacecraft 
structural shell and electrical system”; all else had been subcontracted. 
Thousands of components made by hundreds of firms flowed into St. Louis; 
if Gemini mirrored Mercury in this respect, an unknown, sizable subset 
of those devices would fail on test, fail to meet specifications, or fail to 
integrate effectively, and thus would need to be redesigned or repla~ed.~’ In
a retrospective overview, Hacker reflected, “Although the precise nature of 
39. Ibid., pp. 49-82,95. Even as expectations faded that technical apparatus from Mercury could be 
duphcated in Germm, major continuiues in personnel between the two programs proved a strength, 
from Faget, Gilruth, Chamberlain, and McDonnell’s Walter Burke down to the shop level, where, for 
example, NASA plant representative Wilbur Gray shifted gradually from Mercury to Gemmi. Gray’s 
memos and reports are a marvelous source for reconstituting, in part, the informal relations and 
emergent communities of prachce mentioned earher in the essay. Chamberlain’s autonomy may have 
been modeled on the &rect relationship NASA’s Max Faget and McDonnell’s John Yardley had in 
makmg “thousands of detailed design decisions” on the Mercury capsules. See Loyd Swenson, “The 
‘Megamachme’ Behind the Mercury Spacecraft,” American Quarterly 21 (1969): 210-227, quotahon 
from p. 222. 
40.Ths approach in no way intends to overlook issues and pressures external to the Gemixu project, 
such as the uncertainties about Apollo’s developmental trajectory, funding, and schedule, or the cultural/ 
pohtical pressure to keep perforrmng launches as Mercury was beginning to w n d  down. 
41.Archivists at NARA-Fort Worth inchcated that the boxes on techca l  testing and subcontractor 
relations I was using in my NASM/Lindbergh-supported research had not prevlously been pulled. 
Swenson’s This New Ocean understandably did not penetrate to thls level of source material, some 
of which, it appears, had not yet been archved or declassified at the time of its writing. NASMs 
Michael Neufeld suggested to me that the view among space historians is that Gemini was a much less 
troublesome project than Mercury, due to technological and orgamzahonal 1earmng.Ths 1s a position 
that rmght merit hrther probing, although Hacker chd drive more deeply into industry/produchon 
documents than &d Swenson (Hacker cites telexes, letters to contractors, and achvity, status, and “tiger 
team” reports, for example). 
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Gemini’s problems could not have been predicted, they did arise where they 
were expected-in those systems that demanded the greatest advances beyond 
current te~hnology.’”~ This is such a basic point that it is worth reinforcing- 
innovation generates disorder, and dramatic innovation entails error. failure, and 
conzict across a broad front. In some technological environments, a stabilization 
follows, both of knowledge and technology. When additional requirements 
are promulgated, extensions of capability are feasible on the basis of retained 
learning and scalable technique, though the achievements usually are hard- 
won. In other situations, workable innovations do not provide a foundation 
for enhancing capabilities, which is to say that stabilization proves illusory 
and learning less than readily applicable to upgrading. These often involve 
nonscalable technologies, which are the home for hordes of unk-unks and the 
sources of persistent frustration and failure in large technological projects. 
Two Gemini examples merit recounting: the fuel cell innovation and 
the recurrent issues surrounding thrusters-both involving subcontractors, 
here General Electric and Rocketdyne. Fuel cells had the potential to replace 
batteries as the source of on-board electricity, at a major savings in weight. 
However, in Gemini, the array of problems cropping up “seemed to suggest 
that theory had outrun practice.” GE researchers knew scientifically that the 
reaction of hydrogen and oxygen could generate power, and they had devised 
a clever “solid, ion-exchanging membrane” that dramatically simplified both 
the device and its operation. Unfortunately, this science-led technology did not 
operate successfully-the membrane leaked, weakening output, and once this 
fault was corrected, the cell exhibited “degraded performance” once activated. 
Technicians traced this to the shortcomings of a fiberglass component and 
replaced it with a Dacron substitute, which triggered new troubles. Other test 
failures derived from the cracking of the cell’s titanium tubing; these were 
replaced with a titanium-palladium alloy. Further problems appeared, but 
they “were never conceptual . . . . The rub came in trying to convert [the] 
concept into hardware to meet the Gemini specifications.” After two years’ 
work, NASA canceled the effort in January 1964, resumed work on battery 
development, and spent $600,000 to retrofit two capsules outfitted with fuel 
cells. The same pattern recurred soon after, with the Apollo Moon lander’s fuel 
cell program (this time handled by Pratt & Whitney) canceled early in 1965 
following two years of trials and failures, with reversion again to ba t te r ie~ .~~ 
Thrusters presented an enduring difficulty. Twice in the Mercury pro- 
gram, their fragility and unreliability caused serious concern. In January 1962, 
McDonnell was testing Capsule No. 2’s Reaction Control System when the 
42. Hacker, Titans, p. 162. 
43. Ibid., pp. 103-104,148-152. For the LEM story, see Kelly, Moon Lander, pp. 82-84. 
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base of the spacecraft caught fire due to leaking thruster propellant, which, 
when it combusted, caused further leaks, more combustion, and quite a bit of 
damage to the artifact and to the designers’ ~onf idence .~~ Just a month later, 
during John Glenn’s orbital flight, the Automatic Stability Control System, 
which coordinated the thrusters to maintain proper attitude, went for a walk 
over Mexico. Glenn explained: 
The capsule started drifting to the right in yaw and it would 
drift over to about 20 degrees, instead of the normal 30 degree 
limit, and then the high thruster would kick on and bat it back 
over to the left. It would overshoot and then it would hunt 
and settle down again somewhere around zero. The spacecraft 
would then drift again to the right and do the same thing 
re~eatedly.~~ 
Glenn put the system into manual control (then into fly-by-wire), which 
saved fuel, but the capsule began to yaw to the left, and it was soon apparent 
that “there was no left low Glenn discussed how he dealt with the 
inoperability problem: 
When the fly-by-wire one-pound thruster was not actuat- 
ing in yaw, I was using a real fast flip of the high thruster in 
the mode that the one-pound thruster was not operating to 
control. I couldn’t control this as accurately as you can with 
the one-pound thruster, . . . so what I did several times was, 
when I would overshoot in rate with the 24-pounder, I would 
use my one pounder on the other side to bring it back to zero 
. . . I wouldn’t call this desirable.47 
Unsurprisingly, attention to thruster testing and possible design flaws increased 
sharply. 
With the more ambitious Gemini program’s development, thruster prob- 
lems became more acute and challenging. The smaller of the two propulsion 
units on Gemini was roughly the size of Mercury’s larger unit (25 pounds of 
thrust), whereas Gemini’s big pusher was to yield three times that power (85 
44. R. H. Lhenkamp, Senior Engineer, McDonnell, “Investigation of the Capsule No. 2 Incident, 
9 January 1962,” 16 January 1962, MAC Technical Reports, box 27, entry 198C, NASA-JSC, NAFU 
R G  255. 
45. R. B.Voas, “Memorandum for Those Concerned, MA-6 Pilots Debriefing,” pp. 13-14, Contract 
Administration Files, box 31, entry 198E, NASA-JSC, RG255. 
46. Ibid. 
47. Ibid., p. 61. 
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pounds). The Mercury components had simply managed attitude control; in 
Gemini, they had to handle spacecraft maneuvering and in-orbit rendezvous. 
Third, the Gemini fuel was different-monomethylhydrazine and nitrogen 
tetroxide, which combusted on contact, versus Mercury’s simple hydrogen 
peroxide, which expanded radically on release under pressure. Last, and most 
troublesome, whereas the Mercury thrusters operated for a few seconds at a 
time, Gemini’s would need to burn steadily for 5 minutes or more, as well as 
to pulse repeatedly. 
The bad news came in waves. Tests early in 1963 showed that the 25- 
pound Geminis tended to “char through their casings” when run continuously. 
A redesign at first seemed to remedy this, but pulse testing proved half again 
more destructive to the casings, and a series of “expedients . . . could only 
alleviate, not solve, the problem.” Most troubling, the nonscalability gremlin 
soon surfaced, as “new tests revealed that the larger maneuvering thrusters 
could not be simply enlarged versions” of the 25-pound engines. Therefore, a 
separate design and testing program for them had to be devised. In October, 
the hammer dropped-mission simulations showed that astronauts used their 
thrusters far more than had been anticipated-thus, “thruster life would have 
to be doubled or tri~led.’”~ 
Rework lasted well into 1964, with the result that Rocketdyne fell far 
behind schedule and had spent more than double its allotted $30 million. 
NASA soon demanded a “full scale” audit, which revealed a “badly managed 
program,” for the company had “grossly underestimated the magnitude and 
complexity” of its engine subcontract. Fewer than half the engines slated for 
delivery by November 1964 had been received, and McDonnell was far from 
confident in the thrusters’ reliability. Still, by mid-1965, Rocketdyne had 
reorganized the engine division, recovered its momentum, and begun to meet 
or exceed schedule expectations.j9 The facts that different-sized and differently 
purposed engines could not be scaled up or down from existing, workable 
models and that elaborate fueling and combustion systems were inadequately 
understood meant that propulsion surprises would continue to arise.50 
Technological problems solved for a mission having certain requirements 
did not necessarily spill over to later missions with more demanding require- 
48. Hacker, Tttum, pp. 83-84,154-157.The upgraded demands settled at over 9 minutes for the small 
thrusters and over 13 m u t e s  for the large. 
49. Ibid., pp. 210-21 1 .Ths  happy outcome &d not prevent thruster problems from arismg on three 
nussions-GenuniV,VII, andVIII. See ibid., pp. 259-260,292,314-315, 
50. One of the key cldemmas here was combustion instability, whch arose when flows of fuels (and 
oxldizers) fded  to generate a steady, focused flame thrust, whether due to cawtation, component 
pedormance problems, or other factors. Correcting such instabkty once it occurred seemed impossible, 
for the effects were dramatic and instantaneous on mssde attitude and trajectory, nor was the science of 
fluid dynamcs sufficiently developed to model these flows mathematically and continuously. 
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ments. The organizational approaches effective for solving first-generation 
dilemmas would not assuredly suffice for next-generation challenges. As well, the 
insufficiencies of science regarding critical, complex phenomena (combustion 
and fluid dynamics, materials performance under zero gravity, etc.) meant that 
workable engineering outcomes could not be stripped of their anxiety dimen- 
sions, for, as with Mercury, components that worked 10 times could (and did) fail 
on the l l th,  without warning and without obvious (or remediable) cau~e.~’ In 
this light, it would perhaps be worthwhile for researchers to explore those 
domains in which basic science guided NASA technical practice, those where 
NASA practice extended scientific knowledge and theory, and those where the 
two remained disconnected in specific situations or for longer periods. 
Moving to the industry-NASA relationships depicted in Joan Bromberg’s 
pioneering overview entails a shift in focus, for her work undertakes a long- 
term analysis. This essay is anchored in thinking through technology and 
production issues, whereas after its opening sections, NASA and the Space 
Industry (NSI) moves toward the second of its two themes-space and the 
marketplace, for satellites, Shuttle usage, et a1.-if you will, the consumption 
side of NASA. Nonetheless, NSI’s first theme, “the innovation process,” is 
clearly germane. Here, Bromberg delineates production for NASA’s crucial 
background conditions, identifies core tensions, and offers two detailed case 
studies of innovation-satellites at Hughes and Apollo at North Ameri~an.~’ 
Four background items Bromberg highlights are particularly rich with 
implications: 
1) Lockheed’s science crisis in the mid-’50s “over whether scientists on 
a project should have control over advanced development.” The firm 
said no; 15 top scientists left, frustrated that their demand to direct 
work for which “the skill and technical knowledge [was] beyond the 
state of the art” had been rejected. Science-engineering and scientist- 
manager relations are a subplot in NASA-industry relations, though, as 
a novice, it’s not clear to me how much these have been investigated. 
51. As Hugh Dryden stated in the closing Project Mercury Conference, “We learn how to build 
things to last longer by trying to build them, by operating them in space, finding out what goes wrong, 
correcting, learning more about the environment These are things that we learn by going into 
space and working there, not fiom some theory in the laboratory” (“Mercury Final Conference,” pp. 
52. At the outset, Bromberg refers to technical professionals’ “community of practice” but does not 
seem to be aware of the communities of prachce in literature and research approaches noted here in the 
sechon on conceptual fiameworks. In a mscussion with NASM’s Martin Cokns (13 January 2005), I came 
to appreciate that oral history interviewing below the executive level (planned but never completed)- 
interviewing of design, test, and production engineers, for example-would, in h n g  novel questions, 
profit substantively from familiarity with the work of Orr, Suchman, and Lave, and also from thinlung 
closely about Karl Weick‘s challenging Sensemaking in Organizations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), 
especially in relation to puzzles, fdures, and conflicts over knowledge, interpretation, and practice. 
1-2, box 1, E196, RG255). 
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Here, did those resigning create their own firm; move to universi- 
ties; seek research unit jobs at Mellon, Battelle, or RAND; hire on 
to other industrial firms; or what? Did such confrontations appear on 
aerospace’s technological edge with some frequency, or vas this a rare 
moment?53 After all, the role of science and scientists in NASA work 
is not so obvious at it might seem, given the huge holes in scientific 
understanding of space environments in this era. 
2) The Air Force’s creation of Ramo-Wooldridge as a systems engineer- 
ing and technical management firm (1954). To be sure, this laid the 
foundation for “weapons system” development and for TRW, but to 
what extent did valorizing this cluster of sophisticated experts create a 
template helpful for defining NASA’s differences from NACA? Clearly 
the Air Force was already a contested model in terms of innovation 
management, so was NASA, in a slightly twisted organizational-lineage 
sense, Ramo-Wooldridge’s unacknowledged or ungrateful offspring?j4 
3)The mid-’50s conflict between the Naval Research Lab and Martin, 
which prefigured scores of subsequent contretemps. In ProjectVanguard, 
Martin argued that it should be provided “full [technical/managerial?] 
responsibility,” while the N U  demanded the inverse. Martin claimed 
that the Lab was full of busy fault-finders, “always promoting the ‘better’ 
at the expense of the ‘good enough,”’ whereas the NRL asserted that 
Martin didn’t “grasp how much they were dealing with unknowns, nor 
the importance of reliability . . . .” This contest, arrayed in just about 
these exact terms, would be replayed for several decades in NASA- 
industry relations, so what are we to learn from this early incidence? Was 
it thut early, that is, was this just an extension of Navy “control-freakish’’ 
patterns, inverse to Air Force (and Army Air Force) delegation of project 
responsibilities to contractors? Was this ‘‘&vide” a structural fault in post- 
war military/space programming, and was it ever resolved? If so, how? If 
not, with what implications? Or is this whole scenario just an outsider’s 
confused view of the unfolding game?j5 
4) The Army’s arsenal system (after its separation from the new Air Force) 
could not run all its ballistic missile projects inside von Braun’s shop, 
simply because “it did not have the manpower.” So was the arsenal sys- 
tem chiefly a managerial/operations framework and, in fair measure, 
53. Bromberg, NSI, p. 25. 
54.These relationships are sketched in Mueller Interview No. 4. See also Bromberg, NSI, pp. 26-28. 
55. Bromberg, NSI, pp. 26-28. 
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a hollow production system? Did shortcomings in securing adequate 
manpower (engineering, production, testing?) preview the complexi- 
ties of producing for NASA? Did contractors learn from ABMA that 
they needed to resist control moves from their funders in order to 
protect opportunities for enhancing their own engineers’ capabilities? 
Did “the enmity between the Army and the aircraft industry” bleed 
through to the space industry-NASA relationship, and if so, to what 
extent and with what conseq~ences?~~ 
Bromberg also details key drawbacks and advantages for companies 
undertaking production for NASA. On  the downside were the small numbers 
of artifacts ordered, the necessity for expensive experimental development and 
research (some of which would be self-funded), demands for higher precision 
than usual in aeronautical engineering and fabrication, and the need to find 
and hire ever more engineers (and high-skill shop workers). Still, the pluses 
were substantial, if somewhat more vague: the “chance to learn technologies, 
develop skills and install production tooling that they could use for other 
projects,” possible spillovers into commercial products, and the excitement of 
joining the space-race ~ulture.~’ 
She also shows that the bases for strain were quite concrete. If industry rep- 
resentatives in the 1950s saw “NACA engineers . . . as researchers, people whose 
aim was the production of papers and books,” the incoming NASA leadership 
was equally critical. Given the necessity of contracting, Headquarters feared 
the loss of design control, shoddy work by contractors given too much leeway, 
and the loss of collective memory (and identity) as project teams formed and 
disbanded. Specifically in the Mercury capsule case, “Langley engineers mis- 
trusted industry’s ability to design something as novel as a spacecraft,” whereas 
“industry and the military were convinced they knew more about space flight 
than NASA did.”58 This last item, the industry-military connection, reinforced 
NASA’s uncomfortable position as the national novice in major project devel- 
opment and operations. Max Faget may well have had an advantage in being 
able to conceptualize a blunt-body spacecraft, but McDonnell’s Walter Burke 
and his Air Force Material Command colleagues had learned firsthand how to 
fabricate complex aerospace technologies, as had von Braun and ABMA. Last, 
NASA might have considered industry folks immature and arrogant, but, as 
Bromberg so neatly puts it, “arrogance in proposals is also one of the channels 
by which creative ideas flow from industry to g~vernment.”~~ 
56. Ibid., p. 29. 
57. Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
58. fbid., pp. 32,43. 
59. Ibid., p. 43. 
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When introducing the first of her two case studies (Hughes and satel- 
lites), Bromberg poses seven questions which articulate the chief concerns and 
boundaries of the study, “the relation between US. industry and the federal 
government.”60 Except by inference, none of these questions spotlight the tech- 
nologies themselves, their design, prototyping, testing, redesign, fabrication, plus 
the consequent interfirm and contractor-government linkages. One technologi- 
cal-process moment appears when the failure of the first Syncom satellite was 
traced to a ruptured “gas tank,” a problem “corrected” after a “search for a stron- 
ger material.” The second Syncom “functioned brilliantly,” but further questions 
that might have probed this failure and correction fell outside the study’s scope.6! 
This set-aside resonates with W. D. Kay’s concern about the literature’s silences 
on “the internal workings of the nation’s aerospace contractors.”62 It remains for 
future scholars to address how Hughes designed and built its first three satel- 
lites; what the firm learned thereby and through what process; what innovations 
it embedded in the following four INTELSAT 11s; what machinery, materials, 
engineers, workers, consultations, conflicts, and compromises were involved.63 
Similarly with North American, Bromberg’s analysis works at the level 
of policy and program, though the secondary sources drawn on (especially 
Bilstein) yield a greater frequency of references to technical competencies and 
fabrication challenges. Thus the confrontation between Air Force General Sam 
Phillips (working for NASA) and North American leaders over “inadequate 
engineering, poor fabrication quality, faulty inspections, and cost escalations,” 
all leading to delays and rework, is concisely reviewed, yet the underlying 
reasons for these multiple failures are not divined. As Bilstein, Kelly, and, to 
a degree, Mike Gray (Angle OfAttuck) demonstrate, in-depth technical review, 
appropriately contextualized, generates complex, contingent, and real-time 
analyses of innovation, critical insights and errors, integration, and techno- 
logical and organizational learning.64 This is, however, very difficult without 
60. The questions are, “How much of the research for the commercial cornmumcations satehtes 
would be financed, dlrected or done by government, and how much by the private sector? Would a 
private industry arise to launch the satehtes or would they be launched by government?Would industry 
or government own and operate the systems? . . .What private firms would enter into the manufacture 
and the operation of commercial satellites (comsats)? What strategies would they use to gam market 
share? How would government policies and actions affect the market poslhons of private compames? 
How would these policies and achons affect the technology that was chosen?” (ibid., p. 46). 
61. Ibid.,p. 53. 
62. Kay,“NASA,”p.127. 
63. Five years ago, I dld an onhne database search for articles in scholarly and techmcdjournds on the 
design and fabrication of satehtes, which then ylelded fewer than a dozen hts. I expect a repeat these 
days would do much better, although the sdences on buddlng aerospace technologies may continue to 
mclude these devices. 
6 4 . h  excepuonal source in ths  regard is Martin Collins’s series of intennews m t h  North American 
Aviahon’s Lee Atwood, whch document the critical role of NASA’s detaded oversight in generahng 
continued on the next page 
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archival research, which, given its parameters and resources, was not plausible 
for this study. 
Nonetheless, Bromberg skillfully reviews the fabrication and engineer- 
ing practice changes that followed the Apollo fire deaths: scparate managers 
for each spacecraft, heightened attention to quality control, frequent shop- 
floor visits (including during night shifts), tightened change controls, along 
with some of the dilemmas their introduction created. “All changes now had 
to be funneled first through the program officer at Houston, and then through 
the manager of that particular spacecraft at NA Rockville. North American 
engineers were made to adhere rigorously to agreed-on procedures, without 
any creative flourishes.” Moreover, NASA’s increased surveillance and micro- 
management necessitated hiring hundreds of inexperienced technical manag- 
ers who knew far less about their programs than those they were overseeing, 
which in turn led to mechanical rule-following and conflicts, very much on 
the pattern that Vaughn’s conceptualizations outline. Pursuing these issues 
deeply into archival materials, especially those surrounding the astronauts’ 
deaths and their aftermath, could provide valuable understandings of a critical 
transition in America’s space program.65 
INDUSTRY AND NASA: 
MERCURY MOMENTS AND CLOSING QUESTIONS 
Scattered about earlier pages are some items derived from my archival 
work with NASA Mercury sources. I’ll mention just two others here focusing 
on a single matter, engineering changes, and will end by offering questions on 
other issues which may take on a fresh significance when researched from the 
contractors’ technology and organization viewpoint. These items and issues 
may have more significance to historians of technology and enterprise (who 
continued on the next page 
masses of change orders and consequent delays and estabhshes the distinction between projects that 
were just complex (such as the Apollo Command Module) and those that involved “technological 
stretching,” which ventured into the unknown. (See NASM Oral History Project, Atwood Interviews, 
no. 4, pp. 3, 10-11; no. 5, pp. 12, 14; no. 6 ,  p. 3; available at http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/ 
TRANSCPT/AT WOOD4. HTM, http: //www.nasm.si. edn /research/dsh /TRANSCPT/AT WOODS. 
HTM, and http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh /TRANSCPT/ATWOOD6.HTM.) It appears that this 
is the only interview with a contractor official. It would be valuable were someone or some inshtution 
to take up Collins’s plan for interviews with contractor engineers (and perhaps shop workers) before it 
is too late to target these sources of work and technology information. 
65. Bromberg, NSI, pp. 70-73, quotation fkom 71. NASMs Alan Blinder is currently researchmg 
the Apollo 204 fire. For the industry perspective here, Bromberg cites a pamphlet by John L. “Lee” 
Atwood, NAA president, Eom NASMs Oral History Working Flle. Deeply interesting is the extensive 
oral history interview itself, done by NASMS Martin Collins, noted above. (The first segment is at 
http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/TRANSCPT/ATWOODl. HTM; links at each section’s end take 
the reader to the next segment.) 
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Engineering drawing release for the Mercury capsule, March 1960. (Source: NASA 
Contract Administration Files, Procurement Division, box 22, entry 100, RG 255, 
NA RA-Southwest) 
very much need to integrate public-sector innovations and organizations into 
their private-sector worlds) than for NASA history purposes, unless/until the 
scope and conceptualization of NASA history shifts in the years ahead. 
The figure on this page is a simple graph documenting the engineering 
drawing releases for the Mercury spacecraft project, from inception through 
15 March 1960. Lines A and C indicate that based on component counts, 
McDonnell had estimated that roughly 1,200 drawings would be needed 
through early 1961,500 for the basic configuration and another 700 to include 
different capsules’ mission-specific requirements (e.g., an orbital spacecraft 
versus one for a ballistic flight). Yet in response to the flow of engineering 
changes inside the project’s first year, the actual number of drawings released 
reached 5,000 (line D). What significance this volume of redesigns had for 
project development is evident in Lee Atwood’s reflections on Apollo: 
Once your engineering output of drawings and specifications 
gets ragged as far as the schedule is concerned, everything else 
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gets ragged . . . . An engineering change is really a recall of 
something that’s been released. You stop it, recall your draw- 
ing, you get an instruction to change it, bring it back, and 
the shop is full of that . . . . The things that are most apparent 
are usually picked up [in] a couple of weeks’ surveys, because 
everybody has some kind of a schedule. Are you on it? Are you 
not? Well, of course you’re not, and the whole place looked 
like a wreck. It was stop orders, hold orders, missing parts, 
material procurement had to be modified in many cases.66 
Change orders were also lightning rods for NASA-industry arm wrestling, 
as was plainly the case with the Apollo Command Module: 
[The CSM] commanded the attention of so many astronauts 
and so many other people, engineers from Houston and all 
that. They all had their ideas of how things should be arranged, 
how controls should be set up, and an awful lot of brou- 
haha over the actual arrangement [resulted] . . . . One of the 
astronauts said, in connection with that, “YOU know, we 
have a pretty strong union.” And they really did. They really 
did. And Dale [Myers] had to face the problem of arrange- 
ment [changes,] plus electrical changes, which came from 
other parts of the stack and from the ground equipment itself 
. . . . So there were just infinite refinements and changes, 
more than the S-11, which was fundamentally structural, a 
weight problem, . . . whereas the impact on the command 
module was almost screw by screw, and estimate by estimate 
and switch by swit~h.~’ 
Researching the dynamics, thepolitics, thelanguage, and the practices regarding 
engineering changes, which had pervasive implications for scheduling, cost, 
and program/artifact reliability and success, demands moving deep within 
both NASA and contractor organizations, following plant representatives like 
Wilbur Gray from Mercury to Gemini, chasing the origins and resolutions of 
66. Atwood Interviews, no. 5, pp. 10-1 1. 
67. Ibid., p. 12. Elsewhere, Atwood added “Your ideal is to engineer somethmg, put it in the shop, 
get it built efficiently, and then inspect it carefully and get it out the door and operate. We had an 
environment that required us to do all those things at once, with much backtrachng to make changes. 
The changes were almost overwhehng. So this was part of the problem of the organization, and it 
was far &om normal. In fact, as Sam Phillips noted, it was to a considerable degree out of control. 
Parts had to go back for re-engineering, redesign, again and again, re-release, new material, supply and 
manufacturing and tooling. Yes, it was a struggle” (Atwood Interviews, no. 7, p. 3). 
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issues that surfaced briefly in configuration control committee minutes, and 
reconstituting the scale and significance of conflicts over payment for extra 
work, rework, redesign, supplementary testing and such. Only in this way will 
historians begin to understand the sadness behind Atwood’s crisp aphorism: 
“If things are done well, NASA succeeded; if things are done poorly, the 
contractor failed.’”j8 
A chart issued on the same date as the drawings release graph accounted 
for the sources of engineering changes through mid-March 1960. I have not 
yet tallied the total of engineering changes with any precision, as there evi- 
dently were several levels of and procedures for requesting and reporting 
these. However, there were approximately 340 major “contract change 
orders” in roughly 30 months and at least 6,000 changes to the capsule com- 
ponents and configurations. Key dilemmas included communicating change 
implementations, authorizing changes, testing implications of changes on 
other components, identifying failure sources, and updating specifications to 
reflect changes. 
The figure shows that nearly half the ECRs (Engineering Change 
Requests) emerged from deficiencies detected in testing, here components. 
A different class of failures, “interferences,” was noted under “Manufacturing 
Coordination,” and at that date, my sense is that these were still physical 
impingements due to the “spaghetti” style of packing in capsule system com- 
ponents. When full capsule testing commenced, a third sort of testing defi- 
ciency appeared-system integration and interface problems. These took on 
yet further ramifications when capsules connected to boosters and to launch- 
related ground equipment displayed higher-order integration deficiencies. 
Together, tests and coordination problems represented nearly two-thirds of 
the ECRs, with improvements, including the famous astronauts’ demand for 
a window, another one-fifth. Engineering studies, the work closest to scien- 
tific research, were handled both by NASA Centers and by McDonnell. 
What significance and impact these studies had on the project is not yet 
clear, nor do summary documents provide cost figures for the four classes. 
Still, this simple chart suggests that, from the beginning, waves of engineer- 
ing changes flowed through manned space projects from multiple directions, 
generating specialized knowledge, urgent workarounds and overtime labor, 
unpredictable cost and schedule implications, and fluctuating currents of dis- 
order.69 In sum, retelling NASA stories from the drafting room and shop 
floor outwards, from the bottom up, has the potential to reorient a universe 
of NASA-centric histories. 
68. Atwood Interviews, no. 4, p. 11. 
69. Originals of these two figures may be found in CCP Status Reports, box 20, NAS 5-59, Contract 
Adrmnlstration Files, entry 100, NASA-Mercury, RG255. 
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Ifsuch a scheme were to be activated, questions and issues like these, some 
of which reiterate points sounded earlier, would be tabled, all considering 
change over time, 1950~-1970s, at least: 
1) How were relationships between design revisions and manufacturing 
practice articulated, in the dual-pressure contexts for extensive changes 
on one count and design freezes and standardization on another? 
2) What implications did NASA contracts have for manufacturers’ recruit- 
ment, training, and retention of highly skilled workers-engineers, 
shop-floor workers, and managers-for manufacturers’ procurement 
of machinery and facilities? 
3) Considering relationships between primes and subcontractors, what 
patterns and variations in knowledge exchange, mentoring and moni- 
toring, financial management, etc., emerged in NASA contracts? How 
were these different from such patterns in military contracts? In com- 
mercial contracts? How did they differ when technological stretching 
was at issue, beyond “routine” complexity? 
4) What spatial patterning eventuated in early NASA prime and sub- 
contracts, and did this change? If so, how/when/why? What factors 
conditioned these outcomes (labor supply, proximities and networks, 
politics)? How did technological change in communications, creating 
virtual proximities, affect the spatiality of producing for NASA? 
5) How did NASA’s fabricators frame practices for identifying/processing/ 
testing new materials, including a) uses in prototyping, b) developing 
supply lines (titanium being a classic case), and c) adapting existing 
or creating novel manufacturing procedures? What prior experiences 
with materials substitution (alloy metals, synthetics) conditioned this 
process versus what new trajectories of technical knowledge-seeking 
did the devising of aerospace materials articulate? 
6) What historically tested production skills and practices were installed/ 
modified/rejected as shop-floor experience in producing for NASA 
developed? What occasions for technological learning proved crucial 
to overcoming obstacles to fabrication, precision, or quality? (Consider 
candidates like chemical milling, explosive forming, numerically con- 
trolled tooling, et al.) What implications for further manufacturing prac- 
tice did these adaptations/adoptions have, and to what degree were they 
realized? What conflicts between contractor managers and engineers 
resulted, between managers/engineers and workers, with what out- 
comes, including strikes? (N.B.: aircrafi/aerospace manufacturing had 
one of the highest union densities in U.S. manufacturing, 1950-1990.) 
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7) What would be the breakdown of sources for delays and cost overruns; 
how would these differ among projects, and why? What links and 
learning trajectories can be established among projects from the 
contractors’ side-evidence for and significance of knowledge- 
sharing among aerospace rivals-in terms of materials, electronics, or 
fabrication shifts? What internal and networked transfers of know- 
how among projects took place, and how significant were they?70 
8) What arrays of managerial techniques did contractors deploy in efforts 
to comprehend and influence fabrication projects that, as Atwood 
testified, threatened to spin out of control? How did firms assess 
internally the competence of their production efforts, and to what 
degree did these evaluations correspond with those authored by NASA 
overseers? How did such Venn diagrams differ among projects, both 
over time and across artifact classes? 
9) How did primes and subcontractors integrate producing for NASA 
into their enterprises’ overall operations, and how was this integration 
(or lack of it) evidenced by corporate planning processes, capital funds 
allocations, career tracks, etc.? 
10) T h a t  informal practices did contractors’ employees devise, at each 
locus and level of institutional activity, to deal with (make sense of) 
the persistence of insufficient knowledge, the nonlinearity of test- 
ing and performance outcomes, the ubiquity of uncertainty, the 
stresses of complexity, and the nonrational character of creativity? To 
what degree were such practices formalized in training procedures 
or, alternatively, concretized, either spontaneously or in a planned 
way? Most broadly in this arena, how can we assess the human cost 
of aerospace innovation to individuals, families, and communities 
(both of practice and of residence)? How do these practices, train- 
ings, outbursts, quits, and implications compare and contrast with 
those which materialized in commercial-market enterprises and 
institutions? Ultimately, how (and to what extent) can producing for 
NASA be integrated into the experience of American business in the 
70.Weick makes a provocative comment regardingwestrum’s “fallacy of centrality” (the phenomenon 
of discounting new information because if it were important the indiwdual/orgamzation would already 
have heard about it): “It is conceivable that heavily networked orgamzations rmght find their dense 
connechons an unexpected liability, if this density encourages the fallacy of centrality. ‘News’ might 
be discounted if people hear it late and conclude that it is not credible because, if it were, they would 
have heard it sooner.This dynamc bears watching because it suggests a means by which perceptions 
of information technology might undermine the abdity of that technology to facilitate sensemaking. 
The more advanced the technology is thought to be, the more likely are people to discredit anything 
that does not come through it. [Thus] the better the information system, the less sensitive it is to novel 
events” (Sensemaking, p. 3, emphasis in original). 
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Cold War decades, the social life of organizations, the construction 
of knowledge, and the history of technologies? 
These, and surely other, open questions flow from this very partial review 
of literature and documents concerning NASA-industry relations. Along with 
the foregoing thoughts on key issues, plausible conceptual frameworks, and 
implications drawn from that literature, they are offered for reflection and 
reaction. Perhaps they will encourage what seems a long-overdue vector for 
research into the distinctive, little-understood world of production for NASA, 
which exemplifies the intensities, urgencies, joys, and miseries of high-tech, 
high-pressure, state-sponsored innovation. 
CHAPTER 7 
NASA AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: 
ENDURING THEMES IN THREE KEY AREAS 
Peter Hays 
s with any large government bureaucracies with imprecisely delineated areas A of responsibility and potentially overlapping missions, the quality and pro- 
ductivity of the relationship between the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have waxed and 
waned over the years.The NASA-DOD relationship has been shaped by a series 
of fundamental issues and questions that accompanied the opening of the Space 
Age, as well as by subsequent organizational structures, domestic and international 
politics, technology, and the personalities of key leaders. It is also helpful to 
consider these relations in terms of the three government space sectors and the 
bureaucratic roots and culture of the organizations created or empowered to 
perform these missions: the civil space sector for science and exploration missions 
performed by NASA, the intelligence space sector for intelligence collection 
from space by systems procured and operated by the National Reconnaissance 
Office (NRO), and the defense space sector for military missions enhanced or 
enabled by space systems procured and operated primarily by the Air Force.’ 
Although relations between these predominant space organizations have 
usually been quite harmonious and served the United States well, this analysis 
focuses more attention on periods of uncertainty or tension among these 
organizations in order to highlight enduring themes that were, and sometimes 
remain, at stake. Three key issue areas and time periods are examined: 
organizing to implement America’s vision for space in the 1950s, wrestling 
with the rationale for human spaceflight in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and 
finding the logical next steps in space transportation and missions in the 1980s. 
The state of relations between the three predominant space organizations is 
also an important factor in shaping current issues such as how best to organize 
and manage national security space activities or implement the President’s 
Vision for Space Exploration. 
1. The fourth space sector, commercial activities for profit, is regulated by but not performed by 
government. See the comprehensive dmussion of the activities included in each sector in Report ofthe 
Commission tohsess National Security Space Management and Organization (Washington, DC: Commission 
to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization, 11 January ZOOl), pp. 10-14. 
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DEVELOPING, ORGANIZING, AND IMPLEMENTING 
AMERICA’S SPACE AGE VISION IN THE 1950s 
Following a long and difficult path, the United States Air Force was 
created as a separate service as a part of the National Security Act of 1947. 
Its raison d’Gtre was strategic bombing, a mission that had enchanted airmen 
almost from the inception of flight, provided the foundation for the doctrine 
that guided America’s use of airpower during World War 11, and was of even 
greater concern following the advent of nuclear weapons. The Air Force was 
organized, trained, and equipped to provide a full range of airpower missions, 
but strategic bombing, the Strategic Air Command, and bomber pilots formed 
the institutional core of the new service. The development of long-range 
ballistic missiles and space systems presented difficult cultural challenges for 
the Air Force. These new systems held the potential to perform or support 
the Air Force’s core strategic bombing mission, and the service was eager 
to develop and operate them rather than have them come under the control 
of the Army or Navy. At the same time, however, the new systems clearly 
threatened the bombers and bomber pilots at the Air Force’s institutional core. 
The Air Force attempted to walk a difficult organizational tightrope through 
this situation by pursuing missiles and space strongly enough to keep them 
out of the grasp of the other services, but not so strongly as to undercut the 
bomber pilots who ran the service. This Air Force balancing act helps to 
explain much of its behavior at the opening of the Space Age and continues 
to be a useful illustration of its ongoing struggles to incorporate space most 
appropriately in its current and future missions.2 
Space issues were not primary concerns in the wake of World War 11, but 
America quietly struggled with many questions associated with why it should 
attempt to go to space and what it might do there. By the mid-l950s, a number 
of groups and individuals had advanced various reasons for going to space,3 
2. O n  the evolution of air- and space-power doctrine and their role in Air Force institutional culture 
see, in particular, Phdip S. Meilinger, ed., Paths ofHeaven:The Evolution ofAirpower Theory (Maxwell Air 
Force Base [AFB], AL: Air University Press, 1997); Bruce M. DeBlois, ed., Beyond the Paths offfeaven: 
The Emergence ofspace Power Thought (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1999); Carl H. Builder, 
The Icarus Syndrome: T h e  Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate o f  the US.  Air Force (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1994); James M. Smith, U S A F  Culture and Cohesion: Building an 
Air and Space Forcefor the 21st Century, Occasional Paper 19 (U.S.Air Force [USAF] Academy: USAF 
Institute for National Security Studies, June 1998); Mike Worden, Rise ofthe Fighter Generals:The Problem 
of Air Force Leadership, 1945-1 982 (Maxwell AFB, AL. Air University Press, 1998). 
3. In addition to the space-for-strategic-reconnamance rationale advocated by RAND, other 
promnent rationales for space included the scienhfic imperative that found early expression in the 
International Geophysical Year (IGY) efTort and the exploraQon imperative perhaps best captured by 
Wernher von Braun in a series of articles on future space stations published in Collier’s magazine in the 
continued on the next page 
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but the Eisenhower administration had secretly determined that its primary 
rationale for going to space was to attempt to open up the closed Soviet state 
via secret reconnaissance satellites. The RAND Corporation, a think tank 
sponsored by Army Air Force Commander General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold 
as a joint project with the Douglas Aircraft Company, was the first to study 
these issues systematically. RAND’s very first report, “Preliminary Design 
of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship,” was delivered to the Army 
Air Force in April 1946 and not only detailed the technical design for and 
the physics involved in launching such a spaceship (the word satellite had not 
yet come into common usage), but also identified possible military missions 
for satellites, including communications, attack assessment, navigation, weather 
reconnaissance, and strategic reconnaissance! 
In October 1950, Paul Kecskemeti at RAND produced another compre- 
hensive report on space that Walter A. McDougall believes should “be consid- 
ered the birth certificate of American space p01icy.”~ This report highlighted 
the psychological impact the first satellite would likely have on the public and 
raised the issue of how the Soviet Union might respond to overflight of their 
territory and space-based reconnaissance. It even suggested that one way to test 
the issue of freedom of space would be first to launch an experimental U.S. sat- 
ellite in an equatorial orbit that would not cross Soviet territory before attempt- 
ing any satellite reconnaissance overhead the Soviet Union. 
The Technological Capabilities Panel and NSC-5520 
In March 1954, President Dwight Eisenhower commissioned a secret study 
and named Dr. James R. Killian, President of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, as chairman of this Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) . With 
a thermonuclear standoff looming between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, Eisenhower wanted the best minds in the country to examine how 
technology might help to prevent another Pearl Harbor. The TCP report was 
delivered to the National Security Council (NSC) in February 1955. The report 
stands out as one of the most important and influential examinations of U.S. 
national security ever undertaken; it formed the foundation for US.  national 
security planning for at least the next two years, made remarkably prescient 
continued from the previous page 
early 1950s. Several of these articles are reprinted in John M. Logsdon, ed., Exploring the Unknown, vol. 1, 
Ovganizingfor Exploration (Washington, D C  NASA SP-4407,1995), pp. 176-200. 
4. Merton E. Davies and William R. Harris, RAND’S Role in the Evolution of Balloon and Satellite 
Observation Systems and Related Space Technology (Santa Monica: R A N D  Corporation, 1988), pp. 
6-9. Portions of RAND’s first report are reprinted in Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, vol. 1, pp. 
5. Walter A. McDougall, . . .The Heavens and the Earth:A Political History of the Space Age (NewYork: 
236-244. 
Basic Books, 1985), p. 108. 
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predictions about the evolution of the superpowers’ strategic nuclear arsenals, 
and called for crash programs to develop early-warning radars and ballistic 
missiles, as well as to improve the survivability of Strategic Air Command assets 
in the face of potential nuclear attack.6 
The TCP also called for a vigorous program to improve U.S. technological 
intelligence collection capabilities. Killian and Edwin H. “Din” Land, founder 
of the Polaroid Corporation and chairman of the intelligence subcommittee 
of the TCP, were briefed on a wide range of potential collection methods and 
systems, including satellites, but became most enthused about attempting high- 
altitude reconnaissance overflights of the Soviet Union via a jet-powered glider 
that was then on the drawing boards at Clarence “Kelly” Johnson’s Lockheed 
skunk works in Burbank, California. They recommended production of this new 
aircraft during a series ofbriefings that culminated in an Oval Office meeting on 
24 November 1954, attended by the President, Secretaries of State and Defense, 
as well as top DOD and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials? The initial 
programs and structure for a national strategic reconnaissance program were 
discussed at this meeting; the President verbally authorized the CIA to begin 
development of the CL-282 (U-2) aircraft program with Air Force support.8 
6. For the text of theTCP report, see John l? Glennon, ed., Foreign Relations ofthe United States, 1955- 
1957, vol. 19, National Security P o l q  (Washngon: Deparhnent of State, 1990), pp. 42-55. James R. Killian, 
Jr., provldes details on the worlangs of the TCP in Sputnik, Scientists, and E1senhower:A Memoir of the First 
Special Assistant to the Presidentfor Science and Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977), pp. 67-93. On the 
relaaonshp between the TCP report and subsequent U.S. nuclear stmtegy, see Lawrence Freedman, The 
Evolution ofNuclear Strategy (NewYork St. Martlns Press, 1983), pp. 76-90. 
7. Stephen M. Rothstein, Dead on Arrival? The Development of the Aerospace Concept, 1944-58 (Maxwell 
AFB, AL: h r  University Press, November 2000), p. 43; Clarence E. Smth, “CIA’S Analysis of Soviet 
Science and Technology,” in Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA’S Analysis o f  the Soviet Union, ed. Gerald 
K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett (LangleyVA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2003); Gregory \JC! 
Pedlow and Donald E.Welzenbach, The CUI and the U-2  Program, 1954-1974 (Langley,VA: Center for 
the Study of Intelligence, 1998). Land wrote a 5 November 1954 letter to CIA Director Allen W. Dulles 
outhmng “A Unique Opportumty for Comprehensive Intelligence” via a specialized high-altitude 
aircraft; the letter is avadable electronically &om the Natlonal Security Archive at http://www2.gwn. 
edu /-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB74/U2-03.pdf: 
8. It is not clear from unclassified sources how much RAND reports or the An Force’s nascent WS- 
117L reconnaissance satellite system was dscussed during these meetmgs. Satelhte reconnaissance was 
strongly advocated by a series of RAND reports during the early 1950s (particularly the 1954 “Project 
Feed Back Report”; see Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, vol. 1, pp. 269-274). In late 1953, the h r  
Research and Development Command (ARDC) had pubhshed a management “Satellite Component 
Study” and designated it Weapons System (WS) 117L. On 1 July 1954, the Western Development 
Division (WDD) of ARDC was estabhshed in Inglewood, CA, under the command of Colonel 
Bernard Schriever (who had participated in Project Feed Back), primardy to speed development of 
balhstic mssdes. WDD formally imtiated a program to develop reconnaissance satelhtes in Weapons 
System Requirements Number 5 (WS-l17L), “System Requirement for an Advanced Reconnaissance 
System,” secretly issued on 27 November 1954. Accordmg to Spires, “Focused on Project Aquatone, 
continued on the next page 
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Following the start of these new technical intelligence collection initiatives, 
in early 1955 the National Academy of Sciences proposal for DOD to support 
the launch of a scientific satellite for research during the July 1957-December 
1958 International Geophysical Year (IGY) landed on the desk of Donald 
Quarles, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development. 
Quarles used this opportunity to tie together various strands of the administra- 
tion’s embryonic policies on satellites, intelligence collection, and ballistic mis- 
siles by drafting a space policy for review by the National Security Council. His 
draft formed the basis for NSC-5520, the most important space policy of the 
Eisenhower administration. Portions of this document remain classified almost 
50 years after it was written, but the basic themes are quite clear: the Space Age 
would soon open; the TCP “recommended that intelligence applications warrant 
an immediate program leading to a very s m a l l  satehte in orbit around the earth” 
and a reexamination “of the principles or practices of international law with 
regard to ‘Freedom of Space”’; DOD should provide support for launching the 
IGY satehte so long as such support would not delay or otherwise impede 
DOD programs; and all U.S. space efforts should be arranged to emphasize 
peacefbl purposes and fieedom of space.’ NRO historian Cargill Hall succinctly 
summarized how Eisenhower’s space policy was put into practice: “The IGY sci- 
entific satellite program was clearly identified as a stalking horse to establish 
the precedent of overflight in space for the eventual operation of d t a r y  recon- 
naissance satehtes.”’O The final piece of the policy, satellite, and booster 
puzzle fell into place when Quarles established an advisory committee to decide 
continued from the previous page 
the U-2 project that promsed immelate results, the d i t a r y  satellite program received little interest or 
support from K~llian and his experts. At that hme, he considered the h r  Force’s reconnamance 
satellite a ‘peripheral project.’ Ths attitude from one so influenual helps explain the less than 
enthusiashc admnistration support of the Au Force’s Advanced Reconnaissance Satekte in the two 
years precelng Sputnik. Despite the growing need for strategic intelligence and awareness that the 
U-2 represented a temporary solution, W a n  declined to acnvely support the d i t a r y  satellite untd 
after the launch of the first Sputnik. He beheved an American scientlfic satellite had to precede the 
launch of a military vehcle to provide the overfhght precedent for d t a r y  satellites to operate with 
mnimum international criucism” (David N. Spires, Beyond HOYEOVIS:A Half Century ofAir Force Space 
Leadership [Colorado Springs: h r  Force Space Command, 19981, p. 39) See Robert L. Perry, Orgins 
ofthe USAF Space Program, 2945-2956 (Los Angeles Space Systems Division, 1961), p. viii, microfiche 
document 00313 in U S  Military Uses o f  Space 1945-1991. Index and Guide (Washngton, DC:The 
National Security Archive, and Alexandria,VA Chadwyck-Healey, Inc , 1991); Spires, Beyond Horizons. 
9. NSC-5520 was approved at the NSC meeting on 26 May 1955, and Eisenhower signed it the 
following day. Quotations are from the declassified portions reprinted in Dwayne A. Day, “Invitation 
to StruggkThe History of Civd-Mditary Relanons in Space,” m Explortng the Unknown, ed. John M. 
Logsdon, vol. 2, External Relationships (Washngton, DC: NASA SP-4407,1996), p. 241. 
10. R .  Cargd Hall, “Origins of U.S. Space Policy. Eisenhower, Open Slues, and Freedom of Space,” 
in Explonng the Unknown, ed. Logsdon, vol. 1, p. 222. 
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which military booster should be used, and it recommended the Navy’sViking 
(Vanguard) booster rather than the Army or Air Force proposals.” 
This most important but secret process to legitimize overflight spelled 
out by NSC-5520 was not at all clear at the time, even to many of the senior 
participants in the development of early U.S. space and missile programs. 
Indeed, it remained politically expedient to continue obscuring the origins and 
operation of space-based intelligence collection, America’s first and arguably 
most important space program, for decades into the Space Age?2 This subtext 
is, however, critical to understanding the nature of the relationships between 
NASA, the NRO, and the Air Force. 
Responding to the Sputniks and Creating NASA 
The Eisenhower administration carefully planned to use the opening of 
the Space Age to create a new legal regime that would legitimize the operation 
of reconnaissance satellites, but, despite repeated warnings, it did not prepare 
well for the psychological implications of this milestone. The worldwide public 
reaction to the Soviet successes with Sputniks I and I1 on 4 October and 3 
November 1957 precipitated a crisis in confidence in Eisenhower’s leadership 
that was seized upon by opponents of his New Look defense policies and shaped 
the remainder of his second term. In an attempt to limit the growing crisis, 
one of Eisenhower’s first responses was to appoint Killian to a new position as 
science adviser to the President. A second major administration response was the 
establishment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) within DOD 
on 7 February 1958. ARPA was authorized to direct or perform virtually all 
United States space research and development efforts but was viewed by many 
as a stopgap measure and proved insufficient to derail the mounting pressure to 
create a comprehensive, independent, and civilian space agency.13 
11. The Army Bas t ic  Miss& Agency’s Project Orbiter proposal was the most advanced of the 
proposals presented to the Stewart Committee. On 20 September 1956, a Jupiter-C rose to an altitude of 
600 d e s  whde traveling 3,000 miles downrange despite having an inert fourth stage (it was filled w t h  
sand) to preclude this vehicle &om accidentally launching the first satellite and thereby circumventing 
the IGY stahng-horse strategy laid out in NSC-5520. See Major General John B. Medaris, U.S. Army 
(USA) (ret.), Countdownfor Decision (NewYork G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1960), pp. 119-20,147. 
12. The existence of the NRO was first ofticially acknowledged in September 1992. The impor- 
tance and uses of United States overhead photoreconnaissance (IMINT), as well as the fact that 
the United States conducts overhead signals intelligence (SIGINT) and measurement and signature 
intelligence (MASINT) collection, were first acknowledged in the 19 September 1996 National Space 
Pohcy Fact Sheet. 
13. Other major responses included authorization for the ABMA to prepare to launch a satellite on 
the modifiedv-2 booster known as the Jupiter-C or Juno (this system boosted Explorer I, America’s 
first satelhe, into orbit on 31 January 1958), as well as the congressional hearings on satellite and mssile 
programs that were called by Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson and held between 25 November 1957 
and 23 January 1958. 
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Killian was the most important actor in creating NASA as the centerpiece 
of the organizational structure America developed in response to the Sputniks 
shock, but he worked very closely with other key actors and organizations such as 
the President, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Texas), and the military services. 
By the end of 1957, the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), under 
Killian, had decided that a scientifically oriented civil space program, rather 
than a military program, ought to be the nation's top space priority and that 
the new civilian space agency ought to be built out of and modeled after the 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). This approach was the 
primary recommendation of the PSAC headed by Edward Purcell; Killian used 
the Purcell Committee findings to help persuade Eisenhower of the need for a 
civilian agency and sent proposed legislation to Congress on 2 April 1958. 
Both houses held extensive hearings on the civilian space agency proposal 
during April and May; soon, however, they drifted into positions that differed 
from one another and from the administration. The most contentious issues 
revolved around three areas: the relative priority of civil and military space efforts, 
the appropriate relationship between civilian and military space organizations, 
and the organizational structure for creating national space policy. Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) witnesses included Deputy Secretary Quarles, 
ARPA Director Roy Johnson, and ARPA Chief Scientist Herbert York. They 
emphasized that DOD must retain the power to define and control military space 
programs. Service witnesses generally took the same positions they had over the 
creation of ARPA. The Navy opposed a strong civilian agency and preferred an 
organization similar to NACA that would support but not shape military space 
efforts. The Air Force was confident of its position as the lead service for military 
space and supported a strong civilian agency as a means to undercut Navy and 
Army space efforts. By contrast, the Army opposed the creation of a civilian 
agency or the division of scientific and military space missions; the Army also 
urged if a civilian space agency were created that it, rather than DOD or the Air 
Force, should control the national space effort,'4 
Compromises were ironed out following a meeting between Eisenhower 
and Senator Johnson on 7 July and during Conference Committee meetings 
later that month. The major compromises included a modified version of 
the House's Civilian-Military Liaison Committee (CMLC), creation of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC) at the White House, and 
carefully brokered language in Section 102 (b) that was designed to delineate 
between NASA and DOD space missions. The latter issue was perhaps the most 
controversial aspect of the entire process. The final language called for NASA to 
exercise control over all U.S. space activities 
14. Enid Curas Bok Schoettle, "The Establishment of NASA," in Knowledge and Power: Essays on 
Science and Government, ed. Sanford A. Lakoff (NewYork: Free Press, 1966), pp. 162-270. 
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except that activities peculiar to or primarily associated with 
the development of weapons systems, military operations, or 
the defense of the U.S. (including Research and Development 
necessary to make effective provision for the defense of the 
U.S.) shall be the responsibility of and shall be directed by 
the DOD.15 
Eisenhower signed the National Aeronautics and Space Act into law on 29 July, 
and NASA was created on 1 October 1958. 
Frictions over manned spaceflight, budgets, and organizational structure 
between NACA and ARPA were evident before NASA was established. Both 
NACA and ARPA strongly desired to control manned spaceflight, and both 
organizations fought hard for this mission during a series of meetings with the 
Bureau of the Budget during the summer of 1958. Once again, Killian was an 
important player behind the scenes; he helped broker a compromise whereby 
NASA would design and build the capsules for manned spaceflight and DOD 
would concentrate on the boosters required for this mission.16 Killian also pushed 
to reprogram $117 million from ARPA and the Air Force to NASA, helped 
ARPA retain $108 million for space programs outside of the WS-117L (see note 
8), and steadfastly refused to entertain any suggestions to change the organization 
or reduce the $186-million budget for the WS-117L.” Organizational changes 
were also looming. The Army’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory wished to transition 
immediately to NASA, and the Army was close to granting this request, but it 
wanted to use the transfer of JPL as a bargaining chip in its efforts to retain its 
space crown jewel, the von Braun rocket team at ABMA. 
Completing the Organizational Structure 
Following the creation of NASA, there were three major tracks ofactivity 
that shaped NASA-DOD relations during the remainder of Eisenhower’s 
term and into John Kennedy’s administration: moving ABMA into NASA, 
consolidating DOD space activities under the Air Force, and establishing the 
NRO. Each of these tracks helped establish the basic organizational structures 
and bureaucratic interests that endure today. 
Army Secretary William Brucker and ABMA Commander Major General 
John Medaris understood very well how hard the Army had worked to capture 
and maintain the von Braun group as one of the key spoils of World War I1 
and just how important von Braun’s expertise would be to any major U.S. 
15. Ibid., pp. 260-261. 
16. Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 150. 
17. Ibid., pp. 151-152. 
Divine notes that Killian had quickly emerged as Eisenhower’s “key post-Sputnik advisor.” 
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space effort-they were not about to give up ABMA without a fight. They had 
strongly opposed creation ofa powerful civilian space agency, and after NASA 
was established, they redoubled their efforts to retain control ofABMA. NASA 
had inherited NACKs infrastructure but initiallylacked expertise in many space 
areas such as the development of large boosters. By contrast, ABMA contained 
arguably the world's best booster development team, but it lacked a specific 
military rationale for developing large boosters.18 In October 1958, T. Keith 
Glennan, NASA's first Administrator, and Deputy Secretary Quarles worked 
out a deal to resolve this anomalous situation by transferring JPL and ABMA 
to NASA. Brucker and Medaris successfully blocked transfer of ABMA at this 
time. But in December, the NASC brokered a second compromise that moved 
JPL to NASA and left the von Braun team under ABMA while directing that 
their work on Saturn would be under contract to NASA. 
Significant military space organizational restructuring was also under 
way within DOD. Following creation of NASA and pressure on ABMA, 
the Navy and the Army, in particular, became increasingly concerned with 
retaining their military space capabilities, shoring up ARPA, and formulating 
the proper bureaucratic structure for military space. The Air Force, by 
contrast, was growing increasingly confident of its inside track for gaining 
control over military space missions, supported a strong NASA, and continued 
to oppose ARPA's direction of military space efforts. Another key player that 
entered the mix at this time was Herbert York, the first Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering (DDR&E), a position created by the 1958 Defense 
Reorganization Act. 
Debates over DOD's space organizational structure became increasingly 
heated during 1959 and came to a head in September. In April, Chief of Naval 
Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke highlighted the indivisibility of space and 
proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) creation of a unified (multiservice) 
command for space. Burke's proposal was supported by the Army but was 
strongly opposed by the Air Force. Arguing that space systems represented a 
better way of performing existing missions, the Air Force advocated treating 
space systems on a functional basis under ARPA or, preferably, under the 
Air Force. DDR&E York weighed in on this debate and sided strongly with 
the Air Force, largely because he was eager to consolidate military space 
efforts under the Air Force as a way to rein in what he considered to be 
overreaching space proposals on the part of all the services. A memorandum 
18. ABMA had been tasked by ARPA to study and design a 1.5-million-pound-thrust booster that 
came to be known as the Saturn B.The Saturn B was, in turn, a primary driver behmd the ABMA 
Project Horizon proposal to use 149 Saturn launches to build a 12-person lunar outpost by 1966. See 
John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1970), pp. 51-52. 
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from Secretary Neil McElroy to JCS Chairman General Nathan Twining on 
18 September attempted to resolve these disputes and represented a significant 
bureaucratic victory for the Air Force. McElroy assigned responsibility for 
most satellite systems, payload integration, and “the development, production, 
and launching of space boosters” to the Air Force.” The memo also found that 
“establishment of a joint military organization with control over operational 
space systems does not appear desirable at this time.”’’ 
For the remainder of the Eisenhower administration and the beginning 
of the Kennedy administration, the space prospects of the Army continued to 
decline while those of the Air Force usually continued to rise. Following the 
transfer of the Redstone program in December 1958 and the Saturn program in 
November 1959, between March and July 1960 the Army moved the von Braun 
team and 6,400 other ABMA personnel under NASA control.” Eisenhower 
presided over the 8 September 1960 ceremony in Huntsville, Alabama, that 
dedicated the Marshall Space Flight Center and officially moved the Army 
out of the space business. It took decades for the Army to recover from this 
loss and regain its enthusiasm towards space, but today the Army is the largest 
user of military space data among the services, and it is eagerly considering a 
range of significant future enhancements such as Global Positioning System 
(GPS) I11 satellites and Blue Force Tracking. 
Despite Air Force support for NASA’s creation, NASA’s role in absorbing 
the Air Force’s most serious competition for developing military space 
systems, and generally good early relations between America’s two largest 
space organizations, NASA-Air Force relations hit a snag after an internal 
letter from Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas White to his staff was 
leaked to Congressman Overton Brooks (D-Louisiana), Chairman of the 
House Committee on Science and Astronautics. The bulk of White’s 14 April 
1960 letter urged the Air Force “to cooperate to the maximum extent with 
NASA, to include the furnishing of key personnel even at the expense of 
some Air Force dilution of technical talent.”” The opening two sentences of 
White’s letter, however, raised questions about the strength and longevity of 
Air Force support for NASA independence: 
19. Spires, Beyond Horizons, p. 77. ARPA returned responsibility for thews-1 17L to the Air Force. By 
this time, the program consisted of three separate developmental satellite systems: Corona, a recoverable 
film photoreconnaissance system; Samos, an electro-optical system designed to downlmk imagery 
electronically; and Midas, an infrared satellite sensor system designed to detect ballistic mssile launches. 
The Navy acquired the Transit satellite navigation systems, and the Army gained responsibdity for 
Notus communicahons satellites.This approach overturned AELPA’s monopoly on control over d t a r y  
satellite systems. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Day, “Invitation to Struggle,” p. 253. 
22. Ibid., p. 256. 
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President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Mrs. George C. Marshall unveil the bronze bust 
of General George C. Marshall during the dedication ceremony of the George C. 
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama, on 8 September 1960. 
On 21 October 1959, President Eisenhower directed the transfer of personnel from the 
Redstone Arsenal's Army Ballistic Missile Agency Development Operations Division 
to NASA. The complex of the new NASA Center was formed within the boundaries 
of Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville. MSFC began its operations on 1 July 1960 after 
the transfer ceremony, with Dr. Wernher von Braun as Center Director. (NASA MSFC 
photo no. 9131490) 
I am convinced that one of the major long term elements of 
the Air Force future lies in space. It is also obvious that NASA 
will play a large part in the national effort in this direction 
and, moreover, inevitably will be closely associated, if not 
eventually combined with the military.23 
In March 1961, Brooks held hearings to lscuss White's letter, the proper balance 
between military and civil space, and the general direction of U.S. space efforts. 
Brooks sought and even received clarification &om President Kennedy. On 23 
March, Kennedy wrote a letter to Brooks that emphasized several key points: 
23. Ibid 
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It is not now, nor has it ever been, my intention to subor- 
dinate the activities in space of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration to those of the Department of Defense. I 
believe, as you do, that there are legitimate missions in space for 
which the military services should assume responsibility, but 
that there are major missions, such as the scientific unmanned 
and manned exploration of space and the application of space 
technologies to the conduct of peaceful activities, which should 
be carried forward by our civilian space agency.24 
Kennedy’s letter helped to delineate space missions between NASA and the 
Air Force and indicated Kennedy’s growing emphasis on civil missions, an 
emphasis that would grow significantly stronger after Yuri Gagarin’s orbital 
flight some three weeks later. 
During the same month as the Brooks hearings, Air Force control over 
military space programs was solidified when Secretary Robert McNamara 
issued Defense Directive 5160.32, “Development of Space Systems.” This direc- 
tive built on Secretary McElroy’s September 1959 memo and the January 1961 
recommendations of incoming science adviser Jerome Wiesner. It gave the 
Air Force operational control over almost every military space program from 
research and development through launch and operations and stopped just short 
of naming the Air Force as DOD’s executive agent for space. This was, of 
course, a welcome development for the Air Force, but McNamara’s motivation, 
like York’s before him, was to consolidate and prune rather than to encourage 
Air Force leadership in developing more robust military space activities. 
The creation of NRO was the final major organizational response to 
the opening of the Space Age and was, like the IGY stalking-horse strategy 
in NSC-5520, an official state secret hidden from the public and even many 
of the leaders of U.S. civil and military space efforts. Following Sputnik, in 
January 1958 the NSC granted highest national priority to development of 
an operational reconnaissance satellite, but Eisenhower had doubts about Air 
Force management of the WS-117L program and was particularly troubled by 
press leaks about the program. Decisions made at meetings on 6-7 February 
1958 between the President, Killian, Land, Director of Central Intelligence 
Allen Dulles, Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy, and Eisenhower’s staff 
secretary, Colonel Andrew Goodpaster, created ARPA and publicly gave this 
new agency all open military space programs. In secret, these decisions also 
gave ARPA direction over the highest priority WS-117L and moved control 
of the Corona recoverable film photoreconnaissance system from the Air 
24. Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, vol. 2, p. 317. 
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Force to the CIA in an organizational structure that initially mirrored that 
of the U-2.25 
U.S. efforts to develop operational spysat systems faced very daunting 
technological challenges during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Corona was 
the most mature technology, yet between February 1959 and June 1960, it 
still suffered a string of 12 consecutive failures of various types that prevented 
recovery offilm imagery from space before achieving its first success in August 
1960. These problems with Corona, along with even more serious difficulties 
with Samos and Midas, prompted Eisenhower, in May 1960, to direct his 
new science adviser, George Kistiakowsky, to put together a committee to 
recommend changes to improve these programs. Kistiakowsky and Defense 
Secretary Thomas Gates decided on the structure and charter of what became 
known as the Samos Panel and selected members including Under Secretary 
of the Air Force Joseph Charyk, Deputy DDR&E John Rubel, Killian, Land, 
York, and Purcell. The Samos Panel reported its recommendations at an NSC 
meeting on 24 August. Eisenhower and the NSC strongly supported the 
primary recommendation, immediate creation of an organization to provide 
a direct chain of command from the Secretary of the Air Force to the officers 
in charge of each spysat project; this decision was the genesis of the NR0.26 
It represented another vote of no confidence in the Air Force to manage 
spysat programs through military channels, moved this highest priority space 
mission and its products out of the military chain of command, and completed 
America’s three-legged organizational structure for space. 
In addition to the organizational changes discussed above, beginning in 
1961 there was a major change in the way information was released about U.S. 
military space programs that had a significant effect both on contemporary 
analyses and the historiography of space. A security clampdown was slowly 
implemented, first on spy satellite programs and then on all military space 
efforts. The Samos 2 launch on 31 January 1961 was the first to be affected 
by the Kennedy administration’s new publicity guidelines. Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Public Affairs Arthur Sylvester and NRO Director Charyk 
worked out a very terse statement provided to the press following this launch 
25. R. Cargdl Hall, “Clandestme Victory: Dwight D. Eisenhower and Overhead Reconnaissance 
in the Cold War” @aper presented at the “Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st Century 
Symposium,” Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, DC, 26-28 January 2005); Day, 
“Invitahon to Struggle,” p. 250; Kenneth E. Greer, “Corona,” in Corona:Amerrca’s Fcrst Satellite Program, 
ed. Kevm C. Ruf i e r  (L.angley,VA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1995). 
26. George Gstiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House: The Private Diary of President Eisenhower’s 
SpecialAssistantfor Science andzchnology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); Hall,“Clandeshne 
Victory”; Gerald M. Steinberg, Satellrte Reconnaissance:The Role ofInfoorrna1 Bargaining (NewYork: Praeger 
Pubhshers, 1983); Jef??eyT. Rxhelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space:The U. S. Keyhole Spy Satellite Program 
(NewYork: Harper & Row, 1990). 
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that contrasted significantly with the large prelaunch publicity packages which 
had been given out previou~ly.~~ The remainder of 1961 saw a gradual tightening 
of the security classifications with less and less information provided with each 
successive launch.28 
The Air Force chafed at these restrictions, and many officers, including 
General Schriever, continued publicly to press the case for an increased military 
space program. This ongoing public discussion ofmilitary space programs by the 
Air Force greatly irritated President Kennedy, and on more than one occasion, 
he called Sylvester directly, demanding to know why he had “let those bastards 
talk.”29 Following these calls, Sylvester’s office greatly intensified the screening 
process required for all public releases on space. As a result of this widespread 
clampdown, planned speeches by Air Force general officers were very carefully 
screened by civilians in Sylvester’s office for any references to the Samos program, 
and the winter-spring 1960-1961 A i r  University Quarterly Review issue devoted to 
“Aerospace Force in the Sixties” was heavily censored, including the removal of 
an article entitled “Strategic Reconnaissance” in its entirety.30 
The final step in this security-intensification process was the classified 
DOD directive issued on 23 March 1962 known as the “blackout” directive. 
According to Stares, this directive 
prohibited advance announcement and press coverage of all 
military space launchings at Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg 
AFB. It also forbade the use of the names of such space projects 
as Discoverer, MIDAS and SAMOS. Military payloads on space 
vehicles would no longer be identified, while the programme 
names would be replaced by numbers.31 
While this directive may have made it somewhat more difficult for the Soviets 
to distinguish between different types of US. military space programs and 
launches, it certainly made it much more difficult for the Air Force to sell its 
preferred space program to the public or Congress and helped to establish and 
perpetuate a wide divergence between public knowledge and perceptions of the 
NASA and DOD space programs. 
27. Paul B. Stares, The Militarization ofspace: US.  Poky, 1945-1984 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1985), p. 64. Sylvester and Charyk were mindfd of the volume of information promded in the past and 
deliberately opted for a slow blackout process in the hopes that ths would arouse less attenhon than 
an abrupt blackout. 
28. Rxhelson, Secret Eyes, p. 53. By the time of the Samos 5 launch on 22 December 1961, DOD 
officials would no longer confirm that the Samos program even existed. 
29. Stares, Militarization of Space, p. 64. 
30. Steinberg, Satellite Reconnaissance, p. 43. 
31. Stares, Militarization ofspace, p. 65, emphasis m original. 
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WRESTLING WITH THE RATIONALE 
FOR HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT IN THE EARLY SPACE PROGRAM 
With the organizational structure for space completed, the majority of 
issues concerning the relationships and cooperation between NASA, the 
Air Force, and the NRO revolved around the rationale for human space- 
flight, the organizations empowered to perform these missions, and develop- 
ing and operating space launch vehicles. These issues were, of course, also 
instrumental in initially shaping and continuing to mold America’s space 
bureaucratic structure. 
Jockeying for Human Spaceflight Missions 
The period from the opening ofthe Space Age until completion of NASA’s 
Apollo Moon race was a time of both cooperation and intense competition 
between NASA and the Air Force. Both organizations were very interested 
in and believed they would be directed to develop major human spaceflight 
programs; their intricate dance fundamentally shaped these programs. The 
Air Force had emerged as the most powerful military space actor, advanced a 
variety of rationales for manned military spaceflight, and strongly believed- 
especially at the beginning of the Kennedy administration-that it would be 
given approval for a major manned spaceflight program. NASA, meanwhile, 
drew heavily on Army and Air Force expertise to develop its spaceflight 
programs and struggled to transition from science to prestige as the most 
important rationale for its manned spaceflight programs. During the 1960s, the 
Air Force was repeatedly rebuffed in its attempts to gain a foothold in military 
manned space missions; following the failure of Dyna-Soar, Blue Gemini, 
and the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL), the Air Force was sufficiently 
chastened that it remains highly skeptical of manned military missions. 
The Air Force had displayed a significant amount of interest in military 
manned spaceflight well before Sputnik, but, like almost all other space activities, 
this interest was energized following the Soviet triumph. The Air Force’s 
earliest support was for the dynamic soaring (Dyna-Soar) concept for skipping 
off the Earth’s atmosphere to extend the range of a spaceplane that might be 
used for a variety of missions including strategic bombing, reconnaissance, 
and antisatellite attacks.32 By 1955, the Bell Aircraft Company had received 
32.The idea of an antipodal bomber that would shp off Earth’s atmosphere to acheve intercontinental 
range was developed by an Austrian, Dr. Eugen Sanger, and was considered in 1943 by von Braun and 
General Walter Dornberger at Peenemunde. Dornberger worked for Bell hrcraft after the war and was a 
tireless advocate for Dyna-Soar.The idea of flying to and from space held special appeal to the test pilots 
who derided the capsule approach to manned spaceflight as “Spam in a can.” See Tom Wolfe, The Right 
Stufl(NewYork: Bantam Press, 1980).The definitive work on Dyna-Soar is Roy E Houchin, US Hypersonic 
Research and Development, 194+1963:The Rise and Fall ofDyna-Soar (London: Frank Cas, 2005). 
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over $1 million in Air Force funding and had raised an additional $2.3 million 
from six other aerospace firms willing to ante up company funds to support 
the prospect of a major Air Force manned military space mission.33 
Following Sputnik, Air Force leaders were among the first to adopt a 
space-race attitude toward manned spaceflight and supported using either 
spaceplanes or capsules to achieve rapid results. In a 31 January 1958 letter 
from Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development Lieutenant General 
Donald Putt to the Air Research and Development Command, Putt advocated 
rapid development of manned spaceflight and indicated it was “vital to the 
prestige of the nation that such a feat be accomplished at the earliest technically 
practicable date-if at all possible before the Russians.”34 Recognizing that 
congressional deliberations on creating a civilian space agency were under 
way, the Air Force mounted a full court press to gain approval of its Manned 
Military Space System Development Plan (MISS) before the civilian agency 
was e~tablished.~~ The MISS plan received support from the highest levels of 
the Air Force and throughout many DOD offices but was shot down, first by 
ARPA Director Johnson on 25 July and then by the President a few weeks 
later, when he formally assigned the role of human spaceflight to NASA.36 
The Rise and Fall of Dyna-Soar 
After its failure to advance its MISS plans and Eisenhower’s decision 
to make NASA primarily responsible for manned spaceflight, the Air Force 
refocused on the Dyna-Soar program, and it became the service’s top space 
priority. The official start of the program came in November 1957, when Air 
Research and Development Command issued System Development Directive 
464.37 In May 1958, the Air Force and NACA signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) indicating that Dyna-Soar would be a joint Air Force- 
NACA project managed and funded along the lines of the X-15 effort.38 The 
program took more definite shape during 1959 and 1960, when the Air Force 
laid out a four-step development program that was designed to achieve full 
operational capability by 1966. The zenith for the program came early in the 
Kennedy administration, when the plans were finalized for a small, single- 
33. McDougall, Heavens and Earth, p. 339. 
34. “Early AF MIS Activity,” mcrofiche document 00446 in U. S. Military Uses o f  Space. 
35. Ibid. The MISS plan had four phases. The first, “Man-In-Space-Soonest,” called for the first 
orbital flight by April 1960, and the 1ast:“Manned Lunar Landing and Return,” was to be accomplished 
by December 1965.The entire program was projected to cost only $1.5 bd!ion. 
36. Day,“Invitation to Struggle,” p. 252. 
37. “Review and Summary of X-20 Mllitary Application Studies,” mcrofiche document 00450 in 
38. “Memorandum of Understanding,” document 11-7 in Exploring the Unknown, ed. Logsdon, vol. 
U. S. Military Uses o f  Space. 
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seat, delta-winged space glider (designated as the X-20 in 1962) that would be 
launched atop a Titan I11 and land like an airplane. 
Soon, however, the X-20 ran afoul of McNamara's systems analysis 
approach and his fears of provoking an action-reaction arms race in space. 
After McNamara refused to accelerate the program, even after receiving an 
unrequested extra $85.8 million from the House Appropriations Committee 
for fiscal year (FY) 1962, funding was cut to only $130 million for FY 1963 and 
1964, and the first scheduled flight was slipped to 1966.39 Next, McNamara's 
systems analysts "showed that a modified Gemini might perform military 
functions better and more cheaply than the X-20.'"0 This finding prompted 
McNamara to attempt to gain a large role for the Air Force in Project Gemini, 
a move NASA Administrator James Webb successfully parried by citing the 
impact of such a restructuring on the nation's highest priority Apollo Program. 
Instead, on 23 January 1963, Webb and McNamara signed an agreement to 
allow DOD experiments on Gemini missions. During this time, the Air Force 
also proposed a plan to procure some of NASA's Gemini spacecraft under a 
program referred to as Blue Gemini.41 
The creation of the DOD Gemini Experiments Program and studies on 
the military usefulness of a space station that would evolve into the Manned 
Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program weakened the rationale for the X-20 and 
placed additional pressures on the troubled program."' In October 1963, the 
39. McDougall, Heavens and Earth, p. 340; Stares, Militarization $Space, p. 130. 
40. McDougall, Heavens and Earth, p. 340. 
41. Stares, Militarization of Space, p. 79. DOD eliminated the Blue Gemini and Military Orbital 
Development System (MODS) programs fiom the Air Force budget in January 1963.The NASA-DOD 
experiment program was officially titled Program 631A,"DOD Gemini Experlments Program,"and called 
for 18 experiments to be run on Gemim fights between October 1964 and Aprll1967 for a cost of$16 
million.The experiments were programmed for areas such as satellite inspection, reconnaissance, satellite 
defense, and asmnaut extravehicular activity. See Colonel Damel D. McKee, "The Gemini Program," 
Air University Review 16 (May-June 1965): 6-15; GeraldT. Cantwell,"A€ m Space, FY 64," pp. 31-36, 
microfiche document 00330 in US. Military Uses $Space. 
42. NASA and DOD interactions during 1963 over the issue of hture manned space stations greatly 
affected the X-20 and other Air Force man-in-space p1ans.h November 1962, the Air Force had completed 
a study on a h t e d  military space station known as the MODS. Based upon the MODS concept,Webb 
and McNamara dwussed the possibility of a joint Stahon project, and on 27 April 1963, they agreed that 
neither organization would initiate station development without the approval of the other. McNamara 
pressedwebb for a commitment to a joint program, but Webb did not want to make any pledge that might 
sidetrack Apollo. Finally, after intervention by Vice President Johnson and the NASC, NASA and DOD 
agreed in September that, Ifpossible, stations larger and more sophsticated than Gemni and Apollo would 
be encompassed in a single project. After DDR&E Harold Brown recommended to McNamara on 14 
November that the X-20 be canceled and replaced by studies on what would become the MOL program, 
Brown next attempted, unsuccessfdly, to coordinate a joint NASA-DOD station. NASA, wary that the 
fairly large and sophsticated station Brown favored might threaten its space turf, suggested that DOD 
pursue a smaller and less sophisticated space laboratory rather than a space station.DOD accepted at least the 
semantic unportance of this distinction in initiating MOL studies for an independent military station. See 
Cantwell,"AF in Space, FY 64,"pp. 16-23, microfiche document 00330 in US. Military Uses ofspace. 
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PSAC compared the relative military utility of the Gemini, X-20, and MOL 
programs and judged that the X-20 held the least p0tential.4~ By this time, 
according to the editor of Missiles and Rockets, the X-20 had been “reviewed, 
revised, reoriented, restudied, and reorganized to a greater extent than any other 
Air Force pr~gram.’”~ On 10 December 1963, Secretary McNamara publicly 
announced cancellation of the X-20 program and, at the same time, assigned 
primary responsibility for developing MOL to the Air Force!’ 
The MOL Program and the Demise of Military Spaceflight Dreams 
Announced at the same time as the cancellation of the X-20, MOL quickly 
took the place of the X-20 and became the cornerstone of Air Force efforts to 
build a significant manned military presence in space. The Air Force put a great 
deal of energy, effort, and funding into MOL, and this project soon emerged as 
DOD’s only manned military space program. Numerous technical and especially 
political problems beset the program, and MOL was repeatedly cut back and 
stretched out in the late 1960s. The Nixon administration officially canceled 
MOL on 10 June 1969. Having been repeatedly thwarted and left without any 
military man-in-space programs, for many years the Air Force became more 
resigned to the sanctuary school of thought on space and came to view plans and 
doctrines calling for the military to help control space or to exploit the high- 
ground potential of space as increasingly irrelevant. 
The roots of the MOL program can be traced back at least to the “Global 
Surveillance System” proposed by Air Force Systems Command in November 
1960.46 As described above, the more direct inspiration for the MOL came 
from the MODS space station first proposed by the Air Force in June 1962, 
the 1963 DOD-NASA deliberations over the possibility of building a joint 
space station, and the cancellation of the X-20. In his Posture Statement for 
FY 1965, Secretary McNamara generally remained unconvinced of a specific 
need for military spaceflight but indicated that the time had come for U.S. 
military man-in-space efforts to “be more sharply focused on those areas 
which hold the greatest promise of military ~tility.”~’ Accordingly, he had 
canceled the X-20, expanded the small-scale testing of the Mach 5-25 flight 
regime through the unmanned ASSET vehicle, initiated the DOD Gemini 
Experiments Program, and proposed MOL as a “much more important step” 
for investigating the possible military utility of man-in-~pace.~~ 
43. McDougall, Heavens and Earth, p. 340. 
44. Ibid., p. 341. 
45. Between 1957 and 1963, the X-20 program consumed $400 million, or almost the same amount 
46. Fbchelson, Secret Eys in Space, p. 83. 
47. House Committee on Armed Services, FiscalYears 1965-1969 Defme Program and Fiscalyear 1965 
48. Ibid., pp. 104-106, quotation from page 106. 
spent on Project Mercury. 
Defense Budget, Hearlng before the Committee on Armed Semces, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1964, p. 104. 
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During 1964 and the first half of 1965, the MOL program was subjected to 
intense scrutiny by OSD and underwent several design and program application 
changes. By mid-1965, specific missions and station designs were firmed up. Most 
importantly, MOL applications added in 1965 were designed to turn MOL into 
a formidable reconnaissance platform with a large 90-inch telescope and huge 
signals intelligence (SIGINT) antennas to be assembled on orbit alongside the 
stati0n.4~ At a press conference on 25 August 1965, President Johnson formally 
A 1960 concept image of the United States Air Force‘s proposed Manned Orbiting 
Laboratory (MOL), intended to test the military usefulness of having humans in orbit. 
The station‘s baseline configuration was that of a two-person Gemini B spacecraft 
that could be attached to a laboratory vehicle. The structure was planned to launch on 
a Titan lllC rocket. The station would be used for a month, and the astronauts could 
return to the Gemini capsule for transport back to Earth. The first launch of the MOL 
was scheduled for 15 December 1969, but the program was canceled by Defense 
Secretary Melvin R.  Laird in 1969. (NASA HQ image no. 2B24070-Fig3) 
49. Stares, Militarization $Space, p. 98; Xchelson, Secret Eyer, p. 85. Richelson indicates that the MOL 
telescope camera system would have had a resolution of approximately 9 inches and was designated as 
the KH-10.A depiction of construction of a 100-foot-diameter SIGINT antenna as a proposed MOL 
experiment is found in J. S. Butz, Jr., “MOL The Technical Promise and Prospects,” Air Force/Space 
Digest (October 1965): 44-45. 
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approved the development of MOL. The MOL design at this time called for a 
configuration approximately 54 feet long and 10 feet in diameter consisting of 
a Gemini B capsule attached to the 41-foot-long laboratory. The station was to 
be launched into polar orbit from Vandenberg AFB atop a Titan 111-C boo~ter.~’ 
The entire program was originally scheduled to include five manned flights of 
MOL beginning in 1968 at a cost of $1.5 billion.51 The overall objectives of the 
program as approved in August 1965 were to 
a) learn more about what man is able to do in space and how that 
ability can be used for military purposes, 
b) develop technology and equipment which will help advance 
manned and unmanned space flight, and 
c) experiment with this technology and eq~iprnent .~~ 
The Air Force directed the MOL program, and the Navy was a minor 
partner in the effort.53 The initial Air Force support for this program was 
unmistakable. In congressional testimony in early 1965, Deputy Chief of Staff 
for R&D Lieutenant General James Ferguson indicated that “MOL would 
provide the space testing and evaluation facility which we have long sought. 
We consider it to be the keystone of our future space program.”54 Earlier, 
Ferguson had simply identified the MOL as the Air Force’s “most important 
space program.”55 More generally, Ferguson highlighted the need for MOL 
due to the Air Force belief “that man is the key to the future in space, and 
50. Richelson, Secret Eyes, p. 85; Execuhve Office of the President, National Aeronautics and Space 
Council, Report to Congress on Aeronautics and Space Activities, 2965 (Washington: GPO, 31 January 1966), 
pp. 49-50. MOL astronauts would transfer into the shirtsleeve environment of the laboratory via a 
hatch through the heatshield of the Germni B capsule. MOL was designed for 30-day rmssions.At the 
completion of the mission, the astronauts would transfer back into the capsule and reenter; the station 
itself would eventually also reenter and burn up. The Titan 111-C had originally been developed to 
launch the canceled X-20. 
51. Executive Ofice of the President, Aeronautics and Space Activities, 2965, p. 50. 
52. Ibid., p. 49. These three objectives in Aeronautics and Space Activifies, 2965 were considerably less 
detaded and ambitious than the six MOL objectives that Secretary McNamara and DDR&E Harold 
Brown had outlined m congressional testimony in early 1965. See, for example, the statement of Brown m 
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services and Subcommittee on Department of Defense of 
the Committee on Appropriations, Military Procurement Authorirationr, FiscalYear 2966, Hearings before the 
Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on 
Appropriations, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, pp. 413-414. 
53. Richelson, Secret Eyes, pp. 91-92.The original MOL schedule called for Navy MOL astronauts to 
conduct extensive ocean surveillance and submarme tracking experiments during the fourth mssion. 
54. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture, Fiscal Year 2966, 
Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 1229. 
55. Ibid., p. 1219. 
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that certain military tasks and systems will become feasible only through the 
discriminatory intelligence of man.”56 
Soon, however, MOL ran into substantial technical and very difficult polit- 
ical problems. An unmanned Gemini B capsule was successfully tested and 
recovered from space on 3 November 1966, but design changes and technical dif- 
ficulties with the laboratory portion of MOL caused delays and weight increases 
in this portion of the hardware. Due to the greater weight of the laboratory, the 
booster configuration for MOL was redesigned for more thrust and designated 
as the Titan III-M.57 More significantly, the political support for MOL began to 
erode from all quarters. The Johnson administration was attempting to deal with 
the effect of the buildup of the war in Vietnam on its Great Society programs and 
had little time or inclination to focus on MOL. The program also suffered from 
a lack of strong support within Congress, where space attention was focused on 
the growing Apollo costs and the upcoming Moon landing. Even within the 
Air Force, MOL began to face serious questioning as the war in Vietnam heated 
up and resources were required for this conflict and for more traditional devel- 
opment programs such as the C-5A transport aircraft. With declining political 
support, funding for MOL began to be cut well below the levels required to 
keep the program on its original schedule. By early 1969, the first manned MOL 
mission had been slipped to 1972, while the total projected cost of the program 
had risen from $1.5 billion to $ 3  billion.58 Despite these difficulties, in February 
1969 incoming Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird endorsed a comprehensive 
review of the program that “concluded that the continuance of the program 
is fully justified by the benefits to our defense posture anticipated from MOL; 
and that all MOL objectives established by the President in 1965 can now be 
met with a six- rather than a seven-launch program.7759 Additionally, the Nixon 
administration initially requested $525 million for MOL in FY 1970.60 
The Nixon administration quickly and completely reversed its initial sup- 
port for MOL. President Nixon was eager to limit the budget, and MOL soon 
emerged as “an ideal target for OMB.”61 The actual decision to terminate MOL 
was apparently made at a White House meeting of OMB representative Robert 
Mayo, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and President Nixon.6’ As 
56. Ibid., p. 1228. 
57. Richelson, Secret Eyes, p. 90. 
58. Ibld., pp. 101-102. 
59. Quoted from prepared statement of Air Force Chief of StaE General John McConnell in US. 
Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Authorization f o r  Military Procurement, Research and 
Development, Fiscal Year 1970, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 
1969, p. 956.This cutback meant that MOL would now include only four manned missions rather than 
the five originally planned. 
60. Ibid., p. 957. 
61. Quoted from an unnamed “senior Air Force o&cer”in Stares, Militarization ofSpace, p. 159. 
62. Richelson, Secret Eyes, p. 102. 
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they made clear in subsequent congressional testimony, Secretary Laird and the 
JCS were not consulted prior to this decision.63 The public announcement of the 
cancellation of the MOL program came on 10 June 1969. A total of $1.4 billion 
was spent on the MOL program, making it one of the most expensive military 
programs ever prematurely terminated as of that date.64 
The cancellation of MOL must also be viewed within a broader context 
than just the budgetary concerns of the Nixon administration. Shortly after 
entering office, Nixon had established a Space Task Group (STG) comprised 
of Vice President Spiro Agnew, Acting NASA Administrator Thomas Paine, 
Secretary Laird, and science adviser Lee D ~ B r i d g e . ~ ~  Nixon tasked the STG to 
complete a comprehensive review of the future plans of the U.S. space program. 
The STG national-level review was supported by reports from working groups at 
the departmental 1evel.The DOD working groups in support of the STG studied 
future d i t a r y  space plans and budgets and again raised the issue of the military 
utility of MOL in an era of constrained budgets. More specifically, a report for the 
STG prepared by Walter Morrow of MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory “declared that no 
significant increase in space spending was necessary to meet DOD requirements 
and that an annual military space investment of about $2 billion would suffice 
through the 1 9 7 0 ~ ” ~ ~  In competition for scarce space program funds, MOL did 
not necessarily do well even in DOD-sponsored analyses. 
The most significant factor in the demise of the program, however, was the 
growing beliefthat unmanned spy satellites could perform the primary mission of 
MOL as well as or better than MOL and at a lower cost. According to Richelson, 
the NRO and CIA had been leery of the idea of a manned reconnaissance system 
from the outset. They reasoned that a manned system might present more of a 
provocation to the Soviets, that the contributions of manned operators in space 
would not be all that significant when balanced against the costs and requirements 
of life-support systems, and that any accident involving MOL astronauts might 
set back the whole space-based intelligence-gathering process ~nacceptably.~~ 
Moreover, beginning in 1965, NRO had begun development of the United 
63. Ibid. 
64. Ibid. 
65. AK Force Secretary Robert Seamans represented Secretary h r d  at STG meetings. Seamans had 
previously been NASA’s Associate Ahrustrator. 
66. Jacob Neufeld, “The AK Force in Space. 1969-1970,” Secret History, Office of h r  Force History, 
July 1972, p. 4, mcrofiche document 00338 in Military Uses .fSpace. The overall mil~tary input to the STG, 
“DOD Programs, Options, Recommendations,” was largely shaped by the AK Force and o u h e d  four 
prmary d t a r y  space objechves: “(1) iformahon gathering; (2) deterrence; (3) hmthng enemy damage 
to the nation; and (4) support ofAUled forces.”Ths report also grouped possible hture space efforts mto 
three categories: 1) improvements on emtmg and planned mnstream space systems, primardy for force 
enhancement; 2) systems responsive to “sigmficant technological or engmeering advances, changes in 
national policy, or the emergence of new threats” such as a deep space command post; and 3) “undefined” 
systems such as Earth illurmnation systems or weather-mod&cation systems (ibid., pp. 2-4). 
67. kchelson, Secret Eyex, p. 103. 
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States’ fourth-generation photoreconnaissance satellite known as the KH-9 or 
“Big Bird”-a system originally planned to serve as a backup to MOL.68 In 
the late 1960s, with MOL already in jeopardy, the NRO now argued that the 
projected capabilities of the KH-9 system would make the MOL mnecessary. 
It is not possible in open sources to trace the exact impact of this argument 
on the decision to cancel MOL, but it may have been the clincher, given the 
development paths of both programs and subsequent events. The first KH-9 was 
launched from Vandenberg AFB atop a Titan 111-D on 15 June 1971.69 
The saga of the demise of the MOL program served as another painful lesson 
to the Air Force and the military that their preferred military space doctrines and 
programs would not come to fiuition. The loss of MOL hit the Air Force very 
hard because 1) it was the Air Force’s only attempt to establish a major manned 
d t a r y  space program during this period, 2) the Air Force had planned to use 
MOL as the basis to build a larger manned military space presence, and 3) the 
program had been specifically tailored primarily to support the space-as-sanctuary 
school but had still been rejected.Mter the Air Force’s plan to use men in space to 
support the nation’s highest priority military space mission was not approved, it was 
very unlikely that any other d t a r y  man-in-space program would be approved. 
For a number of years after the cancellation of the MOL, the An Force largely 
lost interest in high-ground and space-control doctrines and basically considered 
the development of a sipficant manned military space presence a lost cause. 
Stares summarizes the organizational impact of the loss of the X-20 and the MOL 
programs upon the A r  Force during this period very well: 
With the cancellation of the Dynasoar and MOL, many believed 
in the Air Force that they had made their “pitch” and failed. This 
in turn reduced the incentives to try again and reinforced the bias 
towards the traditional mission of the Air Force, namely flying. As 
a result, the Air Force’s space activities remained a poor relation to 
tactical and strategic airpower in its organizational hierarchy and 
inevitably in its hnding priorities. This undoubtedly influenced 
the Air Force’s negative attitude towards the various ASAT mod- 
ernization proposals put forward by Air Defense Command and 
others in the early 1970s. The provision of satellite survivability 
measures also suffered because the Air Force was reluctant to pro- 
pose initiatives that would require the use of its own budget to 
defend the space assets of other services and agencies?’ 
68. Ibid., p. 105; Stares, Militarization offpace,  p. 160; William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space 
69.“Launch Listing,”in US. Military Uses ofspace, p. 100.TheTitan 111-D launch vehcle for the KE-9 
70. Stares, Militarization ofspace, p. 242. 
Espionage and National Security (New York: Berkley Books, 1986), pp. 228-229. 
was very similar to theTitan 111-M designed to launch the MOL. 
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DOD AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE 
Interactions between NASA, the NRO, and the Air Force were among the 
most important inputs in structuring the development and operation of the Space 
Transportation System (STS) or Shuttle program. STS interactions deserve special 
attention because they were the most focused, longest running, and most intense 
interplay among these organizations and became the single most important factor 
in shaping their interrelationships. NASA’s decision to pursue a large shuttle vehicle 
program to serve as the national launch vehicle was the Agency’s primary post- 
Apollo space program goal. This decision necessitated that the Shuttle design be 
able to accommodate the most important potential users and satisfy the military 
in particular. Accordingly, DOD was instrumental in setting Shuttle payload 
and performance criteria. Even more importantly, when the STS ran into great 
political and budgetary problems during the Carter administration, DOD stepped 
in to help save the program-largely due to the Shuttle’s projected capability 
to launch huge spy satellites. Thus, the rationale behind the STS development 
became increasingly militarized and related to spy satellites. Additionally, STS 
operations up to the Chullenger disaster allowed the military to again entertain 
plans to develop a manned military presence in space. 
The question of what the U.S. should focus on in space following its 
triumph in the Moon race was the overriding issue for U.S. space policy in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. President Nixon created the Space Task Group (STG) 
in February 1969 to examine this issue. On 15 September, the STG presented 
Nixon with three options for post-Apollo U.S. civil space plans. Option one 
called for a manned mission to Mars by 1985 supported by a 50-man space 
station in orbit around Earth, a smaller space station in orbit around the Moon, 
a lunar base, a space shuttle to service the Earth space station, and a space tug to 
service the lunar stations. Option two consisted of all of the above except for the 
lunar projects and delayed the Mars landing until 1986. Option three included 
only the space station and the space shuttle, deferring the decision on a Mars 
mission but keeping it as a goal to be realized before the end of the century?l The 
report estimated that option one would cost approximately $10 billion annually, 
option two would run about $8 billion per year, and option three would be $5 
billion annually?’ Considering that NASA’s budget had peaked at the height of 
the Moon race in 1965 at a little more than $5 billion and that political support 
for space spectaculars was rapidly eroding, the STG recommendations seemed 
fiscally irresponsible and politically nai~e.7~ 
71. Colonel Cass Schchtle,USAe The National Space Program From the Flfties to the Eighties (Washington: 
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Meanwhile, the Air Force and NASA had begun coordinating with one 
another concerning the need for, design criteria, and performance capabilities 
of a shuttle vehicle. In March 1969, STG Chairman Agnew had directed that a 
joint DOD-NASA study on a shuttle system be completed to support the overall 
STG eff0rt.7~ During the spring of 1969, Air Force Chief of Staff General John 
McConnell was very impressed with the military potential of a shuttle vehicle 
and even “proposed the Air Force assume responsibility for STS de~elopment.”~~ 
Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans was also impressed with the potential of a 
shuttle but “he vetoed the proposal that the Air Force take charge of STS devel- 
opment, preferring to await additional study In June, DOD and NASA 
submitted to the STG their coordinated report that strongly backed develop- 
ment of a ~huttle.7~ By contrast, the Morrow report, which was also prepared for 
the STG, questioned the technical feasibility of a shuttle and specifically refuted 
the projected STS launch rates and cost estimates. The Morrow report recom- 
mended “the DOD postpone its participation in the system’s development pend- 
ing technical and economic analysis.”78 
DOD and the Air Force acknowledged some of the potential STS difficul- 
ties raised by the Morrow report but remained supportive ofshuttle development. 
The military specifications for the shuttle at this time included a 50,000-pound 
payload capability for launches into a 100-nautical-de (NM) due-east orbit, a 
payload compartment measuring 15 by 60 feet, and a cross-range maneuvering 
capabdity of 1,500 NM.79 Some NASA shuttle designs did not meet all of these 
criteria, but NASA quickly recognized the political necessity for strong Air Force 
support in attempting to sell the shuttle within the administration and agreed spe- 
cifically to include the Air Force in future STS design and policy decision-making. 
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To formalize this arrangement, on 17 February 1970 the Air Force signed an agree- 
ment with NASA that established the joint USAF/NASA STS Committee.80 
On the basis of the STG report and the recommendations from other space 
studies during this period, President Nixon moved to formalize U.S. post-Apollo 
space policy goals in March 1970.81 Nixon only endorsed the development of a 
shuttle and left a space station or a Mars mission contingent upon the successful 
completion of a shuttle program. Of course, this was far less than NASA had 
hoped for, and the agency that had conquered the Moon was initially less than 
enthused about the prospect of building a nonglamorous space truck as its 
primary post-Apollo mission." Soon, however, NASA came to realize that a 
space shuttle was the only major program that stood a chance of being approved 
at this time and the only possible way to preserve at least a part of NASA's 
integrity in the face of radical cuts in civil space programs and budgets.83 
Faced with this situation, NASA continued its attempts to design a space 
shuttle during 1970 and 1971. In late 1970 and early 1971, acting Administrator 
George M. Low continued Paine's emphasis on the shuttle as a national vehicle by 
moving NASA &om concept towards design of a larger and more capable shuttle. 
Thus, by 1971, NASA was hard at work on what has been described as a"Cadillac" 
shuttle system-very large,very capable,and completely reusable, but very expensive 
to develop.84 These very capable designs proved to be too expensive, especially 
after the Office of Management and Budget ( O m )  reiterated that NASA could 
expect no more than $6.5 billion to develop the ~huttle.'~ Meanwhile, the An- 
80. Neufeld,"Air Force in Space. 1969-1970,"~. 9. Creation of this c o m t t e e  &d not solve all of the 
h r  ForceNASA differences over STS design issues. Powerfd elements w t h n  NASA, such as Associate 
Admnistrator for Manned Spaceflight Dr. George E. Mueller, continued to press for a smaller STS 
design that would not meet all of the h r  Force's criteria. 
81.Two of the most mportant other stu&es on US. post-Apollo space goals that were also completed 
durmg ths period but not mentioned above were 1) the overall NASA input into the STG, known 
as the Mueller report after its charman, George Mueller, and 2) the PSAC report, headed by Leurls 
Branscomb. The Mueller report stressed a buddmg-block approach for the next major civd space programs 
and emphasized the general u&ty of a space shuttle for all other projects.The Branscomb report urged 
that the US. place more emphasis on unmanned versus manned exploration and recommended robohc 
exploration of Mars. On these two reports and their impact, see Hans Mark, The Space Sfation:A Pevsonal 
Journey (Durham, NC: Duke Umversity Press, 1987), pp. 31-34. 
82. NASA AhnistratorThomas Paine resigned m September 1970 over &IS issue and over h s  general 
percephons ofa lack ofsupport for NASA urlthm the Nyion ad-strahon.See Joseph J.Trento, Prescription 
for Disaster (NewYork Crown Pubhshers, 1987), pp. 84-99. 
83. NASA's budget (m constant dollars) fell to only 36 percent of its 1965 peak by the time of its nadlr 
m 1975.The speed of these reduchons meant that NASA's budget often was reduced by more than 36500 
d o n ,  or more than 10 percent, in constant dollars each year. Moreover, the number ofjobs in the c i d  
space sector dropped &om a peak of 420,000 m 1966 to only 190,000 by 1970 and conanued down &om 
that pomt. See Schchtle, National Space Program, p. 73; "NASA Budget History," Aviation Week G. Space 
Technology (16 March 1992): 123. 
84.Alex Roland,"Priorihes ~fl Space for the USA," Space Policy 3 (May 1987): 106. Roland is a former 
NASA historian. 
85. Logsdon,"Decision to Develop the Space Shuttle," p. 107. 
NASA AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.. 225 
Force remained adamant on its payload and performance criteria and apparently 
even raised its maximum payload weight requirement to 65,000 pounds.86 During 
the remainder of 1971, NASA came up with a revised shuttle design known as the 
Thrust-Assisted Orbiter Shuttle (TAOS) that seemed to meet these demanding 
development cost ceilings and performance criteria better.87 M e r  very intense 
scrutiny fiom the OMB during the f d  of 1971, the TAOS design went forward 
to President Nixon for final approval.88 Nixon privately decided to approve the 
fU-scale TAOS at the Western White House at San Clemente over the 1971-72 
New Year’s weekend.89 James Fletcher, the new NASA Administrator, went to the 
Western White House to brief the President and to be present when the decision 
to approve the STS was publicly announced on 5 January. 
Other than setting the payload and performance design criteria discussed 
above, the Air Force was not very involved, financially or otherwise, in the STS 
program during most of its development period. In 1971, the Air Force agreed 
that it would not compete against the STS and would forgo the development of 
any new expendable launch vehicles (ELVs)?’ In April 1972, the Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC) and Vandenberg AFB were selected as Shuttle launch and landing 
sites, and the Air Force agreed to reconfigure the planned MOL launch complex 
at Vandenberg, known as space launch complex (SLC)-6, for STS launches into 
polar orbit?’ Interestingly, former NASA Administrator Fletcher claimed in a 
later interview that the Air Force had verbally committed to him during STS 
development that they would buy the planned fifth and sixth orbitersY2 
86. Ibid., pp. 108-110. Here, Logsdon discusses the Air Force’s payload and performance criteria. He 
inmcates that the most important h r  Force weight requirement was for the capability to launch 40,000 
pounds into polar orbit and that the 15-foot dimension of the cargo bay was a NASA requirement for 
possible future station construction rather than an Air Force criterion. 
87. The TAOS design moved away &om the original designs, whch called for a vertically stacked 
booster-orbiter configuration staging 111 sequence, as ~fl a l previous spacecraft designs, to a horizontally 
stacked booster-orbiter design where the booster and orbiter engmes could be used at the same time. 
Ths  design also moved the large main fuel tank outside the booster and made this section expendable 
rather than reusable. The TAOS design lowered the overall size and weight of the vehicle by allomng 
the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) to contribute to takeoff thrust, but it also greatly increased the 
technological challenges for designing the SSMEs and introduced the problem of asymmetrical thrust on 
takeoKThis and other design decisions at this time lowered the development costs for the STS but would 
also contribute significantly to the much higher than desired STS operations costs. 
88. Logsdon describes the NASA-OMB exchanges in detail in “Decision to Develop the Space Shuttle,” 
89. Ibid.,p. 118. 
90. Ibid., p. 110. 
91. Major General R. C. Henry and Major Aubrey B. Sloan,“The Space Shuttle andvandenberg Air 
Force Base,” Air University Review 27 (September-October 1976): 19-26.The Aeronautics andhtmnauhcs 
Coordinating Board formally approved SLC-6 reconfiguration for STS launches in January 1975. 
92.Trent0, Presniptionfor Disaster, p. 128. I was unable to find any hard evidence of such a commitment. 
In the wake of the Challmger disaster, many varied theories were advanced to determine culpabfity for the 
woes of the STS program. 
pp. 112-1 16. 
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Throughout the remainder of the 1970s, the STS faced difficult technical 
and political challenges. Three major technical challenges were the most difficult: 
developing the computer software and interfaces for the orbiter’s computer- 
controlled flight system, designing and especially attaching the ceramic tiles for 
the orbiter’s heat-protection system, and designing and testing the Space Shuttle 
Main Engines (SSMEs). Politically, the STS faced even more difficult challenges 
at the outset of the Carter administration. Several powerful individuals and 
organizations such as Vice President Walter Mondale, the OMB, and the Office 
of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) favored drastically cutting back the 
STS if not canceling the program o~tright.9~ In the summer of 1977, as the 
test vehicle Enterprise was about to begin STS approach and landing tests at 
Edwards AFB, President Carter asked newly appointed NASA Administrator 
Robert Frosch to evaluate comprehensively whether to continue with the STS 
pr0gram.9~ Thus, the stage was set for the most difficult challenge the STS would 
face during its development process. 
At this point, DOD stepped in strongly to defend the STS as a program 
critical to national security and to play an important role in preserving this 
program. In July 1977, Dr. Hans Mark, who had been Director of NASA’s Ames 
Research Center, became Under Secretary of the Air Force (and NRO Director). 
As an avid manned spaceflight enthusiast who believed the STS was an essential 
step towards a future manned space station and future exploration, Mark was 
instrumental in lining up DOD support for the STS in its time of peril. During 
November and December of 1977, OMB called a series of meetings on the 
future of the STS.9’ The OMB had urged that the STS program be converted 
into a three-orbiter test project and that only the KSC launch site be 
According to Mark, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown was persuasive in 
making the DOD’s need for the STS clear at these meetings: 
prown] made the case that at least two launch sites (one on the 
east coast and the other on the west coast) would be required 
and that at least four Orbiters would be necessary to meet the 
requirements of national security. This last argument was based on 
the fact that the first two Orbiters to be built (OV-102, Columbia, 
93. Mondale had helped to make a name for himself in the Senate both with his attacks on the 
“bloated” NASA budgets of the late 1960s and as a leader of congressional opposition to building 
the STS. In 1973, President Nixon had abolished the NASC and moved the science adviser’s office 
out of the Executive Office of the President FOP).  In 1976, President Gerald Ford created OSTP 
within EO€! Carter’s OSTP Director, Dr. Frank Press, saw government hnding for all scientific efforts 
as a zero-sum game and was eager to address the deficiencies he perceived in basic scientific research 
funding by reducing quasi-scientific efforts such as manned spaceflight. 
94.Trent0, Presuiptionfor Disaster, p. 149. 
95. Mark, Space Station, pp. 71-73. 
96. Ibid., p. 72. 
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and OV-099, Chullenger) would be somewhat heavier than the 
following vehicles and would therefore not be capable of carrying 
the very heaviest national security related payloads. It was therefore 
necessary to have at least two Orbiters capable of carrying the very 
heaviest payloads in order to have a backup in case one of these 
vehicles was 1ost.This argument carried the day and the decision 
was reached to build four Orbiters (OV-103, Discovery, and OV- 
104, Atluntis, in addtion to the first two) and to continue with 
construction of the west coast launch site. (The west coast launch 
site was deemed necessary in order to conduct polar orbiting 
f%ghts required for national security related  mission^.)^' 
Although Mark does not highlight another aspect of saving the STS, some- 
time during this period, perhaps at these OMB meetings, the decision was 
also taken to make the STS virtually the only launch vehicle for both NASA 
and DOD. 
The outcome of these meetings marked a definite shift in the rationale for 
the STS program that again illustrates the overriding impact of spysats on all 
other types ofspace policy. NASA was publicly selling the STS program as a way 
to meet U.S. civil space policy goals and on cost-effectiveness grounds, but the 
rationale that saved it during the Carter administration was its ability to launch 
huge spy satellites. Moreover, with the pending debate over the ratification of 
the SALT I1 Treaty, spy satellites as national technical means of verification 
took on added significance. On 1 October 1978, President Carter marked the 
first official break with the blackout policy on spysats promulgated in 1962. 
In a speech at the KSC, Carter noted that “photoreconnaissance satellites have 
become an important stabilizing factor in world affairs in the monitoring of arms 
control agreements. They make an immediate contribution to the security of all 
nations. We shall continue to develop them.”98 Meanwhile, however, the NRO 
was ambivalent about the prospects of using the STS as its sole launch vehicle: on 
97. Ibid. 
98. Cited in Stares, Militarization of Space, p. 186. Accordmg to kchelson, Secret Eyes, pp. 140-143, 
various agencies wthm the adrmnistrahon debated during early September how far to go in declasslfying 
spysats.The primary motivahon behind the desire to loosen the security restrichons on spysats was pubhcly 
to promde a h s t r a h o n  officials w~th better evldence of US. abdity to v e r 6  SALT II adequately. 
Those argumg for greater declassificahon mcluded Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Arms Control and 
Dlsarmament Agency Dlrector Paul Warnke, Director of Central Intelhgence Stansfield Turner, Natlonal 
Security Agency Dlrector Bobby Inman, and NRO Dlrector Mark. Secretary Brown, backed by the JCS 
and the Defense Intelhgence Agency, strongly opposed wdespread declassificahon. The most powerfd 
argument rased by DOD (which apparently won the day) was that the release of one spysat photo would 
lead to a deluge of Freedom of Informahon Act (FOIA) requests and thereby he up the manpower of the 
intelhgence agencies in nonproduchve achnties. On 13 September, the Pohcy Renew Co-ttee (Space) 
voted for declassification, but only of the fact that the Umted States conducted photoreconnassance fiom 
space-a “truly mmmalist decision,” in kchelson’s opmion. 
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the one hand, it was already planning the large spysats that would take advantage 
of STS capabilities; but on the other hand, it did not want to lose control over 
its launch vehicles, feared the possible disruption of spysat launchings due to 
accidents with astronauts, and also chafed at the prospect of the increased media 
attention that NASA involvement would bring. 
General Air Force attitudes towards STS were also ambivalent during 
this period. While STS was strongly supported by elements within the Space 
and Missiles Systems Organization and by Mark (who became Secretary of the 
Air Force in July 1979), other elements such as the Secretary of the Air Force 
Special Projects Office were less enthusiastic. Mark attempted to push STS and a 
general space emphasis on the Air F0rce.9~ These efforts, along with the military 
potential of the STS, certainly were important in helping to revive Air Force 
interest in space and in possible military man-in-space applications. At the same 
time, however, the Air Force was very much a junior partner on STS in terms 
of funding and effort. Moreover, the Air Force dragged its feet on refurbishing 
SLC-6 at Vandenberg for STS operations and in developing the Inertial Upper 
Stage (IUS) to be used for boosting payloads into higher energy orbits than 
possible with the STS.’” In sum, then, although the STS program did reignite 
some Air Force interest in more ambitious space missions, the level of Air Force 
support for this program by the end of its development did not approach the 
level of enthusiasm the Air Force had displayed for the X-20 or MOL, and this 
ambivalent support undoubtedly reflected the fact that the Air Force did not 
control STS. 
The Military, Space Transportation Policy, and STS Operations 
The 1980s witnessed both the long-awaited arrival of STS operations and 
the wrenching reordering of U.S. space transportation policy following the 
Challenger disaster. DOD interactions with the STS program continued to be 
a very important factor in shaping this program, while DOD’s stance on STS 
provides important insights into the military’s space priorities and actual level 
of commitment to various space programs. Despite the great military potential 
of the STS and the considerable support for the STS within elements of the Air 
99. Mark listed“the development of a doctrine and an organizahon that WIU permt greatly increased 
h r  Force actlvities in space in order to take advantage of new technology to enhance commurucations, 
reconnalssance, and other vltal Air Force funchons” as one of the USAF’s top prlorlties. Hans M. Mark, 
“USAF‘s Three Top Priorihes,” Air Force Magazine (September 1979), reprinted as appendm 3 in Mark, 
Space Station, pp. 235-236. 
100. It is &cult to apportlon blame for delays on the STS program; however, STS was origmally 
scheduled to be launched from SLC-6 in December 1982 (after “more than forty launches v d  have 
taken place from KSC”!), and SLC-6 would barely have been ready for its rescheduled first launch in 
March 1986 had the Challenger disaster not d e d e d  that plan. In prachce, there were only 5 STS fights by 
December 1982 and a total of only 24 fights prior to the Challenger disaster. See Henry and Sloan,“Shuttle 
andvandenberg,” p. 25; Edgar Ulsamer,“Shck 6,” Air Force Magazine (November 1985): 4748. 
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Force and elsewhere in DOD, several significant points of friction remained 
between the Air Force, NRO, and NASA concerning STS operations and 
plans. Even prior to the Challenger disaster, the NRO had managed to gain 
formal approval to build a backup launcher, the Complementary ELV (CELV), 
for its most important payloads. Following the Challenger disaster, U.S. national 
space transportation policies were completely reordered under the Space Launch 
Recovery Plan, and the Air Force planned to move almost all DOD payloads 
onto ELVs. NASA-DOD interactions over STS during the 1980s led to the 
reversal of several major space transportation policies, abandonment of the 
original STS program goals, and the demise of yet another potential vehicle for 
significant military spaceflight. 
DOD was instrumental in saving STS from cancellation at the outset of the 
Carter administration and was again a key player in defending STS late in the 
Carter administration when the program faced significant political opposition 
due to successive schedule slips and funding shortfalls requiring supplemental 
appropriations.lO’ DOD support for the STS was critical in maintaining political 
support for STS within the administration and culminated in a 14 November 
1979 White House meeting between the President and all key actors on this 
issue, where Carter firmly committed his administration to fully funding and 
rapidly completing STS.lo2 DOD support for the national security mission of the 
STS was also a key factor in pushing the supplemental appropriations through 
Congress following hearings in March 1980.’03 
DOD exacted a price from NASA for its indispensable support: on 25 
February 1980, NASA and DOD signed an extensive MOU on management 
and operation of the STS which was very favorable to DOD.lo4 Specifically, 
the MOU indicated that “DOD will have priority in mission preparation and 
operations consistent with established national space policy.”’o5 Further, the 
101. In 1979, NASA required supplemental appropriations totaling over $1 bdlion (1972 dollars) to 
102. Mark, Space Station, pp. 101-103;Trento, Prescriptionfor Disatter, p. 169. 
103. Representative Edward Boland @-Massachusetts) was mstrumental in gammg approval for these 
supplemental appropriatlons as c h m a n  of the NASA appropriatlons subcommittee. His support for 
STS stemmed &om his posinon as C h r m a n  of the House Permanent Select C o m t t e e  on Intelhgence, 
where he learned about the STS-spysat hnk in detad. See Mark, Space Station, p. 105;Trento, Presmption for 
Disaster, pp. 156-157. 
104. “NASA/DOD Memorandum of Undeetandmg on Management and Operation of the Space 
Transportation System,” 25 February 1980, microfiche document 00561 in US. Military Uses of Space. 
Thls MOU replaced the 14 January 1977 NASA-DOD MOU on STS and provlded the basis for several 
NASA-DOD subagreements. 
105. Ibid., p. 3. The “estabhhed nahond space policy” referenced is presumably Presidentlal Direchve 
(PD)-37 signed by President Carter on 11 May 1978 (unclasslfied version avdable at http://www.au.af: 
mil/a~/awc/awcgate/nsc-37.htm).Thls DOD mssion pnority on the STS was often referred to as the right 
of DOD to “bump” other payloads 6om the STS madest in favor of top-priority natlond security 
continued on the next page 
keep the STS program on track. See Mark, Space Station, p. 93. 
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MOU established two categories of DOD STS missions: 1) national security 
missions conducted by NASA and 2) “Designated National Security Missions” 
controlled by the Air Force.’06 Overall, this MOU went a long way towards 
giving the Air Force the type of operational control over a manned space vehicle 
it had sought since the late 1950s-an arrangement which was quite remarkable, 
considering that the Air Force had not paid for the development of the STS. 
The initial STS spaceflight took place on 12 April 1981 when Columbia was 
launched from KSC. This marked a bittersweet milestone because it was the 
world’s first reusable spacecraft and signified the return of manned American 
spaceflight. But the STS was also two years behind schedule and cost $2 billion 
more to develop than originally projected. Moreover, it rapidly became appar- 
ent that due to very intensive and difficult refurbishing requirements following 
each flight, STS could not come close to meeting its planned flight s~hedule.’~’ 
However, the military potential of the STS was also apparent from the outset. 
The second STS mission in November 1981 conducted radar-imaging experi- 
ments from orbit that pinpointed an ancient city buried beneath the sands of the 
Sahara and thereby demonstrated the significant military potential of this type 
of spaceborne sensor.lo8 The first classified military payload was carried into 
continued from the previous page 
payloads. Other sigruficant provlsions of ths MOU indcated that 1) the h r  Force was DODS “sole point 
of contact wlth the NASA for all commmnents affechng the STS and its use in matters regardmg nahond 
security space operahons and in mnternahonal defense achvihes covered by Government to Government 
agreements”; 2) the h r  Force would “develop, acqulre, and operate a dedcated Shuttle msion plannmg, 
operauons, and control fachty for national security mssions”; and 3) “an STS mssion assignment schedule 
and plan” would be developed to fachtate the “expendable booster transiQon and phaseout plans” of 
NASA and the Arr Force. 
106. Ibid., pp. 3-4,6-9. Specifically, for category one DOD STS fights, NASA would exercise fight 
control from JSC, but “NASA d be responsive to DOD Mission Directors,” who would retain “overall 
responsibhty for achevmg mssion objechves.” For these mssions, Arr Force personnel “d be integrated 
into NASA h e  hnchons for mmng” in order to “allow the USAF to develop the capabhty to plan, 
control, and operate nahond security mssions.” For category two DOD STS fights, an h r  Force Fhght 
Director “d be responsible for overall mssion accomphshment and operahonal control, includmg fight 
vehcle and crew safety, through the Arr Force cham of command.”Although not specified in ths MOU, the 
ImphCahOn is that category two DOD STS mssions would be controlled &om the Shuttle operahons and 
Planrung Complex (SOPC) at the Consohdated Space Operations Center at Falcon (now Schriever) AFB. 
107. NASA’s STS mssion models adopted in the early 1980s were far more rea!sac than the 60 fights 
per year originally projected for the Shuttle m the early 1970, but they shll called for 24 fights per year 
f b m  the complete four-orbiter STS fleet. In prachce, orbiter turnaround hme was approxlmately 60 days 
rather than the 7 days origmally projected, and the turnaround operahon required 6,000 people, nearly 
four hmes the expected number. There were only 24 total fights in the nearly five years of STS operahons 
prior to the Challenger chaster. See E. C. “Pete” Aldridge, Jr., “Assured Access: ‘The Bureaucrahc Space 
War,”’Dr. Robert H. Goddard Historical Essay, n.d., p. 5. Offprmt provlded to author by the Office of the 
Secretary of the Au Force. 
108.Trent0, Pracriphonfor Disaster, pp. 20G201; kchelson, Secret Eyes, p. 219.These first radar-imaging 
expernnents were conducted wlth Shuttle Imagmg Radar (SIR)-A. SIR-B experiments were conducted 
wlth updated hardware on mssion 41-G ~fl October 1984. Accorchg to kchelson, the SIR-A radar 
could apparently m g e  objects 16 feet beneath dry sand. 
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orbit aboard Columbia during the STS-4 mission in June-July 1982, which also 
marked the end of the STS flight-testing phase.”’ 
Meanwhile, elements within the Reagan administration and Congress were 
carefully monitoring early STS developments. On 13 November 1981, President 
Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) -8 that reaffirmed 
the space transportation policies of the Ford and Carter administrations by 
stating, “The STS will be the primary space launch system for both United States 
military and civil government missions. The transition should occur as soon as 
practical.”’“ According to Mark, NSDD-8 also indicated “that the president 
had a strong personal interest in the space shuttle program.”’” Reagan’s first 
comprehensive space policy, NSDD-42, was publicly announced by the President 
himself at a 4 July 1982 ceremony at Edwards AFB marking the beginning of 
the operational phase of STS operations, with Columbia in the background. In 
terms of space transportation policy, NSDD-42 reaffirmed that the STS was 
the nation’s primary launch system, declared that the United States “is fully 
committed to maintaining world leadership in space transportation,” stated that 
the “first priority of the STS program is to make the system fully operational 
and cost-effective in providing routine access to space,” and indicated that U.S. 
“government spacecraft should be designed to take advantage of the unique 
capabilities of the STS.”l12 Additionally, this directive indicated that “for the 
near-term,” the STS would be managed under the terms of the NASA/DOD 
MOUs but as “STS operations mature, options will be considered for possible 
transition to a different institutional str~cture.””~ Finally, NSDD-42 made a 
concession to the NRO : “Unique national security considerations may dictate 
developing special-purpose launch ~apabilities.””~ 
Early STS operations presented a variety of challenges and opportunities for 
the Air Force and NRO. Different elements within the Air Force had particular 
space priorities and viewpoints on the potential of the Shuttle. The space 
enthusiasts former Secretary Mark had reenergized within the Air Force were 
excited about exploring the military potential of STS, especially for military 
109. Melvyn Smth, Space Shuttle (Newbury Park, CA: Haynes Publications, 1989), appendm 7; 
110. NSDD-8, “Space Transportahon System,” 13 November 1981, cited in “Chnology,” in U.S. 
11 1. Mark, Space Station, p. 131. 
112. NSDD-42,“National Space Policy,”4 July 1982, pp. 2-3, NSC box, National Archives,Washington, 
DC.Two complete pages and approximately five additional paragraphs are deleted &om the sanitized 
version of ths direchve. The White House also lssued a five-page fact sheet, “National Space Policy,’’ on 
4 July 1982, reprinted in NASA, Aeronautirs and Space Report 4 t h e  President, 1982Activities (Wlashington, 
DC: GPO, 1983), pp. 98-100. 
“Chronology,” in US.  Military Uses of Space, p. 52. 
Military Uses 4Space, p. 5 1. 
113. NSDD-42, “National Space Policy” p. 4. 
114. Ibid. 
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man-in-space  mission^."^ The NRO was not very happy with being directed to 
abandon ELVs for STS but was in the process of redesigning and reconfiguring its 
future payloads to take full advantage of STS’s substantial payload capabi1ities.ll6 
Other groups within the Air Force were far less excited with space or STS 
and opposed the substantial Air Force expenditures required to prepare for 
DOD STS operations. Major Air Force programs designed to support DOD 
STS operations included the ill-starred Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) program, 
modifications of SLC-6 at Vandenberg AFB for STS launch, construction of the 
Space Operations Planning Complex (SOPC) at Falcon AFB, and modifications 
to the Kennedy, Johnson, and Goddard Space Flight Centers for “controlled 
mode” DOD STS operation~.’’~ 
115. Mditary uses of STS are not often or fully mscussed in open sources. In answering congressional 
questions in March 1983, DOD drew a dishnchon between “payload dehvery” and “fdl exploitation” 
of STS, defining the latter as follows: “In the longer term, when the capabhhes of the Shuttle w d  be 
rouhnely avadable, the DOD enmions use of the enhanced capabhhes umque to the Shuttle, such as 
on-orbit assembly of large structures; chechng out payloads prior to deployment; repcuring and servicing 
of satelhtes on-orbit; retrievmg spacecraft for repcurs and refurbishment; and performng man in the loop 
experments.” See House Comrmttee on Appropriahons, Subcomrmttee on the Department of Defense, 
Department ofDefeense Appropriatiorwfor 2984, Hearings before Subco-ttee on Department of Defense, 
98th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 8,1983, p. 508. See also Edward H. Kolcum,“Defense Moving to Exploit Space 
Shuttle,” Aviation Week G. Space Technology (10 May 1982): 40-42. Kolcum notes that DODS space test 
program (STP) experments (e.g.,Teal Ruby) would henceforth use STS rather than ELVs. 
116. One of the most sensitive pomts for NASA regardmg STS Performance is that it never met its origmal 
65,000-pound payload speclficahon as set in conjunchon mth the Air Force in the early 1970s.The NASA 
STS performance data in the President’s Space Report for 1981-87 mdcated that the STS was able to boost 
appromately 65,000 pounds “in full performance configuration.” However, the figure in the Aeronautics 
and Space Report ofthe President for 1988 (after resumphon of STS operahons) mmcated a sigmficant drop 
in STS full-performance configurahon capabhhes to appromately 54,895 pounds. Moreover, during 
congressional teshmony m 1981, Air Force Assistant Secretary and NRO Dlrector Robert J. Hermann 
inmcated that “current projechons of Shuttle performance show it to be about 8000 Ibs lower than the 
original commitment. DOD mssions can profitably use the fdl capabhty of the original performance 
commitment” (Senate Comrmaee on Commerce, Science, and Transportahon, Subcomrmttee on Science, 
Technology, and Space, N A S A  Authorization for Fscal Year 2982, Hearing before the Subcomrmttee on 
Science, Technology, and Space, 97th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 2, 1981, p. 349). In 1982, Aldridge, Hermann’s 
successor as NRO Director, indcated that the firstvandenberg AFB Shuttle launch scheduled for October 
1985 “d requlre full specificahon Shuttle performanceas called out in our Performance Reference 
h s i o n  4 requirements. Speclfically, the Shuttle must be capable of dehvenng 32,000 pounds to a 98 degree 
inched, 150 nauhcd d e  cucular orbit and, then, recover another satehte weighmg 25,000 pounds and 
return it toVandenberg.The Shuttle mth its current performance eshmate cannot acheve ths long standmg 
defense reqwrement” (prepared statement of Under Secretary Aldridge 111 Senate Co-ttee on Commerce, 
Science, andTransportation, Subco-ttee on Science,Technology, and Space, NASA Authorization for Fisral 
Year 2983, Hearing before the Subcomttee on Science,Technology, and Space, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 1982, 
p. 166). Later, Aldridge simply indicated that the “final Shuttle capabfihes were nearly 20% short” of NASA’s 
orignally promised “65,000 pounds of payload to low earth orbit from Kennedy Space Center and 32,000 
pounds to a polar orbit fromvandenberg AFB, Cal&orma.” See Aldndge, “Assured Access,” p. 3. 
1 17. See Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, NASA Authorization for Fiscul 
Year 2982,pp. 340-341,34&350,444,484.At t h ~ s  hme (Aprd 1981),the first STS launch fi-omvandenberg 
continued on the next page 
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Despite these widespread efforts and considerable expenditures, the Air 
Force and DOD basic positions on how the STS fit into long-range military space 
plans or doctrine remained far from clear, at least in the available unclassified 
material. Undoubtedly, the basic Air Force overall organizational ambivalence 
towards space missions was a factor in structuring the long-term Air Force 
relationship with the STS, especially in light of all the rejected military man-in- 
space programs the Air Force had previously proposed. 
In the early 1980s, former astronaut, space enthusiast, and Space Subcom- 
mittee Chairman Senator Harrison Schmitt (R-New Mexico) was among those 
most clearly upset with the apparent lack of Air Force long-range planning for 
STS use. During exchanges with Air Force and DOD witnesses at congressional 
hearings in 1981, Schmitt charged that “historic inertia” as well as “the lack of 
an organizational focus that has [space] as a primary mission” had made the Air 
Force “relatively slow to grasp the opportunities that the Space Shuttle provides, 
not only as a launch vehicle, but as a test and operational vehicle in space.”118 
Moreover, Schmitt opined that “within a few years, you all are going to come 
back in and say ‘We need a dedicated shuttle fleet.’ And it’s painted blue that 
we could use for our  purpose^.""^ Further, he warned that unless the Air Force 
pursued space missions more aggressively, “I can almost predict that there is 
going to be another Department of Something in the Department of Defense. 
And the Air Force will be flying airplanes, and not Shuttles.”lzo 
More widespread congressional concern in 1982 focused on Air Force- 
NASA relations in regard to the question of whether the U.S. should procure 
a fifth STS orbiter vehicle before the Rockwell orbiter production lines shut 
continued from the previous page 
was scheduled for August 1984. Assistant Secretary Hermann mmcated that the term controlled mode “sig- 
d e s  that we are protecting the classified lnformahon used m the p l m n g  and execution of a DOD 
mssion by controlling access to it. The momfications include construchon changes to the buddmgs to 
isolate certain areas, the procurement of addhond equipment, and the shieldq of certam equipment to 
preclude electromc eavesdroppmg.” He also stated, “All defense payloads wdl have completed thelr transi- 
non to use of the Space Shuttle as the prlmary launch vehicle by 1987.”The SOPC was to “prowde the 
management and control needed for our nahond security space operations m the post-1985 mefi-ame.” 
Additionally, the SOPC would pmwde a backup to the smgle STS control node at JSC and would “pro- 
mde a maxlfnum opporturuty to W y  exploit the Shuttle umque capabhes, m parhcular the presence 
of d t a r y  man m space.” At these same hearings, Dr. James Wade, Actmg Under Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Enpeering, estimated that all of the DOD STS-related actimhes would cost appromately 
$3 bdhon through FY 1986. In March 1983,DOD promded figures inmcatmg that“D0D’s pornon ($15.2 
bdhon) of the total STS cost ($51.1 bdlion) 1s 30 percent [these figures are projected through FY 19881.” 
See House Comnuttee on Appropnations, Defense Appropriationrfor 1984, p. 513. On the Au Force’s STS- 
related expenditures and kfiasmcture, see also W&am P. Sc&tz, “USAF’s Investment in the Nahond 
SpaceTransportation System,” Air Force Magazine 65 (November 1982): 1 0 6 1  12. 
118. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportahon, NASA Authorizationfor Fiscal Year 
1982, pp. 458-459. 
119.Ibid.,p.447. 
120. Ibid., p. 460. 
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down. Many believed that it would be wise to procure a fifth orbiter as a backup 
and to provide greater STS capability.’21 The Air Force was very interested 
in producing another of the lighter weight and more capable orbiters but was 
unwilling to use DOD funds to procure this fifth orbiter.’22 Meanwhile, NASA 
was less supportive of the need for a fifth orbiter, largely because Administrator 
James Beggs and Deputy Administrator Mark had privately agreed that NASA 
should push a permanently manned space station as the nation’s new major civil 
space goal and were therefore unwilling to take on other major new projects at 
this time.’23 By the end of 1982, despite considerable congressional support for 
a fifth orbiter, the NASA compromise solution of keeping the Rockwell lines 
partially open to produce spare parts won out, and the decision to build a fifth 
orbiter was deferred.’24 This decision was formalized by NSDD-80, issued on 3 
February 1983.’25 
During 1983 and 1984, NRO Director Aldridge waged a mostly secret and 
very difficult, but eventually successful, campaign against NASA to obtain 
approval to develop a new ELV capable of launching the spy satellites designed 
to fit into the STS.’26 Building upon the opening in NSDD-42 to consider 
building “special-purpose launch capabilities” for “unique national security 
considerations,” on 23 December 1983 Aldridge issued a memorandum, “Assured 
121.Those favoring a decision to build another orbiter at this time also used arguments about the 
economc impact of keeping the Rockwell production hnes open and the lower costs of budding a fifth 
orbiter in sequence. In Prescription for Disaster,Trento speculates that a decision to budd the fifth orbiter 
at ths  hme (with the lines open) would have cost approximately $1.2 billion instead of the $2.1 bilhon 
that the fifth orbiter (Endeavour) actually cost; see p. 205. 
122. See, for example, the testimony of Major General James Abrahamson (NASA Associate 
Admnnstrator for Manned Spaceflight) and h r  Force Under Secretary Aldridge in House C o m t t e e  
on Science and Technology, Subcomrmttee on Space Science and Applications, T h e  Need For a Fijlh 
Space Shuttle Orbiter, Hearing before the Subcomt tee  on Space Science and Apphcations, 97th Cong., 
2nd sess., 15 June 1982. 
123. Mark, Space Station, pp. 121-122;Trento, Presdptionfor Disaster, pp. 180-181. Followmg a long 
NASA campign ulthin the a h s t r a t i o n ,  President Reagan announced in his 1984 State of the Union 
Address the national goal ofbuddmg a permanently manned space Stahon (Freedom) wthm 10 years. 
124.Trent0, fiesniptionfor Disaster, p. 205. On congressional support for a fifth orbiter, see, for example, 
the posihon of many Representahves m House Committee on Science and Technology, Need For a F@h 
Space Shuttle Orbiter, as well as the formal recommendahon for a fifth orbiter in House Committee on 
Science andTechnology, Subcomt tee  on Space Science and Apphcahons, Trre Need for an Increased Space 
Shuttle Orbrter Fleet, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 1982, C o m t t e e  Prmt Serial HH. 
125. Wdham Clark, NSDD-80, ‘‘Shuttle Orbiter Production Capabhty,” 3 February 1983, NSC box, 
National Archves,Washngton, DC. Specifically, this one-page mrechve indicated that a warm production 
hne would “be acheved through the production of structural and component spares necessary to mure 
that the Nahon can operate the four Orbiter fleet in a robust manner.” 
126. The mtense NRO-NASA struggles of hs period (a “bureaucrahc space war”) are the primary 
focus ofAldridge,“Assured Access,”pp. 3-15. Naturally, this piece covers the positions ofAldridge and the 
Air Force far more sympathehcdy than the posihons of Be= or NASA, but it is by far the most detaded 
descriphon of developments surrounding the CELV decision uncovered during research for ths study. 
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Access to Space,” to Air Force Space Command and Space Divi~ion.”~ This 
memorandum directed these organizations to plan for the procurement of a 
complementary ELV (CELV) capable of boosting a payload the size of the STS 
cargo bay and weighing 10,000 pounds into geosynchronous transfer orbit.”’ 
According to Aldridge, NASA Administrator Beggs “was furious” with these 
developments and saw them as “only a ploy of the Air Force to abandon the 
Shuttle.”’29 However, in August 1984, Aldridge’s position was formally supported 
by the NSC in NSDD-144 that approved Air Force development of the CELV.130 
Nonetheless, Beggs and NASA continued to oppose the CELV option and 
enlisted considerable congressional support in opposition to the CELV.’31 
Aldridge notes that the NSC staff hosted “the critical meeting” on the 
CELV issue on 14 February 1985.’32 At this meeting, Aldridge and Beggs finally 
reached agreement. This agreement was reflected in NSDD-164, issued on 25 
127.“Chronology,” in US.  Milrtavy Uses of Space, p. 55.The primary rationale behind developing such 
a capability was to avoid dependence on a single system for space launch. Additionally, the final Air 
Force ELV buys were being completed at this time, and the production lines were in danger of being 
shut down unless new orders were found. 
128. Ibid. Secretary CasparWeinberger outlined a new DOD space launch strategy relying on a m e d  
fleet of ELVs and the STS in a letter to the President on 7 February 1984; see Aldridge, “Assured Access,” 
p. 6. 
129.Aldridge, “Assured Access,” p. 6. 
130. “Chronology,” in US. Mditary Uses ofspace, p. 56. Presumably, NSDD-144 was the subject of the 
whlte House fact sheet “Nahond Space Strategy,” issued on 15 August 1984 and reprinted in Aeronalrtirs 
and Space Report ofthe President, Fscal Year 1984, pp. 137-139. According to ths fact sheet, the dlrective 
specified two requirements for “assured launch capabhty”: “the need for a launch system complementary 
to the STS to hedge agrunst udoreseen techca l  and operatlonal problems, and the need for a launch 
system suited for operatlons and crisis situahons.” However, there is some confusion about at least the 
number of ths classified hrechve in open sources. Scott Pace, m “US Space Transportahon Pohcy: History 
and Issues for a New Ahnistration,” Space Policy 4 (November 1988): 307,309, indicates that NSDD- 
144, “National Security Launch Strategy,” was not issued by the EOP untd 28 February 1985. Aldridge 
does not dlscuss this drective m “Assured Access.” NSDD-144 was not avdable in the NSC box at the 
Natlonal Archves. 
131. According to Aldridge, NASA had several concerns with and employed several tactics awnst the 
CELV. NASA felt that lfDOD moved away fbm the STS, the costs per launch would increase and NASA 
would need to charge its commercial customers more for each launch.This, NASA officials thought, 
would drive more commercial customers towards the Ariane. In a n  18 May 1984 letter fbm A b s t r a t o r  
Beggs to Secretary Weiberger, NASA indlcated that an STS backup was not necessary but that lfDOD 
was determned to budd a new launch vehcle, it should be derived &om STS components. Next, NASA 
supporters m Congress specified that a COmpehhOn would be run between NASA deslgns and industry 
designs for a system to meet h Force requirements. Aldridge claims in “Assured Access” that NASA 
put subtle pressure on its suppliers not to compete against its Standardized Launch Vehcle (SLV-X) by 
indlcahng that their behavior would have consequences for future NASA purchases. A modhed Titan 111 
called a Titan 34D7 was the mnner in the mdustrlal competitlon conducted by the Ax Force, while the 
NASA entry was judged by the A r  Force Space Division to be uncontrollable durmg the boost phase 
of flight. Finally, as the ELV produchon lines were b e g m n g  to shut down, NASA recommended that 
several mqor and lengthy studies be undertaken on the CELV issue as a delaylng tachc (‘‘Assured Access,” 
pp. 7-13). 
132. Ibid.,p. 13, emphasis m orignal. 
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February 1985.’33 Specifically, NSDD-164 authorized the Air Force to buy 10 
CELVs and to launch approximately 2 CELVs per year in the period 1988-92.’34 
Thus, Aldridge won his victory in the bureaucratic space war less than one year 
prior to the complete reordering of U.S. space transportation policy caused by 
the Challenger disaster. 
In hindsight, given large impact of the Challenger disaster, it is remarkable 
that there was such sustained opposition to acquiring a backup capability for the 
STS. Moreover, while access to space is a prerequisite for any space activity, it is 
unfortunate that Aldridge and the top levels of Air Force space leadership, as well 
as much of NASA’s leadership, were largely consumed with this issue during the 
mid-1980s rather than focusing on broader, more important, or more future- 
oriented space policy issues. Finally, it is also interesting to note that many groups 
were dissatisfied with STS performance capabilities and especially the mounting 
STS payload backlog of the mid-1980s but that only the NRO had the clout to 
develop a new ELV and move its most important payloads off the STS.’35 
The Challenger disaster completely reordered U.S. space transportation pol- 
icy and effectively deferred any Air Force plans to use STS as a vehicle to build 
a significant manned military presence in space. During 1986 and 1987, NASA, 
DOD, and the newly formed Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
(OCST) within the Department of Transportation worked together to produce 
a new U.S. space launch strategy and the Space Launch Recovery Plan. NSDD- 
254, “United States Space Launch Strategy,” was completed on 27 December 
1986.’36 This directive specified that the U.S. would henceforth rely upon a 
133. NSDD-164, “National Security Launch Strategy,” 25 February 1985, NSC box, National 
Archives, Washington, DC.This unclassified directive was pubhcly released on 14 November 1985. 
134. Ibid.,p. 1. NSDD-164 also 1) indcated that a “compeuuve decision” on a specific CELV would be 
made by 1 March 1985,2) drected that “DOD d rely on the STS as its primary launch vehcle and wdl 
commt to at least one-thnd of the STS aghts avallable during the next ten years,” 3) mrected NASA and 
DOD to “Jomtly develop a pricing pohcy for DOD fights that provldes a posihve mcenuve for flying on 
the Shuttle,” and 4) authorized a joint NASA-DOD effort to produce a nahond security study &recave 
(NSSD) on the development of“a second-generanon space transportahon system.” 
135. Some of the strongest opposition to STS “forced busing in space” came from within NASA’s 
own space science community. NASA had directed that all its payloads be launched exclusively by the 
STS, but by the mid-l980s, the STS backlog and problems with the STS upper stages were causing 
multiyear delays and significant design changes for key space science projects such as the Galileo 
Jupiter probe and the Hubble Space Telescope. See, for example, Bruce Murray, “‘Born Anew’ Versus 
‘Born Again,’” in “Policy Focus: National Security and the U.S. Space Program After the Challenger 
Tragedy,” International Security 11 (spring 1987): 178-182. Even more significantly, because STS was 
not providing low-cost launch rates (even at its generous pre-Challenger-disaster subsidized rates) or 
reliable service and launch schedules, commercial customers were “voting with their feet” and moving 
in increasing numbers onto the more commercially viable Ariane ELV. 
136. NSDD-254, “Umted States Space Launch Strategy,” 27 December 1986, NSC box, Nahond 
Archves, Washngton, DC. Approxlmately three sentences of thls two-page &recove are deleted in the 
samhzed version.Themte House released a fact sheet on t l s  hechve on 16 January 1987. NSDD-254 
superseded NSDD-164. 
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“balanced mix of launchers” consisting of the STS and ELVs defined “to best 
support the mission needs of the national security, civil government and com- 
mercial sectors of U.S. space activitie~.”~” Further, “selected critical payloads 
will be designed for dual-compatibility, i.e., capable of being launched by either 
the STS or the ELVS.”’~* In order to accomplish these objectives, the direc- 
tive indicated that DOD “will procure additional ELVs to maintain a balanced 
launch capability and to provide access to 
The Space Launch Recovery Plan dealt with the means to implement this 
new launch strategy in greater detail. The plan focused on the revitalization 
of the nation’s ELV production base and attempted to use government ELV 
purchases as a means to stimulate the development of a more robust commercial 
ELV industry. The plan also provided $2.1 billion to NASA for the production 
of a fifth orbiter, Endeavour, to be ready for flight by 1992. In addition, under this 
plan, the Air Force completely reoriented its future space support infrastructure 
and plans. The Air Force launched a $12-billion program to initiate or expand 
four ELV programs.’40 These Air Force ELV programs included expansion of the 
original 10 booster CELV program to 41 Titan IVs, two medium launch vehicle 
programs consisting of 20 Delta 2 and 11 Atlas-Centaur 2 ELVs, and refurbishing 
14 decommissioned Titan I1 ICBMs for space la~nch.’~’ Additionally, the Air 
Force took drastic steps to reconfigure the infrastructure it had developed to 
operate DOD STS missions, including placing the unused SLC-6 at Vandenberg 
AFB into “minimum facility caretaker” status in July 1986, eliminating the 
32-member-strong Manned Spaceflight Engineer (MSE) program within the 
Space Division, disbanding the Manned Spaceflight Control Squadron at the 
JSC as of 30 June 1989, and ending development of the SOPC at CSOC in 
February 1987.142 Further, as a result of this plan, the DOD scheduled only seven 
137. Ibid., p. 1. 
138. Ibid. 
139. Ibid. Addtionally, NSDD-254 speclfied that NASA would no longer provide commercial or 
foreign launch services on the STS “unless those spacecraft have umque, speclfic reasons to be launched 
aboard the Shuttle.”The drecdve also set a 1995 “commercial contract mandatory termnatlon date.”Ths 
pohcy meant that of the 44 commercial and foreign launch commitments NASA had in January 1986, 
only 20 of these payloads shll quahfied for STS launch. See Aeronautics and Space Report .f the President, 
FiscalyPar 1986, p. 33. 
140. Pace, “US Space Transportanon Pohcy,” p. 310. 
141. Ibid.;W&am J. Broad,“Mtary Launches First New Rocket for Orbital Loads,” NewYork Times (6 
September 1988): 1; Jomt Statement o f h  Force Secretary Aldridge and Chef of StafTGeneral Larry D. 
Welch m Senate Comrmttee on Appropriahons, Subcomrmttee on Department of Defense, Department .f 
Defense Appropriationsfor Fu-cal Year 1988, Hearings before the Subcomrmttee on Department of Defense, 
100th Cong., 1st sess.,pt. 3 , 1 9 8 8 , ~ ~ .  301-303. 
142. W&am J. Broad, “Pentagon Leavlng Shuttle Program,” New York Times (7 August 1989): A13. 
Broad estimated the costs for these programs to be“at least $5 b&on,”the hon’s share ofwhch was the $3.3- 
continued on the next page 
238 CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
dedicated STS launches for the period 1991-95 and thereafter planned to rely 
almost exclusively on 
The relationships between the Air Force, DOD, and NASA over STS oper- 
ations were clearly marked by great difficulties during the 1980s. The develop- 
ment of military space launch policy during this period provides one of the most 
powerful instances of organizational behavior inputs shaping U.S. space policy 
and significantly impacting military space doctrine. Despite building a large and 
expensive infrastructure for launching and controlling DOD STS missions, the 
Air Force never fully exercised this capability prior to the Challenger disaster, 
and, following the disaster, the Air Force and NRO were instrumental in lead- 
ing DOD’s rush off the STS in favor of ELVs. The bitter fight with NASA over 
the CELV and the general desire to fully control its launch vehicles were impor- 
tant factors in motivating this Air Force space launch policy reversal; however, 
the speed and complete nature of the virtual abandonment of the STS and the 
significant infrastructure designed to support DOD STS missions is remarkable 
and not well explained in open sources. The lack of clear and powerful military 
space doctrine undoubtedly contributed to these false starts, reversals, and lack 
of clear direction for the DOD STS mission. Cumulatively, this episode seems 
to be an excellent illustration of the general Air Force ambivalence over the 
military potential of space and military man-in-space, as well as evidence of its 
lack of clear and accepted doctrinal guidance on these issues. 
continued from the previous page 
billion SLC-6 at Vandenberg AFB. The SOPC building at CSOC was converted into the Nahond Test 
Bed (now the Joint National Integration Center) for the Strategic Defense Initiahve (SDI) program. As 
Broad relates, rmlitary space crihcs such as John Pike of the Federation ofAmerican Scientists charged that 
the Air Force went overboard in developing new ELVs and abandoning the STS. 
143. Pace, “US Space Transportation Policy,” p. 310. The first Titan N launch took place on 14 June 
1989 h m  Cape Canaved, see “Chronology,” in US. Military Uses of Space, p. 61. 
CHAPTER 8 
TECHNOLOGY, FOREIGN POLICY, AND 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION N SPACE 
John Krige 
nternational cooperation has always been part of NASA’s mission.’ But I why? Why is it in NASA’s and America’s interest to collaborate with foreign 
partners? The question is not as perverse as it sounds. In 1958, the United 
States was, and probably still remains, the single most important economic 
and military, but also scientific and technological, as well as industrial and 
managerial, power on Earth. Those to whom Eisenhower confided the civilian 
space program drew, though NACA, on a vast and expanding infrastructure of 
scientists, engineers, and managers, along with the facilities and the budget to 
match it, especially once President Kennedy committed the country to putting 
a person on the Moon before 1970. With some important exceptions-like 
the need for a global network of tracking stations, or sounding-rocket studies 
of the properties of the upper atmosphere in equatorial regions-there was 
no overriding scientific or technical (and certainly no financial) reason why 
NASA and the United States needed to collaborate with any other country 
in the conquest of space. Unlike small and medium-sized European states, 
America was rich enough in human and material resources to go it alone, and 
as such was the envy of all aspirant space powers (except perhaps the Soviet 
Union, who had to cripple its domestic economy to maintain its military and 
space capabilities at some sort of parity with those of the U.S.A.). 
One classical argument for international collaboration was that it would 
improve relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union. The 
decision to establish NASA was, of course, just one of a number of measures 
taken by the Eisenhower administration to calm the nation in response to 
the engineered domestic crisis that ensued in the wake of the launch of the 
Sputniks by the Soviet Union in the fall of 1957. Superpower rivalry was at 
its height: by the end of the 1950s, each country knew that it could strike a 
1. For a fine overview of NASA’s international program, w t h  supporting key documents, see John 
M. Logsdon,“The Development of International Space Cooperation,” chap. 1 in Exploring the Unknown: 
Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, ed. John M. Logsdon, with Dwayne A. 
Day and Roger D. Launius, vol. 2, External Relationships (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4407,1996). 
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lethal blow at the other using nuclear-tipped missiles. This balance of terror 
provided one of the most frequent arguments at the time for international 
space cooperation. As Lyndon Baines Johnson, then the Majority Leader of 
the Senate, put it in 1959, “ I f .  . . we proceed along the orderly course of 
full cooperation, we shall by that very fact of cooperation make the most 
substantial contribution yet made towards perfecting peace. Men who have 
worked together to reach the stars are not likely to descend together into the 
depths of war and desolation.”2 This claim, the conviction that international 
space cooperation with the Soviets would remove misunderstanding, project 
a positive image of the U.S. abroad, reduce tension, and advance the cause 
of world peace was a kitmot$ of the early arguments for an international 
component to the space program. It was also used by Richard Nixon, who 
justified the expansion of U.S.-Soviet space collaboration in the early 1970s as 
creating “not just a climate for peace,” but the “building blocks” for “an actual 
structure of peace and c~operation.”~ 
This rhetoric did not carry much weight with some people, notably Arnold 
Frutkin. Frutkin, who was responsible for international affairs inside NASA 
for 20 years, beginning in 1959, was emphatic about this4 “Now, I hope it’s 
come through,” he said towards the end of a long interview conducted a few 
years ago, “that I am not soft-headed about dealing with other people-[like] 
if you knew your neighbor better you’d like him. I never believed that. If you 
knew your neighbor better,” Frutkin went on, “you might conclude that he 
[was] a worse son of a bitch than you [~uspected].”~ Frutkin spoke from bitter 
experience: after many years of achieving little more than “arm’s-length’’ 
cooperation with the Soviets-more may have been possible had Kennedy 
not been assassinated-he had finally been witness to the famous Apollo- 
Soyuz “hand shake in space” in July 1975.6 For him, while international space 
2. Quoted in Don E. Kash, The Polrtrcs $Space Cooperation (n.p.: Purdue University Studies, 1967), 
3.The words are those of Ron Ziegler, the President’s press secretary, during a press conference at the 
m t e  House on the “Agreement Concermng Cooperation in the Exploranon and Use of Outer Space 
for Peacefd Purposes,” 24 May 1972, record no. 12594, Presidential Fdes, NASA Historical Reference 
Collection, Washington, DC. 
4. Arnold W. Fruthn was deputy director of the US. Nahonal C o m t t e e  for the International 
GeophysicalYear in the National Academy of Sciences before he joined NASA in 1959 as hec tor  of 
international programs. His oficial h tk  changed m 1963 to Assistant Adrmmstrator for International 
M a r s .  In 1978, Frutkin became Associate Adrmmstrator for External Relanons. He rehred 6om federal 
service in 1979. 
5. Arnold W. Frutkin interview, Washington, DC, by Rebecca Wright, 11 January 2002, NASA 
Historical Reference Collechon,Washlngton, DC. 
6. In the early years of hls presidency, Kennedy made extensive overtures to the Soviets backed by 
behind-the-scenes negonanons that seemed to be malung considerable headway. These were abruptly 
stopped after his dea thsee  particularly Nahonal Security Action Memorandum 271, dated 12 
November 1963 and reproduced in Logsdon, “International Space Cooperahon,” pp. 166-167. 
p. 10. 
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cooperation was a widely endorsed scientific and political objective, it also was 
also victim of a multitude of “abstractions, moral imperatives, and contrived 
prescriptions.”’ 
Contemporary analyses of the U.S.’s motives for collaborating in space 
combine a refreshing spirit of realpolitik when discussing how the U.S. has 
behaved in the past with a tendency to prescriptive injunctions about how 
NASA should behave in the future, which Frutkin would probably deplore. 
We shall treat each of these dimensions of this body of literature in turn. 
There is something of a consensus that, for the first two or three decades 
of its existence, NASA, by virtue of America’s immense scientific and tech- 
nological advantage vis-i-vis its partners, could use its power to dictate the 
terms of any significant international space effort. American hegemony was 
implicit in the 1958 Space Act which established NASA and which defined the 
organization’s primary objective as being “the preservation of the role of the 
United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and 
in the application thereof.”’ This concept of leadership, we were reminded in 
1987 by a task force ofthe NASA Advisory Council (NAC), chaired by Herman 
Pollack, meant not simply achieving superior performance in all aspects of 
space. It also meant “the defining of goals and the establishment of direction 
that others w[ould] be willing to make their own orfollow” (emphasis added)? To the 
U.S., according to another group of space activists, for the first two decades 
after Sputnik, “cooperation was a politically driven means of linking the space 
programmes of other countries to US goals and activities, rather than having 
them closely allied with Soviet aspirations in space.”l0 Political scientist Joan 
Johnson-Freese makes a similar point: in the Cold War context of the ’60s and 
 O OS, the U.S. actively sought to collaborate with its Western bloc allies and 
countries that it wanted to attract to the Western alliance. And since it was 
“dominant in space, it could dictate terms of cooperation to other countries, 
which they were more than willing to accept in order to gain entrance to the 
space program.”” 
Scientific research was a privileged site for international collaboration, and 
Frutkin quickly defined a set of five criteria which guided NASA’s policy in 
this domain and which embodied these precepts.I2 His criteria are well known 
7. Arnold W. Frutkin, “International Cooperation in Space,” Science 169 (24 July 1970): 333-339. 
8. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (Unamended), Sec. 102 (c) (5) ,  available online at 
9. Herman Pollack, “International Relatlons m Space. A US View,” Space Policy 4, no. 1 (February 
10. Space Pohcy Institute and Association of Space Explorers,“International Cooperatlon in Space- 
11. Joan Johnson-Freese, Changing Patterns .f International Cooperation in Space (Malabar, FL Orbit, 
12.Arnold W. Frutkin, International Collaboration in Space (Englewood ClifEs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965). 
http://www. hq.nasa.gov/offe/pao/History/spaceact.html (accessed 27 January 2005). 
1988): 24-30. 
New Opportunihes, New Approaches,” Space Policy 8, no. 3 (August 1992): 195-203. 
1990), p. 5. 
242 CRITICAL h J E S  IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
and need not be rehearsed here. Suffice it to say that Frutkin’s stress on the 
need for clean interfaces and no exchange of funds between the partners was 
inspired by the need to limit technological (and managerial) sharing between 
the U.S. and its partners to a minimum. Even the content of the program 
had to dovetail with U.S. interests. As Logsdon puts it, being the dominant 
partner in space science “often meant that NASA and U.S. scientists would 
define the objectives and content of a scientific mission and only then invite 
non-U.S. scientists to parti~ipate.”’~ Even then, NASA sometimes pulled the 
plug on a well-defined joint international project to meet domestic pressures 
for budget cuts and the redefinition of prioritie~.’~ 
Scientific collaboration was the most readily available and least controversial 
instrument of international collaboration, but it was not enough, particularly 
in dealing with major allies like Western Europe. The U.S. technological lead 
and the dynamism of American industry allowed the administration to think 
beyond the limits of scientific collaboration and to use its technological assets, 
including technological knowledge and skills, as an instrument of foreign 
policy to consolidate the Atlantic alliance. Put differently, if the U.S. pursued 
international collaboration, it was because it “sought the political benefits of 
leadership [while] its partners [sought] the technical and managerial benefits 
that come from working with the leader.”” Here lies the soft underbelly 
of technological collaboration in the space sector. For if the benefit was in 
foreign policy, as the Pollack Task Force stressed, the cost lay in the risk that 
technological sharing would subvert U.S. leadership by helping allies to assert 
themselves, would endanger national security in a sector where almost all 
satellite and booster technology is “dual-use technology,” and would endanger 
U.S. industry in a crucial high-tech sector. 
Once we move beyond scientific collaboration to technological sharing, 
those who promote international cooperation will be on the defensive. They 
will have to overcome the opposition of counterforces that stress the threats 
to the U.S. that such collaboration entails. These critics will point out that 
if America’s allies are willing to be dependent on the U.S. in the short term, 
it is with the long-term aim of being autonomous. That if those allies accept 
the hegemonic regime imposed by the U.S., it is in the hope that they will 
eventually be able to throw off its yoke. And that if they collaborate initially 
on terms which are not of their own choosing, it is in order later to compete 
better with the United States as equal partners, or even to become leaders 
in areas where America was previously supreme. In short, international col- 
13. Logsdon, ‘‘International Space Cooperation,” p. 4. 
14. For an angry account of this by two ESA insiders, see Roger M. Bonnet andvittorio Manno, 
International Cooperation in Space: T h e  Example .f the European Space Agency (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Umveeity Press, 1994). 
15. Space Policy Institute and Association of Space Explorers, p. 200. 
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laboration in space is always a contested policy objective. It will always have 
to justify itself to critics who will ask, as I did at the start of this paper, “But 
why collaborate?” and who see little reason for risking national security and 
industrial competitiveness, which are essential for the long-term strength of 
the country, in return for the fragile and unpredictable foreign policy benefits 
that international collaboration putatively enshrines. 
This domestic political context informs much of the literature on interna- 
tional cooperation and accounts for the prescriptive dimension alluded to above. 
It is dominated by activists, ahnistrators, and political scientists who combine 
their sense of realpolitik with a wish to influence the way NASA and the United 
States behave in current international collaborative projects, notably the negotia- 
tions on foreign participation in the International Space Station. All are sensi- 
tive to the changed balance of power in the space sector: the collapse of the 
Soviet Union as a rival superpower (which forced a major reevaluation of one of 
NASA’s original goals) and the technological and managerial maturity achieved 
by space programs in the U.S.5 traditional allies (notably Western Europe and 
Japan). All are also convinced that international collaboration is a worthwhile 
goal and that, to maintain American leadership in at least certain key areas, the 
U.S. will have to change its attitudes to meet the changed environment of the 
late 20th century. Thus Joan Johnson-Freese: “Because the United States began as 
the dominant space power concerning cooperative ventures, it has never had to 
learn to operate in any manner other than‘the U.S. way’. But thngs have changed,” 
she goes on. “There are now an increasing number of space ‘actors’ with varying 
ranges of capabilities,” including the Soviet Union, Japan, and Western Europe, 
and “the United States is no longer ‘the only game in tom’  in space activities, 
although in some cases it is stdl trying to act as though it is.”16 So, too, the Task 
Force chaired by Pollack in 1987: “The USA will have to adopt [sic] its attitude, 
approach and politics on international cooperation and competition to a new set 
of realitie~.”’~ And Ken Pederson, who was responsible for NASA’s International 
H a i r s  Division in the 1980s and who gave some concrete examples of what that 
meant. “For NASA today,” he wrote, “‘power’ is much more likely to mean the 
power to persuade than the power to prescribe.”This entails 1) that NASA must 
accept that “leadershp does not mean that it must or ought do it all”; 2) that even 
if it is the provider of major hardware, NASA “may sometimes have to accept the 
role of junior partner rather than managing partner” and understand that it can 
still benefit while doing so; and 3) that NASA must “learn to share direct man- 
agement and operational control in projects where it is the largest hardware and 
financial contributor, especially when manned flight systems are in~olved.”‘~ 
16. Johnson-Freese, p. 113. 
17. Pollack, “International Relations in Space.” 
18. Ken Pedersen, “The Changing Face of International Space Cooperation. OneView of NASA,” 
Space Policy 2, no. 2 (May 1986): 120-137. 
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This stream of modal concepts, this prescriptive discourse is situated at the 
core of the struggle to define the U.S.5 role in space in the 21st century and 
intended to reshape its practices in the international domain. These advocates 
believe that space cooperation is a “good thing” for the United States, and they 
seek to lay down the ground rules, based on past experience, for what the U.S. 
“must do” if it wants to retain credibility and leadership as an international 
partner. And while commendable for their sensitivity to the points of hiction 
which have traditionally irritated America’s partners, their proposals also have an 
air of unreality. It is indeed striking that, while all o f  these authors stress that the US.  
international space eforf is driven by foreign policy and that technological collaboration is 
a substantive issue which shapes its physiognomy, none o f  them deal with foreign policy 
or technology except in the most generic way.These are a taken-for-granted backdrop 
against which their prescriptions are made, a context which, precisely, cannot be 
taken for granted, for it is the always-contested framework in which stakeholders 
wlll decide whether to collaborate internationally at all, let alone on the terms, 
and respecting the “musts,” that the advocates promote so skillfully. 
Scientific and technological sharing, and foreign policy concerns, are 
the material substrates of international collaboration in space. Scientific and 
particularly technological sharing, both of hardware and of knowledge and 
skills, are the single most important means that the U.S. has to influence 
the space programs of other countries, so consolidating and legitimating its 
leadership and its hegemonic regime. Technological sharing is also the single 
greatest danger to national security and national industrial competitiveness in a 
crucial high-technology sector. The onus on those who promote international 
collaboration in space is to show how the sharing of specific technologies and 
the knowledge embedded in them will further America’s leadership abroad 
in a particular historical conjuncture and why that objective will not unduly 
jeopardize national industry or undermine national security. To advance this 
debate, one cannot “black-box’’ technology and foreign policy: they are not 
the context in which international collaboration takes place; they are the 
stakes that define what is possible. 
This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of international col- 
laboration by using an illustrative historical case study to open the black 
box of technology and of foreign p01icy.’~ At the risk of oversimplifying an 
extremely complex debate, I will explain briefly why the Johnson adminis- 
tration decided in the mid-1960s that it was imperative to collaborate with 
Western Europe in developing a civilian satellite launcher and discuss the kind 
19.The case study presented here is based on a small subset of a huge number of documents retrieved 
from the archives preserved in the NASA Historical Reference Collection in Washmgton, DC, and 
at the Lyndon Banes Johnson Library in Austin, TX (hereafter LBJ Library). Additional material was 
acquired fiom the National Archives and Records Adrmnistration in College Park, MD. I would like to 
thank the archivists for their invaluable help and support. 
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of technological sharing that some people thought might be used to achieve 
the President’s foreign policy objectives.20 What I want to emphasize above 
all is the strong coupling between technology and foreign policy. I also want 
to insist that, to understand the possibilities of international collaboration in 
space, it is crucial to focus on what specijic technologies might be available for 
sharing in the pursuit of specijic foreign policy objectives, rather than-as so 
often happens-to simply lump technology and foreign policy into an undif- 
ferentiated whole. Those in the administration who are engaged in working 
out what can be done with a foreign partner fight over the boundary between 
what technologies can be shared and what cannot. The advocates of a more 
open approach are driven by the conviction that the maintenance of American 
“leadership” and its ability to control the form and content of the space pro- 
grams of other nations are best achieved by relaxing restrictions in particular 
areas. Sometimes they win; sometimes, as in the case to be described here, 
they lose, both because the forces arraigned against them are formidable and 
because the foreign policy context is never stable and calls forth a different 
response to changed circumstances. I am convinced that only if historians 
study international collaboration at this fine-grained level can they help avoid 
what Frutkin bemoaned over 30 years ago, namely, analyses replete with the 
usual quota of abstractions, moral imperatives, and contrived prescriptions.” “ 
THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION AND THE ELDO CRISIS 
On 29 July 1966, Walt W. Rostow, one of LBJ’s two national secu- 
rity advisers, signed off on National Security Action Memorandum 354.’l 
NSAM 354 was a response to a request from the Department of State that the 
U.S. “clarify and define” its policy concerning collaboration with the “pres- 
ent and future programs” of ELDO, the European Launcher Development 
Organisation. The document affirmed that it was “in the U.S. interest to 
encourage the continued development of ELDO through U.S. cooperation.” 
It referred to the results of an ad hoc working group, established by the State 
Department and chaired by Herman Pollack, that had prepared a statement 
“defining the nature and extent of U.S. cooperation with ELDO which the 
U.S. government is now prepared to extend.” This statement was to be “con- 
tinually reviewed by the responsible agencies,” above all, the Department of 
20.The reactlorn m the Umted States to the ELDO crisis in 1966 have received little scholarly 
attention. For the best analysis, see Lorenza Sebesta, Alleuti Compeh‘tivi. Origini e sviluppo dellu cooperuzione 
spaxiulefva Europu e Stuti Uniti (Bologna, Italy: Laterza, 2003), chap. 3.The issue is also described in a 
project Sebesta worked on with John M. Logsdon. I thank John Logsdon for making a copy of their 
unpublished manuscript avadable to me. 
21. NSAM 354, “US  Cooperation with the European Launcher Development Organization,” 29 
July 1974, available online at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu (accessed on 9 March 2005). 
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Defense and the State Department, along with NASA, “to ensure that it is 
current and responsive in terms of developing strategies.” 
The help that the working group proposed was extensive. It was divided 
into three categories: general, and short-range and long-range assistance.22 
The first contained some standard items-training in technical management, 
facilitating export licenses, use of NASA test facilities-but also suggested 
that a technical office be established within NASA “specifically to serve in an 
expediting and assisting role for ELDO.” Short-range help included “technical 
advice and assistance” in items like vehicle integration, stage separation, and 
synchronous orbit injection techniques, as well as the provision of unclassified 
flight hardware, notably a strapped-down “guidance” package used on the Scout 
launcher which had already been exported to Japan. Long-range assistance was 
focused on helping with a high-energy cryogenic upper stage of the rocket, 
currently being considered in ELDO. It was proposed that Europeans be given 
access to technological documentation and experience available in the Atlas- 
Centaur systems, that ELDO technical personnel “have intimate touch with 
the problems of systems design, integration, and program management of a 
high-energy upper [sic] such as the Centaur,” and even that the U.S. consider 
“joint use of a high-energy upper stage developed in In short, in 
mid-1966, the U.S. was considering making a substantial effort to help ELDO 
develop a powerful launcher with geosynchronous orbit capability by sharing 
state-of-the-art knowledge and experience and by facilitating the export of 
hardware which-it should be added-would not normally be available on a 
bilateral basis to European national launcher programs. 
NSAM 354 was catalyzed by a crisis in ELDO in February 1966 and deep 
concerns in the Johnson administration about the future of the collaborative 
European effort. ELDO, it must be said, had been a fragile organization from 
its very inception in 1960-61.24 It was born of the need by the British govern- 
ment to find a new role for its Blue Streak missile. The liquid-fueled rocket 
was rendered obsolete by the long time required to prepare it for launch and 
22. This paragraph is derived from “Policy Concerning US Cooperation with the European 
Launcher Development Organization (ELDO),” attached to U. Alexis Johnson’s “Memorandum,” 
10 June 1966, folder 15707, International Cooperation and Foreign Countries, NASA Historical 
Reference Collection, Washington, DC. 
23. In summer 1965, ELDO had asked for help from NASA on “desigmng, testing and launching 
liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen upper stages” (Frutkin to Robert N. Margrave, Director, O6ce  of 
Mumtions Control, Department of State, 6 June 1965, record no. 14465, International Cooperation and 
Foreign Countries, International Cooperation, folder International Policy Manual Material &om Code 
I, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC). 
24. I describe the launch of ELDO in detall in J. Krige and A. Russo, A History of the European Space 
Agency, 1958-1987, vol. 1, T h e  Story of ESRO and ELDO, 1958-1973 (Noordwijk, Netherlands: ESA 
SP-1235, April 2000), chap. 3. See also Michelangelo De Maria and John Krige, “Early European 
Attempts in Launcher Technology,” in Choosing Big Technologies, ed. John Krige (Chur, Switzerland 
Harwood Academic Publishers, 1993), pp. 109-137. 
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by the cost, which spiraled to new heights as the expenditures on reinforced 
concrete silos were factored into the budget. Hence the idea to recycle Blue 
Streak, stripped of its military characteristics, as the first stage of a multistage 
civilian satellite launcher, built together with partners in continental Europe. 
This would save face at home, it would ensure that the money already spent 
on development was not completely wasted, it would preserve the engineer- 
ing teams and their skills intact, it would please British industry, and-and 
this was crucial-it would serve as a gesture of solidarity and good will to the 
emerging European Common Market, which Britain had previously boy- 
cotted, nay, tried to sabotage. Indeed, shortly after the British proposed this 
joint venture to their continental partners, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan 
made an official application for his country to join the European Community. 
Long, drawn-out negotiations ensued before Blue Streak was given a new lease 
on life. The French would build the second stage atop the British rocket, the 
Germans would build the third stage, and the Italians would build a test satel- 
lite. Clean interfaces were retained to limit technology transfer between firms 
in different countries to protect competitive advantage and national security 
(especially in Britain and France, which were both developing independent 
nuclear deterrents). The ELDO staff had little authority over the separate 
national authorities and, above all, no power to integrate the three indepen- 
dently built stages of the rocket or to ensure compatibility between the vari- 
ous systems and subsystems built in different countries or in different firms in 
the same country.25 By 1966, as many had predicted, ELDO faced the first of 
many crises that led to its eventual demise in 1972.26 Development costs had 
increased from the initial estimate of about $200 million to over $400 million, 
and no end to the upward spiral was in sight. Blue Streak had been successfully 
commissioned, while the French and German stages were still under develop- 
ment. What is more, in January 1963, French President de Gaulle had vetoed 
Britain’s application to join the Common Market. For Britain, who was pay- 
ing almost 39 percent of the ELDO budget, the original technological, indus- 
trial, and political rationale for launching the organization had evaporated. In 
February 1966, her Minister circulated an aide-mkmoire to his homologues in 
the ELDO member states suggesting that it was unlikely that the organization 
would produce any worthwhile result and that the United Kingdom saw little 
interest to continue in the program and to contribute financially to it. 
This move perturbed the Johnson administration immensely. At the most 
general level, the U.S. saw ELDO as a technological embodiment of European 
25. For a fine description of the failure of management in ELDO, see Stephen B. Johnson, The Secret 
oJApollo: Systems Management irr American and European Space Programs (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2002), 
chap. 6.  
26. On the crisis, see Krige and Russo, A History, vol. 1, chap. 4, sect. 4.3.2. 
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multilateralism. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom would send a signal 
that Britain was still not enthusiastic about participating in European inte- 
gration, which the United States had always regretted. It would also strike a 
major blow to the gradual movement towards European unity on the continent. 
This was in a very brittle state at the time.There was a crisis in the European 
Economic Community (EEC), precipitated by the French, who had begun to 
boycott the EEC’s decision-making machinery so as to liberate the country 
from its “subordination” to Community institutions and the dilution of sover- 
eignty that that entailedeZ7 There was a similar crisis in NATO.The French were 
not against the Alliance as such but believed that NATO needed reforming. 
Western European nations were no longer prostrate, as they had been in 1949, 
and they needed to be prepared to meet a Soviet nuclear threat in Europe with 
their own independent deterrents (would Washington be prepared to risk New 
York to defend Paris? it used to be said). “The French have emphasized their 
dissatisfaction by becoming increasingly an obstructionist force in NATO,” one 
task force wrote, “equating” integration with subordination.28 In this inauspi- 
cious climate, everything possible had to be done to sustain the momentum 
for European unity. As Under Secretary of State George Ball emphasized, “The 
United States has a direct interest in the continuation of European integration. 
It is the most realistic means of achieving European political unity with all that 
that implies for our relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union . . . and 
is the precondition for a Europe able to carry its proper share of responsibility 
for our common defense.”29 While ELDO was not central to European integra- 
tion, its collapse would provide additional encouragement for those who were 
increasingly hostile to supranational ventures in Europe. 
Saving a European launcher was justified by a second foreign policy con- 
cern pressing on the Johnson administration at the time: it would help close 
the so-called “technological gap” that had opened between the two sides of the 
Atlantic. Beginning in summer 1965, there were increasingly strident complaints 
in France, and to some extent Germany, that American business was invading 
Europe and dominating key sectors of European indu~try.~’ The U.S. could not 
27.TedVan Dyk to thevice President, 7 July 1965, folder Germany ErhardVisit [12/65], 12/19- 
21/65, box 192, National Security Files, Country File Europe and USSR, Germany, LBJ Library. 
28. “France and NATO,” position paper, 25 September 1965, folder Germany ErhardVisit [12/65] 
12/19-21/65, box 192, National Security Fde, Country File Europe and USSR, Germany, LBJ 
Library. 
29. Department of State to Amembassy BOM 1209, outgoing telegram, 18 November 1965, signed 
[George] Ball, folder Germany Erhard Visit [12/65], 12/19-21/65, box 192, National Security File, 
Country File Europe and USSR, Germany, LBJ Library. 
30. SC No. 00666/65B, “US Investments in Europe,” CIA Special Report, 16 April 1965, folder 
Memos [2 of 21,Vol. II,7/64-7/66, box 163, National Security File, Country Fde, Europe, LBJ Library. 
Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s The American Challenge (NewYork: Atheneaum, 1968; translahon of Le 
D& amkricain) is, of course, the locus classicus of this argument. 
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easily dismiss their concerns. As Frutkin explained, Western Europe’s progress in 
space was “a contribution to the strength of the Free World. An increasing tech- 
nological gap between us {and them) can only lead to political and economic 
strains and to weakness.”31 Indeed, the President took this matter so seriously 
that in November 1966, Johnson personally signed NSAM 357, instructing his 
science adviser, Donald Hornig, to set up an interdepartmental committee to 
look into “the increasing concern in Western Europe over possible disparities 
in advanced technology between the United States and Europe.”32 In its pre- 
liminary report, the committee concluded that “the Technological Gap [was] 
mainly a political and psychological problem” but that it did have “some basis 
in actual disparities.” These included “the demonstrated American superiority 
in sophisticated electronics, military technology and space systems.” Particularly 
important were “the ‘very high technology industries’ (particularly comput- 
ers, space communications, and aircraft) which provide a much greater military 
capability, are nationally prestigious, and are believed to be far-reaching in their 
economic, political and social  implication^."^^ The U S ,  Herman Pollack told 
Sir Solly Zuckerman, Britain’s Chief Scientific Adviser, was “seeking new and 
different ways of expanding cooperation in space because we consider that there 
is a close connection between [xic] technological gap and the development of 
space te~hnology.”~~ 
There was a third, even more fundamental argument for supporting 
the development of a launcher in the ELDO framework. This was, in fact, 
the single most important reason why Pollock’s ad hoc working group of 
the NASC was asked to look again at the possibilities of sharing booster 
technology with foreign nations. It also led directly to the release of NSAM 
354, expressing American interest in helping ELDO. The argument, in the 
words of NASA Administrator James Webb, was that enhanced international 
collaboration in space would be “a means whereby foreign nations might be 
increasingly involved in space technology and diverted from the technology of 
nuclear weapons deli~ery.”~’ More precisely, it was by encouraging multilateral 
31. Quoted in Space Business Daily 25, no. 35 (18 April 1966): 286. 
32. NSAM 357,“The Technological Gap,” 25 November 1966, avahble online at http://www.lbjlib. 
utexas.edu/johnson/archives. hom/NSAMs/nsam357.gjf (accessed on 9 March 2005). Hornig’s official 
title was the Special Assistant to the President for Science andTechnology. 
33. “Preliminary Report on the Technological Gap Between U.S. and Europe,” attached to David 
Hornig’s letter to the President, 31 January 1967, folderTechnological Gap [l of21, box 46, Subject File, 
National Security File, LBJ Library. 
34. “Memorandum for the Files. Cooperation mth  ELDO,” 6 May 1966, folder Cooperation in 
Space--Working Group on Expanded International Cooperation in Space ELDO #1 [2 of 21, box 14, 
National Security Files, Charles Johnson File, LBJ Library. 
35. Webb to Robert McNamara, 28 April 1966, record no. 14459, International Cooperation, 
International Cooperation and Foreign Countries, folder Miscellaneous Correspondence &om CODE 
I-International Relations 1958-1967, NASA Historical Reference Collection,Washingon, DC. 
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organizations that the nonproliferation of missile technology at the national 
level could be controlled. A position paper prepared for the very first meeting 
of Pollack’s working group in May 1966 stressed this. Multilateral programs 
should be encouraged, it asserted, since 
[i]n such a framework rocket programs tend to be more open, 
serve peaceful uses and are subject to international control and 
absorb manpower and financial resources that might otherwise be 
diverted to purely national programs. National rocket programs 
tend to concentrate on militarily significant solid and storable 
liquid fueled systems, are less open, and less responsive to interna- 
tional controls.Any break up ofELDO might lead to strengthen- 
ing national programs tending in the latter d i re~t ion .~~ 
Put differently, since European nations had limited resources to devote to 
their military and civilian space programs and had to make hard choices 
about priorities, the U.S. could use the carrot of technological sharing with 
ELDO to divert human and material resources away from national programs 
which were more difficult to control and which might see the proliferation of 
weapons delivery systems. 
It was the French national program which particularly bothered the U.S. 
On  26 November 1965, France had become the third space power by launch- 
ing its own satellite with its own launcher, Diamant-A, from Hammaguir in 
Algeria. The feat was repeated in February 1966. This three-stage launcher 
combined “militarily significant solid and storable liquid fueled systems”-just 
the kind of technologq the U.S. did not want it to develop-in a highly suc- 
cessful vehicle derived from the national missile pr~gram.~’ In the light of 
these achievements and de Gaulle’s growing determination to affirm his inde- 
pendence of the EEC and the Atlantic alliance, “The US is concerned that, if 
ELDO were to be dissolved, France might devote more of its resources to a 
national, military-related program or that it might establish undesirable bilat- 
eral relationships for the construction of satellite launch vehi~les”~~-meaning 
that unless Britain and America boosted the organization, “the Soviets would 
36.T. H. E. Nesbitt, “Meeting No. 1, Committee on Expanded International Cooperation in Space 
Activities. Subject: Cooperation Involving Launchers and LaunchingTechnology,” 17 May 1966, folder 
Cooperation in Space--Working Group on Expanded International Cooperation in Space. ELDO #1 
[2 of 21, box 14, National Security Files, Charles Johnson File, LBJ Library. 
37. Diamant-A used a mixture of N,O,/UDMH (storable liquid fuels) in its first stage and solid fuel 
in the second and third stages. 
38. “US Cooperation with ELDO,” position paper, 21 July 1966, folder Cooperation in S p a c e  
Working Group on Expanded International Cooperation in Space. ELDO #1 [2 of 21, box 14, Natlonal 
Security Files, Charles Johnson File, LBJ Library. 
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move into the vacuum if ELDO collap~ed.”~~ The U.S. had to contain this 
threat and to ensure that European institutions emerged “from the present 
crisis with their prestige, power and potential for building a united Europe 
as little impaired as po~sible.’”~ Developing advanced space technology in 
Europe and assisting ELDO to develop its launcher, in particular, were some 
of the many measures considered by the Johnson administration to achieve 
that objective in 1966. 
THE OBSTACLES TO THE SUPPORT FOR ELDO 
Two major obstacles stood in the way of these initiatives. Both were 
enshrined in National Security Action Memoranda. There was NSAM 294 of 
20 April 1964, which dealt with “U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System 
Assistance to France.” The second was NSAM 338 of 15 September 1965, 
defining “Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in the Development of Foreign 
Communications Satellite Capability.’”’ 
NSAM 294 stated that since the administration opposed the development 
of a nuclear force outside the framework of NATO and that since France was 
doing all it could to evade the constraints of the Alliance, nothing should 
be done to help its nuclear weapons system (France first successfully tested 
its A-bomb in the Sahara in February 1960), including the “French national 
strategic nuclear delivery capability.” This included “exchanges of information 
and technology between the governments, sale of equipment, joint research 
and development activities, and exchanges between industrial and commercial 
organizations.” This obviously made collaboration with ELDO difficult since 
how could one be sure that technology that was shared with the organization 
would not leak through to the French military program?42 
NSAM 338 was less specific, referring instead to the policy guidelines 
established by General J. D. O’Connell, the President’s Special Assistant for 
Telecommunications, in a memorandum of 25 August 1965. These guidelines 
effectively extended the military constraints on the transfer of booster tech- 
nology to cover specific commercial concerns. O’Connell’s memo stipulated 
39. Anonymous, “Memorandum for the Files, Cooperation with ELDO,” meeting with Zuckerman, 
6 May 1966, folder Cooperation in Space-Working Group on Expanded International Cooperation 
in Space. ELDO #1 [2 of 21, box 14, Nahond Security Files, Charles Johnson File, LBJ Library. 
40. Department of State to Amembassy Bonn 1209, outgoing telegram, 18 November 1965, signed 
[George] Ball, folder Germany Erhard Visit f12/65], 12/19-21/65, box 192, National Security File, 
Country File Europe and USSR, Germany, LBJ Library. 
41. NSAM 294, “U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance to France,” 20 April 1964, 
and NSAM 338, “Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in the Development of Foreign Communications 
Satellite Capabihty,” 15 September 1965, both available online at http://www.IbjIib.utexas.edtr (accessed 
9 March 2005). 
42. NSAM 294,“U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System.” 
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that if the U.S. was to help other countries develop a comsat (communications 
satellite) capability, it had to have guarantees that the foreign program was 
integrated into the single global system enshrined in the INTELSAT agree- 
ments of 1964. INTELSAT was the international consortium that owned 
and operated the international comsat system. It had 56 member nations in 
1967 (though neither China nor the Soviet Union were members). American 
interests were represented by COMSAT, a private corporation, 50 percent of 
whose stock was owned by communications carriers (like AT&T). Voting was 
weighted according to use, which made it “an unusually attractive interna- 
tional vehicle for the U.S.”43 since it had veto power inside INTELSAT at the 
time (its voice counted for 54 percent). What is more, the 1964 INTELSAT 
agreements (due to be renegotiated in 1969 to take account of the expected 
expansion in the use of comsat technology by other nations) stipulated that 
the U.S. weight could never drop below 50 percent: “in other words, we con- 
tr01.”~~ With this power in its pocket, the “core” of NSAM 338, as McGeorge 
Bundy explained to LBJ, was “to use our technological superiority to & 
courage commercial competition with COMSAT and/or wasteful investment 
in several duplicative Free World defense-related systems” (emphasis in the 
original) .45 To this end, the U.S. should “withhold provision of assistance to 
any foreign nation in the field of communications satellites which could sig- 
nificantly promote, stimulate or encourage proliferation of communications 
satellite systems” outside the INTELSAT framework, including “the provision 
of launching services or launch vehicles for communications  satellite^.'"^ 
The significance of NSAM 338 for our story is that it extended the provi- 
sions of NSAM 294 beyond national security and foreign policy objectives to 
protect also U.S. busiaess interests4’ By defining launchers as a component of 
the “communications satellite system,” it included delivery systems inside the 
43. Charles Johnson to Walt Rostow, 13 July 1967, folder NSAM 338, box 7, National Security Files, 
LBJ Library. 
44. Ibid. 
45. McGeorge Bundy to the President, “Helping Others to Use Communications Satellites,” 13 
46. “Policy Concerning U.S. Assistance in the Development of Foreign Communications SateUlte 
s,” position paper, unsigned, 23 August 1965, folder NSAM 338, box 7, National Security 
Files, LBJ Library. 
47. It should he stressed that NSAM 338 was not restricted to protecting commercial interests, 
though it included them. As the memo from McGeorge Bundy that I cited earlier makes clear, there 
were also naaonal security concerns involved. The United States, he noted, would set up a separate 
national defense comsat system “where security demands” and would encourage “selected allies” 
(actually Britain and Canada) to “buy time” on this system for their security needs. Otherwise, he 
wanted everyone to use the single global system for all purposes. The United States thus wanted to 
discourage the proliferation of regional comsat systems both to linut international competition for 
a potentially lucrative market and to hmit the spread of parallel regional comsat systems for defense 
(McGeorge Bundy to the President, “Helping Others to Use Communications Satellites”). 
September 1965, folder NSAM 338, box 7, National Security Files, LBJ Library. 
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policies being ddended by COMSAT on behalf of the U.S. in INTELSAT. 
The sale of launch vehicles and launch services and technological assistance 
with the development of an indigenous launch capability were now condi- 
tional on the foreign clients’ guaranteeing that such launchers would not be 
used to subvert a single worldwide commercial satellite communications sys- 
tem then under U.S. control. As one senior administrator put it, “It is difficult 
to maintain international cooperation on this basis.”48 
FINDING A WAY AROUND THE OBSTACLES 
To overcome these obstacles to technology transfer, NASA and the State 
Department insisted that to promote U.S. foreign policy and business interests, 
one had to distinguish between dgerent  types of technology and the spec@ foreign 
policy options that America wanted to promote. They were convinced that 
American leadership, and its ability to restrict the proliferation of weapons 
systems and comsats, was best achieved by treating technology transfer on a 
case-by-case basis and by “building high walls around small fields,” as it is 
sometimes called today, rather than by blanket restrictions which treated both 
technology and foreign policy as seamless wholes. 
To achieve this, a number of crucial distinctions had to be made. Current 
U.S. policy was dominated by the “dual-use” aspect of boosters as both ballistic 
missiles and as stages of satellite launchers. This was too simple, Webb pointed 
out: “If we could focus our controls on the weapons themselves, we might 
even hope to free vehicle technology for maximum stimulus of space activity 
abroad.”49 Consider the constraints on booster technology imposed by NSAM 
294. As Webb pointed out to Defense Secretary McNamara, although high- 
energy, cryogenic, or nonstorable upper stages might conceivably be employed 
for military purposes, in practice they would probably not be deployed in 
that way. “Even in the case of France,” Webb stressed, “it seems likely that 
encouragement to proceed with upper stage hydrogen/oxygen systems now 
under development might divert money and people from a nuclear delivery 
program rather than contribute to that which is already under way using quite 
dift‘erent technology.”50 Guidance and control technology was another gray area. 
An American company had recently been refused a license to assist France with 
48. Charles Johnson to Walt Rostow, 13 July 1967. 
49. Webb to Johnson, 26 April 1966, record no. 14459, International Cooperation and Foreign 
Countries, folder Miscellaneous Correspondence from CODE I-International Relations 1958-1967, 
International Cooperation, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC. 
50. Webb to McNamara, 28 April 1966, and reply, Bob [McNamara] to Jim Webb], 14 May 1966, 
record no. 14459, International Cooperation and Foreign Countries, International Cooperation, folder 
Miscellaneous Correspondence from CODE I-International Relations 1958-1967, NASA Historical 
Reference Collection, Washington, DC. 
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the development of gyro technology. But as Richard Barnes, the Director of 
Frutkin’s Cooperative Projects Division, pointed out to the chair of the NSAM 
294 review group, gyros of comparable weight and performance were already 
available in France.The release of inertial guidance technology to Germany had 
been officially sanctioned in July 1964 on condition that it was not employed 
“for ballistic missile use or de~elopment.”~~ And, as we mentioned earlier, a 
strapped-down “guidance” package used on the Scout launcher had already been 
exported to Japan. Here, and in general, wrote Webb to McNamara, rather than 
a blanket restriction, “we might be better off were we to concentrate on a few 
very essential restrictions, such as advanced guidance and reentry systems” (my 
emphasis). In a supportive reply to Jim, Bob reassured the NASA Administrator 
that he strongly supported international cooperation in space and that he had 
directed his Department of Defense staff “to be as liberal as possible regarding 
the release of space technology for payloads and other support items.”52 
One important consideration shaping the argument for a revision in policy 
was that restrictions on the export of some items were now redundant since 
European booster technology was advancing rapidly without external help. It 
was also counterproductive to deny a nation a technology if it could easily and 
quickly be obtained from a source other than the United States: this would not 
simply be to the detriment of American business, but also to U.S. foreign policy, 
particularly if that source was the Soviet Union. Thus Barnes suggested (and 
Webb concurred) that the interpretation of NSAM 294 on the export of booster 
technology needed to be more specific. The guidelines should deny to a foreign 
power “& those few critical items which are clearly intended for use in a 
national program, would significantly and directly benefit that program in terms 
of time and quality or cost, and are unavdable in comparable substitute form 
elsewhere than the US” (emphasis in the original). The guidelines should also 
explicitly recognize that it was in America’s interest to promote European space 
collaboration, so that technology transfer intended for multinational programs 
like ELDO (and ESRO-the European Space Research Organisation) would 
“normally be approved” so long as the items were “of only marginal benefit to 
the national program” or “were available elsewhere than the US without undue 
difficulty or delay.”53 In short, requests for technology transfer were to be treated 
on a case-by-case basis and should take into account the kind of technology at 
issue, its likely uses in practice, the global state of the market for the technology, 
51. NSAM 312,“Nabonal Poky on Release of Inertial GuidanceTechnology to Germany,” 10 July 
52.Webb to McNamara, 28 April 1966, and reply, Bob [McNamara] to Jim [Webb], 14 May 1966. 
53. Richard Barnes to Scott George, Chairman, NSAM 294 Renew Group, Department of State, 
15 April 1966, record no. 14459, International Cooperahon and Foreign Countries, International 
Cooperation, folder Miscellaneous Correspondence fi-om CODE I-International Relations 1958- 
1967, NASA Historical Reference Collection,Washngton, DC. 
1964, available online at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu (accessed 9 March 2005). 
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and the importance of collaboration &om a foreign policy perspective. The last, 
along with U.S. business interests, was not to be sacrificed on the altar of an 
overcautious, generalized reluctance to share technology just because it might 
encourage programs which sections of the US. administration disapproved of. 
Frutkin was also keen to relax the constraints on the sharing of comsat 
technology that were embodied in NSAM 338. Europeans, he wrote, were 
persuaded that the United States was “seeking by all means, fair or foul, to 
maintain political and technical control of Intel~at.”~~ He was convinced that, 
to allay their suspicions, the U.S. had to be prepared to provide launch services 
on a reimbursable basis for (experimental) foreign communication satellites. 
This would “extend the market for American vehicles, remove some incentive 
for independent foreign development of boosters, and assure that we could 
continue to exercise critical leverage in foreign comsat activities rather than lose 
such leverage.” Frutkin also favored the removal of restrictions on the export of 
satellite technology as such, including the kick-stage and propulsion technology 
needed to place a communications satellite in geosynchronous orbit. 
An anonymous internal memorandum argued that technological sharing 
was the best way to enroll foreign firms and their governments in American 
comsat policy. By allowing “United States firms to enter cooperative arrange- 
ments with the communications and electronics manufacturing industry in 
other countries,” notably in Western Europe, industries in these countries 
would develop the technical know-how needed for them “to compete effec- 
tively for contracts for the space segment ofthe global communications system.” 
This would “remove a current irritant, primarily expressed by the French but 
also shared by the British, Italians and Germans, about their inability to supply 
hardware for the INTELSAT space segment.” And even if such technologi- 
cal sharing did not irreversibly lock these European countries into the single 
global system favored by the U.S., one could expect them to have a “greater 
incentive” to collaborate with America in developing that global system. One 
might also expect them to be more cooperative and sympathetic to the U.S. 
position during the renegotiation of the INTELSAT agreements scheduled 
for 1969. Anyway, if the U.S. did nothing to help these nations, they would 
eventually develop the technology on their own, without American help, 
and would be quite capable of establishing separate, regional communications 
satellite systems in due course.55 As Frutkin explained, “(a) We do need to 
54. A. W. Frutkin to Mr. Hilburn, “Memorandum for Mr. Hdburn-AAD, Policies Relevant to ‘69 
Revision of Intelsat Agreement,” 11 April 1966, record no. 14459, International Cooperation and 
Foreign Countries, International Cooperation, folder Miscellaneous Correspondence &om CODE 
I-International Relations 1958-1967, NASA Historical Reference Collection,Washington, DC. 
55. “Communications Satellite Technology,” undated and unsigned memorandum, but obviously 
written around April 1966, folder Cooperation in Space-Working Group on Expanded International 
Cooperation in Space, ELDO #1 [2 of 21, box 14, National Security Files, Charles Johnson Files, LBJ 
Library. 
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improve our situation in Intelsat with specific reference to the 1969 negotia- 
tions. (b) We already have a strong technical lead in the comsat field. (c) We 
already have an adequate voting majority in Intelsat. (d) We can rely upon 
our technical, moral and financial strength to assure continuing leadership- 
without seeking to deny technology to our partners in In te l~a t .”~~ Rather, 
then, use technological sharing as an instrument to divert foreign firms and 
governments into working with U.S. industry within the framework of a 
single global system where the U.S. was the dominant partner than have them 
defiantly develop an independent national or regional comsat capability over 
which the U.S. had no control and which could be used to bargain for a major 
revision of the INTELSAT agreements against U.S. interests. 
I have stressed the pressure which foreign policy concerns played in argu- 
ing for technological sharing with ELDO. Implicit in my account is another 
dimension of the issue: the need to promote and channel the interests of 
American industry. Indeed, NASA officials like Frutkin mediated between 
firms who wanted to export technology abroad and the Office of Munitions 
Control in the State Department, which authorized them to do so. As Frutkin 
explained to Margrave, who directed the Office, American firms were put- 
ting NASA, the Department of Defense, and the State Department under 
extreme pressure to export nonmilitary vehicle technology to individual 
national firms in Europe.57 By releasing export controls on the transfer of this 
technology to ELDO, one could at once satisfy their demands and divert them 
from the national to the multilateral level in line with U.S. foreign policy. We 
see, then, that arguments for relaxing constraints on booster technology were 
intended not simply to advance multinationalism in Europe and to help 
ELDO, but also to satisfy pressure for access to the launcher construction mar- 
ket from U.S. business. This stakeholder in international space collaboration is 
almost always ignored; it should not be. 
DENOUEMENT 
Those administrators who were for, and those were against, relaxing con- 
straints on technology transfer to ELDO shared a concern for nonproliferation. 
They differed on how best to achieve this. NASA and the State Department 
argued that by sharing high-energy nonstorable liquid-fuel launcher technol- 
ogy with ELDO, they could divert resources away from national military 
programs for which such fuels were obsolete. Similarly, they argued that by 
letting U.S. firms help European industry to build up its comsat capability, 
56. Frutkin to Hilburn,“Memorandum for Mr. Hilburn.” 
57. Frutkin to Margrave, 1 April 1965, record no. 14465, International Cooperation and Foreign 
Countries, International Cooperation, folder International Policy Manual Material &om Code I, NASA 
Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC. 
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they could more easily engage European governments in the single global 
system promoted and controlled by Washington at the expense of a prolif- 
eration of competing regional communications satellite systems which could 
serve independent commercial and military needs. The defenders of NSAM 
338 were adamant, however, that the U.S. should do nothing to help other 
countries develop comsats, or the powerful launchers needed to place them 
in geostationary orbit, without cast-iron guarantees that these would only 
be used in the INTELSAT framework. For them, technological assistance 
in either of these domains could only hasten proliferation, not contain it. By 
summer 1967, it was clear that the latter had won the day. 
The reasons for this are complex and will be dealt with very briefly here. 
Developments in Europe played a role. ELDO (temporarily) survived its crisis 
and, by September 1966, had reoriented its program unambiguously in favor of 
developing a launcher called Europa I1 that achieved geostationary capability by 
adding a fourth, French-built solid-fuel stage to the previous ELDO-A rocket. In 
parallel, France and Germany decided to fuse their national comsat projects in a 
joint experimental telecommunications satellite called Symphonie to be launched 
by Europa I1 from the new French base in Guyana.58 ELDO had moved from an 
artificial political construct to an organization with a well-defined technical 
mission and was far less vulnerable to offers of American help. 
From the American point of view, to channel this “European fixation on 
comsats and launch vehicles,” as Richard Barnes put it, the U.S. had to make 
an unambiguous offer for technological assistance in domains which satisfied 
the interests of both parties.59 With cryogenic fuels no longer being considered 
and with France responsible for the kick-stage into geostationary orbit, this 
was going to be vey difficult. Divisions within the administration on how 
best to interpret the requirements of NSAM 338 made it virtually impossible. 
Frutkin described the state of play in August 1966 to Webb, just before the 
NASA Administrator was to leave on a crucial European tour to discuss possible 
collaborative projects. While the “general atmosphere for space cooperation 
with the United States may have improved slightly,” thanks to the initiatives by 
NASA and the State Department which we have described in this paper, they 
had done little more than “clear the air somewhat.” The Europeans, Frutkin told 
Webb, “know of no progress in easing US restrictions upon communications 
satellite technology,” and “it may be sometime” before the progress that had been 
made in Washington could be divulged to them. Webb was therefore to repeat 
the standard answer to the usual request for comsat launch assistance: “that we 
could certainly give consideration to such a proposition on the assumption that 
58.The official agreement between the two governments was signed on 6 June 1967. 
59.RJHB toAWF,“The‘Webb Commission,’”5 May 1967, recordno. 14459, International Cooperation 
and Foreign Countries, International Cooperation, folder Miscellaneous Correspondence from CODE 
I-International Relations 1958-1967, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washngton, DC. 
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the European countries take their INTELSAT commitment to a single global 
system as seriously as we do.”60 By virtue of this approach, there was, to quote 
Barnes again, a “deterioration of ‘climate for cooperation’ caused by (1) US 
policies and actions within the Intelsat, and (2) US export policies in support 
of the ‘single global system.”’This led to “European reaction of suspicion and 
distrust to US offer to escalate cooperation.’’61 
As Barnes remarked, the breakdown in trust between the two sides of the 
Atlantic was fueled by a very public, high-level offer to “escalate” space collabo- 
ration with West Germany and other European allies, which had gained momen- 
tum throughout 1966.62 In an exchange of toasts between President Johnson 
and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard at a state banquet on 20 December 1965, LBJ 
suggested that existing scientific cooperation should be extended to embrace 
“an even more ambitious plan to permit us to do together what we cannot do 
alone.” The President gave two examples of “demanding” and “quite complex” 
collaborative projects which would “contribute vastly to our mutual knowledge 
and to our mutual skills”: a solar probe and a Jupiter probe. He also announced 
that NASA Administrator Webb would be traveling to Europe shortly to &scuss 
these ideas in Germany and with other European  government^.^^ 
The target and timing of Johnson’s offer were not coincidental. Erhard was 
a convinced and reliable American ally and was deeply hostile to de Gaulle’s 
attempts to undermine the existing structures of both NATO and the EEC. As 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk stressed to James Webb, with the Chancellor boldly 
resisting this attack on European institutions, “it [was] politically important for 
the United States to cooperate as closely as possible with Germany.” Increasing 
“the vigor and scope of space cooperation” with the country would be tangible, 
“positive evidence of constructive American interest in Germany,” and it would 
encourage Erhard to take the lead in advancing U.S. policies in the region.64 
The fanfare surrounding this offer for expanded scientific cooperation con- 
trasts sharply with the reluctance to disclose publicly the possibility for tech- 
nological collaboration with ELDO. And it was counterproductive in many 
respects. The American attempt to isolate de Gaulle was evident for all to see; 
indeed, Erhard was forced to relinquish his post in November 1966, accused of 
60. Frutkin to Webb, “Memorandum for Mr. Webb,” 11 August 1966, record no. 14618, folder 
Germany (West), 1956-1990, Foreign Countries, International Cooperation and Foreign Countries, 
NASA Historical Reference Collection,Washington, DC. 
61. RJHB to AWF,“The ‘Webb Commission.”’ 
62.This initiative is worthy of a separate paper; I give only the barest outline here. 
63. “Exchange of Toasts Between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard of 
the Federal Republic of Germany (In the State Dining Room),” 20 December 1965, folder Germany 
ErhardVisit [12/65], 12/19-21/65, box 192, National Security Files, Country Flle Europe and the 
USSR, Germany, LBJ Library. 
64. Dean Rusk to James Webb, 29 August 1966, record no. 14618, folder Germany (West), Foreign 
Countries, International Cooperation and Foreign Countries, NASA Historical Reference Collection, 
Washington, DC. 
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mismanaging the economy and of being too pro-American and anti-French. 
The cost of the kind of projects discussed (about $100 million) was deemed to 
be excessive, given the resources available for space science and European priori- 
ties (although eventually Germany did embark on a bilateral venture with the 
U.S., the $lOO-million Helios project to send two major spacecraft within 45 
million miles of the Sun).65 Finally, with the U.S. publicly insisting on the need 
to respect the INTELSAT agreements, the American offer was also interpreted 
by some as a strategy to divert scarce European resources into science and away 
from applications, notably telecommunications. “All in all,” wrote Frutkin to 
Webb in August 1966, “we must say the President’s proposal got off to a poor 
start due to misunderstandings which are inevitable when a proposition of this 
sort is made in the headlines without preparation of the ground.”66 Barnes put 
it pithily: because of European “suspicion and distrust,” aggravated by President 
Johnson’s spectacular overtures to Chancellor Erhard, there was “no prospect for 
escalating cooperation with Europe unless (1) US is willing to modi$ its present 
export control policies, and (2) we could offer other possibilities for cooperation 
in areas of interest to them (i.e., comsats and ~ehicles).”~’This was not to be. 
CONCLUSION 
The defeat ofthose inside NASA and the State Department who considered 
sharing communications satellite and booster technology with Europe in mid- 
1960s was simply the first of a series of setbacks for those in the administration 
who believed that technological sharing could be used to unite Europeans 
around projects whch were at once useful to them and compatible with the 
maintenance of U.S. leadership in strategc areas. Indeed, the battle was repeated 
just a few years later with the same result. European hopes to be integrally 
engaged at the technological level in the post-Apollo program, sparked by 
NASA Administrator Tom Paine in the late 1960s, were soon dashed. The 
compromise that ensued left Germany taking the lead in building a shirtsleeve- 
environment scientific laboratory that could fit in the Space Shuttle’s cargo 
bay and that, crucially, preserved the basic principles of clean interfaces and no 
exchange of funds more or less intact. Indeed, Europe’s ongoing struggle to be 
a genuine partner at the level of technological and managerial sharing with 
NASA and the US. might suggest that, when the chips are down, the need by 
powerful forces in the U.S. to protect national industry and national security will 
always prevail over foreign policy considerations. For them, American leadership 
is best preserved by denying sensitive technology, not by finding ways to use 
technological sharing to orient a partner’s program in line with U.S. interests. 
65.The project is discussed in Fruthn, “International Cooperation in Space.” 
66. Frutkin, “Memorandum for Mr.Webb.” 
67. RJHB to AWE “The ‘Webb Commission.”’ 
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The negotiations over the ISS, particularly with Russia, show that this is not 
always so.68 Indeed, it is striking that here, NASA has departed from past practice 
in accepting critical-path contributions from Canada and Italy and, more signifi- 
cantly, in accepting that there be a joint U.S.-Russian core and ihastructure as 
the foundation of the program. Sadeh has enumerated the foreign policy moti- 
vations for this move. Some were purely symbolic, e.g., to signal an end to the 
Cold War and Russia’s entry into the club of advanced Western industrial states. 
Others were f d y  in line with the use of technology as an instrument of foreign 
policy as we have described it here. In particular, in these negotiations, as in the 
debates over the help to ELDO 30 years earlier, technological sharing was an 
instrument to steer Russia’s civilian and military high-tech sectors along paths in 
line with American interests. Thus, integrating Russia into the core of the Space 
Station “enhances U.S. efforts to strengthen Russia’s commitment to adhere to 
guidelines of international non-proliferation standards regardmg ballistic missiles 
and nuclear technology, lends support to U.S. efforts to privatize and dedtar ize  
the high-technology sector in Russia . . . and encourages Russian scientists and 
engineers to work on ‘peaceful’ projects rather than selling their talents to other, 
possibly hostile, states.”69 It also, of course, diverts scarce Russian resources away 
from projects of which the U.S. might not approve. In short, b e  kinds Ofargu- 
ments for technological sharing with ELDO in 1966 were still being used when 
dealing with Russia in 1996.The difference is that ELDO had nothing to offer 
at the technical level, while Russia could use its extensive experience in human 
spaceflight as a bargaining chip to win some key concessions.The lesson is clear: 
if we want to make sense of international collaboration in space from a U.S. per- 
spective, we need focus carefully not only on what technology the U.S. has to 
offer, but what its potential partner has to give. In any event, as I have stressed, we 
simply cannot grasp the dynamics of international cooperation in space if we do 
not situate the scientific and technological content of the collaborative venture at 
the core of our analysis and relate it to strategies to maintain American “leader- 
ship” and some measure of control over the space programs of her partners. 
I should like to thank Roger Launius for helpful comments on a previous 
draft of this paper. 
68. Two important studies of policy regarding the Space Station are John M. Logsdon’s Together in 
Orbit: The Origins .f International Participation in the Space Station (Washington, DC: Monographs in 
Aerospace History, No. 11, November 1998) and Howard E. McCurdy’s The Space Station Decision: 
Incremental Politics and Technological Choice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1990). 
69. Eligar Sadeh, “Techmcal, Organizational, and Pohtical Dynamics of the International Space 
Station Program,” Space Policy 20, no. 3 (August 2004): 171-188. Sadeh makes no systematic dminction 
between the dimensions of the collaboration which were, indeed, symbolic and the far more substantive, 
material items that I have quoted here. Indeed, quite mistakenly in my view, he reduces all these policy 
considerations to the symbolic 1evel.This evades the question of how the United States uses technology 
to steer the space and high-tech programs of its partners in particular directions. 
SECTION IV 
ACCESS TO SPACE 

INTRODUCTION 
othing has been more significant for the long-term development of the 
Space Age than the ability to reach Earth orbit. When Columbia was 
lost on Saturday morning, 1 February 2003, one of the issues the accident 
brought to the fore was the long and complex history of the Space Shuttle’s 
origins, evolution, and operation, as well as the continuing challenge of space 
access. Even more, the accident opened the issue of space access from the 
dawn of the Space Age in the 1950s to the present. This is a rich and inviting 
history, requiring serious inquiry, critical thinking, and hard-edged analysis. 
The first-generation launchers were all ballistic-missile-derived vehicles that 
served well; with some upgrades over the years, they are still the backbone of 
the U.S. space launch fleet. Indeed, Redstone, Atlas, Titan, Delta, and Saturn 
were all scaled-up variants of the ICBMs, but with notable improvements. 
The Space Shuttle, the only human-carrying vehicle of the United States 
since the Apollo program of more than 30 years ago, followed those earlier 
space launch systems and has served many space-access needs for more than a 
quarter century.’ 
After more than four decades of effort, access to space remains a diffi- 
cult challenge. Although space transport services should not be measured by 
terrestrial standards, if the grand plans of space visionaries and entrepreneurs 
are to be carried out, there is a real need to move beyond currently available 
technologies. Unfortunately, the high cost associated with space launch from 
1950 to 2005 has demonstrated the slowest rate of improvement of all space 
technologies. Everyone in space activities shares a responsibility for addressing 
this critical technical problem. The overwhelming influence that space access 
has on all aspects of civil, commercial, and military space efforts indicates that 
it should enjoy a top priority.2 
Of course, a key element in the spacefaring vision long held in the United 
States is the belief that inexpensive, reliable, safe, and easy spaceflight is attain- 
able. Indeed, from virtually the beginning of the 20th century, those interested 
1. For a discussion of the overarchmg space-access history, see Roger D. Launius and D e m s  R .  
Jenkins, e&., To Reach the High Frontier:A History ofU.S. Launch Vehicles (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2002). 
2. More than 50 space-access studies have reached this conclusion over the last 40 years. See 
Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy, Imagining Space: Achievements, Projections, Possibilities, 
1950-2050 (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2001), chap. 4; United States Congress, Office of 
Technology Assessment, Launch Optionsfor the Future: Special Report (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1984); Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board, “The Future of U.S. Space 
Launch Capability,” Task Group Report, November 1992, NASA Historical Reference Collection, 
Washington, DC; NASA Office of Space Systems Development, Access to Space Study: Summary 
Report (Washington, DC: NASA, 1994). 
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in the human exploration of space have viewed as central to that endeavor the 
development of vehicles of flight that travel easily to and from Earth orbit. The 
more technically minded recognized that once humans had achieved Earth orbit 
about 200 miles up, the vast majority of the atmosphere and the gravity well had 
been conquered, and that persons were now about halfway to anywhere they 
might want to 
Although a large number of issues could be explored in the history of 
space access, five central legacies offer tantalizing possibilities for space history 
and represent critical issues in the field. These include the following: 
1. The limitations of chemical rocket technology. 
2. The ICBM legacy of space access. 
3. The costly nature of space access. 
4. Launch vehicle reliability. 
5. The value of reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) versus expendable launch 
vehicles (ELVs). 
The two chapters that follow review each of these legacies, sometimes explic- 
itly but more often indirectly, and raise serious policy issues that must inform 
any debate concerning access to space.4 
In chapter 9, John M. Logsdon asks the poignant question, why is there 
no replacement for the Space Shuttle despite the longevity of the issue on the 
national agenda? From almost the first flight of the Space Shuttle in 1981, 
NASA realized that planning should begin on an eventual replacement. Most 
observers in those early years of the program believed that the current fleet 
could remain operational for about 20 years but that by about the year 2000, 
replacement would probably be necessary. Understanding that it took most of 
a decade, sometimes even more, to carry a major spaceflight program to frui- 
tion, they thought it important to begin the process of building a successor 
second-generation reusable space-access vehicle capable of human launch. Yet, 
as of 2005 and despite a plethora of studies, little has been accompli~hed.~ 
Logsdon asserts that there was a fundamental “failure of national space 
policy over the past three plus decades, and that the lack of a replacement for the 
Space Shuttle is just one of the most obvious manifestations of that policy fail- 
ure.” At sum, he finds that the “lack of a clear ‘mandate’ for human spaceflight 
3. G. Harry Stine, Halfway to Anywhere: Achieving America’s Destiny in Space (New York: M. Evans 
and Co., 1996). 
4. Roger D. Launius, “Between a Rocket and a Hard Place: Legacies and Lessons from 50 
Years of Space Launch” (presentation in Lessons Learned Session of the 36th American Institute 
of Aeronautics and Astronautics [AIAA] Joint Propulsion Conference, sponsored by AIAA Solid 
Rocket Technical Committee [SRTC], Huntsville, AL, July 17, 2000). 
5. See Roger D. Launius, “After Columbia: The Space Shuttle Program and the Crisis in Space 
Access,” Astropolitics 2 (July-September 2004): 277-322. 
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over the past 35 years has meant that the U.S. human spaceflight program, and 
indeed the NASA program overall, has been sustained by a complex coalition 
of interests, not by a clearly articulated national goal and a stable political con- 
sensus in support of achieving that goal.”6 This is an important observation, for 
it gets to the heart of the overarching issue of rationales for human space explo- 
ration. Those rationales have not proven especially compelling, and NASA and 
its human spaceflight effort have been forced to deal with a lack of motivating 
reasons for the Agency’s activities since the Apollo program. 
Instead of developing a finely honed and convincing rationale for the 
necessity of humans in space, NASA has cobbled together a loose coalition of 
government interests, industry contractors, politicians of all stripes who are 
supportive because of “pork” for districts as well as patriotism, and spaceflight 
enthusiasts who dream of becoming a multiplanetary species. They came 
together to support the Shuttle as a means of achieving reliable, assured, and 
flexible access to space and have continued to support it to the present because 
of the lack of anything better-however “better” might be defined by the 
various interest groups-on the horizon. 
Logsdon offers the bold assertion that the reason for undertaking human 
spaceflight was reconsidered by the nation soon after the United States began 
to fly astronauts in 1961 and that this reflection has led to a less supportive 
public commitment than NASA or the spaceflight community would like. 
“The people of the United States and their government have been willing 
over the past 35 years to continue a human spaceflight program,” he writes, 
“but only at a level of funding that has forced it to constantly operate on the 
edge of viability.” Logsdon concludes, “The lack of a replacement for the 
Space Shuttle is a symptom of this larger reality.” 
Logsdon goes on to ask how badly Americans want to fly humans in space 
and finds that the answer to that is “not very badly.” Accordingly, at least by 
the time of post-Apollo planning, the United States, through the democratic 
process, had reached the conclusion that spaceflight in general, and human 
spaceflight particularly, had to stand behind a long list of other national needs. 
Its funding level would be something less than 1 percent of the federal budget 
per year, and within that budget, NASA should advance a useful space explo- 
ration agenda. Logsdon concludes that spaceflight enthusiasts have failed to 
align their vision of the future with the democratically arrived-at decisions 
relative to space policy. In other words, something less than the bold visions of 
the past are necessary in the realities of the present and the future. 
At sum, Logsdon concludes that both the community of spaceflight advo- 
cates in the United States and the personnel of NASA have overemphasized 
6. John M. Logsdon, “‘A Failure of National Leadership’: Why No Replacement for the Space 
Shuttle?” chap. 9 in this volume. 
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human spaceflight’s centrality to the modern nation. Instead, he argues for a 
more realistic perspective that reduces the spaceflight agenda to a realm that 
might be successful with the funding available. But a question that must be 
asked is, despite an unwillingness by the public to open the treasury more fully 
to achieve the human spaceflight vision, would the American public accept a 
scaled-back program that is far less grandiose? More important for the policy 
debate concerning a replacement for the Space Shuttle, however, would the 
American public accept an end to the human spaceflight mission that NASA 
has conducted since 1961, since failure to replace the vehicle signals that end? 
Only time will tell if this is how the policy decisions relating to the Shuttle 
replacement effort will turn out. 
In chapter 10, Andrew J. Butrica assesses the historical debate over reus- 
able launch vehicles versus expendable launch vehicles. RLV advocates have 
been convincing in their argument that the only course leading to “efficient 
transportation to and from the earth” would be RLVs and have made the case 
repeatedly since the late 1960s: Their model for a prosperous future in space is 
the airline industry, with its thousands of flights per year and its exceptionally 
safe and reliable operations. Several models exist for future RLVs, however, 
and all compete for the attention-and the development dollars-of the fed- 
eral government. 
Prior to the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs of the 1960s, vir- 
tually everyone involved in space advocacy envisioned a future in which 
humans would venture into space abozrd winged, reusable vehicles. That 
was the vision from Hermann Oberth in the 1920s through Wernher von 
Braun in the 1950s to the U.S. Air Force’s X-20 Dyna-Soar program in the 
early 1 9 6 0 ~ . ~  Because cjf the pressure of the Cold War, NASA chose to aban- 
don that approach to space access in favor of ballistic capsules that could be 
placed atop launchers originally developed to deliver nuclear warheads to the 
Soviet Union. NASA developed its human-rated ballistic launch and recov- 
ery technology at enormous expense and used it with a 100-percent success 
rate between 1961 and 1975. As soon as Apollo was completed, NASA chose 
to retire that ballistic technology, despite its genuine serviceability, in favor 
of a return to that earlier winged, reusable vehicle. The Space Shuttle was 
the result? 
7. This was the argument made to obtain approval for the Space Shuttle. See The Post-Apollo 
Space Program: A Report for the Space Task Group (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space 
Adminktrahon, September 1969), pp. 1,6. 
8. This quest has been well documented in Ray A. Williamson and Roger D. Launius, “Rocketry 
and the Origins of Space Flight,” in To Reach the High Frontier, ed. Launius and Jenkins, pp. 33-69. 
9. O n  this issue, see T. A. Heppenheimer, The Space Shuttle Decision: NASA’s Search for a Reusable 
Space Vehicle (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4221, 1999); Roger D. Launius, “NASA and the Decision 
to Build the Space Shuttle, 1969-72,” The Historian 57 (autumn 1994): 17-34. 
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Then there is an alternative position that suggests that the most appro- 
priate approach to space access is through the use of throwaway “big, dumb 
boosters” that are inexpensive to manufacture and operate. Although reus- 
able rockets may seem to be an attractive cost-saving alternative to expend- 
ables because they allow repeated use of critical components such as rocket 
motors and structural elements, ELV advocates claim, they actually offer a 
false promise of savings. ,This is because all RLV savings are predicated on 
maximizing usage of a small number of vehicles over a very long period of 
time for all types of space launch requirements. Accordingly, cost savings are 
realized only when an RLV flies many times over many years. That goal is 
unattainable, they claim, because it assumes that there will be no (or very few) 
accidents in the reusable fleet throughout its lifespan.” 
The reality, ELV advocates warn, is that the probability of all RLV com- 
ponents’ operating without catastrophic failure throughout the lifetime of the 
vehicle cannot be assumed to be 100 percent. Indeed, the launch reliability 
rate of even relatively “simple” ELVs-those without upper stages or spacecraft 
propulsion modules and with significant operational experience-peaks at 98 
percent with the Delta 11, and that took 30 years of operations to achieve. To be 
sure, most ELVs achieve a reliability rate of 90 to 92 percent-again, only after 
a maturing of the system has taken place. The Space Shuttle, a partially reusable 
system, has attained a launch reliability rate of slightly more than 98 percent, 
but only through extensive and costly redundant systems and safety checks. In 
the case of a new RLV, or a new ELV for that matter, a higher failure rate has 
to be assumed because of a lack of experience with the system. Moreover, RLV 
use doubles the time of exposure of the vehicle to failure because the vehicle 
must also be recovered and be reusable after refurbishment. To counter this 
challenge, more and better reliability has to be built into the system, and this 
exponentially increases both R&D and operational costs.” 
Designing for one use only, those arguing for ELV development sug- 
gest, simplifies the system enormously. One use of a rocket motor, guidance 
system, and the like means that it needs to function correctly only one time. 
Acceptance of an operational reliability of 90 percent or even less would 
10. Barbara A. Luxenberg, “Space Shuttle Issue Brief #IB73091,” Library of Congress Congressional 
Research Service Major Issues System, 7 July 1981, NASA Historical Reference Collection; Economic 
Analysis of New Space Transportation Systems: Executive Summary (Princeton, NJ: Mathematica, Inc., 1971); 
General Accounting Office, Analysis of Cost Estimates for the Space Shuttle and Two Alternate Programs 
(Washmgon, DC: General Accounting Office, 1973); William G. Holder and W i h m  D. Siuru, Jr., 
“Some Thoughts on Reusable LaunchVehicles,” Air University Review 22 (November-December 1970): 
51-58; Office of Technology Assessment, Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices 
(Washington, DC: US. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1988). 
11. Stephen A. Book, “Inventory Requirements for Reusable Launch Vehicles” (paper presented 
at the Space Technology & Applications International Forum [STAIF-991, Albuquerque, NM, 
copy in possession of the author). 
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further reduce the costs incurred in designing and developing a new ELV. 
Indeed, many experts believe that reliability rates cannot be advanced more 
than another 1.5 percent above the 90-percent mark without enormous effort, 
effort that would be strikingly cost-inefficient.12 
The debate is far from decided. As Butrica shows in this essay, human 
spaceflight advocates seem driven toward RLVs for space access. This has been 
an enormously costly perspective over time and directly affects the search for a 
replacement for the Space Shuttle. Butrica recounts the depressing story of failed 
attempts to build new vehicles and their eventual cancellation. 
Collectively, Logsdon and Butrica encapsulate a critical issue for both the 
history of NASA and the current policy arena as the space agency struggles to 
deal with an aging Shuttle fleet, a major reorientation of its mission, and pros- 
pects for a post-Columbia-accident spacefaring future. 
12. B. Peter Leonard and William A. Kisko, “Predicting Launch Vehicle Failure,” Aerospace 
America (September 1989): 36-38, 46; Robert G. Bramscher, “A Survey of Launch Vehicle 
Failures,” Spaceflight 22 (November-December 1980): 51-58. 
CHAPTER 9 
“A FAILURE OF NATIONAL LEADERSHIP”: 
WHY No REPLACEMENT FOR THE SPACE SHUTTLE? 
John M. Logsdon 
f the policy for the future of U.S. civilian space activity first laid out by I President George W. Bush on 14 January 2004 is pursued, the United States 
will retire the Space Shuttle from service in 2010. Ending Shuttle flights will 
leave the United States without its own capability to carry its astronauts into 
orbit until a replacement crew-carrying vehicle makes its first flight with 
astronauts aboard. According to the Bush “Vision for Space Exploration,” this 
may not happen until 2014.’ As leading space historian Roger D. Launius has 
commented, “The inability to ensure a continued capability for human space 
access has placed the United States in a situation that is unenviable and unfor- 
tunate as the twenty-first century  begin^."^ 
This essay attempts to set out the reasons why the United States has found 
itself in this “unenviable and unfortunate” situation, with a focus on why the 
country had not, by the time of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident on 1 
February 2003, developed a replacement for the Shuttle as a U.S. means for 
carrying humans into space. That same question was asked by the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) set up in the immediate aftermath of 
the Columbia tragedy. (I was a member of that 13-person group.) In addition 
to its investigation of the physical and organizational causes of the accident, 
CAIB, in its 26 August 2003 report, offered brief but pointed observations 
on the broader policy context within which the accident took place and on 
“future directions for the U.S. in   pace."^ This kind oflook ahead was not part 
of CAIB’s original charter; it became part of the CAIB focus after members of 
Congress asked the Board Chair, retired Admiral Harold Gehman, to have the 
Board’s report “set the stage” for a national debate on the fhure directions of the 
U.S. civilian space program. Including a discussion of national space policy in 
an accident investigation report was unprecedented; neither the internal NASA 
report following the Apollo 1 fire in January 1967 nor the Rogers Commission 
1.  White House, “A Renewed Spirit of Discovery,” January 2004. 
2. Roger D. Launius, “After Columbia: The Space Shuttle Program and the Crisis in Space 
3. Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: NASA and GPO, 
Access,” Asfropolitics 2 (autumn 2004): 279. 
August 2003), p. 209. 
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investigation of the Challenger accident had gone beyond identieing and sug- 
gesting remedies for the immediate causes of those tragedies. 
The brief section titled “Long-Term: Future Directions for the U.S. in 
Space” in chapter 9 of the CAEB report has had an impact well beyond the 
Board’s expectations. It is not too grandiose a claim to suggest that it led to a 
fundamental change in national space policy. Staff members in the Executive 
Office of the President have confirmed that the Board’s observation that there 
had been a “lack, over the past three decades, of any national mandate pro- 
viding NASA a compelling mission requiring human presence in space” was 
the direct catalyst for the White House deliberations in fall 2003 that led to 
the 14 January 2004 announcement by President George W. Bush of the new 
space exploration vision. This “Vision for Space Exploration,” with its call for 
a “sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar 
system and beyond,” is explicitly intended as the “national mandate” that had 
been missing since Americans landed on the Moon in 1969. 
The Board made a second set of general observations. The CAIB report 
noted that “following from the lack of a clearly-defined long term space mis- 
sion,” there had been no “sustained national commitment over the past decade 
to improving access to space by developing a second-generation space trans- 
portation system.” The Board concluded that “the United States needs improved 
access for humans to low-Earth orbit as a foundation for whatever directions the nation’s 
space program takes in the future.” The CAIB report suggested that it was “in 
the nation’s interest to replace the Shuttle as soon as possible as the primary means f o r  
transporting humans to andfrom Earth orbit.” Finally, it contained the following 
indictment: ‘>revious [unsuccessful] attempts to develop a replacement vehicle for the 
aging Shuttle represent afdilure of national leadership” (all emphasis in original) .4 
In his recent comprehensive and insightful analysis of U.S. policy towards 
access to space, Launius has used even stronger language than the Columbia 
Board. He suggests that “the lack of a firm decision to develop a Shuttle replace- 
ment represents the single most egregious failure of space policy in hi~tory.”~ 
This essay will argue that there has been an even more fundamental and 
“egregious” failure of national space policy over the past three-plus decades 
and that the lack of a replacement for the Space Shuttle is just one of the most 
obvious manifestations of that policy failure. The series of decisions regarding 
a Shuttle replacement must be cast in the broader context of U.S. policy with 
respect to the reasons for sending people to space in the first place. The lack of 
a clear “mandate” for human spaceflight over the past 35 years has meant that 
the U.S. human spaceflight program, and indeed the NASA program overall, 
has been sustained by a complex coalition of narrow interests, not by a clearly 
4. CAIB, Report, pp. 209-211. 
5. Launius, “After Columbia,” pp. 278-279 
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articulated national goal and a stable political consensus in support of achiev- 
ing that goal. As the CAIB report observed, without such a goal, NASA 
has found it necessary to gain the support of diverse constitu- 
encies. NASA has had to participate in the give and take of 
the normal political process in order to obtain the resources 
needed to carry out its programs. NASA has usually failed to 
receive budgetary support consistent with its ambitions. The 
result . . . is an organization straining to do too much with 
too little.6 
It is this situation-“straining to do too much with too little’’-that 
reflects the fundamental failure of U.S. space policy. In the 1969-1970 period, 
the administration of President Richard M. Nixon made a purposeful deci- 
sion not to continue in the post-Apollo period the type of space effort that had 
taken Americans to the Moon. As Nixon stated in March 1970: 
Space expenditures must take their proper place within a rigor- 
ous system ofnational priorities. What we do in space from here 
on in must become a normal and regular part of our national 
life and must therefore be planned in conjunction with all of 
the other undertakings which are important to  US.^ 
This declaration was more than rhetorical. The NASA budget was rap- 
idly reduced in the early 1970s to less than 1 percent of the federal budget, 
approximately one-fifth of its budget share at the peak of Apollo 10 years ear- 
lier. Outside of postwar demobilization, few government activities have seen 
such a rapid decline in the resources devoted to their implementation. More 
to the point of this essay, this lowered level of budget allocations has persisted 
to the current time. 
WHAT DOES “REPLACING THE SPACE SHUTTLE” MEAN? 
Many people talk of replacing the Shuttle as if the meaning of such an 
undertaking is quite clear. Such is not the case. There are several meanings that 
could be attributed to the term “replacing the Space Shuttle.” They include 
the following: 
6.  CAIB, Report, p. 209. 
7. Richard M. Nixon, “Statement About the Future of the United States Space Program,” 7 
March 1970, in U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents ofthe United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1971), p. 251. 
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Developing an advanced-technology, second-generation vehicle simi- 
lar in its capabilities to the Shuttle, including the ability to carry both a 
sizable number of people and large and/or heavy cargo into low-Earth 
orbit, to provide living and working space for the crew for some period 
of time, and to be capable of various space operations such as payload 
deployment and retrieval and in-orbit servicing. Such a vehicle, pre- 
sumably, would be as reusable as the Shuttle, preferably more so. 
Developing a vehicle that can carry either cargo or passengers to 
space and deliver its payload to an orbital destination such as the 
International Space Station; reusability would be a desired, but not 
necessary, characteristic. 
* Developing a vehicle only to carry people to another destination in 
space and to return them to Earth, with limited or no cargo-carry- 
ing capacity. Again, reusability would be a desired, but not necessary, 
characteristic. 
Developing a vehicle capable of transporting people both to low-Earth 
orbit and to destinations beyond Earth orbit, such as the Moon, Mars, 
or a Lagrangian point. 
Each of these types of vehicles could be considered a Shuttle replace- 
ment, and failure to differentiate among them has caused, and will continue 
to cause, policy confusion. For the purposes of this essay, the central meaning 
to be attributed to the term “Space Shuttle replacement” is a vehicle having 
the capability to transport humans to and from low-Earth orbit. Whether that 
vehicle would be reusable or not and whether it would be capable of going 
beyond Earth orbit are secondary considerations. This certainly was what the 
CAIB had in mind when it judged that “i t  is in the nation’s interest to replace the 
Shuttle as soon as possible as the primary means f o r  transporting humans to and f r o m  
Earth orbit” (emphasis in original). 
What did not happen, either during the CAIBS deliberations or since, 
was a corresponding adjustment in either the expectations placed on NASA 
by the nation’s leaders or the ambitions of those committed to the vision 
of an expansive future in space. T h e  reality that national space policy did not 
bring ambitions and resources into balance in the 1970s, nor in  the subsequent two 
decades, is the basic policyfdilure. Either NASA should have been forced by the 
White House and Congress to plan and carry out a less ambitious program, 
or those national leaders should have been willing to provide the resources 
needed to carry out the ambitious program, with human spaceflight at its 
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core, that NASA has proposed to implement.’ By allowing NASA to try to 
“do too much with too little,” national leaders failed in their responsibility 
as stewards of well-conceived national policy. The space sector has suffered 
as a result, most visibly with two Space Shuttle accidents and the loss of 14 
astronaut lives. 
AN ALBUM OF FRUSTRATION 
How has this “unenviable and unfortunate” situation come to be? The 
answer to this question can be portrayed by a set of ‘‘snapshots’’ taken at 
various times during the evolution of the U.S. human spaceflight effort? This 
“photo album” of the steps towards the current situation will set the stage for 
a fuller analysis of why ensuring reliable, affordable, and safe human access has 
been a continuing policy problem for the past two decades: 
1. From almost the start of serious thinking about human spaceflight, 
visionaries have expected that people would travel to and from space 
in a reusable, winged spacecraft; this image has continued to influence 
thinking about how to send people to space for most of the time since. 
2. The pressures of Cold War competition drove the United States and 
the Soviet Union to abandon a winged approach to spaceflight and to 
develop instead crew-carrying ballistic capsules launched into space 
on top of expendable rockets, most of them derived from missiles 
designed to deliver nuclear warheads over intercontinental distances. 
Until the Space Shuttle‘ was approved in 1972, only the U.S. Saturn 
family of boosters was designed from their start in the 1950s as space 
launch vehicles. 
3. Once the United States had won the race to the Moon, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1969 proposed an ambitious 
post-Apollo space effort beginning with the rapid development of a 
Saturn V-launched, 12-person space station. As a “logistics vehicle” 
for such a station, NASA proposed developing a reusable Earth-to- 
8. In May 1992, then-new NASA Administrator Daniel S. Goldin did recognize this situation 
and told his senior officials to stop making plans that anticipated future budget increases. This was 
one of the foundations of Goldin’s “faster, better, cheaper” guidance. But Goldin was also impatient 
and wanted to lay the foundation for human missions to Mars. This made his attempts to limit 
future ambitions not very effective. 
9. In his Astropolitics article cited earlier, Roger Launius provides a parallel and well-stated 
account of this history. 
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orbit launch vehicle called the Space Shuttle. In NASA’s 1970 budget 
presentation, the space station and Space Shuttle were presented to 
Congress as a single program. When the Nixon administration refused 
to approve the space station, NASA, in the fall of 1970, deferred-not 
canceled-its space station plans and directed its Shuttle contractors to 
design a vehicle capable of carrying pieces of a space station into orbit. 
This requirement defined the width of the Shuttle payload bay as no 
less than 14 feet. Thus the currently unbreakable link between the 
Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs actually has its 
roots in decisions taken 35 years ago. 
4. In 1971, there was intense debate within the Executive Branch and its 
advisers of whether to approve Space Shuttle development. This debate 
led, in January 1972, to approval of Shuttle development as a product of 
“a series of political compromises that produced unreasonable expecta- 
tions-even myths-about its performance,” with a “technically ambi- 
tious design [that] resulted in an inherently vulnerable vehicle.”” The 
Space Shuttle program was approved even in the face of a fundamental 
policy decision, made two years earlier, to reduce the priority of and 
resultant budget allocations for the civilian space program.” Based on 
that decision, the Office of Management and Budget forced NASA, in 
May 1971, to accept a $5.15-billion development cost ceiling for the 
Space Shuttle; this led NASA to abandon hopes for a two-stage, fully 
reusable vehicle and to quickly examine a wide variety of designs that 
could be developed within that cost cap. 
5. In order to make the case that the investment in developing the Space 
Shuttle was cost-effective, NASA had to gain the agreement of the 
military and intelligence communities that when it became opera- 
tional, the Space Shuttle would be the only launch vehicle for almost 
all government payloads, both human crews and robotic spacecraft. In 
order to gain this agreement, NASA had to design a Shuttle with spe- 
cific performance characteristics that increased its technological risks. 
CAIB noted that “the increased complexity of a Shuttle designed to 
be all things to all people created inherently greater risks than if more 
realistic technical goals had been set from the start.”” Certainly, if the 
10. CAIB, Report, p. 21. 
11. Accounts of the process that led to the decision to develop the Space Shuttle can be found in 
John M. Logsdon, “The Space Shuttle: A Policy Failure?” Science 232 (30 May 1986): 1099-1105; 
and T. A. Heppenheimer, The Space Shuttle Decision: NASA’s Search for  a Reusable Space Vehicle 
(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4221, 1999). 
12. CAIB, Report, p. 23. 
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Space Shuttle design had been optimized for its crew-carrying role, 
a less risky vehicle, with more provisions for crew safety, could have 
been designed. 
6. A byproduct of the decisions to develop in the Space Shuttle a vehicle 
capable of launching all types of payloads was the drying up, begin- 
ning in the 1970s, of NASA funding for research and technology 
development related to any aspect of space transportation not associ- 
ated with the Shuttle. Thus there was a limited base of technology 
from which NASA could draw when it did initiate or participate in 
Shuttle replacement efforts in the 1980s and 1 9 9 0 ~ ’ ~  
7. Soon after the first flight of the Space Shuttle in April 1981, the new 
NASA leadership set as its two top priorities bringing the Shuttle to 
operational status as soon as possible and getting presidential and con- 
gressional approval to develop a (Shuttle-launched) space station. No 
alternatives to using the Shuttle in this role were considered at the 
inception of the space station program.14 
8. Also in 1981, after only two Shuttle flights, President Ronald Reagan 
approved a formal policy statement saying that the Space Shuttle “will 
be the primary space launch system for both United States military 
and civil government  mission^."'^ This policy was reinforced in a 1982 
statement of National Space Policy, which said that “completion of 
transition to the Shuttle should occur as expeditiously as possible” and 
that “government spacecraft should be designed to take advantage 
of the unique capabilities of the STS [Space Transportation System, 
another designation for the Space Shuttle] .’’I6 
9. The U.S. Air Force, as the launch agent for both military and intel- 
ligence spacecraft, early on recognized the dangers of this “all eggs in 
one basket” policy. Soon after the Shuttle was declared operational on 
13. This statement is not quite accurate. There continued to be some low-level efforts within 
NASA to examine future space transportation vehicles and technologies even as the Shuttle was 
being developed during the 1970s, but there was very limited financial support of these efforts. 
14. For a discussion ofthe steps leading to President Reagan’s approval ofa space station program, 
see Howard E. McCurdy, The Space Station Decision: Incremental Politics and Technological Choice 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 1990). 
15. John M. Logsdon, ed., Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil 
Space Program, vol. 4, Accessing Space (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4407, 1999), pp. 333-334. 
16. John M. Logsdon, ed., Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History ofthe U.S. Civil 
Space Program, vol. 1, Organizing for Exploration (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4407, 1995), 
pp. 591-592. 
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4 July 1982, after only four flights, the Air Force began to argue that 
the risks and costs of the system could be a detriment to its ability to 
perform its launch responsibilities for critical national security pay- 
loads. Most of those payloads had been designed since the late 1970s so 
that they could only be launched on the Shuttle. Beginning in 1983, 
the Air Force campaigned for approval of a backup to the Shuttle in 
order to provide assured access to space for such payloads. NASA fought 
this move. The dispute between the Air Force and NASA reached the 
White House in early 1985, where it was decided in favor of the Air 
Force.” This decision led to the development of the Titan IV expend- 
able launch vehicle, which was capable of launching the largest mili- 
tary and intelligence spacecraft. After the 1986 Challenger accident, the 
Titan IV became the primary launcher for large national security mis- 
sions, and those spacecraft that had been intended for Shuttle launch 
had to be redesigned at high cost. 
10. Discussions within NASA about the need to develop a second-genera- 
tion replacement for the Space Shuttle began even before the Shuttle was 
launched.18 The first public statement of this need came in the report of 
the National Commission on Space in January 1986 (made public a few 
days after the Chullenger accident). The Commission concluded that 
“the Shuttle fleet will become obsolescent by the turn of the century.” 
It recommended separating cargo and “passenger” (its term) launches 
and developing, within 15 years, a new system for “passenger transport 
to and from low Earth orbit.”” In contrast, an inside-the-government 
NASA-DOD National Space Transportation and Support Study during 
1985-1986, while agreeing that in the future, separate human-carry- 
ing and cargo-carrying launch systems were desirable, concluded that 
“there was not an urgent need for an advanced manned vehicle; incre- 
mental improvements to the Space Shuttle would suffice.”2o 
11. While NASA during the 1970s and early 1980s allocated only limited 
funding to advanced space transportation technology, the Department 
of Defense did support a fair amount of such research and technology 
17. This dispute can be traced in John M. Logsdon, ed., Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents 
in the History ofthe U.S.  Civil Space Program, vol. 2, External Relationships (Washington, DC: NASA 
SP-4407, 1996), documents II-40 through 11-45, 
18. Launius, “After Columbia,” pp. 287-288. 
19. Pioneering the Space Frontier, Report of the National Commission on Space, quoted in Launius, 
20. Ivan Bekey, “Exploring Future Space Transportation Possibilities,” in Exploring the Unknown, 
“After Columbia,” p. 288. 
ed. Logsdon, vol. 4, pp. 505-506. 
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The National Aero-Space Plane (NASP) began as a NASA-DOD joint project in 1982. 
It called for the development of two vehicles capable of SSTO a t  Mach 25. It was 
intended to use a multicycle engine shifting from jet to ramjet to scramjet; it would use 
liquid-hydrogen fuel with oxygen scooped and frozen from the atmosphere. President 
Ronald Reagan had high hopes for it, announcing in the State of the Union Address 
in 1986: ”We are going forward with research on a new Orient Express that could, 
by the end of the decade, take off from Dulles Airport, accelerate up to 25 times the 
speed of sound attaining low Earth orbit, or fly to Tokyo within two hours.” It was 
canceled in 1992 without ever having flown. (NASA KSCphoto no. EL-2007-00432) 
development related to advanced-technology crew-carrying systems. 
By the early 1980s, these efforts were focused on a vehicle that used air- 
breathing engines to accelerate to hypersonic or perhaps even orbital 
velocity. The Air Force program was focused on a TransAtmospheric 
Vehicle (TAV), while a separate, highly classified, Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (ARPA) study was called Copper Canyon.’* In late 
1985, all Department of Defense research and development activity 
on hypersonic flight was consolidated into a program that became 
known as the National Aero-Space Plane (NASP); NASA joined the 
Department of Defense as a minority funder and comanager of the 
NASP effort. This program was given presidential endorsement in 
the 1986 State of the Union Address, delivered by President Ronald 
21. The National Aero-Space Plane Program is discussed in Andrew J. Butrica, Single Stage to 
Orbit: Politics, Space Technology, and the Questfor Reusable Rocketry (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 
2003), chap. 4. 
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Reagan on 5 February of that year. In his address, the President spoke 
of an “Orient Express” that would, “by the end of the decade,” be able 
to “take off from Dulles Airport [near Washington, DC], accelerate 
up to 25 times the speed of sound attaining low Earth orbit, or fly to 
Tokyo within two 
12. The President’s 1986 address came only a few days after the 28 January 
explosive burning and breakup of the Space Shuttle Chullenger; seven 
crew members died in the accident. In the following months, policy 
toward use of the Space Shuttle came under intense scrutiny. First, the 
White House, on 15 August, announced that a new Shuttle orbiter 
would be built to replace Chullenger but that the Shuttle would no 
longer be used to launch commercial payloads such as communication 
satellites. On 27 December, President Reagan signed a directive that 
established a “mixed fleet” concept for government payloads, with 
“critical mission needs” supported by both the Shuttle and expendable 
launch vehicles “to provide assurance that payloads can be launched 
regardless of specific launch vehicle availabilities.” According to this 
directive, the Space Shuttle would only be used to support programs 
requiring “manned presence and other unique STS ~apabilities.”~~ 
These decisions formally reversed the policy that had been one of the 
foundations of the decision to develop the Space Shuttle-that it could 
serve as a reliable, affordable launch vehicle for all U.S. payloads. It 
focused future Shuttle use on missions where the human presence was 
essential to the mission, not merely crew members delivering cargo 
to orbit. In 1987, the Air Force announced its support for resuming 
production of the Delta and Atlas expendable launch vehicles, with the 
clear implication that the military would in the future use the Space 
Shuttle only for those few missions that required its specific capa- 
bilities. The sum of these post-Chullenger decisions meant that NASA 
became not only the operator, but also the main future user, of the 
Space Shuttle. With fewer missions to fly, with NASA having to pay 
all the costs of its operation, and with a flat or decreasing NASA bud- 
get for most of the 1990s, the Shuttle became a “mortgage” on the 
NASA budget that had to be paid. Funds for investing in its replace- 
ment could be made available only if the NASA budget were increased 
or the Shuttle program’s budget were reduced. 
22. Quoted in ibid., p. 65. 
23. See the essay by Ray A. Williamson, “Developing the Space Shuttle,” and documents 11-42 
and 11-43 in Exploring the Unknown, ed. Logsdon, vol. 4, for an account of this policy shift. 
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13. While DOD-NASA work on NASP continued in the late 1980s, with 
DOD bearing some 80 percent of its costs, NASA gave top priority to 
returning the Space Shuttle to flight. Leading that effort was Admiral 
Richard H. Truly, a former Shuttle astronaut who was brought back 
to NASA in the weeks following the Challenger accident as Associate 
Administrator for Spa~eflight.’~ Truly was a firm believer in the value 
of the Shuttle. When in 1989 the new administration of President 
George H. W. Bush selected him as NASA Administrator, the Space 
Shuttle gained a strong proponent at the top of the space agency. 
Then President Bush proposed an ambitious long-range vision for the 
nation’s space program in July 1989. The NASA plan for implement- 
ing that vision did not include a proposal to replace the Shuttle as the 
means for taking people to orbit, even though the plan extended over 
several decades. 
Administrator Truly’s personal embrace of the Shuttle as key to 
NASA’s future was reflected by others in NASA, particularly those 
working on the Space Shuttle program in NASA Headquarters and 
at Johnson Space Center and Marshall Space Flight Center. Rather 
than respond to criticisms of the Shuttle and calls for its replacement, 
they strove to “impose the party line vision on the environment, not 
to reconsider it.” Central to this behavior was the belief that the Space 
Shuttle could be made a safe and reliable system and should play a cen- 
tral role in NASA’s human spaceflight efforts for many years to come. 
This behavior, in the judgment of the Columbia Board, led to “flawed 
decision-making, self deception, introversion and a diminished curi- 
osity” about alternatives to the Shuttle.25 
14. In 1990, the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space 
Program, usually called the Augustine Committee after its chairman, 
aerospace executive Norm Augustine, concluded that “we are today 
overreliant on the Space Shuttle as the backbone of the civil space 
program.” The Committee recommended rapid development of “an 
evolutionary, unmanned but man-rateable, heavy lift launch vehicle” 
to replace the Space Shuttle in supporting space station assembly and 
utilization. Noting that there was no alternative to the Shuttle for 
human transportation, the Committee recommended “expedited 
24. See John M. Logsdon, “Return to Flight: RichardTruly and the Recovery &-om the Challenger 
Accident,” chap. 15 in From Evrgineering Science to Big Science, ed. Pamela E. Mack (Washington, DC: 
25. Yale University organizational studies scholar Gary Brewer, quoted in CAIB, Report, 
NASA SP-4219,1998). 
p. 102. 
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development of a two-way [human] transportation capability” on 
such a launch vehicle “for use in the event of a Space Shuttle stand- 
down.” The Augustine Committee was critical of the low level of 
NASA spending on space technology, including that related to 
advanced propulsion and aerodynamics, and called for a “two-to- 
three-fold enhancement” of NASA’s space technology budget. It rec- 
ommended an annual increase of 10 percent in the NASA budget if 
the nation was serious about wanting a successful space program.26 
The Committee concluded its report by recommending that the 
United States should reduce “dependence on the Space Shuttle . . . for 
all but missions requiring human presence.”27 
15. After receiving presidential endorsement in 1986, the NASP program 
over the subsequent several years struggled to achieve its technological 
and schedule goals. A 1988 Defense Science Board report concluded 
that the program’s advocates had been overly optimistic in their initial 
promise of an early flight demonstration and suggested that the pro- 
gram should be “realistically presented to its sponsors.” A year later, 
after the Air Force withdrew funding from the program, the White 
House, in 1989, approved a stretch-out of the program (rather than its 
cancellation as proposed by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney), 
with a flight demonstration of the X-30 test vehicle to come only after 
relevant technologies had been developed.28 In the face of competing 
budget priorities and slow technological progress, the NASP program 
was canceled in 1992, after $1.7 billion had been spent on it.29 At that 
point, the cost of a full X-30 flight-test program was estimated at $17 
billion, with another $10-20 billion to develop an operational vehi- 
~le.~O No flight demonstration was attempted, but the program left a 
technological legacy for future advanced space transportation efforts. 
Andrew Butrica observes that “the NASP concept was the wrong 
road.” By pursuing an air-breathing approach to a single stage to orbit 
26. The administration of George H. W. Bush took to heart the advice that the NASA budget 
should be substantially increased and proposed significant increases for FY 1992 and FY 1993. 
However, after coming to the White House in January 1993, the administration of President Bill 
Clinton reversed this upward trend in the NASA budget, which actually lost more than 10 percent 
in constant dollars during the eight years that Clinton was President. 
27. Report ofthe Advisory Committee on the Future ofthe U.S. Space Program (Washington, DC: GPO, 
December 1990), pp. 21,31, 33-34, 48. 
28. Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, vol. 4, documents IV-9, IV-10, quotation from p. 562. 
29. Launius suggests that the costs were probably higher since some of the work on the NASP pro- 
gram was classified, and thus not all cost information was readily available (“After Columbia,” p. 290). 
30. Global Security.Org, “X-30 National Aerospace Plane (NASP),” http://www.globalsectrrity. 
ovg/military/systems/airnaft/nasp.htm (accessed 13 January 2005). 
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vehicle rather than one using rocket power, NASA “propelled the 
nation into an expensive program that had no chance of success.” Its 
failure “demonstrated unmistakably that an air-breathing, single- 
stage-to-orbit was not the road to travel.” Ivan Bekey adds that “being 
airplane-like, the NASP concept attracted powerful backing because 
it was intuitively easy to grasp. The nation fooled itself into believing 
that because the NASP image was what was desired, the reality itself 
was therefore attainable.’’31 Whatever the reason, the United States 
had lost several years and almost $2 billion in pursuing a failed path 
towards a Shuttle replacement. 
16. On 1 April 1992, Daniel S. Goldin replaced the fired Richard Truly 
as NASA Administrator. In contrast to Truly, Goldin would prove 
to be no fan of the Space Shuttle, viewing its budget demands as a 
major barrier to initiating new, innovative NASA programs.32 This 
was especially the case after 1993, when the new administration of 
President Bill Clinton retained Goldin as Administrator but declined 
to increase the NASA budget to both meet the demands of the Space 
Shuttle and the International Space Station programs and allow signif- 
icant investments in major new efforts such as a Shuttle replacement. 
The Space Shuttle budget had peaked at over $5.5 billion per year as 
NASA recovered from the Challenger accident; the Bush administra- 
tion, in early 1992, had proposed a $4.1-billion allocation. By the time 
Dan Goldin left office in November 2001, the Shuttle budget had been 
reduced by another 25 percent, to $3.2 billion per year. Goldin initiated 
the switch of Shuttle operations to private-sector management both as 
a cost-savings measure and as a way to encourage NASA engineers to 
focus on developing new capabilities. Until 1999, when he declared 
a “space launch crisis,” Goldin was unwilling to allocate significant 
resources to Shuttle upgrades. Even so, Goldin, during his long tenure, 
came to recognize that successful and safe operation of the Shuttle was 
critical to political and public support of NASA’s programs. His expec- 
tation was that by innovative partnerships with the private sector, the 
technological developments on which to base a Shuttle replacement 
could be achieved without a multibillion-dollar government invest- 
ment. This unfortunately proved to be a false hope. 
31. Butrica, Single Stage to  Orbit, pp. 66, 81; Bekey, “Exploring Future Space Transportation 
Possibilities,” p. 508. 
32. As one indication of his attitude, it IS reported that Goldin had removed from the cabin of 
the NASA Administrator’s airplane all the pictures of the Space Shuttle that had been placed there 
under Richard Truly. 
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17. In 1992, during the last months of the George H. W. Bush administra- 
tion, the Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board, which advised 
the National Space Council, recommended the development by 2000 
of an expendable “Spacelifter” launch vehicle, which would be human- 
rated, and also the development of a new Personnel Launch System for 
use with it. This would allow the government to “phase out the Space 
Shuttle at the earliest opport~ni ty .”~~ With the November 1992 elec- 
tion of a new administration, the recommendations contained in the 
Advisory Board’s report were stillborn. 
18. In 1993, both NASA Administrator Goldin and the U.S. Congress 
requested that the NASA staff carry out a comprehensive study of 
alternate approaches to accessing space through 2030. A principal 
goal of the study was “to make major reductions in the cost of space 
transportation (at least 50 per cent), while at the same time increasing 
safety for flight crews by at least an order of magnitude.” The Access 
to Space Study examined three alternatives: 1) an upgraded Shuttle, 
2) new expendable vehicles using conventional technologies, and 
3) “new reusable vehicles using advanced technologies.” The study 
concluded that “the most beneficial option is to develop and deploy 
a fully reusable single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) pure-rocket launch 
vehicle fleet” that would allow the phasing out of the Space Shuttle, 
beginning in 2008.34 
19. This conclusion of the Access to Space Study became formalized when 
President Clinton approved a new statement of National Space 
Transportation Policy in August 1994. That statement gave NASA the 
responsibility “to support government and private sector decisions by 
the end of this decade on the development of an operational next gen- 
eration reusable launch system.” NASA was to focus its research “on 
technologies to support a decision no later than December 1996 to 
proceed with a sub-scale demonstration which would prove the con- 
cept of single-stage-to-orbit.” The policy envisioned that the private 
sector “could have a significant role in managing the development and 
operation of a new reusable space transportation It was 
extremely unusual, if not unprecedented, for a specific technological 
solution such as the SSTO approach to be written into a presidential 
policy statement on space. 
33. Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, vol. 4, document IV-6, p. 550. 
34. Ibid., document IV-14, pp. 585-586. 
35. Ibid., document IV-16, p. 628. 
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20. Given the White House policy directive, NASA, over the following 
two years, organized a competition among potential developers of the 
subscale flight demonstrator. Three companies submitted proposals. 
Rockwell International proposed a vehicle that was in many ways a 
second-generation version of the Space Shuttle; Rockwell had been 
the prime contractor for the Shuttle. McDonnell Douglas proposed 
a version of the Delta Clipper vehicle that had been developed under 
The McDonnell Douglas Delta Clipper-Experimental (DC-XA) reusable launch 
vehicle (RLV) was originally developed for DOD. NASA assumed control of the 
vehicle in the summer of 1995. The DC-XA was to have been an SSTO vertical 
takeoff/vertical landing launch vehicle concept, whose development would 
significantly reduce launch cost and provide a test bed for NASA RLV technology. 
(NASA MSFC image no. MSFC-95732141 
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the sponsorship of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization to 
demonstrate simpler space operations  technique^.^^ Lockheed Martin 
proposed an advanced-technology vehicle based on the use of a linear 
aerospike engine. On 2 July 1996, Vice President A1 Gore announced 
that NASA had selected the most technologically advanced (and thus 
the riskiest) of these proposals, that from Lockheed Martin. The rea- 
soning behind this decision has not been adequately explored. 
At that time, the plan was to have the first flight of what was 
christened the X-33 by March 1999 and to complete a 15-flight test 
program by the end of that year. The goal was to demonstrate the 
technological foundation for a decision by Lockheed Martin to invest 
its own funds in a full-scale operational vehicle, which the company 
named VentureStar.TM The X-33 program would be a cooperative 
undertaking between NASA and Lockheed Martin, with NASA pro- 
\ viding $941 million of the required funding and Lockheed providing 
$220 million. Once Lockheed Martin developed the VentureStarTM 
using private capital, the assumption was that NASA would be a 
major customer for its services, but also that a booming commercial 
space industry would emerge. The combination of government and 
commercial demand for access to space, it was claimed, would allow 
Venturestarm to be a profitable ~nder tak ing .~~ 
Although Lockheed Martin, over the following several years, pro- 
moted theVentureStarTM project as symbolic of its status on the cutting 
edge of future technologies, the X-33 program encountered technologi- 
cal difficulties almost from its inception. In November 1999, there was 
a major test failure of the vehicle’s hydrogen fuel tank; by that time, 
the White House and NASA were losing confidence that the program 
would be able to overcome its technological hurdles. In March 2001, 
NASA announced that it would provide no more funding for the X- 
33, effectively killing it well before a flight demonstration could be 
attempted. At that point, NASA had spent $912 million on the project, 
while Lockheed Martin had exceeded its planned investment, having 
put $356 million into the X-33.38 
21. Some in the Executive Office of the President and at NASA had, 
by at least 1998 (if not before), become skeptical that the X-33 pro- 
36. See Butrica, Single Stage to Orbit, parts I11 and IV, for a discussion of the origins and fate of the 
37. NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, “Lockheed Martin Selected to Build the X-33,” news 
38. Leonard David, “NASA Shuts Down X-33, X-34 Programs,” Space.com, 1 March 2001, 
Delta Chpper program. 
release 96-53, 2 July 1996. 
http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/missions/x33~cancel~OlO3Ol. html (accessed 5 February 2005). 
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gram would be able to overcome its technical challenges and would 
provide the information needed to decide when and how to replace 
the Shuttle. In 1998, the Office of Management and Budget asked 
NASA to fund the aerospace industry to carry out what were called 
Space Transportation Architecture Studies to determine 1) if the Space 
Shuttle system should be replaced; 2) if so, when the replacement 
should take place and how the transition should be implemented; and 
3) if not, what is the upgrade strategy to continue safe and affordable 
flight of the Space Shuttle beyond 2010. Five industry teams examined 
these questions through 1999 and came up with a variety of approaches 
to meeting both NASA and commercial-sector launch requirements. 
Many of the suggested approaches for taking humans to space involved 
a capsule-type spacecraft launched on top of an expendable launch 
vehicle. NASA leadership viewed such proposals as not being ade- 
quately forward-looking. 
22. In 1999, NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin declared a “space launch 
crisis” and urged the White House to add funds to the NASA bud- 
get for necessary safety upgrades to the Shuttle. Substantial funds for 
this purpose were added to the NASA FY 2001 budget, submitted to 
Congress in early 2000. However, this upgrade initiative had a short 
lifespan. Within a year, funding for upgrades was reduced by over 
one-third in response to rising Shuttle operating costs and the need to 
stay within a fixed Shuttle budget.39 
23. Based on the results of the Space Transportation Architecture Studies 
and the increasingly evident problems with the X-33 program, the 
NASA FY 2001 budget also contained a new Space Launch Initiative. 
This effort was to provide some $4.8 billion over five years to conduct 
studies and technology development to identify the most promising 
path to replacing the Space Shuttle and meeting other launch require- 
ments. The hope was that this effort could provide the basis for a 2006 
decision on what type of Shuttle replacement to develop, with a target 
date of 2012 for its initial launch. Three contractor teams-Boeing, 
Lockheed Martin, and a joint team of Orbital Sciences and Northrop 
Grumman-by early 2002 had identified 15 launcher concepts for 
detailed 
39. CAIB, Report, p. 114. 
40. Leonard David, “Plans for Next Generation ‘Shuttle’ Ends First Phase; 15 Concepts Have 
Emerged,” Space.com, 30 April 2002, http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/sIi~firstphase~020430. 
html (accessed 5 February 2005). 
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24.The Space Launch Initiative was also short-lived. By the end of 2002, 
White House and top-level NASA optimism that it would provide the 
hoped-for basis for deciding to develop a second-generation, advanced- 
technology replacement for the Space Shuttle had evaporated. In 
November 2002, NASA announced that it was terminating the Space 
Launch Initiative and reallocating its funding to a new Integrated Space 
Transportation Plan. According to this plan, the Shuttle’s life would be 
extended so that it could fly until 2020, and potentially to 2030. The 
Shuttle would be used for missions requiring its cargo-carrying and 
orbital-operations capabilities. However, for missions carrying only crew 
to and from the International Space Station, a new Orbital Space Plane 
(OSP) would be developed, but as a complement to, not a replacement 
for, the Shuttle.The OSP would not be an advanced-technology vehicle; 
the goal was to have it available for use as an ISS crew-rescue vehicle by 
2010, eliminating dependence on the Russian Soyuz spacecraft to per- 
form this function.The OSP would also become a crew-transfer vehicle 
by 2012, capable of carrying four or more astronauts to the International 
Space Station.The OSP would be launched either in the Shuttle’s cargo 
bay or atop an expendable launch vehicle. A third element of the plan 
was funding of technologies and studies for an eventual next-generation 
vehicle to replace the Shuttle. No date was set for such a replacement 
vehicle to enter service. 
The Integrated Space Transportation Plan was also a reaction to the 
lack of a long-term plan for U.S. human spaceflight. Without know- 
ing how long the International Space Station would operate, it was not 
possible to determine how long the Space Shuttle would be needed. 
Without a post-ISS goal for human spaceflight, particularly given the 
collapse of the commercial space launch market, it also was not clear 
what kind of “post-Shuttle” vehicle to develop. 
25. On 1 February 2003, Shuttle orbiter Columbia broke up overTexas, and 
all seven crew members aboard died. As noted at the start of this essay, 
the August 2003 report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
set off, in the following months, a sweeping review of national space 
policy. On 14 January 2004, President George W. Bush announced a new 
“Vision for Space Exploration” centered on “a sustained and affordable 
program of human and robotic exploration of the solar ~ystem.”~’ The 
newvision had as a key element the decision to retire the Space Shuttle 
as soon as the assembly of the International Space Station was declared 
41. White House, “Renewed Spirit of Discovery.” 
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complete, in 2010 or soon thereafter. To replace the Shuttle, the Vision 
calls for the development of a Crew ExplorationVehicle (CEV) to carry 
humans into space, first to low-Earth orbit and eventually to the Moon 
and Mars. This vehicle will house the crew as they travel into space 
and thus will indeed replace the Shuttle as the means for U.S. human 
access to space.The CEV is the latest of the many attempts to develop a 
replacement for the Space Shuttle as a human transport vehicle. One can 
only hope that it will be become reality, unlike its predecessors. 
One cannot escape the conclusion that these 25 “snapshots” add up to a 
portrait of failure-failure to provide for the United States’ “assured access” to 
space for its citizens. Since 1981, there has been only one way for the United 
States to send people into space-at least using U.S. hardware. That way, of 
course, has been the Space Shuttle, and with its two fatal accidents, the United 
States lost human access to space twice-first for 32 months, and then for more 
than 30 months.The United States will not have independent access to space 
for humans between the time the Space Shuttle is retired in 2010 and the CEV 
begins crewed operations.This interval could be as long as four years, and during 
that time, the only way for U.S. astronauts to get to and from the International 
Space Station will be on Russian spacecraft. 
It is worth noting that “assured access” for key national security and other 
robotic payloads has been a stated national policy since at least 1988. In its 1988 
statement of National Space Policy, the Reagan administration declared that 
“United States space transportation systems must provide a balanced, robust, and 
flexible capability with sufficient resiliency to allow continued operations despite 
failures in any single system.” The 1991 National Space Policy of President 
George H.W. Bush stated that “assured access to space is a key element of U.S. 
national space policy.’742 This policy continues in force today. President George W. 
Bush, on 21 December 2004, approved a new National Space Transportation 
Policy which stated that “‘assured access’ is a requirement for critical national 
security, homeland security, and civil missions.” To be fair, this most recent state- 
ment also suggests that assured access to space for humans is also a desired policy 
objective. It declares that “access to space through U.S. space transportation capa- 
bilities is essential . . . to support government and commercial human space- 
flight.”43 If this objective were met, it would signifjr a strong commitment to 
human spaceflight on the part of the U.S. government.As the following analysis 
suggests, such a strong commitment has been missing for many years. 
42. Thor Hogan and Vic Villhard, “National Space Transportation Policy: Issues for the Future,” 
43. Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President, “National Space 
RAND Science andTechnology Working PaperWR-105-OSTP, October 2003, p. 7. 
Transportation Policy,” fact sheet, 6 January 2005. 
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THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE FAILURE TO 
DEVELOP A SHUTTLE REPLACEMENT 
There can be no one explanation for why this complex chain of devel- 
opments has taken place. But certainly it is possible to suggest some of the 
fundamental reasons for the lack of a Shuttle replacement more than 30 years 
after the original commitment to the Space Shuttle program. 
W. D. Kay, in his book Can Democracies Fly in Space, suggests that the 
“space program’s failures, like its earlier successes, have multiple causes, all of 
them ultimately traceable to the way the American political process operates.” 
Space policy is “a political outcome, a product of the discussion, debates, com- 
petition, and compromises that attend all public issues.” While there could 
be alternate frameworks within which to examine the reasons why there has 
been no replacement for the Space Shuttle, this essay will adopt the political 
perspective suggested by Kay. He sets out a framework that provides a useful 
way to analyze this situation. Kay suggests that it is possible to conceptualize 
the creation of space policy in terms of three levels of analysis: 
1. An organizational output, produced by the hardware, procedures, and 
personnel developed and trained by NASA. 
2. A political activity, an outgrowth of the ongoing debates, compro- 
mises, votes, and other decisions involving NASA, its contractors, the 
Congress, various executive agencies, and a number of other loosely 
coordinated (and in some cases competing) individuals, institutions, 
and organizations, both public and private. 
3. A national enterprise, the product of a society and a people possessing 
not only a certain level of technical expertise, but also a high degree 
of consensus and a determination expressed through its political 
representatives . . . .44 
These three levels of analysis, and particularly viewing space policy as the 
foundation of a national enterprise, help to understand was has happened in 
the space sector over the past three and one-half decades. 
44. W. D. Kay, Can Democracies Fly in Space? The Challenge of Revitalizing the U.S. Space Program 
(Westport, C T  Praeger Publishers, 1995), pp. 33, 26-27. 
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TECHNOLOGICAL HUBRIS AND ORGANIZATIONAL OUTPUTS 
In the last 20 years, the aerospace community has been given two major 
opportunities by the national leadership to develop a Shuttle replacement; 
these opportunities were accompanied by significant (although not adequate) 
funding commitments. The first of these opportunities, the NASP program, 
was initially justified on national security grounds; NASA was a junior part- 
ner in the undertaking and was not able to continue it as a development effort 
leading to a flight-test vehicle once Department of Defense funding was with- 
drawn. The second opportunity was the SSTO effort initiated by NASA in 
1996 in response to NASA’s internal studies and then the 1994 National Space 
Transportation Policy. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to see that these two efforts 
were very likely doomed to failure from their outset. In both cases, the approach 
selected depended on being able simultaneously to bring to an adequate level 
of maturity a variety of challenging technologies in areas such as aerodynam- 
ics, guidance and control, materials, and propulsion. Those responsible for 
both efforts within the Department of Defense, NASA, and the aerospace 
industry assured their leaders that they could overcome these technological 
challenges and move forward rapidly and with affordable costs. These assur- 
ances were at variance with what actually transpired. 
As mentioned above, the reality that the NASP program was unlikely 
soon to result in a flight vehicle became rather quickly evident after President 
Reagan gave the program national visibility in 1986. By 1988, the Defense 
Science Board had raised major questions about the technological feasibil- 
ity of the undertaking. In 1989, the RAND Corporation reported “reserva- 
tions” with respect to NASP coming “anywhere near its stated/advertised 
cost, schedule, payload fees to orbit, etc. . . .” and suggested that the “primary 
NASP X-30 objective-manned single stage to orbit-is exceedingly sensi- 
tive to full success in technology maturation.’”’ Ivan Bekey, a proponent of 
a rocket-based approach to space access rather than the NASP air-breathing 
approach, was less kind; he has characterized the NASP program as “the big- 
gest swindle ever to be foisted on the country,” “full of dubious . . . claims” 
and “hot air.”46 
WhenVice President AI Gore announced in July 1996 that NASA had 
selected Lockheed Martin’s proposal to develop an SSTO demonstrator, he 
made a point of noting that it was the most “technologically advanced” of the 
45. Bruno Augenstein and Elwyn Harris, “Assessment of NASP: Future Options,” RAND Working 
46. Quoted in Butrica, Single Stage to Orbit, p. 79. 
Dr&WD-4437-1-AF, July 1989, p. 2. 
290 CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
three competing proposals.The story of why this risky choice was made has yet 
to be told. But once again, an approach to replacing the Shuttle had been chosen 
that would require simultaneous maturation of challenging techn~logies.~’ And 
once gain, achieving that maturation, at least on the original timescale and in 
the face of an impatient NASA and national leadership, proved impossible. 
Why were these two efforts given high-level approval to proceed and 
widespread publicity when, at the time of approval, their chances of success 
were known to be low to at least some observers? This is a question deserving 
of more attention than it has received to date. 
In 1989, one veteran aerospace engineer wondered, with respect to NASP, 
“HOW could ideas that were so thoroughly explored thirty years ago, and so 
thoroughly found lacking in sufficient promise twenty years go, have sud- 
denly become once again in vogue?” It was not technological progress that 
had brought the ideas to the fore, he concluded, but rather “blissful igno- 
rance of the past.” Only a few of the instigators of the NASP program had 
been involved in earlier efforts, and “they were the ones who not only had 
been infected by the dream of long ago, but who had, in the process, become 
addicted to it and, therefore, immune to any amount of contrary e~idence.”~’ 
One suspects that an informed independent assessment of those who advo- 
cated the X-33 program would not be much different in its conclusions. 
The costs of a lack of historical perspective and unchecked technological 
optimism, bordering on hubris, have been high. Roger Launius has suggested 
that the X-33 program and the NASP program before it “have been enormous 
detours for those seeking to move forward with a replacement for the Space 
Shuttle. Expending bilhons of dollars and dozens of years in pursuit of reus- 
able SSTO technology, the emphasis on this approach ensured the tardiness of 
development because of the strikingly ddkult technological  challenge^."^^ The 
Columbia Board agreed, suggesting that one reason for the ‘‘failure of national 
leadership” related to the absence of a replacement for the Space Shuttle was 
“continuing to expect major technological advances” in a replacement vehicle.50 
How are nontechnical decision-makers to be protected against the enthu- 
siasm of technological optimists? That is a topic well beyond the scope of this 
essay, but clearly, in the case of NASP and X-33, the necessary checks and 
balances were missing or not influential. 
47. It should be noted that although X-33 and then Venturestarm were widely perceived as 
a path to Shuttle replacement, the original designs were for an automated, cargo-carrying vehicle. 
Presumably, humans could be carried as “cargo,” i.e., passengers, as the reliability of Venturestarm was 
demonstrated. 
48. Carl H. Builder, “The NASP as a Time Machine,” R A N D  Internal Note 25684-AF, August 
1989, p. 1. 
49. Launius, “After Columbia,” p. 291. 
50. CAIB, Report, p. 211. 
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THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE STRENGTH 
OF THE PRO-SHUTTLE COALITION 
As noted by the CAIB, the Space Shuttle is “an engineering marvel that 
enables a wide variety of on-orbit  operation^."^^ The Shuttle is also a program 
with a multibillion-dollar annual budget which employs thousands of people 
in various locations and is the focus of much of the activity at the Johnson 
Space Center, with a large astronaut corps located there; the Marshall Space 
Flight Center; and the Kennedy Space Center. Major and smaller aerospace 
firms across the United States work on the Shuttle program. 
It is not surprising, then, that throughout the Shuttle program’s history 
there has grown up a politically active coalition of government, contractor, 
local, and congressional supporters who argue that the Shuttle is a vehicle that 
continues to be superior in capabilities to any technologically feasible replace- 
ment, and who therefore have suggested that the preferred course of action is 
to invest scarce funds in upgrading and modernizing the Shuttle rather than 
seeking an early replacement. From the time when President Jimmy Carter (in 
1979) considered terminating the Shuttle program, through the conflicts in the 
early 1980s with the Air Force on one hand and foreign and domestic competi- 
tors on the other, to the aftermath of the Challenger and Columbia accidents, 
and perhaps even to the current time, this coalition has argued that it would be 
a mistake to rush towards a Shuttle replacement. Ten years ago, a report from 
an advisory group headed by NASA veteran Christopher Kraft argued that the 
Shuttle was “a mature and reliable system . . . about as safe as today’s technol- 
ogy will provide.”52 At the time of the 2003 CoZumbia accident, after the failure 
of the X-33 program and the Space Launch Initiative, NASA was planning to 
keep the Shuttle in operation until at least 2020 and potentially beyond. 
The existence of an organized coalition of public and private interests 
with a stake in the Space Shuttle program is an entirely legitimate phenom- 
enon. The whole system design of the American political process is intended 
to allow organized interests to contend for a favorable policy outcome. In 
this case, however, there was no organized alternative interest group push- 
ing for an early Shuttle replacement, and thus the default outcome of annual 
policy debates was likely to favor the pro-Shuttle position, or, at a minimum, 
not result in outcomes opposing it. While, for example, there was opposition 
from the scientific community and some members of Congress in the 1980s 
and 1990s to the space station program, there has been no similar consistent 
opposition to the Space Shuttle. 
51. Ibid., p. 25. 
52. Quoted in ibid., p. 118. 
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There were, however, limits to the political strength of the Shuttle sup- 
port coalition. Although it may have been powerful enough to raise questions 
about the wisdom of proceeding rapidly towards a Shuttle replacement, it 
did not have enough power within the political process to influence deci- 
sion-makers to allocate adequate resources for upgrading the Shuttle and its 
associated infrastructure. The Shuttle program budget was cut by more than 
40 percent in purchasing power between 1991 and 2000. Although some 
upgrades were introduced into the system, more were not funded or canceled 
soon after being approved, and the Shuttle’s ground infrastructure was “dete- 
r i~ra t ing .”~~ Especially in the decade before the Columbiu accident, uncertainty 
about when the Shuttle might be replaced, as the politically weaker and not 
well organized advocates of such replacement contended with the pro-Shuttle 
coalition, created an ambivalent policy attitude towards the Shuttle program. 
This policy outcome was perhaps the worst possible situation-not enough 
funding for successful operation of the Shuttle, but also inadequate politi- 
cal commitment behind an effort to replace it. It was most fundamentally a 
reflection of the place that human spaceflight held, and perhaps continues to 
hold, in the list of national priorities-something that most Americans want 
to see continue but are unwilling to invest enough resources in to do well. 
This is an attitude criticized by those committed to human spaceflight. 
Launius notes that “if the United States intends to fly humans in space it 
should be willing to foot the bill for doing so.” He suggests that “if Americans 
are unwilling as a people to make that investment, as longtime NASA engi- 
neer and designer of the Mercury capsule spacecraft Max Faget [who died in 
20041 recently stated, ‘we ought to be ashamed of our~elves.”’~~ These are 
noble sentiments but do not reflect the long-standing reality of how the space 
program has been seen in terms of national priorities. 
HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT AS A NATIONAL ENTERPRISE 
Kay, writing a decade ago, observed that “three decades ago, the United 
States government made a decision to support space exploration-including 
human flight-on a rather large scale.” He questions whether “our present 
institutional arrangements and political practices prevent us from carrying 
out that decision effectively,” and thus there may be a need to “rethink our 
original policy decision.”55 
This essay asserts that at the national leadership level, the decision “to 
support space exploration-including human flight-on a rather large scale” 
53. Ibid., p. 114. 
54. Launius, “After Columbia,” p. 295. 
55. Kay, Can Democracies Fly in Space? p. x. 
‘‘A FAILURE OF NATIONAL LEADERSHIP” . . . 293 
was rethought soon after it was made and that the outcome of that rethinking 
was a much more muted commitment to the civilian space program over- 
all, including human spaceflight. The people of the United States and their 
government have been willing, over the past 35 years, to continue a human 
spaceflight program, but only at a level of funding that has forced it to con- 
stantly operate on the edge of viability. The lack of a replacement for the 
Space Shuttle is a symptom of this larger reality. In this context, the assertion 
that the lack of a Shuttle replacement is a “failure of national leadership” is 
the logical result of the halfhearted U.S. commitment to human spaceflight. 
If there is a “failure,” then, it is the failure to reconcile the reality of limited 
support with this country’s continuing commitment to sending people into 
space. Human spaceflight may indeed be a “national enterprise”-but it is one 
that for many years has not been central to important American interests, at 
least as they are expressed through the political process. 
Kay ends his book with the question, “Can democracies fly in space?” 
His answer to this question is another question: “How badly do they want 
What will be argued below is that the answer to this second question 
is “not very badly.” 
Perhaps the single most convincing piece of evidence in support of this 
conclusion is the pattern of resources allocated to NASA over its history, as 
seen in the familiar figure repeated on the following page. Two things are 
remarkable about this pattern of resource allocation. The one most usually 
remarked upon is the rapid buildup of resources in the early 1960s in support 
of Project Apollo. This indeed was a peacetime mobilization of financial (and 
human) resources on a wartime scale. The Apollo buildup created an image 
of what a successful space program should be-one developing large-scale, 
expensive technology to take people into space. 
Equally remarkable, however, and more fundamental to the argument 
of this paper is the rapid builddown of resources allocated to NASA between 
1965 and 1974, and even more so the stability of that allocation over the past 
30 years. It: is impossible to escape the conclusion that, whatever the specific 
content of the NASA program at a particular time, the American public and 
their leaders, through the political process, have consistently decided to allo- 
cate less that 1 percent of the annual federal budget to the civilian space pro- 
gram as a national enterprise. This decision has been made, and reinforced, 
as the federal budget for each successive fiscal year has been assembled in the 
White House and approved or modified by the Congress. Within that alloca- 
tion, national leaders have expected NASA to carry on a successful program 
of human spaceflight as well as its other activities. The result, as the CAIB 
56. Ibid., p. 193 
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observed with respect to the Columbia accident, has been an agency striving to 
“do too much with too little.” 
The basic decision that the United States, after succeeding in being first 
to land humans on the Moon, would not continue an ambitious program of 
human spaceflight in Earth orbit and beyond was made in 1969-1970 as the 
administration of President Richard Nixon formulated its post-Apollo policy 
for the civilian space program. It is a decision that has been reinforced by 
Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Clinton. 
Up to 2004, only President George H. W. Bush (in 1989) suggested a 
reinvigoration of the human spaceflight program. Between President Bush’s 
1989 proposal for a “Space Exploration Initiative” and the time he was defeated 
in the 1992 election, it became clear, through the operation of the political 
process, that the country was not interested in a higher priority, more expen- 
sive human spaceflight effort.57 
The first step in the process offormulating a policy to guide the space pro- 
gram after the end of the Apollo program was the creation in February 1969 of 
the Space Task Group, chaired by Vice President Spiro T. Agnew. This group 
was charged with preparing “definitive recommendations on the direction 
57. See Thor Hogan, “Mars Wars: A Case History of Pohcymaklng in the American Space 
Program” (Ph.D. dlss., George Washlngton University, 2004), for a careful account of the origms 
and fate of the 1989 Space Exploration Initiative. 
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which the U.S. space program should take in the post-Apollo period.”58 In its 
15 September 1969 report, the Space Task Group set out several options for the 
future and, “as a focus for the development of new capability,” recommended 
that “the United States accept the long-term option or goal of manned plan- 
etary exploration with a manned Mars mission before the end of the century 
as the first target.” This recommendation was actually a watered-down ver- 
sion of what the Group intended to recommend. President Nixon’s advisers 
had intervened at the last minute, as the report was going into print, to make 
sure that the report did not contain the Group’s planned recommendation that 
the initial mission to Mars be carried out in the 1980s, a recommendation that 
was politically unacceptable. The report proposed that whatever option was 
chosen by the President, the NASA budget by 1980 should be anywhere from 
the same as to twice that at the peak of the Apollo program.59 
Accepting the Space Task Group’s recommendations would have meant 
accepting a long-term national commitment to a robust program of human 
spaceflight, with repeated trips to the Moon and, eventually, forays to Mars. 
This was not at all what Richard Nixon and his advisers had in mind for the 
post-Apollo space effort. Rather than reward NASA for the success of the 
Apollo 11 landing, between October 1969 and January 1970, the NASA bud- 
get for fiscal year 1971 was severely reduced. In October, NASA requested 
White House approval of a $4.5-billion budget which would allow it to begin 
to implement the recommendations of the Space Task Group; by the time the 
President’s budget was sent to Congress the following January, that amount 
had been reduced to $3.3 billion, a cut of over 25 percent from NASA’s request 
and even $400 million less than the previous year’s budget. 
This outcome was not just the result of the Nixon administration’s desire 
to submit a balanced budget; it reflected a major space policy choice. As 
Nixon’s top adviser on space policy Peter Flanigan told the President in a 6 
December 1969 memorandum: 
The October 6 issue of Newsweek took a poll of 1,321 
Americans with household incomes ranging from $5,000 to 
$15,000 a year. This represents 61% of the white population 
of the United States and is obviously the heart of your con- 
stituency. Of this group, 56% think the government should be 
spending less money on space exploration, and only 10% think 
that the government should be spending more money.6o 
58. Logsdon, Exploring the Unknown, vol. 1, document 111-22, p. 513. 
59. Ibid., document 111-25, p. 524. 
60. Ibid., document 111-27, p. 546. 
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NASA Administrator Thomas Paine, who had been touring both the 
United States and foreign countries to promote a post-Apollo space program 
as set out in the Space Task Group report, met with President Nixon on 22 
January 1970 to make one last attempt to keep NASA on a path towards the 
approach laid out in the report. He had no success; Nixon told Paine that 
although he regretted the severe cuts to the NASA budget, “they were neces- 
sary in view of the overall budget situation-the reduced revenues and infla- 
tion.” Nixon discussed “the mood of the country,” which in the President’s 
judgment “was for cuts in space and defense.” Paine, ever an optimist, felt that 
the President “honestly would like to support a more vigorous space program 
if he felt the national mood favored it.” But that was not the case, and Nixon 
wanted to make sure that he was not put in a position where “the opposition 
could invidiously compare his positive statements on space to problems in 
poverty and social programs here on Earth.” Nixon did not want to appear to 
be “taking money away from social programs and the needs of the people here 
to fund spectacular crash programs out in space.” Paine also noted that in their 
meeting, “the President didn’t mention the Space Task Group Report.”61 
On 7 March 1970, the White House released a presidential statement on 
the future ofthe U.S. space program; Richard Nixon never addressed the sub- 
ject in a public address. The statement was cast both as a response to the Space 
Task Group report and as an evaluation of where space fit into the country’s 
future. Its message was clear: 
Space expenditures must take their proper place within a rigor- 
ous system of national priorities. What we do in space from here 
on in must become a normal and regular part of our national 
life and must therefore be planned in conjunction with all of the 
other undertakings which are important to us.62 
The 1969-1970 interactions between NASA and the Nixon White House 
have been given detailed attention because they reflect a fundamental policy 
decision that has not been given adequate historical attention. In the months 
following the apex of U.S. success in human spaceflight with the Apollo 11 
mission, the American President decided that it was neither in his political 
interest nor, more important, consistent with the desires of the American 
public to continue with a well-funded program of human spaceflight. This 
was not, as has been suggested, a case in which “the budget begat space policy 
61. Thomas Paine, “Meeting with the President, January 22, 1970,” memo for record, 22 January 
1970, Apollo Files, University of Houston-Clear Lake Library, Clear Lake,TX. 
62. Richard M. Nixon, “Statement About the Future of the United States Space Program,” 7 
March 1970, in US.  President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1971), p. 251. 
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instead of space policy begetting the budget.”63 Rather, it reflected a deliber- 
ate, purposeful reversal of the space policy adopted by the Kennedy adminis- 
tration that had led to Project Apollo. That policy held that success in highly 
visible space projects was “part of the battle along the fluid front of the cold 
war”; that “dramatic achievements in space . . . symbolize the technological 
power and organizing capacity of a nation”; that it was “man, not machines, 
that captures the imagination of the world”; and that “the nation needs to make 
a positive decision to pursue space projects aimed at national prestige”64 (emphasis 
in original). To Richard Nixon and his advisers, this was not an acceptable 
rationale for a post-Apollo space program. They did not want to put an end 
to human spaceflight, but they were unwilling to set an ambitious goal to 
guide that effort. Instead, they approved development of a means-the Space 
Shuttle-without stating clearly the objectives it was to serve. 
The decision on the future of the space program, and particularly on 
the future of its most visible element, human spaceflight, taken by the Nixon 
administration 35 years ago has remained the core national space policy until 
recently. That decision viewed the space program as a national enterprise, 
to use Kay’s term, but one of secondary priority compared to other areas of 
national activity such as a strong defense, adequate social welfare, and, since 
2001, homeland security. Based on the priority assigned to space efforts in this 
policy, for more than 30 years there hzs been a remarkably consistent share of 
the federal budget allocated to NASA. 
That budget share has also been consistently inadequate to support the 
aspirations of NASA and the space community. Neither the space agency nor 
its supporters have adjusted their aspirations to that reality. Instead, they have 
continued to hold on to the hope that either a technological breakthrough on 
the order of NASP or VentureStarTM or a shift in the national priority assigned 
to space will allow them to make their dreams reality. 
It is understandable that those most directly involved in the space sector 
harbor expansive ambitions for the future. What is not acceptable as a basis for 
government policy is to allow those ambitions to remain unchecked when the 
resources for achieving them are not, and are not likely to be, available. It is up 
to the leaders of NASA and to those to whom they report in the White House 
and Congress to steer the organization in a direction consistent with its place in 
the public’s priorities. As suggested earlier, those leaders have failed to do so. 
63. This is the argument put forth by Joan Hoff in her essay “The Presidency, Congress, and 
the Deceleration of the U.S. Space Program in the 1970s,” in Spaceflight and the Myth o f  Presidential 
Leadership, ed. Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1997), p. 106. 
64. This quotation comes from the 8 May 1961 memorandum, signed by NASA Administrator 
James E. Webb and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, recommending that President 
Kennedy set a human lunar landing as a national goal. The memorandum can be found in Logsdon, 
Exploring the Unknown, vol. 1, p. 444. 
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This analysis seems to have wandered rather far &om the focus of this essay 
on explaining why no replacement for the Space Shuttle has yet been developed. 
On the contrary-the answer to that question depends on understanding the 
context within which the human spaceflight program has operated for at least 
the last 35 years. Beginning with the Nixon administration (or perhaps even 
earlier),65 the political process by which the United States sets priorities among 
various government activities has assigned a consistently secondary priority to 
the NASA space program. Operating within that priority, NASA was able to 
develop the Space Shuttle during the 1970s only by retiring all of the systems 
that had been developed for Project Apollo, with the exception of using surplus 
equipment for the 1973 Skylab and the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz missions.With these 
two exceptions, NASA accepted a lengthy hiatus in human spaceflight as an 
acceptable price to pay for being permitted to develop the Space Shuttle. 
Once the Space Shuttle started flying in 1981 and a space station was 
approved in 1984, NASA has had no similar opportunity to stop what it was 
doing and invest the funds thereby made available in developing a Shuttle 
replacement. Instead, it has had to try both to continue its ongoing, Shuttle- 
based human spaceflight program and to develop new spaceflight capabilities 
within an unvarying share of the federal budget. This has, to date, proven an 
impossible challenge to surmount. Therein lies the fundamental reason why 
there is, today, no replacement for the Space Shuttle; it is a product of a space 
policy decision made many years ago and not reversed since. 
SO HAS WERE REALLY BEEN A FAILURE? 
Calling the lack of a replacement for the Space Shuttle “a failure of 
national leadership” is based on the assumption, as stated in the CAIB report, 
that “America’s future space efforts must include human presence in Earth 
orbit, and eventually beyond.”66 If the United States is to continue human 
spaceflight, so this line of argument goes, it is essential to develop a Shuttle 
replacement rather than continue to rely on the aging and expensive Shuttle. 
To have come so far in space and not to have such a replacement ready or on 
the horizon must indeed be the result of a failure on the part of those respon- 
sible for allocating national resources to provide the support needed. 
There is an alternative perspective: that a program of continuing human 
spaceflight, eventually leading to travel beyond Earth orbit, does serve the 
national interest. The rationales in support of human spaceflight are diffi- 
65.The NASA budget actually began its rapid decline from the 1965 peak of spending on Apollo 
while Lyndon B. Johnson was President. Although Johnson was committed to completing Apollo, he 
apparently gave post-Apollo spaceflight lower priority in the context of the other issues facing hnn in 
the 1965-1968 period. 
66. CAIB, Report, p. 210. 
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cult to articulate to the unconvinced in convincing fashion; Launius calls 
the rationale for human spaceflight “highly pr~blematic.”~~ For example, one 
member of the space community recently commented that taking “as axiom- 
atic that space’s highest and true calling is achieving societal goals of research 
and exploration into the unknown” is the “burdensome baggage of an aristo- 
cratic calling, now bankrupt both ideologically and financially.”68 
What appears to be needed is some form of a national debate on the future 
of human spaceflight that will allow these and other conflicting perspectives 
to be fully articulated and the long-standing policy of assigning space efforts 
a secondary priority as a national enterprise to be reassessed. As suggested 
above, the current policy that assigns space such a priority has resulted in a 
human spaceflight effort that has struggled now for many years to be a viable 
undertaking. As one recent analysis suggests, the fact that the vision of human 
spaceflight, including the resumption of human voyages of exploration, has 
not resonated “with the American public to the point where it inspires action 
is a reflection of a larger problem: the U.S. currently has no larger shared 
vision” into which a space exploration vision can fit.69 
The policy of assigning secondary priority to space is thus not a “failure” 
in a basic sense; the policy is the consistent result of a democratic political 
process and thus can be said to represent the will of the American public. It is 
also difficult to say that national leaders have failed when they have acted in 
accordance with the public will as expressed through established institutions 
and processes. 
Who then-or what-has failed? As suggested above, there has been a 
leadership failure in the sense that space ambitions and the resources to accom- 
plish them have not been brought into balance. But perhaps the failure also 
lies with those who continue to advocate the original space dream, which was 
based on “adventure, mystery, and exploration.” To date, they have failed to 
convince enough others that this dream is worth realizing to make it a focus 
of a higher priority national (or international) enterprise. Most Americans 
appear not to care very much about a future that includes a vigorous space 
effort. Advocates have not adjusted their hopes to reflect the resources soci- 
ety is willing to provide them. Rather, “the dreams continue, while the gap 
between expectations and reality remains unres~lved.”~~ 
67. For a discussion of the &&culty in stating a compelling rationale for human spaceflight, see John 
M. Logsdon, “A Sustainable Rationale for Human Spaceflight,” Issues in Science and Technology (winter 
2004); Launius, “Beyond Columbia,” quotation &om p. 
68. Rick Fleeter, “ContemplatingWhich Direction 
69. Center for Cultural Studies & Analysis, “American Perception ofspace Exploration: A Cultural 
Analysis for Harmonic International and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,” 
report to NASA, 1 May 2004, p. 3. 
70. Howard E. McCurdy, Space and the Americun Imagination (Washington, DC: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1997), p. 243. 
ace,” Space News (18 October 2004): 7. 
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EPILOGUE: AN ACHIEVABLE VISION? 
On 14 January 2004, President George Bush laid out what has become 
known as the Vision for Space Exploration. In his speech announcing this 
new vision, the President called for a “journey, not a race.” In the formal lan- 
guage of the policy directive underlying the Vision, the objective is a “sus- 
tained and affordable program of human and robotic exploration of the solar 
system and bey~nd.”~’  
Those planning this new approach to the U.S. space program appear 
to have recognized the reality described in this essay: any major new space 
initiative, if it is to be achievable, must be planned so that it can be carried 
out within a level of funding consistent with the pattern of more than three 
decades. The Vision gives highest priority within the NASA program to those 
activities related to exploration; other activities will receive lower priority and 
thus less funding in the future. A firm deadline has been set for retiring the 
Space Shuttle from service, and NASA’s activities aboard the International 
Space Station will be gradually phased out. A replacement for the Space 
Shuttle in its role of carrying Americans into space, the Crew Exploration 
Vehicle, is a key part of the new Vision. In order to stay within a politically 
feasible budget, the first crew-carrying flight of the CEV is not scheduled 
until the 2012-2014 timeframe, and the first human mission to the Moon is 
planned for 2018-2020. A several-year period during which the United States 
will have to depend on Russia for human access to space is accepted. Cost 
of achieving the Vision will be minimized by substantial international and 
private-sector involvement. According to the Vision’s financial projections, 
the NASA budget between 2004 and 2020 will increase only by 1.5 percent 
in the first five years of the new effort and not at all in constant dollars in the 
subsequent decade. 
Is this a vision that the country will support on a stable basis? Can its 
objectives be achieved within the resources pr~jected?~’ These are questions 
that cannot be answered now. What can be said is that the Vision for Space 
Exploration in its conception reflects the realities described in this essay. 
Whether its aspirations can become reality remains to be seen. 
71. White House, “Renewed Spirit of Discovery.” 
72. See U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, “A Budgetary Analysis of NASA’s New 
Vision for Space Exploration,” September 2004, for a skeptical response to this question. 
CHAPTER 10 
REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES OR 
EXPENDABLE AUNCH VEHICLES? 
A PERENNIAL DEBATE 
Andrew J. Butrica 
he decades-long debate over reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) versus T expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) has been less a reasoned debate than 
a sustained argument for the building of reusable launchers instead of the 
standard throwaway rocket. The single greatest touted advantage of reusable 
launch vehicles is that they reduce launch costs.' Comparing reusable and 
expendable rockets is not simple; it is a rather complicated task not unlike the 
proverbial comparing of apples and oranges. To compare the costs of the two 
types of rockets, we must consider two types of costs, recurring and nonrecur- 
ring. Nonrecurring costs entail those funds spent on designing, developing, 
researching, and engineering a launcher (called DDR&E costs). Recurring 
costs fall into two categories: expenses for building the launcher and the costs 
of its operation and maintenance. 
Outlays for designing, developing, researching, and engineering reusable 
launchers are necessarily higher than those for expendable launchers because 
reusable rockets are technologically more challenging. For example, a reusable 
launch vehicle must have advanced heat shielding to allow it to reenter the 
atmosphere not once, but many times.Throwaway rockets have no need for such 
heat shielding. In addition, we possess a profound knowledge of expendable 
rocket technologies thanks to our long experience (over a half of a century) with 
ICBMs and other single-use rockets, while many of the technologies needed to 
build a fully reusable launcher remain in the elusive future. Construction costs, 
however, favor reusable launchers. For each launch, the cost of building a new 
expendable rocket is a recurring expense. For reusable launchers, construction 
costs are part of the upfront costs amortized over each launch. 
Because reusable launch vehicles must fly many times in order to amor- 
tize startup costs, they have to be a lot more reliable than throwaway rockets, 
1. Another cost-comparison method, but one that applies to specific launchers rather than 
launcher types and is considered to be more like comparing apples to apples (rather than oranges), 
IS to determine the cost of delivering a pound of payload into orbit using a given launch system. 
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as well as more robust, so that on any given flight the craft does not suffer 
significant deterioration. The reliability of throwaway launchers is about 95 
percent-that is, on average, 1 launch in 20 fails. A reusable launcher with 
equal reliability would not be able to recoup the higher investment needed 
to develop and build it. Achieving the necessary increased robustness and 
reliability also increases the cost and decreases the useful payload weight for 
reusable launchers. 
The result of these intrinsic differences between the two launcher types 
leads to a tradeoff between the lower development costs of expendable rockets 
and the lower recurring costs of reusable launchers. In making that trade- 
off, one must take into account a number of other realistic factors that favor 
expendable launchers. For example, although one can amortize reusable vehi- 
cle construction costs over many flights, they are far more expensive to build 
than expendable rockets. Building a full-scale version of the VentureStarTM, 
Lockheed Martin’s failed attempt at a reusable, single stage to orbit (SSTO) 
launch vehicle, would have cost (conservatively) more than the $1 billion 
NASA spent on the X-33 program, the intent of which was to build a pro- 
totype of the VentureStarTM craft.2 That same amount of money might have 
bought 10 expendable rockets at $100 million each. Also, the knowledge 
gained in manufacturing a large number of a given type of disposable launcher 
actually can help to lower construction costs. Thus, in order to compete with 
the low development and construction costs of the established expendable 
industry, a reusable launcher would have to fly more than 50 times. 
The gamble of the reusable launcher is that a small fleet of three to five 
vehicles could put payloads into orbit for less than the cost of the number of 
expendable rockets required to lift similar payloads. A commercial builder and 
operator of reusable launchers, however, would be burdened by the need to 
amortize development and construction costs over each mission. An obvious 
solution would be to have the government pay for most or all of the develop- 
ment costs and for government (NASA and the Air Force) to buy one or two 
reusable launchers for its exclusive use. 
The preceding discussion applies to a comparison of expendable rockets 
with fully reusable launchers. The economics of launching a reusable vehi- 
cle atop an expendable booster are rather different. Such hybrid systems are 
technologically more achievable than fully reusable single-stage or two-stage 
rockets. A variety of launchers that combine reusable and expendable stages 
have been under development by companies and government, and they appear 
to promise reductions in the cost of placing payloads in orbit. Throughout 
2. NASA canceled plans to have a history of the X-33 written. To date, the best brief description 
of the project’s evolution is General Accounting Office, Status of the X-33 Reusable Launch Vehicle 
Program, GAO/NSIAD-99-176 (Washington, DC: GPO, August 1999), pp. 2-8. 
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the decades-long quest for reusability, the configuration of a reusable reentry 
vehicle atop a throwaway booster (a so-called boost-glide system) has domi- 
nated launcher thinking. In these boost-glide systems, the upper stage vehicle, 
once released from its booster rocket, climbs into orbit on its own power, then 
glides to a landing. Some reusable suborbital vehicles launch from a large jet, 
such as a B-52 or an L-1011. 
Cost has not been the only factor favoring one launch technological sys- 
tem over another. Emotional and political considerations are certainly key, as 
is the pull on the imagination exercised by the promise of reusable launchers. 
RLV enthusiasts believe that a fully reusable rocket would provide the low- 
cost, reliable transport to space necessary to realize the seemingly endless pos- 
sibilities of exploiting space-the “final frontier”-for colonization, mining, 
tourism, manufacturing, or just exploration. 
The history of the debate over reusable versus expendable launchers is 
complex, and one can explore it from a variety of perspectives. The most 
obvious is a narrative of the enduring endeavor to conceive and develop a 
reusable launch vehicle. This chapter begins with such an account, then dis- 
cusses the evolution of space transportation policy regarding reusable and 
expendable launchers. A third section raises historiographical questions about 
launch vehicle history as well as space history in general. 
THE SPACEPLANE CONCEPT 
One of the earliest reusable vehicle concepts was that of the ~paceplane.~ 
They are like airplanes in a rather simplistic and literal way. They have wings 
and take off and land horizontally like an airplane; a pilot and copilot sit in a 
cockpit. They usually (but not always) feature a kind of air-breathing engine 
known as a   cram jet.^ Their appeal is rather similar to that of jet aircraft, 
namely, the urge to go faster and higher than before that permeates the history 
of flying. Indeed, spaceplanes are little more than aircraft that fly into space. 
One of the first spaceplane concepts was that of the American rocketeer 
Robert Goddard. In a Popular Science article published in December 1931, he 
described a spaceplane (“stratosphere plane”) with elliptically shaped wings 
and propelled by a combination air-breathing jet and rocket engine. The 
rocket engine drove the vehicle while it was outside the atmosphere, and 
two turbines moved into the rocket’s thrust stream to drive two large propel- 
3. I am excluding all of those reusable launch vehicles described in science fiction hterature. 
4. Scrumjef is a truncation of “supersonic combustion ramjet.” Ramjets are jet engines that 
propel aircraft at supersonic speeds by igniting fuel mixed with air that the engine has compressed. 
Scramjets achieve hypersonic velocities. 
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lers on either wing, thereby powering the vehicle while in the atm~sphere.~ 
German researcher Eugen Sanger, in his 1933 book on rocket flight, described 
a rocket-powered suborbital spaceplane known as the Silbervogef (Silver Bird), 
fueled by liquid oxygen and kerosene and capable of reaching a maximum 
altitude of 160 kilometers (100 miles) and a speed of Mach 10. Later, work- 
ing with his future wife, the mathematician Irene Bredt, and a number of 
research assistants, Sanger designed the Rocket Spaceplane, launched from a 
sled at a speed of Mach 1.5. A rocket engine capable of developing 100 tons 
of thrust would boost the craft into orbit, where it could deploy payloads 
weighing up to 1 ton.6 
The appearance of ideas for craft capable of flying into space is not sur- 
prising. They reflected the interwar enthusiasm for the airplane, as well as 
excitement over rocketry, and projected those technological enthusiasms into 
space. New technologies often look like older technologies. For example, 
James Prescott Joule’s electric motor resembled a steam engine, and Samuel 
F. B. Morse built his first telegraph from a canvas stretcher, a technology 
he knew as an artist? Inventors necessarily proceed from the known to the 
technologically unknown. The passion for spaceplanes continued for decades 
more, feeding off the exciting advances in technology that propelled aircraft 
faster and faster to supersonic, then to hypersonic, speeds. 
Spaceplanes remained largely fictional concepts until 1957, when the Air 
Force initiated what became the Aerospaceplane program to develop a single 
stage to orbit vehicle powered by an air-breathing engine. By 1959, the proj- 
ect had evolved into the Recoverable Orbital Launch System (ROLS), an 
SSTO design that would take off horizontally and fly into a 300-mile-high 
(483-meter-high) orbit. The ROLS propulsion system collected air from the 
atmosphere, then compressed, liquefied, and distilled it in order to make liq- 
uid oxygen, which mixed with liquid hydrogen before entering the engines. 
5. Russell J. Hanmgan, Spacefiight in the Era $Aero-Space Planes (Malabar, F L  Krieger Publishing 
Company, 1994), p. 71. Materials in file 824 of the NASA Historical Reference Collection at NASA 
Headquarters, Washington, DC, indicate that the article appeared in the December 1931 issue, pp. 
148-149, and was titled “A New Turbine Rocket Plane for the Upper Atmosphere.” 
6.  Irene Sanger-Bredt, “The Silver Bird Story: A Memoir,” file 7910, NASA Historical Reference 
Collection, Washington, DC; Hannigan, Spacefiight in the Era $Aero-Space Planes, pp. 71-73; Michael 
J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemunde and the Coming $the Ballistic Missile Era (NewYork 
The Free Press, 1995), pp. 7-10; Richard F? HalIion, “In the Beginning Was the Dream 
Hypersonic Revolution: Eight Case Studies in the History ofHypersonicTechnology, ed. Richard P. Hdlion, vol. 
1, From Max I/alier to Project Prime, 19241967 (Dayton, OH: Special Sta!TOffice,Aeronautical Systems 
Division, Wright-Patterson AFB, 1987), pp. xi-xv. 
7. Brooke Hindle, Emulation and Invention (New York: New York University Press, 1981), pp. 
85-108, 120-121; Lewis Coe, Telegraph: A History $Morse’s Invention and Its Predecessors in the United 
States (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1993); J. M. Anderson, “The Invention of the Telegraph: Samuel 
Morse’s Role Reassessed,” IEEE Power Engineering Review 18 (July 1998): 28-29. 
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This complicated propulsion system, dubbed LACES (Liquid Air Collection 
Engine System), later renamed ACES (Air Collection and Enrichment System), 
as well as various scramjet engine concepts, underwent Air Force evaluation 
over time. Faced with the uncertainties of the single-stage design, the Air 
Force shifted the focus of the Aerospaceplane to two stage to orbit concepts in 
1962, and following the program’s condemnation by the Scientific Advisory 
Board, the Aerospaceplane died in 1963. Congress cut fiscal 1964 funding, 
and the Pentagon declined to press for its restoration.8 
Dyna-Soar 
A rather different reusable vehicle concept was the boost-glide system. 
The Peenemiinde rocket group under Wernher von Braun originally planned 
to develop a much larger missile, the A-10/A-9, capable of delivering a 1- 
ton bomb over 5,000 kilometers (3,125 miles) away. The A-10 first stage 
was a conventional booster rocket, while the A-9 upper stage was a winged 
vehicle that could glide at supersonic speeds before hitting its target. Other 
Peenemiinde work, kept secret from the Nazis, included a piloted version of 
the A-9 that would launch vertically and land horizontally, like the Space 
Shuttle. An even larger vehicle, the A-12, was a fanciful three-staged launcher 
whose top stage was a reusable winged reentry vehicle.’ None of these con- 
cepts, however, were orbital vehicles. 
At the end of World War 11, as is widely known, Wernher von Braun 
and much of the German rocket program became a vital part of the United 
States’ own missile program and contributed to the development of boost- 
glide systems.*O Walter Dornberger, a key Nazi rocketeer and later a consul- 
tant for Bell Aircraft, persuaded that firm to undertake a study of boost-glide 
technology. In 1952, that study led to the joint development by Bell and the 
Wright Air Development Center, Dayton, Ohio, of a piloted bomber mis- 
sile and reconnaissance vehicle called BoMi. A two-stage rocket would lift 
BoMi, which would operate at speeds over Mach 4. By 1956, the BoMi 
study work had evolved into a contract for Bell to develop Reconnaissance 
System 459L, commonly known as Brass Bell, a piloted two-stage boost- 
8. Hannigan, Spaceflight in the Era of Aero-Space Planes, pp. 77-78; T. A. Heppenheimer, The 
Space Shuttle Decision: NASA’s Search for a Reusable Space Vehicle (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4221, 
1999), pp. 75-78; Hallion and James 0. Young, “Space Shuttle: Fulfillment of a Dream,” in The 
Hypersonic Revolution: Eight Case Studies in the History of Hypersonic Technology, ed. Hallion, vol. 
2, From Scramjet to the National Aero-Space Plane (Dayton, OH: Special Staff Office, Aeronautical 
Systems Division, Wright-Patterson AFB, 1987) pp. 949-951. 
9. Neufeld, Rocket and the Reich, pp. 92-93,121,138-139,156-157,283; Hallion,’% the Beginning 
Was the Dream . . . ,” p. xviii; Hannigan, Spaceflight in the Era ofAero-Space Planes, p. 73. 
10. Linda Hunt, Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 
1945 to 1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991). 
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glide reconnaissance system, while the bomber part of the BoMi work 
became RoBo, a piloted hypersonic, rocket-powered craft for bombing and 
reconnaissance missions.” 
A major step in orbital boost-glide systems was the Dyna-Soar (for 
Dynamic Soaring) program. It was the final stage of a three-stage study 
of rocket-powered hypersonic flight initiated by the National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) with Air Force participation. The study 
used a series of experimental aircraft (“X” vehicles) lifted into the sky by 
reusable aircraft. “Round One,” to use the NACA nomenclature, consisted of 
the Bell X-1 series, the Bell X-2 series, and the Douglas D-588-2 Skyrocket. 
“Round Two” was the series of flights eventually undertaken by the X-15. 
“Round Three” called for testing winged orbital reentry vehicles.12 
The Air Force’s Dyna-Soar program emerged from a 1957 consolida- 
tion of the NACA’s “Round Three” and several military hypersonic flight 
programs. Eventually, NASA participated in the project as well. Launched on 
an expendable booster, the Dyna-Soar X-20 would fly orbital or suborbital 
trajectories, perform reconnaissance at hypersonic speeds, and land horizon- 
tally like an aircraft at many U.S. air bases. Although the Dyna-Soar vehicle 
was never built, a prototype was near completion when Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara terminated the program on 10 December 1963, only eight 
months before drop tests from a B-52. The first piloted flight had been sched- 
uled for 1964.13 
Dyna-Soar had a lot to offer the Air Force and the nation and might have 
changed history. The military might have benefited economically by possess- 
ing the world’s first reusable orbital vehicle, and the Pentagon would not have 
11. Clarence J. Geiger, “Strangled Infant: The Boeing X-20A Dyna-Soar,” in The Hypersonic 
Revolution, ed. Hallion, vol. 1, pp. 189, 191-198, a manuscript copy ofwhich is in file 11326, NASA 
Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC, as Geiger, “History of the X-20A Dyna-Soar,” 
October 1963; additional items from files 495 and 11923, NASA Historical Reference Collection, 
Washington, DC; Hallion, “Editor’s Introduction,” in The Hypersonic Revolution, ed. Hallion, vol. 
1, p. 11-xi. 
12. Hallion, “In the Beginning Was the Dream . . . ,” p. xxi; Hallion, “Editor’s Introduction,” 
in The Hypersonic Revolution, ed. Hallion, vol. 1, pp. I-iv-I-v, 11-xi. 
13. R&D Project Card Continuation Sheet, 23 August 1957, file 11325, NASA Historical 
Reference Collection, Washington, DC; additional items in file 11340, NASA Historical Reference 
Collection, Washington, DC; Geiger, “Strangled Infant,” pp. 198-199, 201-204, 261, 263, 266, 
276-278, 296-297, 299-301,305, 308-309. A number of studies are available on the Dyna-Soar 
program. See, for instance, Terry Smith, “The Dyna-Soar X-20: A Historical Overview,” Quest: 
The History .f Spacefight Magazine 3, no. 4 (1994): 13-18, 23-28; Matt Bacon, “The Dynasoar 
Extinction,” Space 9 (May 1993): 18-21; Roy Franklin Houchin 11, “The Rise and Fall of Dyna- 
Soar: A History of Air Force Hypersonic R & D, 1944-1963” (Ph.D. diss., Auburn University, 
1995); Houchin, “The Diplomatic Demise of Dyna-Soar: The Impact of International and 
Domestic Political Affairs on the Dyna-Soar X-20 Project, 1957-1963,” Aerospace Historian 35 
(December 1988): 274-280. 
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Artist’s concept of a Dyna-Soar manned space glider being launched into space by a 
modified Titan ICBM. The glider, riding on the nose of the Titan, would be separated 
from its booster, leaving the spacecraft in piloted, near-orbital flight. The pilot could 
glide to a conventional landing at  an Air Force base. The Boeing Company was the 
prime contractor for the glider, which was a US.  Air Force program. Only a prototype 
of the glider was built before the program was terminated on 10 December 1963. 
(Boeing drawing S-5938, dated 22 September 1960) 
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been forced to become NASA’s political ally in the space agency’s political 
struggle to win funding for its Space Shuttle program. Also, Dyna-Soar could 
have provided NASA a less expensive, but two-stage, orbital shuttle. The 
knowledge gained from the research program, which included over 14,000 
hours of wind tunnel tests, could have been applied to a number of applica- 
tions from glide bombers to future spacecraft. Moreover, after termination 
of the program, Boeing carried out a small “X-20 continuation program” for 
several more years that involved testing various X-20 components and design 
features both in ground facilities and on flight research vehicles. The Renk 41 
high-temperature nickel alloy developed for the X-20 reappeared in the 1970s 
as part of the airframe structure and heat shielding for Boeing’s Reusable 
Aerodynamic Space Vehicle (RASV) .14 
Lifting Bodies 
Also of note among these early boost-glide systems was a group of reus- 
able suborbital vehicles known as lifting bodies. A lifting body is a wing- 
less aerodynamic shape that develops lift-the force that makes winged craft 
fly-because of its peculiar body shape. Research on lifting bodies began in 
early 1957 at the NACA’s Ames Aeronautical Laboratory (now NASA’s Ames 
Research Center). Following NASA’s success with its wooden M2-F1, the Air 
Force joined NASA at Edwards AFB in the test-flight program of the rocket- 
powered M2-F2, launched from a B-52 from 1966 until its crash in 1967.15 
The most prominent of these lifting-body craft was the Air Force’s X- 
24B, built by Martin Marietta in 1972. A modified X-24B powered by aero- 
spike engines became Lockheed’s Space Shuttle design concept in the latter 
1960s, the Starclipper, while the X-24B’s shape also inspired the design of 
what eventually became Lockheed skunk works’ X-33 launch vehicle. Despite 
the apparent name similarity, the X-24B had rather different shapes and dis- 
tinct origins from the X-24A lifting body built for NASA, though both had a 
role in the Air Force’s lifting-body program.16 
The RASV 
Even as NASA and industry were building the Space Shuttle, the search 
for a reusable Shuttle replacement was under way. As with lifting-body research, 
14. Geiger, “Strangled Infant,” pp. 319-320, 369; Andrew K. Hepler interview, tape recording 
and transcript, Seattle, WA, by Butrica, 11 July 2000, NASA Historical Reference Collection; 
Hepler and E. L. Bangsund, Boeing Aerospace Company, Seattle, WA, Technology Requirementsfor 
Advanced Earth Orbital Transportation Systems, vol. 1, Executive Summary (Washington, DC: NASA 
Contractor Report CR-2878, 1978). 
15. R. Dale Reed, Wingless Flight: The Lijing Body Story (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4220, 1997), 
pp. 9, 67,69-72, 75, 87, 91,9698, 102, 106-109, 116; John L.Vitelli and Hallion, “Project PRIME: 
Hypersonic Reentry &om Space,” in The Hypersonic Revolution, ed. Hallion, vol. 1, p. 529. 
16.Vitelli and Hallion,“Project PRIME,” pp. 558,566,571,577-596,694-695,699,702-704,711. 
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NASA led the way. In 1972, the Langley Research Center, with the approval 
of NASA Headquarters, set up a s m a l l  group to study the possibility of grow- 
ing an aircraft known as the Continental/SemiGlobal Transport (C/SGT) into 
a single stage to orbit vehicle.The C/SGT would take off, almost attain orbit, 
then land, delivering people or cargo to any place on Earth in less than 2 hours. 
Langley researchers’ analyses of the vehicle suggested that with just a little bit 
more speed, the C/SGT could achieve orbit.17 
Using Shuttle technology as the starting point for their study of the struc- 
tures, materials, and engines needed for a Shuttle replacement, the Langley 
analysis team evaluated the impact of improving structures and materials 
(such as composites) beyond the Space Shuttle on various configurations. The 
improved materials promised to reduce overall vehicle weight significantly, 
thereby seeming to bring SSTO transport within the realm of the possible>* 
Then, in 1975, Langley funded two industry studies of SSTO rocket concepts 
carried out by teams from Martin Marietta Denver and Boeing Seattle. The 
stated purpose of the study was to determine the future technology develop- 
ment needed to build an operational rocket-powered, single stage to orbit 
Space Shuttle replacement by the year 1995. Each team concluded that such a 
vehicle was feasible using technology available in the near term.” 
Next, Boeing tried to sell their vehicle design from the Langley 1975 
study to the Air Force. The company’s interest in the reusable SSTO vehicle 
was “based on the belief that the reusable airplane type operation of earth 
orbit transportation vehicles will allow considerable improvement in cost per 
flight and flexibility.”20 The vehicle would have incorporated both proven 
and unproven technologies. The cylindrically shaped, delta-winged, reusable 
single stage to orbit craft, powered by Space Shuttle Main Engines, would 
have take off with the help of a sled and land horizontally on a conventional 
runway. It would have used a combination of aluminum-brazed titanium and 
Ren6 41, a high-temperature nickel alloy developed for the Dyna-Soar X- 
20, for both its structure and heat shielding. The vehicle would have stored 
liquid-hydrogen fuel in its body and liquid oxygen in its wings. The integra- 
tion of the liquid-hydrogen and liquid-oxygen tanks into the load-carrying 
17.Alan Wilhite intemew, tape recording and transcript, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, 
VA, by Butrica, 22 May 1997, NASA Historical Reference Collection,Washington, DC. 
18. Charles H. Eldred interview, tape recording and transcript, NASA Langley Research Center, 
Hampton,VA, by Butrica, 20 May 1997, NASA Historical Reference Collechon,Washington, DC. 
19. The two studies were Rudolph C. Haefeli, Earnest G. Littler, John B. Hurley, and Marhn G. 
Winter, Denver Division, Marhn Marietta Corporation, Technology Requirements for Advanced Earth- 
Orbital Transportation Systems: Final Report (Washmgton, DC: NASA Contractor Report CR-2866, 
October 1977); and Andrew K. Hepler and E. L. Bangsund, Boeing Aerospace Company, Seattle, WA, 
Technology Requirements for Advanced Earth Orbital Transportation Systems, vol. 1, Executive Summary, and 
vol. 2, Summary Report (Washington, DC: NASA Contractor Report CR-2878,1978). 
20. Hepler and Bangsund, Technology Requirements for Advanced Earth Orbital Transportation Systems, 
1:13-14. 
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structure (that is, the wings and the main body of the craft), combined with 
the metallic shell made of honeycomb panels, went far in reducing overall 
vehicle weight.21 
Boeing soon interested the Air Force Space and Missiles System 
Organization (Los Angeles Air Force Station) in this vehicle concept. The Air 
Force dubbed it the Reusable Aerodynamic Space Vehicle (RASV) and, in 
1976, provided funding for a seven-month preliminary feasibility study of the 
RASV concept. It concluded (not surprisingly) that the RASV was feasible 
and that it would fulfill Air Force requirements. Among those requirements 
were flying 500 to 1,000 times “with low cost refurbishment and mainte- 
nance as a design goal” from a launch site in Grand Forks, North Dakota, 
into a polar orbit or once around the planet in a different orbit. The vehicle 
would have to reach “standby status within 24 hours from warning. Standby 
to launch shall be three minutes.”22 
In all, the Air Force invested $3 million in the project for technology 
development. The service had become convinced that the RASV potentially 
could provide a manned platform that could be placed above any point on the 
planet in less than an hour and could perform a variety of missions, includ- 
ing reconnaissance, rapid satellite replacement, and general space defense. 
In December 1982, Boeing Chairman T. A. Wilson gave the RASV effort 
the go-ahead to propose a $1.4-billion prototype vehicle to the Air Force.23 
Boeing, however, would not build the RASV. 
The problem was not the steep technological hurdles that the firm would 
have to leap, such as development of the sled to accelerate the RASV to a 
speed of 600 feet per second or achievement of fast turnaround time (24 hours 
or perhaps as short as 12 hours) for the Strategic Air Command (SAC).24 The 
Air Force ordered two classified studies of single stage to orbit technologies, 
“Science Dawn” (1983-1985) and “Have Region” (1986-1989), conducted by 
industry partners Boeing, Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas. They inter- 
21. Ibid., 1:14-16,2:191; Hepler interview. 
22. Boeing Aerospace Company, Final Report on Feasibility Study ofReusable Aerodynamic Space Vehicle, 
vol. 1, Executive Summary (Kent,WA Boeing Aerospace Company, November 1976), pp. 5,35. 
23. Hallion, “Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: From Shuttle to the National Aero-Space 
Plane,” in The Hypersonic Revolution, ed. Hallion, vol. 2, p. 1334; P. Kenneth Pierpont, “Preliminary 
Study ofAdaptation of SST Technology to a Reusable Aero-space Launch Vehicle System,” NASA 
Langley Working Paper NASA-LWP-157, 3 November 1965; Boeing RASV proposal, December 
1982, file 256, X-33 Archive, record group 255, accession number 255-01-0645, Washington 
National Records Center, Suitland, MD (hereafter, X-33 Archive); Jess Sponable interview, tape 
recording and transcript, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC, by Butrica, 19 January 1998, 
NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC; Gary Payton and Jess Sponable, 
“Designing the SSTO Rocket,” Aerospace America (April 1991): 40. 
24. Hepler interview. 
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preted the study results as demonstrating the technological feasibility of the 
RASV for SAC.25 But instead of proceeding with further RASV studies, the 
Air Force chose to develop a space vehicle that not only operated like an 
aircraft, as the RASV did, but had air-breathing jet engines, too. That space 
vehicle would be known as the National Aero-Space Plane (NASP). 
The National Aero-Space Plane 
With NASP, the spaceplane quest returned.26 The milestone moment 
was President Ronald Reagan’s State of the Union Address, delivered on 4 
February 1986, just days after the Challenger disaster. Reagan declared: “We 
are going forward with research on a new Orient Express that could, by the 
end of the decade, take off from Dulles Airport, accelerate up to 25 times the 
speed of sound attaining low Earth orbit, or fly to Tokyo within two 
As portrayed by the President, the Orient Express would be both a high-speed 
aircraft and a single stage to orbit vehicle, powered by air-breathing engines. 
The program merged two existing efforts. 
One was the TransAtmospheric Vehicle (TAV) program, set up in 1982 
as an Air Force study of Space Shuttle replacement concepts. Air-breathing 
engines were a serious, though not exclusive, consideration. The program 
considered a variety of both single- and two-stage vehicle configurations, 
powered by either rocket or jet engines.28 Interest in the TransAtmospheric 
Vehicle grew as a direct result of the increased need for launchers driven 
25. Raymond L. Chase, “Science Dawn Overview,” March 1990, file 235, X-33 Archive; Major 
Stephen Clift, “Have Region Program: Final Brief,” September 1989, file 235, X-33 Archive; 
Sponable interview. 
26. For background information on NASP, see the materials in file 106, box 4, X-33 Archive; 
Larry Schweikart, “Command Innovation: Lessons from the National Spaceplane Program,” 
in Innovation and the Development $Flight, ed. Roger D. Launius (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1999), pp. 299-323; Hannigan, Spaceflight in the Era ofAero-Space Planes, passim; 
Schweikart, “The National Spaceplane: Evolving Management Approaches to a Revolutionary 
Technology Program,” Essays in Economic and Business History 12 (1994): 118-33; Alan W. Wilhite, 
Richard W. Powell, Stephen J. Scotti, Charles R. McClinton, S. Zane Pinckney, Christopher I. 
Cruz, L. Robert Jackson, James L. Hunt, Jeffrey A. Cerro, and Paul L. Moses, “Concepts Leading 
to the National Aero-Space Plane Program” (paper read at the 28th Aerospace Sciences Meeting, 
Reno, NV, 8-11 January 1990), file 703, box 23, X-33 Archive. 
27. Quoted in Scott Pace, “National Aero-space Plane Program: Principal Assumptions, Findings, 
and Policy Options,” RAND publication P-7288-RGS, December 1986, p. 1. Reagan’s speechwriters 
confused the NASP reusable single stage to orbit vehicle with the Orient Express, a McDonnell 
Douglas hypersonic aircraft design in which Federal Express had shown interest. The confusion 
probably screened the flight vehicle’s military mission, though the McDonnell Douglas prototype 
claimed to be capable of performing either a NASP single stage to orbit or an Orient Express mission, 
depending on the vehicle’s propulsion system. See Paul Czysz interview, tape and transcript, NASA 
Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA, by Erik M. Conway, 17 July 2001, pp. 1-5, 8-9, 11. 
28. Hallion, “Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” pp. 1337, 1340-1341, 1345. 
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by the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and Space Station F~eedorn.’~ The 
second program was the classified three-phase Copper Canyon program of 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), which funded research on 
scramjet hypersonic vehicles3’ The Copper Canyon and TransAtmospheric 
Vehicle efforts merged to form a larger program that comprised the gamut 
of government agencies involved in hypersonic air-breathing engine stud- 
ies at one time or another: NASA, ARPA, the Air Force, the Navy, and the 
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) . On 1 December 1985, the 
title National Aero-Space Plane (NASP) replaced all earlier  designation^.^^ 
The NASP program initially proposed to design and build two research 
craft, the X-30, at least one of which was to achieve orbit by flying in a single 
stage through the atmosphere at speeds up to Mach 25. The X-30 would 
use a multicycle engine that shifted from jet to ramjet and scramjet speeds as 
the vehicle ascended, burning liquid-hydrogen fuel with oxygen scooped and 
frozen from the atmosphere. The engine and vehicle designs had come from 
Tony DuPont, an aerospace designer who had developed a multicycle jet and 
rocket engine under contract with NASA, then ARPA.32 DuPont’s vehicle 
design rested on a number of highly questionable assumptions, optimistic 
interpretations of results, and convenient omissions (such as landing gear) .33 
NASP, like the Aerospaceplane program, fell victim to budget cuts, but 
this time as a result of the end of the Cold War. Congress canceled NASP in 
1992, during fiscal 1993 budget deliberations. Although the program never 
came near to building or flying hardware, NASP contributed significantly to 
the advance of materials capable of repeatedly withstanding high temperatures 
(on the vehicle’s nose and body) or capable of tolerating repeated exposure to 
extremely low temperatures (the cryogenic fuel tanks) .34 
29. Ibid., pp. 1336-1337, 1340-1341. 
30. John V. Becker, “Confronting Scramjet: The NASA Hypersonic Ramjet Experiment,” 
in The Hypersonic Revolution, ed. Hallion, vol. 2, pp. VI.xii, VI.xiv, 765, 786-789, 824, 841; 
Heppenheimer, The National Spaceplane (Arlington, VA: Pasha Market Intelligence, 1987), p. 
14; Hallion, “Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” p. 1361; Larry Schweikart, “The Quest for the 
Orbital Jet: The National Aerospace Plane Program, 1983-1995,” manuscript, pp. 1.30-1.31, NASA 
Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC. For background on these and other hypersonic 
research projects, see Erik Conway, High-speed Dreams: N A S A  and the Technopolitics of Supersonic 
Transportation, 1945-1999 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 2005). 
31. Heppenheimer, The National Spaceplane, p. 14; Hallion, “Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” 
pp. 1334, 1362-1364; Schweikart, “The Quest for the Orbital Jet,” pp. 1.30-1.31; Becker, 
“Confronting Scramjet,” in The Hypersonic Revolution, ed. Hallion, vol. 2, p. VI.xv. 
32. Robert Jones interview, tape and transcript, NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA, 
by Erik M. Conway, 25 June 2001, pp. 8-9; Conway to Butrica, e-mail message, 5 April 2002; 
Schweikart, “The Quest for the Orbital Jet,” pp. 1.19-1.20,1.23,1.28,111.31,111.43-111.44; Hallion, 
“Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” pp. 1346, 1351, 1379. 
33. Schweikart, “The Quest for the Orbital Jet,” pp. 1.11-1.12, 1.19-1.20, 1.23, 1.28, 111.43. 
34. Ibid., pp. III.37-III.38,111.41-111.42. 
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The Delta Clipper 
The end of NASP was not the end of efforts to realize a fully reus- 
able launch vehicle. In parallel with, but never in competition with, NASP 
was the SSTO Program of the SDIO. This program differed radically from 
its predecessors that had attempted to develop flight technology; instead, it 
tested the flight operations of a single stage to orbit vehicle, the Delta Clipper 
Experimental (DC-X). Its intent was not to develop technology, but to dem- 
onstrate “aircraft-like’’ operations, which included autonomous operations, 
minimal launch and operational crews, ease of maintenance, abort capability, 
and short turnaround time. The novelty of the SSTO Program also was to 
combine the goal of “aircraft-like” operations with the use of an “X’ vehicle 
and a “lean” management approach by both government and industry in the 
hope of expediting the project and keeping costs low. 
In early 1990, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization started the 
SSTO Program. The 10-month-long Phase I consisted of design studies and 
the identification of critical technologies by Boeing, General Dynamics, 
McDonnell Douglas, and Rockwell Internat i~nal .~~ In June 1991, follow- 
ing a review of Phase I concepts by NASA’s Langley Research Center, the 
SDIO solicited proposals for Phase 11. The Statement of Work described the 
capabilities of the full-scale operational single stage to orbit vehicle-which 
would loft SDI Brilliant Pebbles payloads into orbit-and the Phase I1 small 
suborbital “X” vehicle, its support infrastructures (such as the launchpad), 
and operational concepts.36 Of the three contractors competing-General 
Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas, and Rockwell International-the SDIO 
selected McDonnell Douglas in August 1991 to build its Delta Clipper 
Experimental (DC-X) in 24 months. The firm clearly understood the need 
to demonstrate operations rather than develop te~hnology.~’ 
McDonnell Douglas rolled out the 111-foot (34-meter) DC-X in 
record time, four months ahead of schedule, in April 1993. The company 
built the Delta Clipper out of modified existing hardware, some of which, 
such as welding rods and hinges, they purchased literally from local hard- 
ware stores. Pressure regulators and cryogenic valves came from Thor 
missiles formerly positioned in Europe, and the manufacturer of the alu- 
35. McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company, “Single Stage to Orbit Program Phase I 
Concept Definition,” 13 December 1990, file 267, X-33 Archive; General Dynamics Space Systems 
Division, “Concept Review Technical Briefing,” 13 December 1990, file 265, X-33 Archive; Space 
Transportation Systems, Boeing Defense and Space Group, “Single Stage to Orbit Technology 
Demonstration Concept Review Technical Briefing,” 12 December 1990, file 264, X-33 Archive; 
Rockwell International, “SDIO Single Stage to Orbit Concept Review,” 12 December 1990, file 
259, X-33 Archive. 
36. “NASA Evaluation of SDIO Phase I SSTO Concepts,” n.d., file 294, X-33 Archive. 
37. Sponable interview. 
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minum liquid-oxygen and -hydrogen tanks was not an aerospace firm, but 
Chicago Bridge and Iron (CBI) of Birmingham, Alabama.38 More impor- 
tantly, McDonnell Douglas sought to achieve SSTO Program operational 
goals. The Flight Operations Control Center at the White Sands Missile 
Range, New Mexico, consisted of a compact, low-cost, 40-foot (12-meter) 
mobile trailer. Three people operated the ground support equipment and 
launched the DC-X, not the hundreds typically used for NASA or military 
rocket launches. Former astronaut Pete Conrad was the “flight manager.” 
McDonnell Douglas designed the DC-X so that they could fly it again after 
only three days. Eventually, on 8 June 1996, the Clipper team demonstrated 
a one-day (26-hour) t u r n a r o ~ n d . ~ ~  
By the time the DC-X undertook its first flight on 18 August 1993, the 
world had changed dramatically. The Cold War was over, and defense cuts 
were the order of the day. As DC-X flight trials took place, the future of 
funding for those flights, as well as for completion of the program, grew less 
certain. Money for Phase I11 disappeared, and various bureaucratic maneu- 
vers stymied White House and congressional approval of financing. The 
predicament grounded the Clipper after only three flights, until the NASA 
Administrator intervened financially in January 1994.40 
NASA’s “ X y  Vehicles 
By January 1994, NASA Administrator Daniel S. Goldin had become 
interested in single stage to orbit and other kinds of reusable launchers. His 
interest did not arise from any internal NASA studies, such as those conducted 
by the Langley Research Center as early as the 1970s, nor from the influence 
of high-level individuals at NASA Headquarters, such as Ivan Bekey, Director 
38. Paul L. Klevatt interview, tape recording and transcript, Tustin, CA, by Butrica, 14 July 
2000, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC; William Gaubatz interview, tape 
recording and transcript, Huntington Beach, CA, by Butrica, 25 October 1997, NASA Historical 
Reference Collection, Washington, DC; Klevatt, “Design Engineering and Rapid Prototyping for 
the DC-X Single Stage Rocket Technology Vehicle,” AIAA-95-1425 (paper read at AIAA-ASME- 
ASCE-AHS-ASC Structures, Structural Dynamics, and Materials Conference, New Orleans, LA, 
10-12 April 1995). 
39. Klevatt interview; McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company, “Single Stage to Orbit 
Program Phase I Concept Definition,” 13 December 1990, file 267, X-33 Archive; Charles “Pete” 
Conrad interview, tape recording and transcript, Rocket Development Company, Los Alamitos, 
CA, by Butrica, 22 October 1997, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC; Luis 
Zea, “The Quicker Clipper,” Final Frontier (October 1992): 4, file 267, X-33 Archive; Mark A. 
Gottschalk, “Delta Clipper: Taxi to the Heavens,” Design News (September 1992), file 292, X-33 
Archive; Leonard David, “Unorthodox New DC-X Rocket Ready for First Tests,” Space News 
(11-17 January 1993): 10. 
40. George E. Brown, Jr., to Les Aspin, 31 January 1994, file 293, X-33 Archive; Ben Iannotta, 
“DC-X Hangs by Thin Thread Despite Short-term Reprieve,” Space News (7-13 February 1994): 
4; Iannotta, “Pentagon Frees Funds for More DC-X Flights,” Space News (9-15 May 1994): 4; 
Warren E. Leary, “Rocket: Program Faces Budget Ax,” New York Times (31 January 1994): 13A. 
REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES OR EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES? 31 5 
of Advanced Programs in the Office of Space Flight, although Bekey was to 
play a role?’ Rather, the Administrator was reacting to a September 1992 
mandate from Congress to assess national space launch requirements, particu- 
larly in light of declining federal budgets.42 
The NASA Access to Space Study considered NASA, military, and com- 
mercial launch needs for the period between 1995 and 2030. It examined 
three different launcher alternatives  option^")^^ and strongly concluded in 
favor of pursuing the development of a single stage to orbit replacement for the 
Space Shuttle, especially because it appeared to be the best approach to reduc- 
ing overall launch ~osts.4~ Indeed, the single stage to orbit zeal of the Access 
to Space team was so strong that they proposed a NASA technology develop- 
ment program using an “X” vehicle-the X-2000 (for the program’s final 
year of operation)-to be built entirely by NASA with joint funding from the 
Pentagon. The X-2000, not by chance, closely resembled the Phase 111 vehicle 
of the Delta Clipper pr0gram.4~ 
NASA, however, was not going to build the X-2000. In April 1994, the 
White House released a draft National Space Transportation Strategy that 
made NASA “the lead agency for technology development and demonstra- 
tion for advanced next generation reusable launch  system^.'"^ It also decreed, 
in section 111, paragraph 2(b): “Research shall be focused on technologies 
to support a decision, no later than December 1996, to proceed with a sub- 
scale flight demonstration which would prove the concept of single-stage to 
orbit.”47 In this way, the new space transportation policy committed NASA to 
the development of reusable and single stage to orbit space launch vehicles. 
Because that policy designated NASA as the lead agency for reusable 
launchers and the Department of Defense as the lead agency for expendable 
41. Ivan Bekey interview, tape recording and transcript, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC, 
by Butrica, 2 March 1999, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC. 
42. U.S. House of Representatives, Conference Report, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., Report 102-902 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1992), pp. 69-70. 
43. Arnold D. Aldrich and Michael D. Griffin to Daniel S. Goldin, “Implementation Plan for 
‘Access to Space’ Review,” 11 January 1993, file 197, X-33 Archive; Office of Space Systems 
Development, NASA, “Access to Space Study: Summary Report,” January 1994, pp. 2-5, 8-58, 
file 100, X-33 Archive; Access to Space Study Advanced Technology Team, “Final Report,” vol. 
1, “Executive Summary,” July 1993, pp. iii, 38, file 85, X-33 Archive. According to Bekey in the 
aforementioned interview, the study initially was to compare Space Shuttle upgrades and a new 
expendable, or partially reusable, launcher. These alternatives ultimately became Option 1 and 
Option 2. 
44. Bekey interview. 
45. Ben Iannotta, “Winged X-2000 Project Considered,” Space News (15-28 November 1993): 
14; “Single Stage to Orbit Advanced Technology Demonstrator (X-2000),” briefing, August 
1993, file 122, X-33 Archive; “Single Stage to Orbit: Advanced Technology Demonstrator: SSTO 
Concept Proposal, X-2000,” August 1993, file 162, X-33 Archive. 
46. Draft, National Space Transportation Strategy, April 26, 1994, file 153, X-33 Archive. 
47. Cited in NASA news release 95-1, 12 January 1995. 
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the DC-X was transferred to NASA, where it formed the initial 
component of the Agency’s Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Program. While 
NASA’s DC-XA (where “A” stood for Advanced) tested certain key opera- 
tional concepts, such as a critical rotational maneuver and a 72-hour turn- 
around time, the vehicle also was a technology dem~nstrator.~~ 
In addition to the DC-XA, NASA’s new RLV Program consisted of two 
additional “X’ vehicles. One, the X-34, also known as the Reusable Small 
Booster Program, would demonstrate certain technologies and operations useful 
to smaller reusable vehicles launched from aircraft. Among those were autono- 
mous ascent, reentry, and landing; composite structures; reusable liquid-oxygen 
tanks; rapid vehicle turnaround; and thermal-protection  material^.^' The other 
was the X-33, known also as the Advanced Technology Demonstrator Program, 
which proved far more challenging technologically. Among the operations and 
technologies it would demonstrate were reusable composite cryogenic tanks, 
graphite composite primary structures, metallic thermal-protection materials, 
reusable propulsion systems, autonomous flight control, and certain operating 
systems, such as electronics for monitoring vehicle hard~are.~’  
The X-33 program experienced insurmountable difficulties. After seeming 
to overcome weight and control problems, the X-33 project encountered one 
delay after another because of complications and obstacles encountered in the 
design and construction of the linear aerospike engines and the construction and 
testing of the composite liquid-hydrogen tanks. The vehicle’s launch was post- 
poned from the original March 1999 date to sometime in 2003. However, with 
program expenditures totaling over $1.4 billion, construction of the vehicle halted 
and the components were divided up among NASA and the  contractor^.'^ 
48. Department of Defense, “Space Launch Modernization Plan: Executive Summary,” April 
1994, p. 29; Iannotta, “Congress, NASA Dueling Over Reusable Rocket Management,” Space 
News (23-29 May 1994): 25. 
49. After the death of General Graham, the DC-XA took on the name Clipper Graham. The 
DC-XA differed from the DC-X in six main areas: 1) a switch from an aluminum oxygen tank 
to a Russian-built aluminum-lithium alloy cryogenic oxygen tank with external insulation, 2) an 
exchange ofthe aluminum cryogenic hydrogen tank for a graphite-epoxy composite liquid-hydrogen 
tank with a low-density reinforced internal insulation, 3) a graphite-epoxy composite intertank 
structure, 4) a graphite-epoxy composite feedline and valve assembly, 5) a gaseous-hydrogen and 
-oxygen auxiliary power unit to drive the hydraulic systems, and 6) an auxiliary propulsion system 
for converting liquid hydrogen into gaseous hydrogen for use by the vehicle’s reaction control 
system. See Delma C. Freeman, Jr., Theodore A. Talay, and R. Eugene Austin, “Reusable Launch 
Vehicle Technology Program,” IAF 96-V.4.01 (paper read at the 47th International Astronautical 
Congress, Beging, China, 7-11 October 1996), p. 3, file 92, X-33 Archive. 
50. John W. Cole, “X-34 Program,” in “X-33/X-34 Industry Briefing, October 19, 1994,” file 
12, X-33 Archive, especially slide 1A-1216. 
51. X-33 announcement in Commerce Busrness Daily (29 September 1994), file 276, X-33 Archive. 
52. Several other serious troubles emerged along the way, but I have mentioned only the best 
known of the numerous X-33 problems. See NASA news release 00-157, 29 September 2000; 
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This artist‘s concept shows the X-33 Advanced Technology Demonstrator, a subscale 
prototype reusable launch vehicle (RLV), in its 1997 configuration. Named the 
VentureStarTM, this vehicle was to have been manufactured by Lockheed Martin‘s 
“skunk works.” The VentureStarTM was one of the earliest versions of the RLVs 
developed in an attempt to replace the aging Shuttle fleet. The X-33 program was 
discontinued in 2001 without flight. (NASA MSFC image no. MSFC-9711197) 
Shortly after the start of the RLV Program, NASA also initiated the 
Pathfinder and Trailblazer programs to develop low-cost reusable space 
transport. Pathfinder involved technology experiments conducted on exist- 
ing flight vehicles, such as the Space Shuttle. Trailblazer, on the other 
hand, entailed the construction of entirely new “X” vehicles to demon- 
strate advanced space transport technologies and operations. In August 1998, 
NASA solicited proposals for Future-X, the first of the Trailblazer vehicles,53 
and, in December, announced that it had entered into negotiations with 
continued from the previous page 
“Development Troubles Push First X-33 Flight Back to July ’99,” article 34208 in Aerospace Daily 
(24 June 1997, electronic edition), hard copy in file 225, X-33 Archive; Brian Berger, “Activists Say 
Lockheed Should Not Compete for X-33 Funds,” Space News 11 (16 October 2000): 21. 
53. NASA news release 98-141,3 August 1998. 
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Boeing to design and build the Advanced Technology Vehicle (ATV), the 
first “X” vehicle to fly in orbit and to reenter the atmo~phere.~~ 
The Advanced Technology Vehicle soon became the X-37. The Shuttle 
would carry the craft into space, then release it. The X-37 would orbit the 
planet, then return to Earth through the atmosphere, testing heat shielding and 
other advanced space materials and technologies. The vehicle’s shape derived 
from that of the X-40A, an unpowered Air Force craft designed and built by 
Boeing’s Phantom Works. In August 1998, the Air Force drop-tested the X- 
40A from an Army Black Hawk helicopter above Holloman Air Base, New 
Mexico, and the vehicle landed under remote control on a runway. The Air 
Force provided partial funding for the X-37 in the hope of realizing some of 
the objectives of its Space Maneuver Vehicle (SMV), a reusable winged craft 
capable of deploying satellites, weapons, and antisatellite devices; inspecting 
enemy satellites; and other military missions. The Space Maneuver Vehicle 
could have remained in orbit for up to a year and would have been capable of 
a 72-hour t ~ r n a r o u n d . ~ ~  
No discussion of NASA’s reusable “X” vehicles would be complete with- 
out at least a mention of the defunct Crew Recovery Vehicle (CRV), which 
would have served as a lifeboat for the International Space Station (ISS). Drop 
tests of the X-38, an experimental 80-percent scale version of the vehicle, 
at increasing altitudes from a B-52 began in 1999. The basic design for the 
X-38 and CRV originated at NASA’s Langley Research Center as the HL- 
10 (Horizontal Lander) lifting body. The initial HL-10 design derived from 
photographs of the BOR-4 (Unpiloted Orbital Rocketplane in Russian), a 
Russian reusable rocket, that had landed in the Indian Ocean. Renamed the 
HL-20 by NASA Headquarters, the vehicle concept subsequently became 
popular in NASA launcher studies.56 
54. NASA news release c98-w, 8 December 1998. 
55. NASA news release 99-139, 14 July 1999; Frank Sietzen, Jr., “Air Force’s Needs Shape 
Newest NASA X Rocket,” Space.com, 25 August 1999, http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/ 
business/x37_brief~g.html, hard copy in file 386, X-33 Archive; “Space Maneuver Vehicle Drop 
Test Planned for Early August,” article 110718 in Aerospace Daily (21 July 1998, electronic edition), 
hard copy in file 226, X-33 Archive; “USAF Sets Aug. 4 Test of Space Maneuver Vehicle,” article 
111407 in Aerospace Daily (30 July 1998, electronic edition), hard copy in file 226, X-33 Archive; 
“Competition Likely for Space Maneuver Vehicle Demonstrator,” article 111904 in Aerospace Daily 
(6 August 1998, electronic edition), hard copy in file 226, X-33 Archive. 
56. Theodore A. Talay interview, tape recording and transcript, NASA Langley Research Center, 
by Butrica, 21 May 1997, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC; Doug Stanley 
interview, tape recording and transcript, Orbital Sciences Corporation, Dulles, VA, by Butrica, 25 
February 1999, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC; “NASA’s X-38 Station 
Lifeboat Testbed Completes a Drop Test,” article 124222 in Aerospace Daily (9 February 1999, electronic 
edition), hard copy in file 386, X-33 Archive;Andrew Bridges,“Space Station Lifeboat Sails to Success 
in Desert Test,” Spaceviews (2 November 2000), hard copy available in file 854, X-33 Archive. 
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Commercial Launchers 
NASA and the Air Force were not the only developers of reusable 
launchers during the 1990s. As the global market for satellite launches grew 
throughout the decade, small startup companies entered the field with plans 
for a variety of two-stage reusable vehicles. Among those was Kelly Space & 
Technology, initially headed by Michael S. Kelly. Starting in 1993, with fund- 
ing from NASA and the Air Force, the firm began developing the Astroliner, 
a reusable glider towed to launch altitude by a Boeing 747 aircraft using pat- 
ented Eclipse towing technology. An expendable stage launched from the 
Astroliner would place payloads in orbit. Subsequently, Kelly received NASA 
funding to develop its reusable la~ncher.~’ 
A comparable two-stage system that combined a reusable first stage 
with a throwaway second stage was Pioneer Rocketplane’s Pathfinder. The 
two-seat Pathfinder aircraft powered by air-breathing and (RD-120) rocket 
engines would have taken off from Vandenberg AFB, taken on additional 
liquid oxygen in midair from a Boeing 747 freighter, then climbed outside 
the atmosphere, where it would release an upper stage and its payload, then 
reenter the atmosphere and land like an aircraft.58 Pursuing development of a 
different two-stage launch system known as the K-1 is the Kistler Aerospace 
Corporation. The K-1 was an unpiloted vehicle powered by surplus Russian 
NK-33 and NK-43 engines. It would launch vertically and be capable of a 
turnaround of nine days. A system of parachutes and air bags (field-tested in 
1998) would allow the company to recover and reuse both the booster and 
orbital stages.59 
The only single stage to orbit vehicle under commercial develop- 
ment-Rotary Rocket Company’s Roton-also was the only one that did 
57. Kelly news releases for 7 October 1996, 22 May 1997, and 2 February 1998, file 373, X-33 
Archive. 
58. “RLV Startups Have Enough Capital, But Worry About Regulation,” article 37503 
in Aerospace Daily (13 February 1998, electronic edition), hard copy in file 226, X-33 Archive; 
“Rocketplane System,” Pioneer Rocketplane Web site, http: //www.rocketplane. corn. 
59. “RLV Startups Have Enough Capital”; “Kistler May Shift Flight Tests to Australia,” article 
37615 in Aerospace Daily (23 February 1998, electronic edition), hard copy in file 226, X-33 Archive; 
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(7 July 1998, electronic edition) and article 111101 (27 July 1998), hard copies in file 226, X- 
33 Archive; Frank Morring, Jr., “Tight Money Forces Slowdown at Kistler Aerospace,” article 
122111 in Aerospace Daily (8 January 1999, electronic edition), hard copy in file 386, X-33 Archive; 
“Northrop Grumman Increases Stake in Kistler’s K-1 Vehicle,” article 127002 in Aerospace Daily 
(22 March 1999, electronic edition), hard copy in file 386, X-33 Archive; “Kistler Has a Line 
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Daily (2 June 1999, electronic edition), hard copy in file 386, X-33 Archive; “NASA Taps Kistler 
to Evaluate ISS Access Options,” article 163106 in Aerospace Daily (28 August 2000, electronic 
edition), hard copy in file 854, X-33 Archive; additional materials in file 179, X-33 Archive. 
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not receive NASA funding. The firm’s founder, Gary Hudson, with funding 
from the private sector, has pursued single stage to orbit concepts since the 
1980s. A staunch believer in private enterprise, Hudson received substantial 
backing for the Roton from author Tom Clancy, along with other investors. 
Like the Delta Clipper, the Roton would take off and land vertically but 
would use rocket-powered rotors for the final descent and touchdown, much 
like a helicopter.60 
Analysis of a Perennial Debate 
The quest for reusability certainly has had its losses, mistakes (NASP), 
overly ambitious projects (X-33), and seemingly fruitful routes taken but 
abandoned (Dyna-Soar, RASV). Success has been partial for three major rea- 
sons: l) the major technological challenges of achieving full reusability and 
“aircraft-like’’ operations; 2) the lack of an ongoing technology development 
program; and 3) the toll on the search for a new launch system taken by past 
space policy and political decisions. Current policy does not redress these 
issues, but rather appears to exacerbate, not assuage, them. 
POLICY 
The Era of Space Transportation 
Space transportation policy obviously did not begin to include reusable 
launch vehicles until reusable launchers were about to become a reality. The 
evolution of launchers as a means for transporting people was gradual, begin- 
ning with the recoverable, but not reusable, craft used for the Mercury and 
Gemini missions.61 Similarly, the means for transporting astronauts to the 
Moon were the recoverable, single-use Apollo spacecraft. These vehicles dif- 
fered from ordinary transportation in that they could not be used more than 
once. Aircraft, for instance, can fly over and over again, and that reusability 
is an essential characteristic of any form of transportation. We therefore can 
think of the advent of the Space Shuttle as ushering in a new era or phase of 
space history, as well as a new period of space policy that would address issues 
related to space transportation. 
In this new era, everything-whether reusable or expendable-that car- 
ried a payload conceptually was transportation. The Shuttle held a privileged 
60. Materials relating to Gary Hudson and the Roton rocket are in fde 348, X-33 Archive. 
61. Starting in 1959, the Air Force’s ASSET (Aerothermodynamic/elastic Structural Systems 
Environmental Tests) boost-glide system involved lofting small, reusable hypersonic gliders from 
Cape Canaveral on top of expendable rockets. The gliders were recovered, and though they 
potentially were reusable, none ever flew more than once. See Hallion, “ASSET Pioneer of Lifting 
Reentry,” in The Hypersonic Revolution, ed. Hallion, vol. 1, pp. 449-450, 510, 512-513, 515-516, 
518, 523-524. 
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place in the constellation of space transporters. It was not only the only reus- 
able launch vehicle, but also the Space Transportation System (STS). Despite 
the de facto mix of expendable and reusable launchers, government policy 
leaned toward domination by the reusable Space Shuttle. Driving this policy 
were claims and assurances-made as early as the 1960~~~---that the Shuttle 
would be a low-cost, reliable launcher (a space “bus” or space “truck”). In 
addition, NASA aggressively marketed the Space Shuttle as a vehicle that 
could place any satellite into orbit.63 Ironically, the Shuttle would not only 
inspire and empower space policy, it would impede it as well. 
President Ronald Reagan made this “one-size-fits-all” strategy national 
policy through National Security Decision Directive 8, “Space Transportation 
System,” dated 13 November 1981. It stated, succinctly, that “the STS will be 
the primary space launch system for both United States military and civil gov- 
ernment missions.” Moreover, its language, that the Shuttle would “service 
all authorized space users,” left the door open for a subsequent enlargement of 
this basic space policy. 
The issuance of National Security Decision Directive 42, “National 
Space Policy,” on 4 July 1982, reiterated the “one-size-fits-all” policy and, 
more importantly, defined the “authorized space users” of the Space Shuttle as 
“domestic and foreign, commercial, and g~vernmental .”~~ In effect, the new 
space policy called for making the Shuttle available to all commercial users, 
provided no conflicts with national security resulted. The directive marked 
a dramatic policy shift, indeed, a redefinition of space policy, not seen since 
the launch of Sputnik in 1957, because for the first time in the history of the 
U.S. space program, a high-level official document made a direct reference to 
the American business c ~ m m u n i t y . ~ ~  Between November 1982 and January 
1986, the Space Shuttle carried 24 communication satellites into orbit on 11 
flights. Five were for private corporations: Westar 6, two Telstars, and two 
SATCOMs. Others were for foreign clients, including Canada (four Aniks), 
62. The Post-Apollo Space Program: A Report for the Space Task Group (Washington, DC: NASA, 
September 1969), pp. 1, 6. 
63. Hans Mark, The Space Station: A PersonalJourney (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), pp. 
61-65; Heppenheimer, Space Shuttle Decision, pp. 275-280; David M. Harland, The Space Shuttle: 
Roles, Missions and Accomplishments (Chichester, U.K.: Praxis Publishing, Ltd., 1998), pp. 411-412. 
64. Christopher Simpson, National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations: The 
Declassified History .f U.S. Political and Military Policy, 2981-2991 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1995), pp. 136-143 (classified version) and pp. 144-150 (unclassified version); “National Space 
Policy,” 4 July 1982, file 386, X-33 Archive. An NSDD 42 innovatlon ofat least equal significance 
was the establishment of the National Security Council Senior Interagency Group (Space), usually 
referred to as simply SIG (Space), as the primary forum for the formulation of space policy. Chaired 
by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, SIG (Space) was the locus of policy- 
making throughout the two terms of Ronald Reagan’s presidency. 
65. W. D. Kay, “Space Policy Redefined (Again),” chap. 7 in DeJning N A S A :  The Historical 
Debate over the Agency’s Mission (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005). 
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Australia (two AUSSATs), Indonesia (two Palapas), India (INSAT), and Saudi 
Arabia (ARABSAT).‘j6 
The 1972 decision by President Richard Nixon to build the Space Shuttle 
short-circuited debate on the desirability of investing in new expendable 
launch vehicles and facilities and froze them in 1970s technologies. NASA 
no longer ordered Delta or Atlas launches, and the Air Force began shutting 
down production lines for the Titan.67 Expendable launch systems began to 
age and became increasingly expensive to build and operate (which added to 
the cost of military and NASA space programs) because needed improvements 
in launch technology had been set back some two decades. The Shuttle already 
was expensive to operate and soon would show its grounding in yesterday’s 
technology. Space transportation came to be perceived as consuming too large 
a share of the federal budget, thereby shutting out opportunities for new sci- 
ence and technology initiatives. Eventually, the government would have to 
spend over $12 billion to restore abandoned ELV operations and to transfer 
satellites designed for the Shuttle back to these aging launchers.68 
A Mixed Fleet 
National space transportation policy, however, soon crashed on the rocks 
of reality-and on the launchpad. Following a launch failure of a Titan 34D 
on 28 August 1985, the Air Force temporarily suspended Titan launches 
until after an inve~tigation.~~ Five months later, the Challenger accident, on 
28 January 1986, grounded the STS for two years, a watershed moment for 
the U.S. space program, for NASA, for the Department of Defense, and for 
space commerce. What made the accident so damaging, aside from the loss of 
human life, was the policy that placed NASA, military, and commercial pay- 
loads aboard the Shuttle. The dependence on the Space Shuttle as the nation’s 
“primary” launch system impaired the ability of the nation’s defense and intel- 
ligence agencies to place payloads into orbit, and it stymied the development 
of a commercial’launch industry which had been struggling against both the 
Shuttle and its European ELV competitor, Ariane. 
66. Dennis R. Jenkins, Space Shuttle: The History of Developing the National Space Transportation 
System (Marceline, MO: Walsworth Publishing Co., 1992), pp. 286-287. 
67. For a discussion ofthe process leading up to Nixon’s decision, see Heppenheimer, Space Shuttle 
Decision; Dorsey Oles Boyle, “The Nixon Space Policy, 1969-1974” (M.A. thesis, University of 
Maryland at Baltimore County, 1993). 
68. National Space Council, “Final Report to the President on the U.S. Space Program,” January 
1993, pp. 5,33, file 017, box 1, X-33 Archive; John M. Logsdon and Craig Reed, ‘‘Commercializing 
Space Transportation,” in Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil 
Space Program, ed. John M. Logsdon, vol. 4, Accessing Space (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4407, 
69. William Boyer, “Titan IV Explosion Halts Launch Program,” Air Force Times 54 (16 August 
1999), pp. 408-409. 
1993): 33. 
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Shortly after the Challenger tragedy, additional expendable launcher fail- 
ures took place. A more disastrous Titan 34D launch accident on 18 April 
1986 effectively grounded military space operations on both coasts until 
the military and industry could ensure the Titan’s reliability. The rocket 
exploded only 8 seconds after lifting off. Upper sections of its solid rockets 
and fuel showered the launchpad, causing severe damage to nearby launch 
facilities. In some instances, large steel fragments were blown 3,000 feet from 
the explosion, which also created a toxic cloud that rose to an altitude of 
8,000 feet before being blown over the Pacific Ocean. The following month, 
on 3 May 1986, a Delta carrying the $57-million GOES-G weather satellite 
broke up about 90 seconds after liftoff from Cape Canaveral, Florida. The 
root cause of the failure (a lightning strike) needed to be determined before 
more Deltas could fly. 
The lessons learned (or that ought to have been learned) from these vari- 
ous launch accidents were that NASA needed to reduce its dependence on the 
Space Shuttle and that the nation needed a variety of launchers, both reusable 
and expendable, as well as a variety of disposable rockets. Collectively, these 
incidents brought home the dangers of relying on one or two launch systems. 
Subsequently, National Security Decision Directive 254, “United States Space 
Launch Strategy,” 27 December 1986, took NASA and the Space Shuttle out 
of competition with potential commercial launch providers. Specifically, the 
directive stipulated that “NASA shall no longer provide launch services for 
commercial and foreign payloads subject to exceptions for payloads that: (1) 
are Shuttle-unique; or (2) have national security or foreign policy implica- 
tions.” By “Shuttle-unique,” the directive meant payloads requiring either 
human intervention or facilities available only on the Space Shuttle.7O 
President Reagan approved a revised national space policy on 5 January 
1988. It too overthrew the long-standing notion of the Shuttle as the nation’s 
“primary” launch system and established the de facto mixed fleet of launch- 
ers as p01icy.~’ Essentially, NASA henceforth would use the (partially) reus- 
able Space Shuttle, and the Department of Defense would rely on expendable 
70. James A. Baker I11 to Economic Policy Council, “Presidential Policy Directive-Space 
Commercialization,” 6 October 1986, file 387, X-33 Archive; “Presidential Directive on National 
Space Policy,” fact sheet, 11 February 1988, p. 9, file 386, X-33 Archive. 
71. The classified space policy was not released until 11 February 1988, following completion of 
a parallel review of commercial space policy being conducted by the Economic Policy Council. 
See NSDD 293, “Presidential Directive on National Space Policy,” 5 January 1988; “Presidential 
Directive on National Space Policy,” fact sheet, 11 February 1988, pp. 7, 9-10, file 386, box 15, 
X-33 Archive. The essential parts of the 1988 national space policy that attempted to foster a 
domestic launch industry made their way into legislation as the Commercial Space Launch Act 
Amendments of 1988 (Public Law No. 100-657). See Kim G .  Yelton, “Evolution, Organization, 
and Implementation of the Commercial Space Launch Act and Amendments of 1988,” Haruard 
Journal ofLaw G. Technology 4 (1989): 34. 
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launchers?’ This institutional division between expendable and reusable 
launchers based on whether or not the launcher carried humans remained in 
effect over the following years, buttressed by intervening space policy dec- 
larations, despite partisan and ideological changes in White House leader- 
ship. The policy was based not on any study of expendable versus reusable 
launch vehicles, but on the exigencies of national security and the promotion 
of (space) business, not to mention the underlying assumption (and fact) that 
the only “human-rated’’ launcher was the partially reusable Space Shuttle. 
A New World (Dis)Order? 
The period of George H. W. Bush’s presidency, 1989-1993, was marked 
more by change than by continuity with the past. The biggest change-the 
winding down of the decades-long Cold War-had many consequences for 
space transportation, especially for the use of reusable and expendable launch- 
ers, as well as for the federal budget, the economy, and strategic planning. For 
starters, the budget reality that emerged at the end of the Cold War meant 
that fewer government dollars were available for space transportation. The 
government would have to find cheaper ways to launch payloads. The pres- 
sure to reduce launch costs was reflected in the December 1992 study “A Post 
Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy.” It called for the scaling back 
of all NASA, Defense Department, and Department of Energy space facili- 
ties, whether operated by the government or a contractor; the elimination 
of all duplication within governmental agencies with space programs; and 
the formation of a nonpartisan commission modeled after the Base Closure 
Commission to suggest consolidation measures.73 
The end of the Cold War also raised new questions about the usefulness 
of President Reagan’s quixotic Strategic Defense Initiative, which had its own 
launcher needs. Additionally, with the Soviet Union no longer a military foe, 
to what extent was it now feasible (or legal) for the United States government 
and launch industry to acquire Russian technology, such as rocket engines, or 
even Russian launchers? By the end of George H. W. Bush’s presidency, space 
policy also began to accommodate new space launch trade agreements with 
Russia as well as 
72. There have been exceptions. Typically, Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites are launched 
into geosynchronous orbit by a combination of a Titan IV booster and an Inertial Upper Stage. 
However, one DSP satellite was launched using the Space Shuttle on mission STS-44 (24 November 
1991). Also, policy excluded NASA specifically from maintaining its own expendable launchers. If 
the Agency wanted to launch on an ELV, it would have to turn to the Pentagon or industry. 
73.Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory Board,“A Post Cold War Assessment of US. Space Policy,” 
December 1992, pp. 39-43, file 016, box 1, X-33 Archive. 
74. See National Space Policy Directive 2, “Commercial Space Launch Policy,” 5 September 
1990, in National Space Council, “Final Report to the President on the U.S. Space Program.” 
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Similarly, a surfeit of now-useless missiles and hardened silos became 
available for nonmilitary uses. Could those Minuteman I1 ICBMs be used to 
conduct scientific research, as the United States had done with V-2 rockets 
brought back from Germany after World War That is exactly what 
the Universities Space Research Association wanted to do with the surplus 
missiles. Specifically, the association proposed conducting a pilot program 
to demonstrate low-cost, short-duration, small scientific satellite missions 
in support of university research and technology development. The initial 
problem was getting the missiles transferred from the military to NASA.’6 
Into this mix of questions and problems President Bush threw a new 
space program that would require the development of its own launch sys- 
tem. The Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) was a grandiose plan to return 
to the Moon, set up a lunar base, and send astronauts to Mars by 2019. Like 
space station Freedom, it would require development of a heavy-lift expend- 
able rocket?’ As a result, both NASA and the Defense Department were in 
the market for an expendable launcher, but the Senate Commerce Committee 
essentially zeroed out its funding before the program even began.’8 
In addition to supporting the development of medium- and heavy-lift 
ELVs by and for both NASA and the Defense Department, the Bush admin- 
istration funded two programs to create innovative reusable launch vehicles: 
the National Aero-Space Plane and the SDIO’s Single Stage to Orbit Program 
(DC-X) . Both were the most technologically challenging kind of reusable 
transport to build: single stage to orbit launchers. Technological change gen- 
erally occurs incrementally, not in giant leaps, and an operational single stage 
to orbit vehicle is too much of a leap. To date, no single stage to orbit craft has 
taken off or landed on this planet. These launchers likely will remain in the 
domain of science fiction and fantasy for a long time into the future, like the 
Stur Trek transporter or the Stargate. 
75. See David H. DeVorkin, Science with a Vengeance: How the Military Created the U.S. Space 
Sciences after World War I1  (New York: Springer, 1992); William R .  Corliss, NASA Sounding Rockets, 
1958-1968: A Historical Summary (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4401, 1971). 
76. Materials in file 130, box 5, X-33 Archive, relate to the use of excess DOD ballistic missiles 
by the Universities Space Research Association. 
77. Synthesis Group on America’s Space Exploration Initiative, “America at the Threshold: 
America’s Space Exploration Initiative,” n.d., p. 31, file 104, box 4, X-33 Archive; William Piland, 
“Space Transportation in the Future: Practical Considerations,” presentation to Access to Space 
Red Team, 4 June 1992, file 430, box 16, X-33 Archive. Piland pointed out that SEI could be 
accomplished with existing ELVs and the Russian Energia launcher. National Space Policy Directive 
6, Space Exploration Initiatrve Strategy, dated 13 March 1992, dealt with Bush’s SEI. A copy is in 
National Space Council, “Final Report to the President on the U.S. Space Program,” appendix 111, 
“National Space Policy Directives.” 
78. Lyn Ragsdale, “Politics Not Science: The U.S. Space Program in the Reagan and Bush 
Years,” in SpaceJlight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership, ed. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), pp. 161, 163-164. 
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The Vision Thing 
The undertaking of these single stage to orbit, as well as expendable 
launch vehicle, programs required for the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Space 
Exploration Initiative, and Space Station Freedom shaped space transportation 
policy during George Bush’s presidency. In addition, the search for a Space 
Shuttle replacement continued, and the nation’s aging launchers and launch 
facilities-the heritage of the “one-size-fits-all” Shuttle policy-demanded 
attenti0n.7~ The basis for the institutional division that made NASA responsible 
for reusable launchers and the Defense Department responsible for single-use 
rockets continued to be the implicit assignment of the role ofhuman spaceflight 
to NASA and its Space Shuttle.80 In the future, however, those roles might 
change, as reusable launchers began to supply the nation’s launch needs. 
Bush’s National Space Launch Strategy, released 24 July 1991, laid the 
groundwork for that change to take place. The strategy charged the Defense 
Department and NASA with joint development, funding, and management 
of a new suite of expendable rockets capable of lifting medium and heavy pay- 
loads for both civil and military use and set the first flight of the new system 
for 1999. Reflecting the stringent budgetary environment and the new direc- 
tion of space commercialization, the space launch strategy called for the two 
agencies to explore potential participation by the private sector.81 The 10-year 
space launch technology plan mandated by the space launch strategy, issued in 
October 1991 by NASA and the Departments of Defense and Energy, painted 
a picture of what the nation’s fleet of launchers would look like a decade later, 
as well as the technologies needed to get there. 
By then, the United States would have a new family of expendable launch- 
ers, known as the National Launch System (NLS), including a heavy-lift rocket 
for the Space Exploration Initiative. Reusable launchers continued to be the 
technological system of choice for human spaceflight, although the expend- 
able launchers under development would have the capability and high reliabil- 
ity required to boost a crew into orbit as part of a Space Shuttle-replacement 
launch system. Starting in 2005, Reusable Aerospace Vehicles, in the language 
79. See, for example, National Research Council, From Earth to Orbit: An Assessmeat of 
Transportation Options (Washington: National Academy Press, 1992), p. 3, copy available in file 102, 
box 4, X-33 Archive. 
80. “National Space Policy,” 2 November 1989, file 374, box 15, X-33 Archive; White House, 
Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S. National Space Policy,” fact sheet, 16 November 1989, file 
374, box 15, X-33 Archive; National Space Policy Directive 3, “U.S. Commercial Space Policy 
Guidelines,” issued 12 February 1991 in National Space Council, “Final Report to the President 
on the U.S. Space Program,” appendix 111, “National Space Policy Directives.” 
81. Interagency Working Group on Space Transportation, “Current National Space Policy on 
Space Transportation,” p. 2; National Space Policy Directive 4, “National Space Launch Strategy,” 
in National Space Council, “Final Report to the President on the U.S. Space Program,” appendix 
111, “National Space Policy Directives,” pp. 111-27-111-28. 
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of the plan, would complement and later replace the Shuttle. The plan included 
a reusable military launcher known as the Military Aerospace Vehicle, which 
also would be operable around 2005, just in time to replace the Space Shuttle. 
Initially, a robotic version of the craft could be launched to address commercial 
launch needs, and a later version could be equipped to carry a crew. By merging 
NASA, military, and commercial launch needs, the 10-year plan envisioned the 
possibility of a low-cost-per-flight reusable vehicle that would satisfy all of the 
nation’s launcher needs. 82 In effect, the plan for implementing Bush’s launcher 
strategy would have committed the same mistake as his predecessor’s space 
policy, which put all of its launch eggs in a single, reusable basket. 
The NASA Access to Space Study 
The election of William Jefferson Clinton as President in November 
1992 opened the door to a significant change in launcher policy. The new 
Democratic administration would want to shape space policy to suit its own 
agendas, which were certain to be different from those of its Republican pre- 
decessors. Three studies formed the basis for the new space transportation 
policy, and they came to different conclusions about the future of reusable 
launchers, especially single stage to orbit rockets. The most important of those 
was NASA’s Access to Space Study. Mandated by the House Subcommittee on 
Space of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology in 1992, Access 
to Space focused on future launch systems, analyzed the launcher needs of 
NASA, Defense, and industry, and developed various alternatives for address- 
ing those needs for the period 1995 to 2030.83 
Option 1 involved retaining the Space Shuttle until 2030. The Option 
1 team endorsed fresh studies of flyback, fully reusable liquid-fueled Shuttle 
boosters in order to increase safety and to reduce costs. Option 2 replaced the 
Shuttle in 2005 with a new expendable launcher using state-of-the-art tech- 
nology. Option 3 was more daring. It would replace the Space Shuttle in 2030 
with “an unspecified . . . next-generation, advanced technology system . . . 
a ‘leapfrog’ approach, designed to capitalize on advances made in the NASP 
and SDI [the DC-XI programs to achieve order-of-magnitude improvements 
in the cost effectiveness of space tran~portation.”~~ 
82. Natlonal Space Council, “Ten-Year Space Launch Technology Plan,” October 1992, pp. ES-1, 
ES-2,l-1,2-8,2-10,2-11, file 103, box 4, X-33 Archive. 
83. Ivan Bekey, “Access to Space,” IAF-94-V.1.515 (paper read at the 45th Congress of the 
International Astronautical Federal, Jerusalem, Israel, 9-14 October 1994), p. 3, copy available in 
file 098, box 3, X-33 Archive, summarizes the Access to Space Study more succinctly than the study’s 
own executive summary. 
84. Office of Space Systems Development, NASA Headquarters, “Access to Space Study: 
Summary Report,” January 1994, p. 71, file 100, box 3, X-33 Archive; Arnold D. Aldrich, “NASA’s 
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The Option 3 team considered three launcher architectures.The first was a 
rocket-powered SSTO ship.The second was a single stage to orbit craft powered 
by a combined rocket and air-breathing propulsion system. A combination of 
rocket and air-breathing engines propelled the third architecture, which was a 
two stage to orbit launcher. As part of the Option 3 study, the team specifically 
compared a generic rocket-powered single stage to orbit launcher with the NASP, 
looking at such factors as cost, risk, and development schedule.They concluded 
against NASP and all other air-breathing vehicles because their technological 
difficulty would drive up costs and require a longer period of development.The 
Option 3 team report concluded that reusable launchers could replace medium- 
load throwaway rockets, leaving expendable launchers to lift heavy payloads in 
the short term, and that in time, reusable vehicles would replace even those.85 
Once each team selected the best vehicle design from the range of alter- 
natives considered, the Access to Space Study then compared all of the winning 
designs. This comparison necessarily included weighing expendable rockets 
against reusable launchers. The study concluded that the most beneficial option 
was to develop and deploy a fleet of fully reusable, rocket-powered single stage 
to orbit vehicles and recommended phasing out current throwaway rockets- 
as well as the Shuttle-beginning around 2008. The new reusable launch 
vehicles would be able to accommodate all conceivable NASA, military, and 
commercial payloads, and-despite their need for a large upfront investment, 
especially in technological development-they would cut government launch 
costs by up to 80 percent while increasing vehicle reliability and safety by 
about an order of magnitude.86 
After the Access to Space Study, several of the NASA officials involved in 
it began to proselytize their belief in the near-term feasibility of SSTO rock- 
ets in various venues, including such popular journals as Aerospace America.87 
Furthermore, the Space Frontier Foundation-dedicated to human colonization 
continuedjom the previous page 
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of space--organized a congressional briefing in the spring of 1996 that they 
called Cheap Access to Space. The message to Congress was to support single 
stage to orbit vehicle programs as the only way to get low-cost space launchers, 
and in particular to fund the DC-X (then a NASA program) and NASA’s X-33. 
With generous funding from NASA Headquarters, the foundation organized the 
Cheap Access to Space symposium in July of 1997 with the same message.88 
Defense Department Studies 
The NASA Access to Space enthusiasm for reusable and single stage to orbit 
rockets was missing from the two Defense Department studies that contrib- 
uted to the formulation of Clinton administration space transportation pol- 
icy. Instead, they proposed to keep launching the existing disposable rockets. 
Such, for instance, was the conclusion of the so-called “Bottom-Up Review.” 
Completed in 1993, the “Bottom-Up Review” of military launchers, like 
NASA’s Access to Space, considered three alternatives. Alternative 1 was to 
extend the life of current military expendable rockets, while Alternative 2 
was to develop a new launch system. Alternative 3 funded the development 
of advanced reusable launch vehicle technologies and maintained current 
expendable launchers until the Pentagon could switch to reusable vehicles. 
Alternative 3 evaluated four reusable launcher concepts chosen for their level 
of increasing technological complexity, ranging from a flyback first stage to 
a fully reusable two stage to orbit craft, plus two different single stage to 
orbit designs, one powered by rockets and the other by a combination of 
rockets and air-breathing engines. Ultimately, the study team eliminated 
Alternative 3 but shifted the SSTO rocket to Alternative 2 for consideration. 
Unlike NASA’s Access to Space, the “Bottom-Up Review” did not embrace 
single stage to orbit rockets or reusable launchers in general. Rather, it con- 
cluded that the current fleet of expendable boosters was fulfilling the Defense 
Department’s launcher needs and selected Alternative l.89 
The other key Defense Department launcher study stemmed from a con- 
gressional mandate, like NASA’s Access to Space. Section 213 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for 1994 directed the Defense Secretary to develop 
a plan for modernizing its launchers and launch facilities, lowering the costs of 
manufacturing current single-use rockets, and developing a new launch sys- 
88. The presentations from the Cheap Access to Space congressional briefing are in file 360, box 
14, X-33 Archive. Notes and other materials from the Cheap Access to Space Symposium held in 
Washington on 21-22 July 1997, inchding the $100,000 in underwriting from NASA, are in file 705, 
box 24, X-33 Archive, and more detded information on the NASA underwriting is in file 842, box 
28, X-33 Archive. 
89. Director, Strategic & Space Systems, “Space Launch Systems Bottom-Up Review,” 4 May 
1993, file 233, box 8, X-33 Archive; “Executive Summary,” in Space Launch Modernization Study, 
April 1994, pp. 5-6, file 142, box 5, X-33 Archive. 
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tem. Issued in April 1994, the Space Launch Modernization Study, better known 
as the Moorman Report after its chairman, Air Force Lieutenant General 
Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., considered four launcher options?O 
Option 1 would have maintained the current fleet ofELVs-Delta, Atlas, 
Titan-and the Space Shuttle while NASA funded a technology program that 
eventually would lead to the development of a reusable launcher to replace the 
Shuttle. In Option 2, NASA also funded development of an RLV and con- 
tinued using the Shuttle, but the current throwaway rockets were upgraded. 
Option 3 involved developing a new expendable launcher. One version would 
launch only cargo and eventually would replace current systems, while the 
other would carry either cargo or passengers, one day replacing both the cur- 
rent expendable rockets and the Space Shuttle. Option 4 involved developing 
a reusable vehicle in cooperation with NASA, plus setting up a government- 
mandated launch corporation. The arrangement would bring together public 
and private financing; government and contractors would share the costs.’l 
Although directed to select the “most attractive” option, the Moorman 
Report simply presented the four options without stating a preference for any 
of them.92 Despite its apparent ambiguity, the report contained a number of 
suggestions that soon became part of national space policy. For instance, it 
recommended that NASA-because of its need to continue human space- 
flight and to replace the Shuttle-be assigned the lead for developing RLVs, 
with the Defense Department maintaining a cooperative reusable launcher 
program that would include experimental flight demonstrations. The X-33 
program embodied that suggestion. Meanwhile, the Defense Department 
would take the lead in developing single-use rockets, and each agency would 
manage and fund efforts within their area of responsibility. That recommen- 
dation became policy. The Moorman Report, however, was not immune to 
the raging enthusiasm for reusable launch vehicles, especially for the growing 
commercial launch industry. It proclaimed that once reusable vehicles reduced 
launch costs by a factor of 10, they would “ignite a commercial space 
They were not alone in that belief. 
90. “Executive Summary,” in Space Launch Modernization Study, April 1994, pp. 1-2, 15-23, 
file 142, box 5, X-33 Archive; Lieutenant General Thomas S .  Moorman, Jr., “DoD Space Launch 
Modernization Plan,” briefing to the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee 
(COMSTAC), 10 May 1994, file 588, box 29, X-33 Archive; Bekey, “Access to Space,” p. 14. 
91. “Executive Summary,” in Space Launch Modernization Study, pp. 15-19; Moorman, “DoD 
Space Launch Modernization Plan”; Bekey, “Access to Space,” p. 14. 
92. Nonetheless, on the question of developing a new launcher, it recommended that the Defense 
Department develop a heavy-lift launcher. See “Executive Summary,” in Space Launch Modernization 
Study, p. 25. 
93. “Executive Summary,” in Space Launch Modernization Study, p. 29; Moorman, “DoD Space 
Launch Modernization Plan.’’ 
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The 1994 Space Transportation Policy 
The Moorman Report, the “Bottom-Up Review,” and the Access to 
Space studies quickly became the foundation for the preparation of a new 
space launch policy by the Clinton White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP), which had absorbed the duties of the National 
Space Council.94 Its goal was to piece together a single, coherent space trans- 
portation policy95 that addressed the various launch vehicle needs of NASA, 
the Pentagon, and industry, while taking into account the changing character 
of the era following the Cold War. Signed by President Clinton in August 
1994, the new space transportation policy addressed the range of ills afflicting 
the country’s launchers and facilities. 
It ruled, for instance, on the use of excess Minuteman missiles96 and gave 
Russian launch vehicles a larger role by involving that country in the space 
station pr0gram.9~ The policy also proposed the modernization of existing 
launch systems (both expendable rockets and the Shuttle) and facilities and 
the development of a new reusable launch vehicle that would reduce “greatly” 
the cost of putting payloads in orbit. In addition, it extended and expanded 
the standing policy of fostering the commercialization of space, as well as the 
international competitiveness of the U.S. commercial launch 
~ 
94. The actual work of preparing the policy was carried out by the Interagency Working Group 
on Space Transportation. Established by the Office of Science and Technology Policy, it consisted 
of representatives of the various agencies with an interest in space policy: NASA; the Defense 
Department; the Joint Chiefs of Stafe the National Security Council; the Director of Central 
Intelligence; the Departments of State, Commerce, Treasury, and Transportation; the Council of 
Economics Advisors; the Nuclear Energy Commission; the Office of Management and Budget; the 
Office of the Vice President; and the United States Trade Representative. See Office of Science 
and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President, “Interagency Working Group on Space 
Transportation Representatives,” May 1994, file 147, box 5, X-33 Archive. 
95. The National Space Transportation Policy replaced National Space Policy Directive (NSPD) 2, 
NSPD 4, and National Security Directive (NSD) 46, “CapeYork,” as well as the porhons that pertain 
to space transportation of NSPD l/NSD 30, “National Space Pohcy”; NSPD 3, “US. Commercial 
Space Policy Guidelines”; and NSPD 6, “Space Exploration Initiahve Strategy.” See Interagency 
Working Group on Space Transportahon, “Current National Space Pohcy on Space Transportation,” p. 
1; National SpaceTransportation Policy, draft, 10 May 1994, file 147, box 5, X-33 Archive. 
96. Office of Science and Technology Pohcy, W u t e  House, “Statement on National Space 
Transportation Policf 5 August 1994, fde 147, box 5, X-33 Archive; Presidentlal Decision Directive 
National Science andTechnology Council (NSTC) 4,5 August 1994, file 147, box 5, X-33 Archive. 
97. The Joint Statement on  Cooperation in Space, signed by Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., 
and the Russian Prime Minister in September 1993, laid the foundation for the two countries to 
cooperate on the Station project. The 1 November 1993 addendum approved by President Clinton 
declared that the Russian launchers (as well as the Shuttle) would carry the various Station segments 
and that Russia was a full partner in the project. See “Use of foreign launch vehicles for the Space 
Station has already been approved by the President,” file 149, box 6, X-33 Archive. 
98. Richard DalBello, Office of Science and Technology Policy, White House, to multiple 
addressees, “May 17, 1994 Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Space Transportation,” 
11 May 1994, file 147, box 5, X-33 Archive. 
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The 1994 National Space Transportation Policy continued the standing 
decision to utilize a mixture of expendable and reusable launchers but added 
the notion of a lead agency for each type of launch technological system, as 
the Moorman Report had recommended. The new language shifted the basis 
for distinguishing institutional responsibilities from the nature of the payload 
(human spaceflight) to the type of technological system utilized (expend- 
able versus reusable launch vehicle). Thus, NASA would be the lead agency 
in developing the “next generation” of reusable launchers-including single 
stage to orbit rockets-while the military would implement improvements in 
expendable rockets on behalf of the entire national security sect0r.9~ 
Even though the Space Transportation Policy made NASA the lead 
agency for the development of reusable launchers, individuals within the Air 
Force, such as Simon P. Worden, and Congress, especially Representative 
Dana Rohrabacher (R-California) , wanted to continue work on such reus- 
able military craft as the TransAtmospheric Vehicle and the Space Maneuver 
Vehicle.Io0 The position of the Defense Department, however, was that the 
1994 Space Transportation Policy clearly gave NASA the responsibility for 
reusable launchers, not the Department, and the Pentagon preferred to split 
the funding the same way. The Air Force recently had started the Evolved 
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program to develop a low-cost heavy- 
lift expendable rocket in collaboration with Boeing and Lockheed Martin. 
As a result, Paul G. Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
and Technology, explained, the Department had “no requirement to initi- 
ate an additional program.” NASA Administrator Dan Goldin agreed with 
Kaminski on splitting launch vehicle funding in the same way that the space 
transportation policy divided up launch vehicle responsibilities.”’ 
99. Office of Science and Technology Policy, White House, “Statement on National Space 
Transportation Policy,” 5 August 1994; Presidential Decision Directive NSTC 4, 5 August 1994. 
The DOD, in cooperation with NASA, could use the Shuttle to meet national security needs. 
Launch priority would be provided for national security missions as governed by appropriate 
NASA/DOD agreements. Launches necessary to preserve and protect human life in space would 
have the highest priority except in times of national emergency. NASA would maintain the Shuttle 
until a replacement became available. 
100. Rohrabacher to members of the House Appropriations National Security Subcommittee, 
“A request for assistance on this week’s markup,” 11 July 1995, file 506, box 19, X-33 Archive; 
“Department of Defense Appeal: FY 1996 Defense Authorization Bill,” 15 June 1995, file 506, 
box 19, X-33 Archive; Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, “Reusable Launcher Backers Push X-Plane Test 
Program,” Aviation Week G Space Technology (25 July 1994): 24-25, copy available in file 180, box 7, 
X-33 Archive; Warren Ferster, “U.S. Air Force Awards 2 Study Contracts for Space Plane,” Space 
News 8 (8-14 September 1997): 19, copy available in file 192, box 7, X-33 Archive; James Cast to 
Gary Payton, e-mail message, 4 September 1997, copy available in file 192, box 7, X-33 Archive. 
101. Paul G. Kmnslu,  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitlon and Technology, to Goldin, 4 
May 1995, file 506, box 19, X-33 Archive; Goldin to Kaminski, 12 June 1995, fde 506, box 19, X-33 
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What is striking about the 1994 Space Transportation Policy is that it was 
the first space policy statement to contain language regarding a specific pro- 
gram, NASA’s X-33 project. That peculiarity was the direct result of strong 
NASA lobbying. One set of proposed language made NASA focus on devel- 
oping technologies “to support a decision no later than December 1996 to 
proceed with a subscale flight demonstration which would prove the concept 
of SST0.”’02 Later, the Agency suggested wording that supported its single 
stage to orbit project by authorizing technology development leading up to a 
June 1997 decision to proceed with a subscale flight demonstration to “prove 
the concept of Single Stage To Orbit (SSTO).”’03 Another iteration of draft 
policy added: “The technology development program will lead to the full- 
scale development of a next generation reusable space transportation system 
by the end of the decade.”’04 NASA subsequently made a point of holding 
back the release of the Cooperative Agreement Notice for the X-33 program 
until after the White House reviewed NASA’s plans for implementing the 
1994 space policy and responded to NASA in writing.lo5 Thus, the Space 
Transportation Policy represented a clear victory for NASA’s pursuit of single 
stage to orbit launchers and reusable launch vehicles in general. 
The RLV Bubble Bursts 
The same enthusiasm for reusable launchers translated to the commer- 
cial launch industry, too. Government policy-the 1994 Space Transportation 
Policy-and government investment in such projects as the NASP and the 
DC-X, followed now by the X-33, favored the development of reusable 
launch vehicles. In part, too, this enthusiasm resulted from one of the touted 
advantages of reusable launch vehicles, namely, their lower operating costs. 
This advantage took on new importance because of the considerable, in fact 
unprecedented, number of launches projected to take place in the near future. 
Setting up the Milstar, Teledesic, Orbcomm, Intermediate Circular Orbit 
(ICO), Globalstar, and Iridium networks would involve launching literally 
hundreds of satellites. 
continuedjiom the previous page 
Archive; “Memorandum of Agreement between Air Force Space Command, the Air Force Research 
Laboratory, and the National Aeronautics and Space Ahmstration for Cooperative Technology 
Development Support of NASA Reusable Launch Vehicles and Air Force Military Spaceplanes,” 12 
October 1997, file 506, box 19, X-33 Archve. 
102. Office of Science and Technology Policy, White House, “Statement on National Space 
Transportation Policy,” 5 August 1994; Presidential Decision Directive NSTC 4, 5 August 1994. 
103. “NASA Comments on the Draft National Space Transportation Strategy Directive and on 
May 17 Interagency Comments,” 19 May 1994, file 147, box 5, X-33 Archive. 
104. Gary Krier to JeffHofgard, “NASA Comments to the OSTP National Space Transportation 
Strategy Draft of 8 April 1994,” 20 April 1994, file 151, box 6, X-33 Archive. 
105. Richard DalBello, Technology Division, OSTP, to Jack Mansfield, NASA, 8 November 
1994, file 153, box 6, X-33 Archive. 
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Commercial launch firms’ enthusiasm for reusable launch vehicles was 
reflected in the technological shift that took place between 1989 and 1999 
within the industry. In 1989, when the Department of Transportation issued 
the first commercial launch licenses,lo6 expendable rockets based on 1950s 
technology and established companies with deep roots in the military- 
industrial complex dominated the industry. These included Martin Marietta, 
manufacturer of the Titan; McDonnell Douglas, maker of the Delta rocket; 
and General Dynamics, which built the Atlas-Centaur. The nation’s smaller 
startup launch providers also were utilizing expendable launchers: the 
Conestoga rocket of Space Services, Inc. (SSI); the Industrial Launch Vehicle 
(ILV) of the American Rocket Company (AmRoc); and Conatec, Inc., and 
E’Prime Aerospace Corporation used various sounding  rocket^.'^' 
The picture in 1999 was quite different. Reusable vehicles were now 
the space launcher dtr jour, thanks mainly to the enthusiasm of a half dozen 
relatively small startup launcher companies that were developing RLVs for 
commercial and government payloads. Among these were the Astroliner of 
Kelly Space and Technology, the K-1 of Kistler Aerospace Corporation,”’ 
the Pathfinder of Pioneer Rocketplane, Rotary Rocket Company’s Roton 
C-9, Space Access’s SA-1, and Vela Technology Development’s Space Cruiser 
System.”’ Meanwhile, with NASA funding, Lockheed Martin was developing 
its single stage to orbit VentureStarTM, as well as the X-33 prototype; Orbital 
Sciences Corporation was building and testing the X-34; Boeing was work- 
ing on the Future X Trailblazer; and Scaled Composites was involved in the 
X-38 Crew Return Vehicle program.”’ The Space Maneuver Vehicle, more- 
over, was under development by the Air Force Space Command in conjunc- 
tion with McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed Martin, and the Boeing Phantom 
106. Stephanie Lee-Miller, “Message from the Director,” October 1989, in Department of 
Transportation Office of Commercial Space Transportation, The U. S. Ofice of Commercial Space 
Transportation Ff th  Annual Report (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990), copy available in file 393, box 
15, X-33 Archive. 
107. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Commercial Space Transportation, “Annual 
Report to Congress: Activities Conducted under the Commercial Space Launch Act,” 1987, pp. 
5-6, file 391, box 15, X-33 Archive. 
108. Walter Kistler, Bob Citron, and Thomas C. Taylor, “A Small, Reusable Single Stage to Orbit 
Rocketship,” IAF-94-V.3.536 (paper read at the 45th Congress of the International Astronautics 
Federation, Jerusalem, Israel, 9-14 October 1994), file 179, box 7, X-33 Archive; Kistler Aerospace 
Corporation, “K-1 Aerospace Vehicle Overview,” December 1997, file 179, box 7, X-33 Archive. 
109. Unless indicated otherwise, the following discussion of RLV projects is from Associate 
Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, “1999 Reusable Launch Vehicle Programs 
& Concepts,” January 1999, pp. 7, 22-29, file 564, box 20, X-33 Archive; and Bill Sweetman, 
“Rocket Planes,” Popular Science 232 (February 1998): 40-45, file 180, box 7, X-33 Archive. 
110. The vehicle would be attached to the International Space Station as a means of returning 
to Earth if an emergency required an immediate evacuation of the Station, if an astronaut had a 
medical emergency, or if the Shuttle were grounded and the astronauts had to return to Earth. 
Strictly speaking, the X-38 was not an RLV, that is, it was not intended to be a launch vehicle but 
was capable of multiple flights nonetheless. 
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Works.”’ Nor was RLV fever confined to the United States. Similar efforts 
were under way in the United Kingdom, India, and Japan.l12 
This RLV bubble burst in 2000, just as various high-technology indus- 
tries were beginning to soften. Space commerce, because of its high capi- 
tal requirements, was one of the first to falter, starting with the failure of 
Motorola’s Iridium communication satellite constellation. The possibility of 
winning the Ansari X Prize encouraged some firms to keep trying, how- 
ever.113 Meanwhile, NASA terminated its RLV programs: the X-33 and the 
X-34 on 1 March 2001, followed by the Future X Trailbla~er,”~ and the X-38 
prototype Crew Return Vehicle on 29 April 2002. The space agency was out 
of the business of developing reusable launchers. 
The New Bush 
George W. Bush brought about major changes in Clinton space policy 
largely through his appointee to head NASA, Sean O’Keefe. Within a month 
of taking charge, O’Keefe embarked on a series of measures that brought 
NASA and the Defense Department into closer collaboration on technology 
development, including a possible jointly developed reusable launch vehi~le.”~ 
While O’Keefe was drafting NASA once again into military service, Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced the revival ofpresident Reagan’s space- 
based missile defense system and elevated the agency’s status from the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Organization to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) on 4 
January 2002 in recognition of the high national priority that the President 
gave to missile defense.’16 Bush, however, did not give space commercializa- 
tion the same status, perhaps because his policy advisers believed that the major 
downturn in the market for commercial launch services had undermined the 
111. The Air Force gave study contracts to both Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas Space 
Division to develop concept designs for the suborbital vehicle. McDonnell Douglas based its design 
on the DC-X. The Boeing Phantom Works was developing the SMV. 
112. Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, “1999 Reusable Launch 
Vehicle Programs & Concepts,” January 1999, pp. 7, 22-29, file 564, box 20, X-33 Archive; 
Sweetman, “Rocket Planes,” pp. 40-45, file 180, box 7, X-33 Archive. 
113. The X Prize was a $10-million prize offered to the first entrant able to launch a vehicle 
capable of carrying three people to a 100-kilometer suborbital altitude and repeating the flight 
within two weeks. See Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, “1999 
Reusable Launch Vehicle Programs & Concepts,” pp. 30-32; Rebecca Anderson and Michael 
Peacock, “Ansari X-Prize: A Brief History and Background,” NASA History Division Web site, 
http://history.nasa.gov/x-prize. htm (accessed 24 March 2005). 
114. The goal of Future X was to develop vehicles more technologically advanced than the X-33. 
It consisted of a series of experimental flight demonstrators called the Pathfinder and Trailblazer 
series. Material on the Future X program can be found in file 184, box 7, X-33 Archive. 
115. Marc Selinger, “Air Force, NASA Studying Joint Development of New Reusable Launch 
Vehicles,” article 197714 in Aerospace Daily (25January 2002, electronic edition), hard copy in file 
854, X-33 Archive. 
116. “BMDO’s Name Changed to Missile Defense Agency,” article 196406 in Aerospace Daily (7 
January 2002, electronic ehtion), hard copy in file 854, X-33 Archive. 
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ability of industry to recoup the considerable investments needed to develop 
launch systems.”’ Instead, on 14 January 2004, he revived his father’s failed 
Space Exploration Initiative as the Vision for Space Exploration.”’ 
Later that year, on 21 December 2004, the White House released a new 
space transportation policy. It raised more questions than it answered. The 
policy made no basic changes in existing space commerce policy, but it did 
throw up barriers to the commercial launch industry by allowing the govern- 
ment to use excess ballistic missiles when their use was cheaper than flying 
on a commercial launcher. It also made it harder for companies to put pay- 
loads on foreign launchers (despite the reliance on Russian launchers follow- 
ing the Columbia disaster). Furthermore, the new space transportation policy 
did not make reusable and expendable launcher responsibility the basis for 
distinguishing the institutional responsibilities of NASA and the Defense 
Department. Instead, it made the Defense Secretary responsible for national 
security launchers and facilities, and the NASA Administrator responsible for 
“the civil sector,” without any mention of reusable or expendable launchers or 
even which agency had responsibility for human spaceflight. 
The central issue addressed by the policy was the need for launchers to 
achieve the Vision for Space Exploration. It declared that the Space Shuttle 
would return to flight, complete assembly of the Space Station by the end of 
the decade, then retire. Concurrently, NASA would develop a new “crew 
exploration vehicle” for human  pacef flight."^ Furthermore, it declared that 
the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program was now “the foun- 
dation for access to space” for intermediate and heavy payloads serving both 
military and civilian missions. The policy also directed NASA and DOD to 
develop jointly a version of the EELV suitable for “space exploration.” 
In January 2004, NASA announced that it would begin developing the 
Crew Exploration Vehicle, a piloted vehicle to carry humans into orbit “and 
beyond,” as well as to ferry astronauts to and from the Space Station following 
the retirement of the Shuttle. Different versions of the vehicle could operate 
in Earth orbit or near the Moon or even on the surface of Mars. The Crew 
Exploration Vehicle effort was part of what the space agency was calling its 
Constellation Systems Theme, a set of projects to develop, test, and deploy the 
various systems needed to prosecute the Vision for Space Exploration. In addi- 
tion, NASA planned to use an established military acquisition process known 
as spiral or evolutionary acquisition to develop space exploration hardware. 
117. “U.S. Space Transportation Policy,” fact sheet, 6 January 2005, p. 2. 
118. Office of the Press Secretary, White House, “Executive Order President’s Commission on 
Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy,” 30 January 2004. 
119. The following section is from “U.S. Space Transportation Policy,” fact sheet, 6 January 
2005, except where noted. 
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The first spiral or stage would deliver humans to orbit in a Crew Exploration 
Vehicle by 2014. The second would land humans on the Moon’s surface by 
2020, followed by extended lunar visits in the third stage.’” All of these pro- 
posed systems would be launched on top of an EELV. 
In the end, the 2004 Space Transportation Policy and its implementation 
seemed to assign reusable vehicles the same role played by Mercury, Gemini, 
and Apollo capsules: sitting atop expendable boosters. This time, though, the 
rocket of choice was the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle and its future 
variants. Implicit in the decisions underlying the latest space transportation 
policy was the assumption of a reduced launch rate. Reusable launch vehicles 
only make economic sense if they have numerous payloads to launch, and 
their absence in the 2004 Space Transportation Policy can be interpreted as 
an admission (or at least an assumption) that launch rates for the foreseeable 
future will be low. One must wonder, then, what the thinking is that lies 
behind the current Russian effort to build the Kliper reusable launch vehicle 
for transporting crew and cargo to the Space Station. Do they see launch rates 
rising? Is the purpose of the Kliper just to bring down launch costs below 
those for the Soyuz for the cash-starved Russian space effort?”’ 
In the relatively brief period between 1980 and 2005, the status of reus- 
able launch vehicles in national space transportation policy waxed and waned 
more than once. The perception that there was something called space trans- 
portation began as people started to fly into space on a reusable, rather than a 
recoverable, craft; that is, the notion of transportation involved both reusabil- 
ity and human spaceflight. Thus, the advent of the Space Shuttle engendered 
and dominated (monopolized) space transportation policy. Beginning in 1986, 
however, reusable craft took their place alongside expendable launchers in a 
mixed fleet. The dividing line between NASA and Defense Department insti- 
tutional responsibilities was human spaceflight, but that did not give NASA 
responsibility for all reusable and the Pentagon responsibility for all expend- 
able launchers. Nonetheless, the 1994 Space Transportation Policy explicitly 
did enunciate that technological separation of institutional responsibilities, 
and it created the framework within which a tremendous commercial and 
governmental enthusiasm for reusable launch vehicles thrived. That policy 
also broke new ground by mentioning-for the first time-specific space pro- 
grams. Following the collapse of enthusiasm that began in 2000, reusable 
launch vehicles disappeared from space transportation policy. 
120. NASA, fiscal year 2006 budget request, http://~~~.na~a.gov/pdf/l07488main~FYO6~low. 
pdf; pp. SAE 5-2, SAE 5-3, SAE 6-1, SAE 6-4 to 6-6. On spiral acquisition, see, for example, 
Alexander R. Slate, “Evolutionary Acquisition: Breaking the Mold-New Possibilities from a 
Changed Perspective,” Program Manager 31 (May-June 2002): 6-13. It is from the lingo of spiral 
acquisition that NASA has picked up the phrase “system of systems.” 
121.Anatoly Zak,“Russians Propose a New Space Shuttle,” IEEE Spectrum 42 (February 2005): 13-14. 
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HISTORIOGRAPHY 
A Question 
The history of air travel in the United States can be traced back to a time 
over two centuries ago. A symposium held at the National Air and Space 
Museum attempted to deal with the subject, a sort of “bicentennial survey” 
held in the year of the U.S. bicentennial, specifically on 4 November 1976.122 
The history of motorized winged flight is much shorter, of course, and the 
first Sputnik launches took place scarcely two decades before the symposium. 
Several of the speakers lamented the chore of condensing 15 or 70 years of 
history into 20 minutes. In placing their talks in a broader context, historian 
Thomas Parke Hughes noted that 70 years was not a large amount of time. 
Nor did he find aeronautics and astronautics to be “an overwhelmingly sig- 
nificant” subject. “We are dealing here with a very short period of time and 
one episode in a long history of man and te~hnology.”’~~ 
Little has changed in the intervening two decades since Hughes made that 
observation.The year 2007 will mark only the 50th anniversary of the Sputnik 
launches, followed by NASA’s 50th anniversary. Fifty years is a short historical 
span; it is certainly not histoive d Zongue &vie. Furthermore, during the past two 
decades, the amount of printed literature and unpublished talks on space history 
has multiplied swiftly, confirming once again the de Solla Price curve. 124 Despite 
this growth, we lack a “big picture” understanding of space history. A different, 
but associated, question is how space history fits into general histories, such as 
those of the United States, or into specialized histories, such as the history of 
transportation. Is space history such a peculiar topic of study that it does not 
lend itself to integration into other histories, into larger historical questions? 
A recent joint publication of the American Historical Association and 
the Society for the History of Te~hnology’~’ that surveyed U.S. transportation 
history ended with a chapter on “airways,” but not a mention of space travel. 
Is going into space such a peculiar human endeavor that its history must be 
segregated from the other categories into which we parse history? Is it because 
many space and space history enthusiasts act as if the space program were a 
nontheistic religion? Or should we be asking whether space transportation is 
122. Eugene M. Emme, ed., Two Hundred Years of Flight in America: A Bicentennial Survey, 
AAS History Series, vol. 1 (San Diego: Univelt, Inc., for the American Astronautical Society, 
1977). The symposium sponsors were NASM, the AIAA, SHOT, and AAS, which published the 
proceedings. 
123. Hughes, “Perspectives of a Historian of Technology: A Commentary,” in Two Hundred Years 
of Flight in America, ed. Emme, p. 257. 
124. Derek de Solla Price, Science Since Babylon, 1st edition (New Haven, C T  Yale University 
Press, 1961). 
125. Robert C. Post, Technology, Transport, and Travel in American History (Washington, DC: 
American Historical Association, 2003). 
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really a form of transportation? Was there anything of substance to the trans- 
portation references common to space travel-such as the Space Transportation 
System and National Space Transportation Policy-or were they just figures of 
speech, similar to the analogies with aircraft and ships reflected by the terms 
spacecraft, spaceplane, rocket ship, and spaceship’26 or, say, the maritime analogies 
used by presidential speech writer^'^' and space advocates?’28 
One of the peculiar aspects of space launch vehicles is their origins in 
rocketry, which for centuries served largely military purposes. The aerospace 
engineer Maxwell W. Hunter I1 captured the difference between the two uses 
of rocket technology with his use of the terms “ammunition” and “transporta- 
tion.” Expendable rockets, he wrote, were ammunition, while reusable launch 
vehicles were tran~portation.“~ The shift from “ammunition” to “transpor- 
tation” was not just one of application, but also a change of perception that 
occurred once people replaced the bombs, electronic instrumentation, and 
other inanimate objects that had served for decades as the sole payloads carried 
into space or the uppermost reaches of the atmosphere. The transformation of 
a military technology into a mode of transport is rather unique in world his- 
tory, perhaps as unique as turning swords into plowshares. 
The reverse, turning transportation into a weapon, is certainly not 
unique, but rather a common occurrence in history. In recent times, we 
have witnessed aircraft turned into weaponry on 7 December 1941 and 11 
September 2001, for example. Automobiles and trucks also have become 
bomb delivery systems in the hands of Timothy McVeigh and colleagues 
on 19 April 1995, against the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, 
and Ramzi Yousef and his fellow coconspirators on 26 February 1993, 
against the World Trade Center in New York City. Any form of transpor- 
126. Another term that evokes the maritime analogy is spacefaring. Much can be written on the 
analogy between moving through outer space and sailing, as I suggested in Single Stage to Orbit: 
Politics, Space Technology, and the Questfor Reusable Rocketry (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 2003), 
127. For example, President Kennedy told a crowd at the Rice University stadium, “We intend 
to be first . . . to become the world’s leading space-faring nation” (John F. Kennedy, address at Rice 
University, 24 September 1962, Public Papers ofthe Presidents Washington, DC: National Archives 
and Records Service, 19631, p. 329). 
128. Lieutenant Colonel Daniel 0. Graham, the well-known proponent of what became the 
Strategic Defense Initiative, believed that a U.S. space-based global defense system would bring 
about a Pax Americana similar to the Pax Britannica induced by Britain’s domination of the world’s 
oceans. See Erik K. Pratt, Selling Strategic Defense: Interests, Ideologies, and the Arms Race (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 96. 
129. See, for example, Hunter to E. P. Wheaton, vice president for research and development, 
Lockheed, “Orbital Transportation,” 28 October 1965, pp. 1-2, file 338, box 13, X-33 Archive. 
The distinction between ammunition and transportation appears throughout Hunter’s oeuvre. See, 
for instance, Hunter, “The SSX: A True Spaceship” (manuscript, 2000), pp. 17, 18,22; and Hunter, 
“The SSX: A True Spaceship” (manuscript, 4 October 1989), pp. 2, 6, both in file 338, box 13, 
X-33 Archive. 
pp. 21-22, 217. 
340 CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
tation can undergo this transformation, pet we cannot imagine any bomb 
delivery system or other form of weapon system being turned into a form 
of transportation. Although certain military-use vehicles have found civil- 
ian applications-such as the Jeep of World War I1 and the High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (more commonly known as the Hum Vee 
or Hummer)-they always served as military transport vehicles, never as 
weapon systems. One could stretch the point and argue that the Bradley M2 
Fighting Vehicle or the Abrams M1 tank could be turned into transport, 
but their high maintenance and operational costs, frequent need for main- 
tenance and repairs, lack of reliability, and poor performance only highlight 
the absurdity of the proposition. 
If we define space transportation as human flight into space via reusable 
launch vehicles (the key being the combination of vetcsability and humans in 
space), then the real question historians need to answer is not whether space 
transportation is really transportation and therefore part of transportation his- 
tory. Space travel clearly has many characteristics in common with the various 
forms of terrestrial transportation. One can point to numerous aspects of space 
transportation shared by other forms of transportation, from the model-build- 
ing of amateurs to the carrying of cargo and passengers (both astronauts and 
tourists) to desired destinations. Even the inherent danger of space travel has 
had its precedents in the boiler explosions that pervaded early steam-powered 
transporters. Like other forms of transportation, travel to places off the planet 
requires a complex infrastructure. 
For instance, one can compare the launch infrastructure required by 
rocketry with the infrastructures that support automobile or truck travel. In 
addition to the nation’s vast network of roads, signage (and the systems needed 
to maintain and operate them), and facilities for refueling and repairing vehi- 
cles (gas and repair stations), these include such legal and regulatory elements 
as driving rules and laws, driver license and registration facilities, driver edu- 
cation, vehicle inspections and inspection stations, and various regulatory 
agencies from the local motor vehicle agency to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission and the Department of Transportation. Infrastructure issues 
also are relevant to the choice between using a solid-fueled or a liquid-fueled 
rocket. Similarly, in the early history of the automobile, different engine 
types (electric, steam, gas) required a dedicated infrastructure. Reusable and 
expendable launch vehicles similarly have different infrastructure needs. 
Historians often claim that one properly cannot write the history of a 
subject until the passage of a certain amount of time. The subject, like a bottle 
of wine, must age and somehow achieve a certain degree of ripeness before it 
is suitable for historical inquiry. Space history, as measured from Goddard’s 
first liquid-fueled rocket near Auburn, Massachusetts, on 16 March 1926 to 
the present, does not span a very long period, just eight decades-even less if 
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one counts from Sputnik forward. In comparison, Georg Agricola, nearly a 
half millennium ago, recounted the use of railways in mining  operation^,'^^ 
and the Appian Way is centuries older still. And yet, histories that cover peri- 
ods as short as five years or less have been-and are continually being-writ- 
ten. The challenge is not the relatively short length of the space travel era nor 
its topical nature. Historians routinely research and write about events that 
have taken place only a few years earlier-or investigate history as it hap- 
pen~.’~’ The real question is a challenge, the challenge for space historians to 
integrate their work into the larger historical context, with its rich fabric of 
political, economic, social, and cultural threads. 
130. Georg Agricola, De R e  Meiallica (Basil, Switzerland: H. Frobenium and N. Episcopium, 
1556), trans. and annotated by Herbert Clark Hoover and Lou Henry Hoover (London: The Mining 
Magazine, 1912). 
131. This was the subject of a recent panel, “Doing the History of the Recent Past: 
Historiography, Sources, Disciplinary Boundaries . . . ,” held by the Society for the History of 
Technology in 1997. The panel’s contributors consisted of Joseph N. Tatarewicz, “In from the 
Cold or Out in the Cold? Warriors and Nuclear Weaponeers Search for their Place in History”; 
Pascal Griset, “Oral History and Recent Evolutlons in the History of French Industry”; and 
Butrica, “From the X-Files: Some Source and Historiographical Problems of the X-33 History 






ne of the main conclusions ofthe Columbia Accident Investigation Board 0 was that “the organizational causes of this accident are rooted in 
the Space Shuttle Program’s history and culture” and that over many years at 
NASA, “cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety and 
reliability were allowed to develop . . . .”’ The idea of organizational culture 
is therefore a critical issue, though, as La Porte points out in this section, it 
is a “slippery concept” with a “high degree of operational ambiguity, its use 
subject to stiff criticism.” Although organizational culture may in fact mean 
many things, all three authors in this section find the concept useful, for lack 
of a better term, to refer to what La Porte characterizes in the NASA context 
as “the norms, shared perceptions, work ways, and informal traditions that 
arise within the operating and overseeing groups closely involved with the 
systems of hazard.” Slippery as it may be as a concept, organizational culture is 
important to understanding real-world questions, such as those that Vaughan 
(a sociologist by profession and a staff member of the CAIB) enumerates in her 
article: How do organizations gradually slide into negative patterns? Why do 
negative patterns persist? Why do organizations fail to learn from mistakes and 
accidents? Although human and technical failures are important, she finds their 
root causes in organizational systems. In order to reduce accidents, therefore, 
organizational systems and their cultures must be studied and understood. 
The first two papers in this section concentrate on organizational culture 
as it relates to accidents in human spaceflight, here restricted to those in 
NASA’s space program. Vaughan focuses on the Space Shuttle Challenger and 
Columbia accidents in 1986 and 2003, respectively, while Brown adds the 
ground-based Apollo 204 (also known as Apollo 1) fire in 1967. Altogether, 
17 astronauts were killed in these accidents, triggering massive criticism, inves- 
tigations, official reports, and personal and organizational soul-searching. 
Vaughan finds that, due to overly ambitious goals in an organization strapped 
for resources, NASA’s Apollo-era technical culture was turned into a “culture 
of production” by the time of the Challenger accident, a culture that persisted 
through Columbia and was characterized by “cultural mandates for business- 
like efficiency, production pressures, allegiance to hierarchy, and rule- 
following.” The result was what she calls “the normalization of deviance”-in 
other words, over time, that which was deviant or anomalous incrementally 
became redefined as normal, most notably Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) O-ring 
behavior in cold weather for Challenger and foam hits from the External 
1. Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report (Washngton, DC: NASA and GP0,August 2003), 
chap. 8. Chapter 8 was largely written by DianeVaughan. 
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Tank (ET) to the wing of the Shuttle in the case of Columbiu. Lack of com- 
munication, which she terms “structural secrecy,” within layers of NASA 
administration compounded the problem. 
Vaughan believes that the thesis of “history as cause” in the CAIB report 
demonstrates how the history of decisions made by politicians and by NASA 
engineers and managers combined twice to produce disaster. She warns that 
economic strain and schedule pressure still exist at NASA and that in such 
circumstances, system effects, including accidents, tend to reproduce. It is 
important to note that it is not possible to prevent all accidents, but, she con- 
cludes, the Challenger and Columbiu accidents, with their long incubation 
periods, were preventable. In her view, reducing the probability of accidents 
means changing NASA’s culture as well as externally imposed expectations 
and limitations, a difficult and ongoing process, one in which social scientists 
must play a role in a systematic way. 
Brown, a historian of technology in the Science, Technology and Society 
program at MIT, takes another approach by analyzing the “disjunctures’’ in 
the three fatal NASA accidents. In the case of Apollo 204, the disjuncture is 
between the engineers designing and managing the spacecraft and the tech- 
nicians manufacturing it. For the two Shuttle accidents, the disjuncture is 
between managers controlling the Shuttle program and engineers maintain- 
ing and analyzing the spacecraft. By way of explaining these disjunctures, he 
analyzes the three accident reports and relates their styles and conclusions to 
the engineering practices of NASA and its contractors. Whereas the Apollo 
204 report concluded that poor engineering practice was the sole cause of the 
fire, the Challenger Commission, by contrast, emphasized secondary causes 
in addition to the technical O-ring failure, including the decision to launch, 
schedule pressure, and a weak safety system. As emphasized in Vaughan’s 
paper, the Columbiu report went even further, pointing (partly at her urging) 
to equal importance for technical and social causes. 
Reading the three accident reports to gain historical insights, Brown 
finds that they suggest a growing separation between management and engi- 
neering over the period under review. They reveal an asymmetry assumed by 
the accident investigators, in the sense that the technical/engineering causes 
are to be understood as “context-free and ahistorical activity,” while manage- 
ment causes are to be understood in a complex historical and cultural frame- 
work. Brown therefore asks two questions: what historical processes caused 
this separation between management and engineering? And what changes in 
engineering over the quarter century covered by the accident reports might 
be important for placing engineering in its own historical and cultural con- 
text? In answer to the latter, he enumerates three changes: widespread use 
of computers, changes in engineering education, and the move away from 
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systems engineering as an organizing philosophy. During the period 1967 to 
2003, modeling, testing, and simulation had changed from hand calibration 
to computer-based calculations, resulting in loss of transparency. For example, 
Boeing engineers who used a computer model known as “Crater” to pre- 
dict the effects of foam impacts on the Shuttle were unaware of its limita- 
tions precisely because the process had been computerized; this ignorance 
greatly affected their ability to make engineering judgments. Over the same 
period, engineering education, which was moving toward science and away 
from design, rendered engineering more abstract and less connected to reality. 
The Challenger and Columbia reports criticized the lack of engineering design 
expertise in some of the contractors involved. Finally, whereas systems engi- 
neering was the guiding philosophy of the space program at the time of the 
Apollo 204 fire, Total Quality Management and the “faster, better, cheaper” 
approach replaced system engineering during the 1990s for senior manage- 
ment, while engineers still used the tools of system management. 
La Porte takes a broader view, tackling the issues of high-reliability 
systems that must operate across decades or generations, as NASA must do 
in planning and implementing its vision to take humans to the Moon and 
Mars. Drawing on a variety of empirical studies in the social and manage- 
ment sciences, including nuclear power plant operation and waste disposal, 
he undertakes this analysis of highly reliable operations that take place over 
decades, and he assumes high levels of public trust over that time. Such long- 
term operations also involve issues of institutional constancy. He finds, among 
other things, that high-reliability organizations (HROs) must have technical 
competence, stringent quality-assurance measures, flexibility and redundancy 
in operations, decentralized decision-making, and an unusual willingness 
to reward the discovery and reporting of error without assigning blame. 
Maintaining an organizational culture of reliability exhibiting these charac- 
teristics is difficult, but important. Nor can HROs become overly obsessed 
with safety; they must strive equally for high levels of production and safety. If 
the Shuttle never launches, NASA fails its mission in equal measure as it does 
when it has accidents. La Porte also emphasizes the importance of external 
“watchers,” including congressional committees and investigating boards, to 
sustaining high-reliability organizations, a factor also evident in Vaughan’s 
and Brown’s analyses of the accident reports. 
La Porte notes that, for obvious reasons, maintaining these characteristics 
over long-term, even trans-generational, efforts is the least-understood process 
in terms of empirical studies. In an attempt to shed light on this problem, he 
examines the idea of “institutional constancy” and concludes that in order for 
such long-term efforts to be successful, an agency such as NASA must demon- 
strate to the public and to Congress that it can be trusted to keep its word long 
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into the future, and it must “show the capacity to enact programs that are faith- 
ful to the original spirit of its commitments.” La Porte discusses the charac- 
teristics associated with institutional constancy, summarized in his table 13.2. 
He, too, calls for further empirical and analytical study, especially to delineate 
requirements for long-term institutional constancy and trustworthiness. 
Implicitly or explicitly, these papers also deal with the question of risk. 
The Challenger Commission found that its managers and engineers under- 
stood risk in very different ways, with the engineers seeing it as quantifi- 
able and the managers as flexible and manageable. The Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board noted similar differences in the perception of risk. La Porte 
broaches the question of risk averseness and the public’s risk-averse demand for 
very reliable operations of intrinsically hazardous systems. He suggests research 
on the conditions under which the public would be willing to accept more 
risk, given that such operations can never be risk-free. NASA’s “Risk and 
Exploration” symposium, held in late 2004 in the midst of the Hubble Space 
Telescope controversy and with the Shuttle still grounded, came to a similar 
conclusion: the public needs to be made aware that accidents are not com- 
pletely preventable. 
Nevertheless, the three views in this section, by a sociologist, a historian, 
and a political scientist, shed important light on NASA cultures and, if one 
accepts their arguments, on ways to reduce accidents in what inevitably remains 
a high-risk endeavor. How to balance risk and exploration is the key question. 
2. Steven J. Dick and Keith Cowing, Risk and Exploration: Earth, Sea and Sky (Washington, DC: NASA 
SP-2005-4701,2005). 
CHAPTER 11 
CHANGING ASA: THE CHALLENGES OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM FAILURES 
Diane Vaughan 
n both the Columbia and Challenger accidents, NASA made a gradual slide I into disaster. The history of decisions about the risk of Solid Rocket Booster 
O-ring erosion that led to Challenger and the foam debris that resulted in 
Columbia is littered with early warning signs that were misinterpreted. For years 
preceding both accidents, technical experts defined risk away by repeatedly 
normalizing technical anomalies that deviated from expected performance. 
The significance of a long incubation period leading up to an accident is that 
it provides greater opportunity to intervene and to turn things around, avoid- 
ing the harmful outcome. But that did not happen. The Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board’s report concluded that NASA’s second Shuttle accident 
resulted from an organizational system failure, pointing out that the systemic 
causes of Challenger had not been fixed.’ In fact, both disasters were triggered 
by NASA’s organizational system: a complex constellation of factors including 
NASA’s political/economic environment, organization structure, and layered 
cultures that affected how people making technical decisions assessed risk. 
These three aspects of NASA’s organizational system interacted, explaining 
the origins of both accidents. 
The amazing similarity and persistence of these systemic flaws over the 
17 years separating the two accidents raise several questions: How do organi- 
zations gradually slide into negative patterns? Why do negative patterns per- 
sist? Why do organizations fail to learn from mistakes and accidents? In this 
chapter, I examine NASA’s experience to consider the challenges of chang- 
ing NASA’s organizational system and to gain some new insight into these 
questions. My data for this analysis are my Challenger research, experience as 
a researcher and writer on the staff of the Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board, conversations and meetings with NASA personnel at Headquarters 
and a NASA “Forty Top Leaders Conference” soon after the CAIB report 
release, and, finally, a content analysis of the two official accident investigation 
1. Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report (Washington, DC: NASA and GPO, August 
2003). 
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reports.2 Summarizing from my testimony before the CAIB, I begin with a 
brief comparison of the social causes of Challenger and Columbia to show the 
systemic causes of both, how the two accidents were similar and different, 
and how and why NASA twice made an incremental descent into di~aster.~ 
I then review the conclusions of the Presidential Commission investigating 
the Challenger accident and their recommendations for change, the changes 
NASA made, and why those changes failed to prevent the identical mistake 
from recurring in Columbia.4 Next, I contrast the Commission’s findings with 
those of the CAIB report and discuss the CAIB’s recommendations for chang- 
ing NASA, the direction NASA is taking in making changes, and the chal- 
lenges the space agency faces in preventing yet a third Shuttle accident. 
Robert Jervis, in System Effects, considers how social systems work and 
why so often they produce unintended  consequence^.^ He stresses the impor- 
tance of dense interconnections and how units and relations with others are 
strongly influenced by interactions at other places and at earlier periods of 
time. Thus, disturbing a system produces chains of consequences that extend 
over time and have multiple effects that cannot be anticipated. I will argue in 
this chapter for the importance of analyzing and understanding the dynamics 
of organizational system failures and of connecting strategies for change with 
the systemic causes of problems. The “usual remedy” in the aftermath of a 
technological accident is to correct the causes of a technical failure and alter 
human factors that were responsible so that they, too, can be fixed. However, 
the root causes of both human and technical failure can be found in orga- 
nizational systems. Thus, remedies targeting only the technology and indi- 
vidual error are insufficient. Neither complacency, negligence, ignorance, 
poor training, fatigue, nor carelessness of individuals explains why, in the 
face of increasing in-flight damage, NASA made flawed decisions, continu- 
ing to fly. The lessons to be learned from NASA’s experience are, first, in 
order to reduce the potential for gradual slides and repeating negative pat- 
terns, NASA and other organizations dealing with risky technologies must go 
beyond the search for technical causes and individual error and search the full 
range of social causes located in the organizational system. Second, designing 
and implementing solutions that are matched to those causes is a crucial but 
challenging step in preventing a recurrence. 
2. Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at N A S A  
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Diane Vaughan, “History as Cause: Columbia and 
Challenger,” chap. 8 in Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report; Presidential Commission 
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President by the Presidential Commission on the 
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 5 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986). 
3. Vaughan, “History as Cause,” pp. 185-204. 
4. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President. 
5. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social L$e (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997). 
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NASA’s SLIPPERY SLOPE: O-RINGS, FOAM DEBRIS, AND 
NORMALIZING DEVIANCE 
In a press conference a few days after the Columbia tragedy, NASA’s Space 
Shuttle Program Manager, Ron Dittemore, held up a large piece of foam 
approximately the size of the one that fatally struck Columbia and discounted 
it as a probable cause of the accident, saying, “We were comfortable with it.” 
Prior to the Challenger accident in 1986, that phrase might have been said 
about O-ring erosion by the person then occupying Dittemore’s position. 
The O-ring erosion that caused the loss of Challenger and the foam debris 
problem that took Columbia out of the sky both had a long history. Neither 
anomaly was permitted by design specifications, yet NASA managers and 
engineers accepted the first occurrence, then accepted repeated occurrences, 
concluding after examining each incident that these deviations from predicted 
performance were normal and acceptable. In the years preceding NASA’s two 
This photograph of the Space Shuttle Challenger accident on 28 January 1986 was 
taken bya 70-millimeter tracking camera at site 15, south of Pad 39B. at 11:39:16.061 
EST. One of the Solid Rocket Boosters can be seen a t  the top of the view. (Image no. 
STS-51L 10181; Kennedy Space Center alternative photo no. is 108-KSC-86PC-747) 
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accidents, managers and engineers had normalized recurring technical anom- 
alies-anomalies that, according to design specifications, were not allowed. 
How-and why-was the normalization of technical deviations possible? 
We must avoid the luxuries of retrospection, when all the flawed deci- 
sions of the past are clear and can be directly linked to the harmful outcomes, 
and instead see the events preceding each accident as did the personnel making 
risk assessments, as the problems unfolded. As managers and engineers were 
making decisions, continuing to launch under the circumstances they had 
made sense to them. The immediate social context of decision-making was an 
important factor. Although NASA treated the Shuttle as if it were an opera- 
tional vehicle, it was experimental: alterations of design and unpredictable 
flight conditions led to anomalies on many parts on every mission. Because 
having anomalies was normal, neither O-ring erosion nor foam debris was the 
signal of danger it seemed in retrospect. In both cases, engineering decisions 
were made incrementally, anomaly by anomaly. Accepting the first devia- 
tion set a precedent on which future decisions were based. After inspection 
and analysis, engineers calculated a safety margin that placed initial damage 
within a safety margin showing that the design could tolerate even more. 
In addition, the pattern of information had an impact on how managers 
and engineers were defining and redefining risk. As the anomalies began 
to occur, engineers saw signals of danger that were mixed-an anomalous 
incident would be followed by a mission with none or a reduced level of 
damage, so they believed they had fixed the problem and understood the 
parameters of cause and effect. Or  signals were weak-incidents that were 
outside what had become defined as the acceptable parameters were not 
alarming because their circumstances were so unprecedented that they were 
viewed as unlikely to repeat. And finally, signals became routine, occurring 
so frequently that the repeating pattern became a sign that the machine was 
operating as predicted. The result was the production of a cultural belief that 
the problems were not a threat to flight safety, a belief repeatedly reinforced 
by mission success. Both erosion and foam debris were downgraded in official 
systems categorizing risk over time, institutionalizing the definition of these 
problems as low-level problems. 
Although these patterns are identical in the two accidents, two differ- 
ences are noteworthy. First, for O-ring erosion, the first incident of erosion 
occurred on the second Shuttle flight, which was the beginning of problem 
normalization; for foam debris, the normalization of the technical deviation 
began even before the3rst Shuttle was launched. Damage to the thermal-protec- 
tion system-the thousands of tiles on the orbiter to guard against the heat of 
reentry-was expected due to the forces at launch and during flight, such that 
replacement of damaged tiles was defined from the design stage as a main- 
tenance problem that had to be budgeted. Thus, when foam debris damage 
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was observed on the orbiter tiles after the first Shuttle flight in 1981, it was 
defined as a maintenance problem, not a flight hazard. This early definition 
of the foam problem as routine and normal perhaps explains a second dif- 
ference. Before the Challenger disaster, engineering concerns about proceed- 
ing with more frequent and serious erosion were marked by a paper trail of 
memos. The foam debris problem history also had escalations in occurrence 
but showed no such paper trail, no worried engineers. 
These decisions did not occur in a vacuum.To understand how these two 
technical anomalies continued to be normalized, we need to grasp the impor- 
tant role that NASA’s political and budgetary environment played and how 
the history of the Space Shuttle program affected the local situation. Decisions 
made by leaders in the White House and Congress left the space agency con- 
stantly strapped for resources to meet its own sometimes overly ambitious goals. 
The Agency’s institutional history was one of competition and scarcity, which 
created a “trickle-down effe~t.”~ Thus, the original, pure technical culture of 
NASA’s Apollo era was reshaped into a culture ofproduction that existed at the 
time of Challenger and persisted over 50 launches later, for Columbia. NASA’s 
original technical culture was reshaped by new cultural mandates for business- 
like efficiency, production pressures, allegiance to hierarchy, and rule-following. 
This culture of production reinforced the decisions to proceed. Meeting 
deadlines and schedule was important to NASA’s scientific launch impera- 
tives and also for securing annual congressional funding. Flight always was 
halted to permanently correct other problems that were a clear threat to take 
the Shuttle out of the sky (a cracked fuel duct to the Space Shuttle main 
engine, for example), but the schedule and resources could not give way for a 
thorough hazard analysis of ambiguous, low-lying problems that the vehicle 
seemed to be tolerating. Indeed, the successes of the program led to a belief 
that NASA’s Shuttle was an operational, not an experimental, system, thus 
affirming that it was safe to fly. Finally, the fact that managers and engineers 
obeyed the cultural mandates of hierarchy and protocol reinforced the belief 
that the anomalies were not a threat to flight safety because NASA personnel 
were convinced, having followed all the rules, that they had done everything 
possible to assure mission safety. 
Both problems had gone on for years. Why had no one recognized what 
was happening and intervened, halting NASA’s two transitions into disaster? 
The final piece of the organizational system contributing to both accidents 
was structural secrecy. By this I refer to how organization structure concealed 
the seriousness of the problems from people with responsibility for tech- 
nical oversight who might have turned the situation around prior to both 
6. Diane Vaughan, “The Trickle-Down Effect: Policy Decisions, Risky Work, and the Challenger 
Accident,” Cal$ornia Management Review 39 (winter 1997): 1-23. 
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accidents. Organization structure affected not only the flow of information, 
a chronic problem in all organizations, but also how that information was 
interpreted. Neither NASA's several safety organizations nor the four-tiered 
Flight Readiness Review (FRR), a formal, adversarial, open-to-all structure 
designed to vet all engineering risk assessments prior to launch, called a halt 
to flying with these anomalies. Top administrators and regulators alike were 
dependent upon project groups for engineering information and analysis. As 
managers and engineers reinterpreted warning signs as weak, mixed, and rou- 
tine signals, normalizing deviance, that diagnosis was what got passed up the 
hierarchy. Instead of reversing the pattern of flying with erosion and foam 
debris, Flight Readiness Review ratified it. 
The structure of safety regulation also affected understandings about risk. 
NASA's internal safety system-both times-a) had suffered safety personnel 
cuts and de-skilling as more oversight responsibility was shifted to contrac- 
tors in an economy move and b) was dependent upon the parent organization 
for authority and funding, so it had no ability to independently run tests that 
might challenge existing assessments. NASA's external safety panel had the 
advantage of independence but was handicapped by inspection at infrequent 
intervals. Unless NASA engineers defined something as a serious problem, it 
was not brought to the attention of safety personnel. As a result of structural 
secrecy, the cultural belief that it was safe to fly with these two anomalies pre- 
vailed throughout the Agency in the years prior to each of NASA's tragedies. 
TWO ACCIDENTS: THE REPRODUCTION OF SYSTEM EFFECTS 
I have shown how the organizational system worked in the years pre- 
ceding both accidents to normalize the technical anomalies: the immediate 
context of decision-making-patterns of information; the context of multiple 
problems; mixed, weak, and routine signals-the culture of production, and 
structural secrecy all interacted in complex ways to neutralize and normal- 
ize risk and keep NASA proceeding with missions. To show how NASA's 
organizational system affected the crucial decisions made immediately before 
both accidents, I now revisit the unprecedented circumstances that created 
yet new signals of potential danger: an emergency teleconference held on the 
eve of the 1986 Challenger launch, when worried engineers recommended not 
launching in unprecedented cold temperatures predicted for the next day, and 
the events at NASA after the 2003 Columbiu foam debris strike, when engi- 
neers again expressed concerns for flight safety. I selectively use examples of 
these incidents to show similarities and differences, recognizing that doing so 
greatly simplifies enormously complicated interactions? An initial difference 
7. For details, see Vaughan, Challenger Launch Decision, chap. 8 ;  and CAIB, Report, chap. 6 .  
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that mattered was the window of opportunity for decision and number of 
people involved. The Challenger teleconference was held prelaunch, involved 
34 people in three locations, consuming several hours of one day, the pro- 
ceedings unknown to others at NASA. Columbia’s discussion was postlaunch, 
with a window of 16 days before reentry, and videos of the foam debris strike 
were widely circulated, involving people throughout the Agency. They can 
be called crisis situations only in retrospect because at the time these events 
were unfolding, many participants did not define it as a crisis situation, which 
was, in fact, one of the problems. 
In both scenarios, people facing unprecedented situations came to the 
table with a cultural belief in the risk acceptability of O-ring erosion and foam 
debris based on years of engineering analysis and flight experience. Thus, 
both the history of decision-making and the history of political and budget- 
ary decisions by elites had system effects. As these selected examples show, the 
mandates of the culture of production for efficiency, schedule, hierarchy, and 
protocol infiltrated the proceedings. Also, structural secrecy acted as before, 
feeding into the tragic outcomes. 
Schedule pressure showed when Challenger’s Solid Rocket Booster 
Project Manager and Columbia’s Mission Management Team (MMT) 
Head, responsible for both schedule and safety, were confronted with 
engineering concerns. Both managers repeated that preexisting defi- 
nition of risk, sending to others a message about the desired result. 
Schedule pressure on managers’ thinking also showed when engineers 
proposed a temperature criterion for Challenger that would jeopardize 
the launch schedule for all launches, and for Columbia when obtaining 
satellite imagery would require the orbiter to change its flight orienta- 
tion, thus prolonging the mission and likely jeopardizing the timing 
of an important future launch. Believing the safety of the mission was 
not a factor, both managers focused on future flights, making decisions 
that minimized the risk of delay. 
* In both cases, hierarchy and protocol dominated; deference to engi- 
neering expertise was missing. In the Challenger teleconference, unprec- 
edented and therefore open to innovation, participants automatically 
conformed to formal, prelaunch, hierarchical Flight Readiness Review 
procedures, placing engineers in a secondary role. The postlaunch 
Columbia Mission Management Team operation, intentionally decen- 
tralized to amass information quickly, also operated in a hierarchical, 
centralized manner that reduced engineering input. Further, engi- 
neering attempts to get satellite imagery were blocked for not having 
followed appropriate protocol. In both cases, norms requiring quanti- 
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tative data were pushed, rendering engineering concerns insufficient; 
they were asked to prove that it was unsafe to fly, a reverse of the 
normal situation, which was to prove it was safe to fly. Engineers ani- 
mated by concern took the issue to a certain level, then, discouraged 
and intimidated by management response, fell silent. A difference for 
Columbia: the rule on rule-following was inoperative for management, 
whose definition of risk was influenced by an “informal chain of com- 
mand”-one influential person’s opinion, not hard data. 
* Organization structure created structural secrecy, as people structur- 
ally peripheral to the technical issue, either by location or expertise or 
rank, had information but did not feel empowered to speak up. Thus, 
critical input was lost to the decision-making. The weakened safety 
system was silent. No safety representative was told of the Challenger 
teleconference. Present at the Columbia MMT meeting but weak in 
authority, safety personnel interjected no cautions or adversarial chal- 
lenges; information dependence and organizational dependence gave 
them no recourse but to follow the management lead. 
This overview shows these accidents as the unanticipated consequences 
of system effects, the causes located in the dynamic connection between three 
layers of NASA’s organizational system: 
1) Interaction and the Normalization of Deviance: A history of deci- 
sion-making in which, incrementally, meanings developed in which 
the unacceptable became acceptable. The first decisions became a 
basis for subsequent ones in which technical anomalies-signals of 
danger-were normalized, creating a cultural belief in the safety of 
foam and O-ring anomalies. 
2) The Culture of Production: History was important in a second way. 
Historic external political and budgetary decisions had system effects, 
trickling down through the organization, converting NASA’s origi- 
nal, pure technical culture into a culture of production that merged 
bureaucratic, technical, and cost/schedule/efficiency mandates that, 
in turn, reinforced decisions to continue flying with flaws. 
3 )  Structural Secrecy: These same external forces affected NASA’s orga- 
nization structure and the structure of the safety system, which in 
turn affected the interpretation of the problem, so that the seriousness 
of these two anomalies was, in effect, unknown to those in a position 
to intervene. Instead, before the crisis events immediately preceding 
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the accidents, a consensus about these anomalies existed, including 
among agents of social control-top administrators and safety per- 
sonnel-who failed to intervene to reverse the trend. 
With these systemic social causes in mind, I now turn to the problem of 
repeating negative patterns and learning from mistake by considering the “Find- 
ings” and “Recommendations” of the report of the Presidential Commission on 
the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, NASA’s changes in response, and why 
the changes NASA implemented failed to prevent a second tragedy.’ 
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION: 
CONNECTING CAUSES AND STRATEGIES FOR CONTROL 
Published in June 1986, the Presidential Commission’s report followed the 
traditional accident investigation format of prioritizing the technical causes of 
the accident and identifying human factors as “contributing causes,” meaning 
that they were of lesser, not equal, importance. NASA’s organizational system 
was not attributed causal significance. However, the report was pathbreaking 
in the amount of its coverage of human factors, going well beyond the usual 
focus on individual incompetence, poor training, negligence, mistake, and 
physical or mental impairment. 
Chapters 5 and 6 examine decisions about the O-ring problems, adher- 
ing to the traditional human factorshndividual failure model. Chapter 5, “The 
Contributing Cause of the Accident,” examines the controversial eve-of-the- 
launch teleconference. A “flawed decision making process” is cited as the primary 
causal agent. Managerial failures dominate the empirical “Findings”: the telecon- 
ference was not managed so that the outcome reflected the opposition of many 
contractor engineers and some of NASA’s engineers; managers in charge had a 
tendency to solve problems internally, not forwarding them to all hierarchical 
levels; the contractor reversed its first recommendation for delay “at the urging 
of Marshall [Space Flight Center] . . . to accommodate a major c~stomer.”~ 
Chapter 6, “An Accident Rooted in History,” chronicled the history of 
O-ring decision-making in the years preceding the teleconference. Again, the 
empirical Findings located cause in individual failures.” Inadequate testing was 
done; neither the contractor nor NASA understood why the O-ring anoma- 
lies were happening; escalated risk-taking was endemic, apparently “because 
they got away with it the last time”; in a thorough review at Headquarters in 
1985, information “was sufficiently detailed to require corrective action prior 
8. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President. 
9. Ibid., p. 104. 
IO. Ibid., p. 148. 
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to the next flight”; managers and engineers failed to carefully analyze flight 
history, so data were not available on the eve of Challengeu’s launch to prop- 
erly evaluate the risks.” The system failure cited was in the anomaly tracking 
system, which permitted flight to continue despite erosion, with no record of 
waivers or launch constraints, and paid attention only to anomalies “outside 
the data base.” 
Both chapters described decision-making, focusing on interaction, but 
did not explain why decisions were made as they were. Chapter 7, “The Silent 
Safety Program,” turned to organizational matters, initially addressing them 
in the traditional accident investigation frame. The Commission noted the 
failures: “lack of problem reporting requirements, inadequate trend analy- 
sis, misrepresentation of criticality and lack of involvement in critical discus- 
sions.”’2 For example, they found so many problems listed on NASA’s Critical 
Items List that the number reduced the seriousness of each. Acknowledging 
that top administrators were unaware of the seriousness of the O-ring prob- 
lems, the Commission labeled the problem a “communication failure,” thus 
deflecting attention from organization structure as a cause of the problems. In 
evaluating NASA’s several safety offices and panels, however, the Commission 
made a break with the human factors approach by addressing the structure of 
regulatory relations. The Commission found that in-house safety programs 
were dependent upon the parent organization for funding, personnel, and 
authority. This dependence showed when NASA reduced the safety work- 
force even as the flight rate increased. In another economy move, NASA had 
increased reliance upon contractors, relegating many NASA technical experts 
to safety oversight of contractor activities, becoming dependent on contrac- 
tors rather than retaining safety control in-house. 
In chapter 8, “Pressures on the System,” the Commission took an unprec- 
edented step by examining schedule pressure and its effects on the NASA orga- 
nization. However, this pressure, according to the report, was NASA-initiated, 
with no reference to external demands or restrictions on the Agency that might 
have contributed to it.The fault rested with NASA’s own leaders.“NASA began 
a planned acceleration of the Space Shuttle launch schedule . . . . In establishing 
the schedule, NASA had not provided adequate resources for its attainment. 
As a result, the capabilities of the system were strained . . . .”13 The system 
being analyzed is the flight production system: all the processes that must 
be engaged and completed in order to launch a mission. The report states 
that NASA declared the Shuttle “operational” after the fourth experimental 
flight even though the Agency was not prepared to meet the demands of an 
11. Ibid., p. 148. 
12. Ibid., p. 152. 
13. Ibid., p. 164. 
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operational schedule. This belief in operational capability, according to the 
Commission, was reinforced by NASA’s history of 24 launches without a fail- 
ure prior to Challenger and to NASA’s legendary “can-do” attitude, in which 
the space agency always rose to the challenge, draining resources away from 
safety-essential functions to do it.14 
Next consider the fit between the Commission’s “Findings,” above, and 
their “Recommendations” for change, summarized as  follow^.'^ Many of the 
changes, if properly implemented, would reduce structural secrecy. The 
Commission mandated a review of Shuttle Management Structure because 
Project Managers felt more accountable to their Center administration than 
the Shuttle Program Director, thus vital information bypassed Headquarters. 
The Commission targeted “poor communications” by mandating that NASA 
eliminate the tendency of managers not to report upward, “whether by 
changes of personnel, organization, indoctrination or all three”; develop rules 
regarding launch constraints; and record Flight Readiness Reviews and 
Mission Management Team Meetings. Astronauts were to be brought into 
management to instill a keen awareness of risk and safety.I6 
Centralizing safety oversight, a new Shuttle Safety Panel would report 
to the Shuttle Program Manager. It would attend to Shuttle operations, rules 
and requirements associated with launch decisions, flight readiness, and risk 
management. Also, an independent Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality 
Assurance would be established, headed by an Associate NASA Administrator, 
with direct authority over all safety bodies throughout the Agency, and report- 
ing to the NASA Administrator. With designated funding to give it indepen- 
dence, SR&QA would direct reporting and documentation of problems and 
trends affecting flight safety. Last, but by no means least, to deal with schedule 
pressures, the Commission recommended that NASA establish a flight rate 
that was consistent with its resources. 
These were the official lessons to be learned from Challenger. The 
Commission’s “Findings” and “Recommendations,” in contrast to those 
later forthcoming from the CAIB, were few and very general, leaving NASA 
considerable leeway in how to implement them. How did the space agency 
respond? At the interaction level, NASA addressed the flawed decision- 
making by following traditional paths of changing policies, procedures, and 
processes that would increase the probability that signals of danger would 
be recognized. NASA used the opportunity to make changes to “scrub the 
system totally.” The Agency rebaselined the Failure Modes Effects Analysis. 
All problems tracked by the Critical Items List were reviewed, engineering 
14. Ibid., pp. 171-177. 
15. Ibid., pp. 198-201 
16. Ibid., p. 200. 
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fixes implemented when possible, and the list reduced. NASA established Data 
Systems and Trend Analysis, recording all anomalies so that problems could 
be tracked over time. Rules were changed for Flight Readiness Review so 
that engineers, formerly included only in the lower-level reviews, could par- 
ticipate in the entire process. Astronauts were extensively incorporated into 
management, including participation in the final prelaunch Flight Readiness 
Review and signing the authorization for the final mission “go.” 
At the organizational level, NASA made several structural changes, 
centralizing control of operations and safety.17 NASA shifted control for the 
Space Shuttle program from Johnson Space Center in Houston to NASA 
Headquarters in an attempt to replicate the management structure at the time 
of Apollo, thus striving to restore communication to a former level of excel- 
lence. NASA also initiated the recommended Headquarters Office of Safety, 
Reliability and Quality Assurance (renamed as Safety and Mission Assurance), 
but instead of the direct authority over all safety operations, as the Commission 
recommended, each of the Centers had its own safety organization, reporting 
to the Center Director.l8 Finally, NASA repeatedly acknowledged in press 
conferences that the Space Shuttle was and always would be treated as an 
experimental, not operational, vehicle and vowed that henceforth, safety 
would take priority over schedule in launch decisions. One step taken to 
achieve this outcome was to have an astronaut attending Flight Readiness 
Reviews and participating in decisions about Shuttle readiness for flight; 
another was an effort to bring resources and goals into alignment. 
Each of these changes addressed causes identified in the report, so why 
did the negative pattern repeat, producing the Columbia accident? First, the 
Commission did not identify all the social causes of the accident. From our 
post-Columbiu position of hindsight, we can see that the Commission did not 
target NASA’s institutional environment as a cause. The powerful actors whose 
actions precipitated “Pressures on the System” by their policy and budgetary 
decisions do not become part of the contributing-cause scenario. NASA is 
obliged to bring resources and goals into alignment, although resources are 
determined externally. NASA took the blame for safety cuts, which were 
attributed to NASA’s own “perception that less safety. reliability and quality 
assurance activity would be required during ‘routine’ Shuttle  operation^."'^ 
The external budgetary actions that forced NASA leaders to impose such 
efficiencies were not mentioned. Most of the Commission’s recommended 
changes aimed at the organization itself, in particular, changing interactions 
17. CAIB, Report, p. 101. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, 
p. 160. 
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structure. The Commission did not name culture as a culprit, although pro- 
duction pressure is the subject of an entire chapter. Also, NASA’s historic 
“can-do” attitude (a cultural attribute) is not made part of the “Findings” 
and “Recommendations.” Thus, NASA was not sensitized to possible flaws 
in the culture or that action needed to be taken. The Commission did deal 
with the problem of structural secrecy; however, in keeping with the human 
factors approach, the report ultimately places responsibility for “communica- 
tion failures” not with organization structure, but with the individual middle 
managers responsible for key decisions and inadequate rules and procedures. 
The obstacles to communication caused by hierarchy and consequent power 
that managers wielded over engineers, stifling their input in crucial decisions, 
are not mentioned. These obstacles originate in organization structure but 
become part of the culture. 
Second, consider NASA’s response to these “Recommendations” and 
the challenges they faced. Although NASA’s own leaders played a role in 
determining goals and how to achieve them, the institutional environment 
was not in their control. NASA remained essentially powerless as a govern- 
ment agency dependent upon political winds and budgetary decisions made 
elsewhere. Thus, NASA had little recourse but to try to achieve its ambitious 
goals-necessary politically to keep the Agency a national budgetary prior- 
ity-with limited resources. The intra-organizational changes that NASA did 
control were reviewed in the CAIB report.” It found that many of NASA’s 
initial changes were good. However, a critical one-the structural changes to 
centralize safety-was not enacted as the Commission had outlined. NASA’s 
new Headquarters Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance did 
not have direct authority, as the Commission mandated; further, the various 
Center safety offices in its domain remained dependent because their funds 
came from the activities that they were overseeing.’l 
The CAIB also found that other changes-positive changes-were 
undone by subsequent events stemming from political and budgetary deci- 
sions made by the White House and Congress. The new, externally imposed 
goal of the International Space Station (ISS) forced the Agency to mind the 
schedule and perpetuated an operational mode. As a consequence, the culture 
of production was unchanged; the organization structure became more com- 
plex. This structural complexity created poor systems integration; communi- 
cation paths were not clear. Also, the initial surge in post-Challenger funding 
was followed by cuts, such that the new NASA Administrator, Daniel Golden, 
introduced new efficiencies and smaller programs with the slogan “faster, bet- 
ter, cheaper.” As a result of the squeeze, the initial increase in NASA safety 
20. CAIB, Report. 
21. Ibid., pp. 101, 178-179. 
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personnel was followed by a repeat of pre-accident economy moves that again 
cut safety staff and placed even more responsibility for safety with contractors. 
The accumulation of successful missions (defined as flights returned without 
accident) also reproduced the belief in an operational system, thus legitimat- 
ing these cuts: Fewer resources needed to be dedicated to safety. The loss of 
people and subsequent transfer of safety responsibilities to contractors resulted 
in a deterioration of post-Challenger trend analyses and other NASA safety 
oversight capabilities. 
NASA took the report’s mandate to make changes as an opportunity to 
make others it deemed necessary, so the number of changes actually made is 
impossible to know and assess, much less report in a chapter of this length. The 
extent to which additional changes might have become part of the problem 
rather than contributing to the solution is also unknown. Be aware, however, 
that we are assessing these changes from the position of post-Columbia hind- 
sight, tending to identify all the negatives associated with the harmful out- 
come.22 The positive effects, the mistakes avoided by post-Challenger changes, 
The 13-member Columbia Accident Investigation Board poses for a group photo taken 
in the CAIB boardroom. The official STS-107 insignia hangs on the wall in the center 
of the boardroom. From left to right, seated, are Board members G. Scott Hubbard, 
Dr. James N. Hallock, Dr. Sally Ride, Chairman Admiral Hal Gehman (ret.), Steven 
Wallace, Dr. John Logsdon, and Dr. Sheila Widnall. Standing, from left to right, are 
Dr. Douglas D. Osheroff, Major General John Barry, Rear Admiral Stephen Turcotte, 
Brigadier General Duane Deal, Major General Kenneth W. Hess, and Roger E. Tetrault. 
(CAIB photo by Rick Stiles, 2003) 
22. William H. Starbuck, “Executives’ Perceptual Filters: What They Notice and How They 
Make Sense,” in The Executive Effect, ed. Donald C. Hambrick (Greenwich, C T  JAI, 1988). 
CHANGING ASA: THE CHALLENGES OF ORGANIZATIONAL.. . 363 
tend to be lost in the wake of Columbiu. However, we do know that increasing 
system complexity increases the probability of mistake, and some changes did 
produced unanticipated consequences. One example was NASA’s inability to 
monitor reductions in personnel during a relocation of Boeing, a major con- 
tractor, which turned out to negatively affect the technical analysis Boeing 
prepared for NASA decision-making about the foam problem.23 Finally, 
NASA believed that the very fact that many changes had been made had so 
changed the Agency that it was completely different from the NASA that 
produced the Challenger accident. Prior to the CAIB report release, despite the 
harsh revelations about organizational flaws echoing Chullenger that the CAIB 
investigation frequently released to the press, many at NASA believed no par- 
allels existed between Columbia and Challenger.24 
THE CAIB: CONNECTING CAUSES WITH 
STRATEGIES FOR CONTROL 
Published in August 2003, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
report presented an “expanded causal model” that was a complete break with 
accident investigation tradition. Turning from the usual accident investiga- 
tion focus on technical causes and human factors, the CAIB fully embraced 
an organizational systems approach and was replete with social science con- 
cepts. Further, it made the social causes equal in importance to the technical 
causes, in contrast to the Commission’s relegation of nontechnical causes to 
“contributing causes.” Part 1 of the CAIB report, “The Accident,” addressed 
the technical causes; part 2 ,  “Why the Accident Occurred,” examined the 
social causes; part 3 discussed the future of spaceflight and recommendations 
for change. 
In the executive summary, the CAIB report articulated both a “techni- 
cal cause statement” and an “organizational cause statement.” On the latter, 
the Board stated that it “places as much weight on these causal factors as on 
the more easily understood and corrected physical cause of the accident.”25 
With the exception of the “informal chain of command” operating “outside 
the organization’s rules,” this organizational cause statement applied equally 
to Challenger: 
The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the 
Space Shuttle Program’s history and culture, including the 
23. CAIB, Report. 
24. Michael Cabbage and William Harwood, CommCheck . . . The Final Flight ofShuttle Columbia 
25. CAIB, Report, p. 9. 
(New York: Free Press, 2004), p. 203. 
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original compromises that were required to gain approval for 
the Shuttle, subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuat- 
ing priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterization of the 
Shuttle as operational rather than developmental, and lack 
of an agreed national vision for human space flight. Cultural 
traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were 
allowed to develop, including reliance on past success as a 
substitute for sound engineering practices (such as testing to 
understand why systems were not performing in accordance 
with requirements); organizational barriers that prevented 
effective communication of critical safety information and 
stifled professional differences of opinion; lack of integrated 
management across program elements; and the evolution of an 
informal chain of command and decision-making processes 
that operated outside the organization’s rulesz6 
The part 2 chapters described system effects. In contrast to the 
Commission’s report, the CAIB explained NASA actions as caused by social 
factors. Chapter 5, “From Columbia to Challenger,” began part 2 with an analy- 
sis of NASA’s institutional environment. Tracking historic decisions by lead- 
ers in NASA’s political and budgetary environment and the effect of policy 
decisions on the Agency after the first accident, it showed how NASA’s exter- 
nal environment caused internal problems by shaping organization culture: 
the persistence of NASA’s legendary can-do attitude, excessive allegiance to 
bureaucratic proceduralism and hierarchy due to increased contracting out, 
and the squeeze produced by “an agency trying to do too much with too 
little” as funding dropped so that downsizing and sticking to the schedule 
became the means to all ends.27 The political environment continued to 
produce pressures for the Shuttle to operate like an operational system, and 
NASA accommodated. Chapter 6, “Decision Making at NASA,” chronicled 
the history of decision-making on the foam problem, showing how the weak, 
mixed, and routine signals behind the normalization of deviance prior to 
Challenger also precipitated NASA’s second gradual slide into disaster. Chapter 
6 presented evidence that schedule pressure directly impacted management 
decision-making about the Columbia foam debris hit. Also, it showed how 
NASA’s bureaucratic culture, hierarchical structure, and power differences 
created missing signals, so that the depth of engineer concerns and logic of 
their request for imagery were not admitted to poststrike deliberations. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Ibid., pp. 101-120. 
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Chapter 7, “The Accident’s Organizational Causes,” stepped back from 
the reconstruction of the decision history to examine how the organizational 
context affected the decisions traced in chapter 6. The chapter set forth an 
analysis of NASA’s organizational culture and structure. The focal point was 
the “broken safety culture” that resulted from a weakened safety structure 
that, in turn, caused decision-makers to “miss the signals the foam was send- 
ing.”” Organization structure, not communication failure, was responsible for 
problems with conveying and interpreting information. Systems integration 
and strong independent NASA safety systems were absent. Incorporating the 
social science literature from organization theory, theories of risk, and acci- 
dents, this chapter surveyed alternative models of organizations that did risky 
work, posing some safety structures that NASA might consider as models for 
revamping the Agency. Then, in the conclusion, it connected these organiza- 
tional factors with the trajectory of decision-making after the Columbia foam 
strike. Chapter 8, “History as Cause: Columbiu and Challenger,” compared the 
two accidents. By showing the repeating patterns, it established the second 
accident as an organizational system failure, making obvious the causal links 
within and between the three preceding chapters. It demonstrated that the 
causes of Challenger had not been fixed. By bringing forward the thesis of “his- 
tory” as cause, it showed how both the history of decision-making by political 
elites and the history of decision-making by NASA engineers and managers 
had twice combined to produce a gradual slide into disaster. 
Now consider the fit between the Board’s expanded causal model and 
its “Findings” and its “Recommendations.” Empirically, the CAIB found the 
same problems as did the Presidential Commission and in fact recognized that 
in the report: schedule pressure; dependent and understaffed safety agents; 
communication problems stemming from hierarchy, power differences, and 
structural arrangements; poor systems integration and a weakened safety 
system; overburdened problem-reporting mechanisms that muted signals of 
potential danger; a can-do attitude that translated into an unfounded belief in 
the safety system; a success-based belief in an operational system; and bureau- 
cratic rule-following that took precedence over deference to the expertise 
of engineersz9 The data interpretation and causal analysis differed, how- 
ever, because the CAIB report integrated social science analysis and concepts 
throughout part 2: culture, institutional failure, organizational system, history 
as cause, structure, the normalization of deviance, and the causal linkages 
between the three empirical chapters. Thus, the CAIB targeted for change 
each of the three layers of NASA’s organizational system. A second difference 
28. Ibid., p. 164. 
29. Ibid., p. 100. 
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was that the number of findings and recommendations was greater and each 
was more detailed and specific than those of the Commission. A few of those 
illustrative of the organization system approach to change follow. 
Chapter 5, “From Challenger to Columbia,” tracing historic decisions by 
leaders, included neither findings nor recommendations about NASA’s exter- 
nal environment. However, in contrast to the Commission’s report, the CAIB 
specifically implicated decision leaders by the data in chapter 5, and in the 
introduction to part 2, the CAIB report stated that the Agency 
accepted the bargain to operate and maintain the vehicle in the 
safest possible way. The Board is not convinced that NASA has 
completely lived up to the bargain, or that Congress and the 
Administration have provided the funding and support neces- 
sary for NASA to do so. This situation needs to be addressed- 
if the nation intends to keep conducting human space flight, it 
needs to live up to its part of the bargain.30 
Policy and budgetary decisions by leaders again show up in the “Findings” 
and “Recommendations” in chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6, “Decision Making at 
NASA,” makes three Recommendations, primary among them the adoption 
of “a Shuttle flight schedule that is consistent with available re~ources.”~~ Also, 
it advocated training the Mission Management Team, which did not operate 
in a decentralized mode or innovate, instead adhering to an ill-advised proto- 
col in dealing with the foam strike. As Weick found with forest-fire fighters 
in a crisis, the failure “to drop their tools,” which they were trained to always 
carry, resulted in death for most.32 The CAIB recommendation was to train 
NASA managers to “drop their tools,” responding innovatively rather than 
bureaucratically to uncertain flight conditions and to decentralize by interact- 
ing across levels of hierarchy and organizational b~undar i e s .~~  
Chapter 7, “The Accident’s Organizational Causes,” asserts the important 
causal role ofa broken safety culture and NASA’s cultural “blind spot” that kept 
them from getting the signals the foam was sending. The “Recommendations” 
advocated changes in the structure of NASA’s safety system: the broken safety 
culture was to be fixed by changing the safety structure. The Commission 
charged NASA to create an “independent Technical Engineering Authority” 
with complete authority over technical issues, its independence guaranteed by 
funding directly from NASA Headquarters, with no responsibility for sched- 
30. CAIB, Report, p .  97. 
31. Ibid., p. 139. 
32. Karl E. Weick, “The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster,” 
33. CAIB, Report, p .  172. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 38 (1993): 628-652. 
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ule or program After Challenger, cost, schedule, and safety were all 
the domain of a single office. Second, NASA Headquarters’ Office of Safety 
and Mission Assurance would have direct authority and be independently 
resourced. Finally, to assure that problems on one part of the Shuttle (e.g., 
the foam debris from the External Tank) took into account ramifications for 
other parts (e.g., foam hitting the orbiter wing), the Space Shuttle Integration 
Office would be reorganized to include the orbiter, previously not included. 
Chapter 8, “History as Cause,” presented general principles for making 
changes, rather than concrete recommendations. These principles incorporate 
the three layers of NASA’s organizational system and the relationship between 
them. First, decision-malung patterns that normalize deviance should be altered 
by “strategies that increase the clarity, strength, and presence of signals that chal- 
lenge assumptions about risk,” which include empowering engineers, changing 
managerial practices, and strengthening the safety system.35 Second, this chapter 
reiterates the accountability at higher levels, stating, “The White House and 
Congress must recognize the role of their decisions in this accident and take 
responsibility for safety in the future.”36 Later and more specifically, “Leaders 
create culture. It is their responsibility to change it . . . .The past decisions of 
national leaders-the White House, Congress, and NASA Headquarters-set 
the Columbia accident in motion by creating resource and schedule strains that 
compromised the principles of a high-risk technology organi~ation.”~’ Third, 
at the organizational level, culture and structure are both targets for change. 
Understanding culture should be an ongoing research-based project. Necessary 
changes to organization structure must be carefdly considered because of the 
law of unintended consequences: change and increased complexity produce 
mistake; changing structure can change culture in unpredictable ways. 
The report made it imperative that NASA respond to many of these rec- 
ommendations prior to the Return to Flight Evaluation in 2005.38 Although 
change is still under way at NASA, it is appropriate to examine the direction 
NASA is taking and the obstacles the Agency is encountering as it goes about 
implementing change. 
Signals of Danger and the Normalization of Deviance 
Because the Space Shuttle is and always will be an experimental vehicle, 
technical problems will proliferate. In such a setting, categorizing risk will 
34. Ibid., p. 193. 
35. Ibid., p. 203. 
36. Ibid., p. 196. 
37. Ibid., p. 203. 
38. Prior to the resumption of Shuttle launches, progress on these changes was monitored and 
approved by a NASA-appointed board, the Covey-Stafford Board, and also by the U.S. Congress 
House Committee on Science, which has official oversight responsibilities for the space agency. 
368 CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
always be difficult, especially with low-lying, ambiguous problems, like foam 
debris and O-ring erosion, where the threat to flight safety is not readily 
apparent and mission success constitutes definitive evidence: calculations and 
lab experiments are approximations, but flight outcome is considered the final 
test of engineering predictions. The decision problem is not only how to 
categorize the many elements and variations in risk, but how to make salient 
early warning signs about low-lying problems that, by definition, will be seen 
against a backdrop of more serious problems. 
The new NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), created after 
the Columbia accident, is to be a safety resource for engineering decisions 
throughout the Agency. NESC will review recurring anomalies that engi- 
neering had determined do not affect flight safety to see if those decisions were 
correct.39 Going back to the start of the Shuttle program, NESC will create a 
common database, looking for missed signals, reviewing problem dispositions, 
and taking further investigative and corrective action when deemed neces- 
sary. However, as we have seen from Columbia and Challenger, what happens 
at the level of everyday interaction, interpretation, and decision-making does 
not occur in a vacuum, but in an organizational system in which other factors 
affect problem definition, corrective actions, and problem dispositions. 
The Culture of Production: 
NASA’s Political/Economic Environment 
NASA remains a politically vulnerable agency, dependent on the White 
House and Congress for its share of the budget and approval of its goals. After 
Columbia, the Bush administration supported the continuation of the Space 
Shuttle program and supplied the vision for NASA’s future that the CAIB 
report concluded was missing: the space program would return to exploration 
of Mars. However, the funds to make the changes required for the Shuttle to 
return to flight and simultaneously accomplish this new goal were insufficient. 
Thus, NASA, following the CAIB prescription, attempted to align goals and 
resources by phasing out the Hubble telescope program and, eventually, plan- 
ning to phase out the Shuttle itself. Further, during the standdown from launch 
while changes are implemented, the International Space Station is still operat- 
ing and remains dependent upon the Shuttle to ferry astronaut crews, materi- 
als, and experiments back and forth in space. Thus, both economic strain and 
schedule pressure still persist at NASA. How the conflict between NASA’s 
goals and the constraints upon achieving them will unfold is still unknown, 
but one lesson from Challenger is that system effects tend to reproduce. The 
Board mandated independence and resources for the safety system, but when 
39. Frank Morring, Jr., “Anomaly Analysis: NASA’s Engineering and Safety Center Checks 
Recurring Shuttle Glitches,” Aviation Week 6 Space Technology (2  August 2004): 53. 
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goals, schedule, efficiency, and safety conflicted post-Challenger, NASA goals 
were reined in, but the safety system also was compromised. 
The Organization: NASA Structure and Culture 
In the months preceding the report release, the Board kept the public and 
NASA informed of some of the recommended changes so that NASA could 
get a head start on changes required for Return to Flight. With the press 
announcement that the CAIB would recommend a new safety center, and 
pressed to get the Shuttle flying again, NASA rushed ahead to begin designing 
a center despite having no details about what it should entail. When the report 
was published, NASA discovered that the planned NASA Engineering and 
Safety Center (NESC) it had designed and begun to implement was not the 
Independent Technical Authority that the Board recommended. Converting 
to the CAIB-recommended structure was resisted internally at NASA, in 
large part because the proposed structure a) did not fit with insiders’ ideas 
about how things should work and where accountability should lie and b) 
was difficult to integrate into existing operations and structures. NESC is in 
operation, as described above, but NASA is now working on a separate orga- 
nization, the Independent Technical Authority, as outlined by the CAIB. 
Whereas CAIB recommendations for changing structure were specific, 
CAIB directions for changing culture were vague.The CAIB was clear about 
implicating NASA leaders, making them responsible for changing culture. What 
was the role of NASA leaders in cultural change, and how should that change be 
achieved? The report’s one clear instruction for making internal change was for 
correcting the broken safety culture by changing the structure of the safety sys- 
tem. From my participation in meetings at NASA, it was clear that NASA lead- 
ers did not understand how to go about changing culture.To these leaders, who 
were trained in engineering and accustomed to human factors analysis, chang- 
ing culture seemed “hzzy.” Many NASA personnel believed that the report’s 
conclusion about Agencywide cultural failures wrongly indicted parts of NASA 
that were working well. More fundamentally, they had a problem translating the 
contents of the report to identi@ what changes were necessary and what actions 
they implied. Each of the three causal chapters contained explicit information 
about where necessary cultural changes were needed 
1) Chapter 5 shows actions by leaders in OMB, Congress, the White House, 
and NASA made cost and schedule a part of the organization culture, 
competing with safety and technical and scientific innovation as goals. 
2) Chapter 6 shows how the technical anomaly became normalized, 
experience with the foam debris problem leading to a cultural belief 
that foam was not a threat to flight safety. 
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3) Chapter 7 points out a gap; administrators’ belief in NASA’s strong 
“safety culture” was contradicted by the way the organization actu- 
ally operated in this accident. Layers of structure, hierarchy, protocol, 
power differences, and an informal chain of command in combina- 
tion stifled engineering opinion and actions, impeding information 
gathering and exchange, showing a culture where deference to engi- 
neering technical expertise was missing. The belief that operations 
were safe led NASA to buy as much safety as they felt they needed; 
cutbacks were made in safety personnel accordingly. 
So changes that targeted the cause of NASA’s cultural problems had 
to be three-pronged. But how to do it? NASA’s approach was this: On 16 
December 2003, NASA Headquarters posted a Request for Proposals on 
its Web site for a cultural analysis to be followed by the implementation of 
activities that would eliminate cultural problems identified as detrimental to 
safety. Verifying the CAIB’s conclusions about NASA’s deadline-oriented 
culture, proposals first were due 6 January; then the deadline was extended 
by a meager 10 days. Ironically, the CAIB mandate to achieve cultural 
change itself produced the very production pressure about which the report 
had complained. Although the study was to last three years, NASA required 
data on cultural change in six months (just in time for the originally sched- 
uled date of the Return to Flight Evaluation, later deferred several times), 
then annually. 
The bidders were corporate contractors with whom NASA frequently 
worked. Details are not available at this writing, but the awardee conducted 
a “cultural analysis” survey to gather data on the extent and location of 
cultural problems in the Agency. The ability of a survey to tap into cul- 
tural problems is questionable because it asks insiders, who can be blinded 
to certain aspects of their culture. A better assessment results when insider 
information is complemented by outside observers who become temporary 
members, spending sufficient time there to be able to identify cultural pat- 
terns, examine records, and interview asking open-ended questions. A fur- 
ther problem is implied in the initial response rate of 40 percent, indicating 
that insider viewpoints tapped will not capture Agencywide cultural pat- 
terns. Further, this survey was to be followed by plans to train and retrain 
managers to listen and decentralize and to encourage engineers to speak up. 
Thus, the Agency response would be at the interactional level only, leaving 
other aspects of culture identified in the CAIB report-such as goals; sched- 
ule pressures; power distribution across the hierarchy and between adminis- 
trators, managers, and engineers-unaddressed. The agency that had always 
been expected to do too much with too little was still struggling with that 
all-too-familiar situation. 
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CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED 
The dilemmas of slippery slopes, repeating negative patterns, and learn- 
ing from mistake are not uniquely NASA’s. We have evidence that slippery 
slopes are frequent patterns in manmade disasters.40 We also know that slip- 
pery slopes with harmful outcomes occur in other kinds of organizations 
where producing and using risky technology is not the goal: think of the 
incursion of drug use into professional athletics, U.S. military abuse of prison- 
ers in Iraq, and Enron-to name some sensational cases in which incremental- 
ism, commitment, feedback, cultural persistence, and structural secrecy seem 
to have created an organizational “blind spot” that allowed actors to see their 
actions as acceptable and conforming, perpetuating a collective incremental 
descent into poor judgment. Knowing the conditions that cause organizations 
to make a gradual downward slide, whether the manmade disasters that result 
are technical, political, financial, public relations, moral, or other, does give 
us some insight into how it happens that may be helpful to other managers 
hoping to avoid these problems. 
In contradiction to the apparent suddenness of their surprising and some- 
times devastating public outcomes, mistakes can have a long incubation period. 
How do early warning signs of a wrong direction become normalized? A first 
decision, once taken and met by either success or no obvious failure (which 
also can be a success!), sets a precedent upon which future decisions are based. 
The first decision may be defined as entirely within the logic of daily opera- 
tions because it conforms with ongoing activities, cultural norms, and goals. 
Or, if initially viewed as deviant, the positive outcome may neutralize percep- 
tions of risk and harm; thus, what was originally defined as deviant becomes 
normal and acceptable as decisions that build upon the precedent accumulate. 
Patterns of information bury early warning signs amidst subsequent indicators 
that all is well. As decisions and their positive result become public to others 
in the organization, those making decisions become committed to their cho- 
sen line of action, so reversing direction-even in the face of contradictory 
information-becomes more difficult. 
The accumulating actions assume a taken-for-granted quality, becoming 
cultural understandings, such that newcomers may take over &om others with- 
out questioning the status quo; or, if objecting because they have fresh eyes 
that view the course of actions as deviant, they may acquiesce and partici- 
pate upon learning the decision logic and that “this is the way we do it here.” 
Cultural beliefs persist because people tend to make the problematic nonprob- 
40. Barry M. Turner, Man-made Disasters (London: Wykeham, 1978); Scott A. Snook, Friendly 
Fire: The  Accidental Shootdown 0fU.S. Black Hawks over Northern Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2000). 
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lematic by defining a situation in a way that makes sense of it in cultural terms. 
NASA’s gradual slides continued because 1) the decisions made conformed to 
the mandates of the dominating culture of production and 2) because organiza- 
tion structure impeded the ability of those with regulatory responsibilities-top 
administrators, safety representatives-to critically question and intervene. 
Why do negative patterns repeat? Was it true, as the press concluded after 
Columbia, that the lessons of Challenger weren’t learned? When we examined 
the lessons of Challenger identified in the “Findings” and “Recommendations” 
of the Commission’s 1986 report, they located cause primarily in individual 
mistakes, misjudgments, flawed analysis, flawed decision-making, and com- 
munication failures. The findings about schedule pressures and safety struc- 
ture were attributed also to flawed decision-making, not by middle managers 
but by NASA leaders. In response, the Commission recommended adjust- 
ing decision-making processes, creating structural change in safety systems, 
and bringing goals and resources into alignment. NASA acted on each of 
those recommendations; thus, we could say that the lessons were learned. The 
Columbia accident and the CAIB report that followed taught different lessons, 
however. They showed that an organizational system failure, not individual 
failure, was behind both accidents, causing the negative pattern to repeat. So, 
in retrospect, we must conclude that from Challenger NASA learned incom- 
plete lessons. Thus, they did not connect their strategies for control with the 
full social causes of the first accident. 
Events since Columbiu teach an additional lesson: we see just how hard it is 
to learn and implement the lessons of an organization system failure, even when 
the CAIB Report pointed them out. Further, there are practical problems. 
NASA leaders had difficulty integrating new structures with existing parts of 
the operation; cultural change and how to go about it eluded them. Some of 
the CAIB recommendations for change were puzzling to NASA personnel 
because they had seen their system working well under most circumstances. 
Further, understanding how social circumstances affect individual actions is 
not easy to grasp, especially in an American ethos in which both success and 
failure are seen as the result ofindividual action.41 Finally, negative patterns can 
repeat because making changes has system effects that can produce unintended 
consequences. Changing structure can increase complexity and, therefore, the 
probability of mistake; it can change culture in unpredictable ways.42 
41.Afier a presentation in which I translated the cultural change implications ofthe CAIB report to a 
group of ahnistrators at NASA Headquarters, giving examples of how to go about it, two adrmmstrators 
approached me. Drawing parallels between the personalities of a Columbia engineer and a Challenger 
engineer who both acted aggressively to avert an accident but, faced with management opposition, 
backed off, the administrators wanted to know why replacing these individuals was not the solution. 
42. Charles B. Perrow, Normal Accident3 (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Diane Vaughan, “The 
Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster,” Annual Review of Sociology 25 
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Even when the lessons are learned, negative patterns can still repeat. The 
process and mechanisms behind the normalization of deviance make incre- 
mental change hard to detect until it’s too late. Change occurs gradually, the 
signs of a new and possibly harmful direction occurring one at a time, injected 
into daily routines that obfuscate the developing pattern. Moreover, external 
forces are often beyond a single organization’s ability to control. Cultures of 
production, whether production of police statistics, war, profits, or timely 
Shuttle launches, are a product of larger historical, cultural, political, ideo- 
logical, and economic institutions that produce them. Making organizational 
change that contradicts them is difficult to implement but, in the face of con- 
tinuing and consistent institutional forces, even more difficult to sustain as 
time passes. The extent to which an organization can resist these conditions 
is likely to vary as its status and power vary. Although compared to some, 
NASA seems a powerful government agency, its share of the federal budget is 
small compared to other agencies. In the aftermath of both accidents, NASA 
changes were undermined by subsequent events, many of which they could 
not control. Political and budgetary decisions of elites created new goals, 
resulting in new structures, making the system more complex; by not giving 
sufficient support, they reproduced a culture dominated by schedule pressures, 
deadlines, resource scarcity, bureaucratic protocols, and power differences that 
made it difficult to create and sustain a different kind of NASA where nega- 
tive patterns do not repeat. It may be argued that under the circumstances, 
NASA’s Space Shuttle program has had a remarkable safety record. 
But even when everything possible is done, we cannot have mistake-free 
organizations because system effects will produce unanticipated consequences. 
Because the Shuttle is unprecedented and flight conditions unpredictable, 
NASA will always have many postflight anomalies to deal with, and low-lying 
problems with hard-to-decipher, uncertain outcomes like O-ring erosion and 
foam debris will always be a challenge. Part of the remedy is to increase the 
power and effectiveness of the safety system, but the critical piece to this 
puzzle is changing the culture of production. For Columbia, as for Challenger, 
resources-both time and money-were not available for thorough hazard 
analysis to fully explore why these two technical problems were occurring 
and the implications of continuing to fly with flaws. The reason they were 
not thoroughly analyzed and fixed was that the level of risk assigned to these 
problems was low. The definition of risk precluded the dedication of time and 
money to problems that had no clear potential for high costs. Further, all con- 
tingencies can never be predicted; most people don’t understand how social 
continuedfvom the previous page 
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Encounters with Risk,  ed. Bridget M .  Hutter and Michael K. Power (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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context affects individual action and so cannot create strategies of control that 
connect with the social causes of a problem; organizational changes that cor- 
rect one problem may, in fact, have a dark side, creating unpredictable others; 
and external environments are difficult to control. 
Jervis describes the unintended consequences and harmful outcomes that 
result from complex interactions in social systems.43 When complex, interac- 
tive technical systems, like the Space Shuttle, are run by complex organiza- 
tions, like NASA, the probability of accidents is increased. Thus, system effects 
force us to recognize that it is not possible to prevent all accidents. However, 
it is important to remember that both of NASA’s accidents had a long incuba- 
tion period, and thus were preventable. By addressing the social causes of gradual 
slides and repeating negative patterns, organizations can reduce the probability 
that mistakes and accidents will occur. To do so, connecting strategies for cor- 
recting organizational problems with their social causes is crucial. Social sci- 
entists can play a significant role. First, we have research showing the problem 
of the slippery slope is perhaps more frequent than we now imagine, but less 
is known about cases where this pattern, once begun, is reversed.44 Building 
a research base about organizations that make effective cultural change and 
reverse downward slides is an important step. Further, by their writing, analy- 
sis, and consulting, social scientists can 1) teach organizations about the social 
sources of their problems, 2) advise on strategies that will address those social 
causes, and 3)  explore the system effects of planned changes, helping to fore- 
stall unintended  consequence^.^^ 
43. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social L$e (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997). 
44. Turner, Man-made Disasters; David Miller, The Icarus Paradox: How Exceptional Companies Bring 
About Their O w n  Downfall (New York: Harper, 1990), but see Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Confidence: 
How Winning Streaks and Losing Streaks Begin and End (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004). 
45. See, e.g., Rosabeth Moss Kanter, The Changemasters (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 
and Confidence: How Winning Streaks and Losing Streaks Begin and End (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2004); Karlene H.  Roberts, “Managing High Reliability Organizations,” Cal$ornia Management 
Review 32, no. 4 (1990): 101-114; Karl E. Weick, Kathleen Sutcliffe, and David Obstfeld, 
“Organizing for High Reliability,” Research in Organizational Behavior 21 (1990): 81-123; Todd R. 
La Porte and Richard Consolini, “Working in Practice but not in Theory: Theoretical Challenges 
of High-Reliability Organizations,”Journal ofpublic Administration Research and Theory 1 (1991): 19- 
47; Diane Vaughan, “The Trickle-Down Effect: Policy Decisions, Risky Work, and the Challenger 
Accident,” Cal$ornia Management Review 39 (winter 1997): 1-23; Lee Clarke, Mission Improbable: 
Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 1999); Anita L. 
Tucker and Amy C .  Edmondson, “Why Hospitals Don’t Learn from Failures: Organizational and 
Psychological Dynamics that Inhibit System Change,” Cal$ornia Management Review 45 (winter 
2003): 55-72; Karen Marais, Nicolas Dulac, and Nancy Leveson, “Beyond Normal Accidents 
and High Reliability Organizations: The Need for an Alternative Approach to Safety in Complex 
Systems,” (unpublished manuscript, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004); Amy C. 
Edmondson, Michael Roberto, and Richard Bohmer, The Columbia’s Last Flght (multimedia busi- 
ness case, Harvard Business School, 2005). 
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Second, NASA's problem of the cultural blind spot shows that insiders 
are unable to identify the characteristics of their own workplace structure 
and culture that might be causing problems. This suggests that rather than 
waiting until after a gradual slide into disaster or repeat of a negative pattern 
to expose the dark side of culture and structure, organizations would ben- 
efit from ongoing cultural analysis by ethnographically trained sociologists 
and anthropologists giving regular feedback, annually replaced by others to 
avoid seduction by the cultural ethos and assure fresh insights. Bear in mind 
this additional obstacle: the other facet of NASA's cultural blind spot was 
that the Agency's success-based belief in its own goodness was so great that 
it developed a pattern of disregarding the advice of outside experts.46 To the 
extent that the CAIB report's embrace of an organizational system approach 
becomes a model for other accident investigation reports, other organizations 
may become increasingly aware of the social origins of mistakes and of the 
need to stay in touch with how their own organizational system is working. 
46. CAIB, Report, chap. 5. 

CHAPTER 12 
ACCIDENTS, ENGINEERING, AND HISTORY AT NASA, 
1967-2003 
Alexander Brown 
ection 203(a)(3) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act directs NASA S to “provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of 
information concerning its activities and the results thereof.”’ To fulfill that 
mandate, NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan instituted the NASA 
History Office in 1959? The office has stayed open ever since, collecting 
archival materials for NASA staff and outside researchers, writing history, 
and commissioning a wide range of works on NASA’s history. Over the last 
decade, the budget of NASA’s history office has remained constant at around 
$335,000 per annum, although funds allocated to the history office from 
project offices vary from year to year. Even assuming such a level over the 
lifetime of the office, and not adjusting for inflation, NASA’s commitment to 
telling its own history has cost the organization at least $15 million. But this 
figure is dwarfed by three official histories of NASA not commissioned by 
the history office. In 1967, 1986, and 2003, NASA spent $31 million, $75 
million, and $152.4 million to produce multivolume accounts of fatal acci- 
dents in the manned space p r ~ g r a m . ~  These three accident reports examined 
the fatal fire in Apollo 204 (Apollo 1) in 1967, the explosion of the Solid 
Rocket Booster in STS-51L (Challenger) in 1986, and the destruction of the 
orbiter in STS-107 (Columbia). 
Fatal accidents in publicly funded systems catch particular media and 
public a t ten t i~n .~  Governments become compelled to conduct wide-ranging 
1.John M.Logsdon et al.,eds., Exploring the Unknown:Selected Documents in the History ofthe US .  Civil 
Space Program, vol. 1, Oganizingfor Exploration (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4407,1995), p. 337. 
2. Roger D. Launius, “NASA History and the Challenge of Keeping the Contemporary Past,” 
Public Historian 21, no. 3 (summer 1993): p. 63. 
3. For Apollo 1 ,  see Ivan D. Ertel and Roland Newkirk, w t h  Courtney G. Brooks, TheApollo SpacecrujE 
A Chronology, vol. 4 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4009,1978); for Challenger, see Frank Ohveri,“NASA 
gets $50 &on for Shuttle Investigation,” Florida Today (21 February 2004); for Columbia, see Paul 
Recer,”NASA Columbia Cleanup costs near $400M,” Newsday (1 1 September 2003). 
4. Thomas White, Jr., “Establishment ofBlame as a Framework for Sensemaking in the Space Policy 
Subsystem: A Study of the Apollo 1 and Challenger Accidents” (Ph.D. diss., Virginia Polytechnic 
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investigations to reassure the public of the safety of the system and the integ- 
rity of the funding process. Accidents at NASA are particularly public and so 
demand an investigation process that is accountable not only to the Congress 
but also to the American people. NASA accident investigation boards are 
forced to draw connections between national politics and engineering design 
and operations. The process of writing a final report also forces an accident 
investigation body to tell one coherent story about the accident-how the 
accident happened, what and who was at fault, and how steps can be taken to 
ensure the accident cannot happen again. 
But as Peter Galison has observed in his study of aircraft accidents in the 
1980s, accident reports are inherently unstable. They are multicausal in their 
historical explanations, and yet embedded in the very process of investigation 
is a drive for a single point of culpability upon which to base moral responsi- 
bility and recommendations for corrective action. Accident reports, then, are 
always ambiguous about the appropriate explanatory scale, so that it is never 
clear which is the right scale for analysis-whether the small scale or the large 
scale, the inflexible O-ring or the schedule pressure imposed on NASA by the 
White House and Congress.’ 
Galison is certainly correct to assert that reports show an explanatory 
tension, but this instability between frames of analysis is not just a function of 
the particular genre of accident reports. Engineering has changed such that 
there is now a social and epistemological gap between the management of 
engineering and engineering practice. The analytical tension in the investiga- 
tion reports mirrors the real gap between engineers and managers at NASA. 
Furthermore, the reports are analytically asymmetrical, treating engineering 
as a context-free activity while explaining management in a sophisticated 
historical and cultural framework. 
These gaps are not just a phenomenon inherent to accident reports, but 
the outcome of a set of historical and historiographical changes. The Apollo 
204 accident shows the disjuncture between the engineers designing and 
managing the project and the technicians manufacturing the spacecraft. The 
Challenger and Columbiu accidents show that disjuncture has shifted to the 
gap between managers controlling the project and engineers maintaining and 
analyzing the spacecraft. Similarly, since the 1980s, the organizational the- 
ory and organizational communications communities have joined the aero- 
nautical engineering community in paying significant scholarly attention to 
continuedfrom the previous page 
Institute and State University, 2000). White’s thesis analyzes the ways in which blame was allocated 
in these two accidents but also makes it very clear that public and political concern and outrage 
were extremely high in both cases. 
5. Peter Galison, “An Accident of History,” in Atmospheric Flight in the Twentieth Century, ed. Peter 
Galison and Alex Roland (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), pp. 3 4 3 .  
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accidents at NASA. Their engagement has shifted attention to the historical 
and organizational context of management decision-making surrounding the 
accidents. No historians of engineering and technology have matched this 
contextualization of management with a history of the engineering involved 
in the accidents or an attempt to integrate the two. 
This paper will briefly lay out the accidents and discuss the findings of 
their investigative bodies. The changing historiographical styles, frameworks, 
and conclusions of the reports will be analyzed. These changes will be linked 
to changes in the practice of engineering by NASA and its contractors. Finally, 
some suggestions will be made for future research into accidents and changes 
in engineering. 
APOLLO 204 
On  27 January 1967, Spacecraft 012, assigned to the Apollo 204 mission, 
was undergoing a Plugs-Out Integrated Test on Pad 34 at Kennedy Space 
Center in Florida. The internal power systems of the newly delivered 
Command and Service Module were being tested, and so the crew cabin was 
pressurized to 16 pounds per square inch (psi) of pure oxygen. There were 
three astronauts on board: Gus Grissom, Ed White, and Roger Chaffee. At 
around 6:31 p.m. EST, the crew reported a fire in the spacecraft. Less than 20 
seconds later, the spacecraft heatshield had ruptured and flame had burst into 
the service tower. The crew in the Command and Service Module (CSM) 
level of the support tower immediately evacuated the area but quickly returned 
with what firefighting and protective gear they could find. However, they 
were unable to extinguish the fire immediately or remove the crew from the 
cabin. Meanwhile, the crew had attempted to remove the middle hatch of the 
spacecraft but had been overcome before doing so. Firefighting crews and 
medical support arrived approximately 20 minutes later. 
NASA Deputy Administrator Robert Seamans had already considered the 
possibility of an accident in the manned spaceflight program, after Neil Armstrong 
and Dave Scott in GeminiVIII had lost control of their capsule after docking 
with an Agena booster.6 In the aftermath of GeminiVIII, he developed a set of 
procedures to be followed should an accident ever occur. On the evening of 28 
January, he followed those procedures and immediately convened an accident 
review board.7The board convened at Kennedy Space Center in Florida and was 
6. Robert C. Seamans, Aiming at Targets (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4106, 1996), pp. 135-136; 
Barton 6. Hacker and James M. Grimwood, O n  the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini 
(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4203, 1977), pp. 308-319. 
7. Apollo 204 Review Board, appendix a-G, “Board Minutes,” in Report OfApollo 204 Review 
Board to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Washington, DC: GPO, 
1967), pp. 1-5-1-6. 
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The mission officially designated Apollo/Saturn 204 is more commonly known as 
Apollo 1. This close-up view of the interior of the Command Module shows the effects 
of the intense heat of the flash fire that killed the prime crew during a routine training 
exercise. While they were strapped into their seats inside the Command Module atop 
the giant Saturn V Moon rocket, a faulty electrical switch created a spark that ignited 
the pure-oxygen environment. The speed and intensity of the fire quickly exhausted the 
oxygen supply inside the crew cabin. Unable to deploy the hatch due to its cumbersome 
design and the lack of breathable oxygen, the crew lost consciousness and perished. 
They were astronauts Virgil I. ”Gus“ Grissom (the second American to fly into space), 
Edward H. White II (the first American to ”walk” in space), and Roger B. Chaffee (a 
“rookie” on his first space mission). (JSC image no. S-67-21294, 28January 1968) 
chaired by Floyd “Tommy” Thompson, Director of NASA’s Langley Research 
Center.8 The board was made up of three senior NASA engineers, a chemist 
from the Bureau of Mines, an Air Force officer from the Inspector General’s 
office, NASA Langley’s general counsel, and an astronaut.’ 
On 5 April 1967, the Apollo 204 Review Board presented its report to 
NASA Administrator James Webb. They concluded that the fire was caused 
8. James R. Hansen, Engineer in Charge: A History ofthe Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, 1917-1958 
9. Apollo 204 Review Board, appendix a-G, “Board Minutes,” pp. 2-1-2-17. 
(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4305, 1987), pp. 387-391. 
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by an unknown source of electrical arc, probably malfunctioning wire insu- 
lation around the environmental control unit on the floor of the spacecraft, 
although the cause would never be definitively known. The spark then ignited 
nylon netting, Velcro strips, and other combustible materials inside the space- 
craft. These materials would have been removed before spaceflight, but under 
test conditions were not seen as hazardous. The coolant inside the spacecraft, 
water-glycol, was flammable and left a flammable residue in the cabin after 
evaporation. As the pipes melted, coolant leaked and ignited, further fueling 
the fire. The fire was rendered particularly dangerous by the high-pressure, 
pure-oxygen environment inside the spacecraft during the test. The crew was 
unable to use the inward-opening inner hatch under the pressurized condi- 
tions. The Board determined that the crew had died from asphyxiation caused 
by fumes from the fire." 
The Board told a story of engineering failure, identifying six conditions 
that led to the fire, and provided recommendations to fix the engineering 
problems they identified. These conditions were a sealed cabin with a pressur- 
ized atmosphere, extensive distribution of flammable materials in the cabin, 
vulnerable wiring carrying spacecraft power, vulnerable plumbing contain- 
ing combustible and corrosive coolant, inadequate escape provisions, and an 
inadequate provision for rescue or medical assistance." 
After the Board made their engineering recommendations, they spoke 
briefly about the larger circumstance surrounding the accident: 
Having identified the condition that led to the disaster, the 
Board addressed itself to the question of how these conditions 
came to exist. Careful consideration of this question leads the 
Board to the conclusion that in its devotion to the many dif- 
ficult problems of space travel, the Apollo team failed to give 
adequate attention to certain mundane but equally vital ques- 
tions of crew safety. The Board's investigation revealed many 
deficiencies in design and engineering, manufacture and qual- 
ity control. When these deficiencies are corrected the overall 
reliability of the Apollo Program will be increased greatly." 
On  27 February 1967, the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space 
Sciences started to hold hearings on the Apollo 204 fire, and on 11 April, the 
House Committee on Science and Astronautics started to hold hearings into 
the Apollo 204 fire. 
10. Ibid., pp. 5-1-5-12. 
11. Ibid., p. 5-12. 
12. Ibid., p. 5-12. 
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On  the first day of the hearings before the Senate, NASA Administrator 
James Webb, Deputy Administrator Seamans, and Associate Administrator 
George Mueller were sandbagged by the Democratic Senator from Minnesota, 
Walter Mondale. Mondale asked them about a report that Apollo Program 
Director Major General Sam Phillips had prepared in 1965 after visiting 
North American Aviation (NAA), manufacturers of the  pacec craft.'^ Mueller 
first denied any knowledge of the report, arguing that Phillips had prepared 
many reports on many NASA contractors. Webb then argued that he was not 
going to release the report for reasons of commercial confidentiality, as it con- 
tained details of contract negotiations between NASA and NAA.I4 Senators 
Brooke, Percy, and, in particular, Mondale became highly critical of NASA’s 
unwillingness, as they saw it, to be accountable to elected 0fficia1s.l~ 
The Phillips report was damning. Phillips had written: 
I am definitely not satisfied with the progress and outlook of 
either program and am convinced that the right actions now 
can result in substantial improvement of position in both pro- 
grams in the relatively near future. 
Even with due consideration of hopeful signs, I could not find 
a substantive basis for confidence in future performance. I 
believe that a task group drawn from NAA at large could rather 
quickly verify the substance of our conclusions, and might be 
useful to you in setting the course for improvements.’6 
Phillips recommended that NAA thoroughly revise (and in many cases 
implement) systems management and engineering procedures. He called 
for them to implement a program management system and to significantly 
improve their manufacturing and quality contr01.’~ 
The House hearing subcommittee was chaired by Representative Olin 
Teague of Texas, a long-term supporter of the space program. The hear- 
ings were contentious-with a Republican from Illinois, Donald Rumsfeld, 
taking particular aim at NASA senior officials Webb, Seamans, and Faget. 
Rumsfeld took objection to the constitution of the Board, arguing that it 
13. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Apollo Accident, Hearing, 90th Cong., 
14. Ibid., pp. 131-132. 
15. Ibid., pp. 217, 331-332; Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Apollo 204 
Accident. Report of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate, with Additional 
Mews (Washington, DC: GPO, 1968), pp. 13-16. 
1st sess., 7 February 1967, pp. 125-127. 
16. Samuel Phillips, cover letter to Lee Atwood, in “NASA Review Team Report,” 1965. 
17. Ibid., pp. 1-20. 
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was made of people responsible for the areas of work whose failure they were 
investigating. NASA was, in effect, investigating itself. Rumsfeld was also 
concerned about the narrow focus of the Board’s report, suggesting that they 
had defined their terms very specifically to avoid investigating larger prob- 
lems within NASA management. Finally, he wanted to know why NASA 
did not have a separate and independent safety organization.18 Webb and 
Seamans gave fairly weak responses to Rumsfeld’s questions and were only 
saved by Teague’s interruptions. 
But the worst was still to come for NASA. It was revealed that in the 
initial awarding of the CSM contract to NAA, NAA had scored lower in the 
technical assessment than Martin. The Congressmen used this revelation to 
imply some sort of improper relationship between NASA and NAA.19 In the 
final days of the House hearing, Thomas Baron, a quality-assurance inspec- 
tor from NAA, presented to the Committee a detailed report of deficiencies, 
official malfeasances, and general complaints about the standard of workman- 
ship and care at NAA.’O While the Baron report was eventually proved to be 
largely personal grievances and unproven accounts of interactions between 
workers at NAA, it all contributed to a larger picture ofpoor management and 
workmanship at NAA and poor supervision at NASA. 
Although the Apollo 204 Board did not blame any individuals for the 
fire, there were consequences. Joseph Shea, manager of the Apollo Spacecraft 
Program Office, and Harrison Storms, NAA’s vice president in charge of the 
Space and Information Division, were both moved out of their positions.” 
Deputy Administrator Seamans also resigned soon after the investigation had 
concluded, his personal relationship with James Webb having deteriorated 
dramatically over the fire.” 
CHALLENGER 
On 28 January 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger launched from Kennedy 
Space Center on mission 51-L. There were seven astronauts on board: Dick 
Scobee, Michael Smith, Ellison Onizuka, Judith Resnik, Ronald McNair, 
Christa McAuliffe, and Gregory Jarvis. Their mission was to deploy and 
18. House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Investigation into Apollo 204  Acddent, Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 10 April 1967, pp. 10-14. 
19. Ertel and Newkirk, The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, vol. 4, entry €or 11 May 1967. 
20. Thomas Ronald Baron, “An Apollo Report,” in House Committee on Science and 
Astronautics, Investigation into Apollo 204 Accident, pp. 483-500. 
21. Ertel and Newkirk, The Apollo Spacecraft: A Chronology, vol. 4, entry for 7 April 1967; Mike 
Gray, Angle $Attack: Harrison Storms and the Race to the Moon, 1st ed. (New York W. W. Norton, 
1992), pp. 254-255. 
22. Seamans, Aiming at Tavgets, pp. 145-147. 
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recover a satellite in orbit and to conduct flight-dynamics  experiment^.'^ 
Christa McAuliffe, a teacher from New Hampshire, was to conduct a sci- 
ence lesson in orbit.24 The 28th of January was a very cold morning. The 
temperature at Kennedy Space Center in Florida had dropped below freezing 
overnight, and ice teams had been sent out three times to examine potential 
damage. Parts of the Space Shuttle, including the Solid Rocket Boosters, were 
still below freezing point at launch. The ambient air temperature was 36”F, 15 
degrees lower than any previous flight.25 
Less than a second after launch, at 11:38 a.m. EST, a puff of gray smoke 
emerged from the right Solid Rocket Booster (SRB). Over the next 2 sec- 
onds, eight more puffs of smoke, blacker and more dense, emerged from the 
same place on the SRB. Thirty-seven seconds after launch, the Shuttle expe- 
rienced a 27-second period of severe wind shear, stronger than any other 
Shuttle launch had experienced. Fifty-eight seconds after launch, a small flame 
appeared on the aft field joint of the right SRB. Over the next 14 seconds, the 
flame grew rapidly, burning through the lower strut holding the SRB to the 
External Tank. Seventy-two seconds after launch, the strut burned through 
and the right SRB rotated around the upper strut, crashing into the External 
Tank. The tank collapsed, venting the hydrogen fuel into the atmosphere. 
The fuel immediately ignited, and the entire Shuttle flew into the fireball. 
The orbiter entered the fireball, broke up under severe aerodynamic load, and 
fell back into the Atlantic Ocean. There were no survivors.26 
On 3 February 1986, President Ronald Reagan appointed the Presidential 
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger A~cident.’~ The Commission 
was chaired by William Rogers, Secretary of State under Richard Nixon 
and an attorney by training and experience. The Commission included two 
astronauts, a test pilot, two physicists, another attorney, three engineers, a 
senior Air Force officer, an aerospace journalist, and an astronomer. Another 
engineer was executive director. The Commission conducted public and pri- 
vate hearings over the early part of 1986 and presented its report to President 
Reagan on 6 June 1986. 
Like the Apollo 204 Review Board, the Commission understood its 
objectives to be investigating the accident and providing a series of rec- 
23. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, 
5 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986), p. 16; “John F. Kennedy Space Center-51-L Shuttle 
Mission,” http://www-pao. ksc.nasa.gov/kscpao/shuttle/mi~sions/51-l/mission-51-l. html. 
24. For Christa McAuliffe’s official NASA biography, see http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/Bios/htmlbios/ 
mcaulijie. html. 
25. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 
26. Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
1, pp. 16-21. 
27. Ibld., pp. 212-213. 
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The STS-51L crew members. In the back row, from left to right: mission specialist 
Ellison S. Onizuka, Teacher in Space participant Sharon Christa McAuliffe, payload 
specialist Greg Jarvis, and mission specialist Judy Resnik. In the front row, from left to 
right: pilot Mike Smith, commander Dick Scobee, and mission specialist Ron McNair. 
(JSC image no. 585-44253,15 November 19851 
ommendations for a return to safe flight.28 And like the Apollo Board, the 
Commission examined the physical causes of the accident but was also critical 
of NASA and its contractors as organizations: 
The genesis of the Challenger accident-the failure of the joint 
of the right Solid Rocket Motor-began with decisions made 
in the design of the joint and in the failure by both Thiokol 
(manufacturer of the Solid Rocket Motors) and NASA's Solid 
Rocket Booster project office to understand and respond to 
facts obtained during testing.29 
28. Ibid., p. 1. 
29. Ibid., p. 166. 
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The Commission determined that a combustion gas leak through the aft field 
joint on the right Solid Rocket Motor caused the flame plume. The field joint 
was designed to be sealed by O-rings. On  STS-51L7 the O-rings failed to 
work because ambient temperature was too cold and the O-rings lost resil- 
ience and hence their ability to seal quickly.30 The Commission’s report took 
aim at poor management decisions, arguing that schedule- and cost-conscious 
managers misunderstood and overruled the safety judgments of engineers. 
They concluded that flaws existed in NASA’s decision-making process and 
that these flaws had caused NASA to decide to launch STS-51L when there 
was reason to believe that launching would be risky and potentially cata- 
strophic. NASA’s safety system was indicted as silent and ineffective in the face 
of increasing pressure on the launch schedule. Finally, the Commission sug- 
gested that these flaws were rooted in the history of the Space Shuttle program 
and the history of NASA.31 
Commissioner Richard Feynman went further in appendix F to the 
report. This appendix contained Feynman’s personal observations from his 
service on the Commission and particularly addressed the difference he had 
observed between NASA and Thiokol engineers and managers. Feynman 
observed that managers and engineers tended to calculate risk in very dif- 
ferent ways-managers determining risk from a number of qualitative fac- 
tors, whereas engineers calculated risk quantitatively, using standard statistical 
methods. He also observed that these two methods tended to produce widely 
divergent results. Managers generally understood risks to be orders of mag- 
nitude less than  engineer^.^' Feynman was highly critical of this gap, arguing 
that there were only two ways to understand it. The first was dishonesty on 
the part of managers, designed to ensure a continuous flow of funding for the 
Shuttle. The second was an incredible lack of communication between engi- 
neers and managers.33 He argued that to ensure safe operation of the Shuttle, 
NASA managers needed to understand the realities of risk involved in flying 
high-performance vehicles like the Shuttle. After all, he concluded, “for a 
successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for 
Nature cannot be fooled.”34 
30. Ibid., chaps. 3,4. 
31. Ibid. Chapter 5 discusses management decisions; chapter 6, the historical background of the 
accident; and chapter 7, NASA’s safety program. 
32. Richard Phillips Feynman and Ralph Leighton, What Do You Care What  Other People Think? 
Further Adventures of a Curious Character, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 1988), pp. 179-184. This vol- 
ume also contains a version of appendix F edited for clarity, pp. 220-237. For the original version, 
see Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, pp. 
F-1-F-5. 
33. Feynman and Leighton, What Do You Care What  Other People Think? pp. 236-237. 
34. Presidenhal Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, p. F-5. 
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The Commission’s report echoed Feynman’s findings, even though he 
felt upset that his opinions had not been adequately incorporated into the final 
document.35 The report suggested that NASA management and NASA engi- 
neers saw the material world in very different ways-the engineers under- 
standing risk as quantifiable and determined by the material world, whilst 
managers understood risk as flexible and manageable in commercial and polit- 
ical contexts. The cause of the accident, the report concluded, was the failure 
of communication between these two perspectives. The ultimate expression 
of this philosophy was the statement by Jerald Mason of Morton Thiokol tell- 
ing Robert Lund, vice-president of engineering, “You’ve got to put on your 
management hat, not your engineering hat” in order to determine whether the 
Challenger would launch the next day despite engineers’ concerns over the safety 
of the Solid Rocket Motor.36 In its final recommendations, the Commission 
wanted design changes to the Solid Rocket Motor, reform of the Shuttle pro- 
gram management structure, and the establishment of a Shuttle Safety Panel and 
an independent Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance. 
The House Committee on Science and Technology started holding hear- 
ings on the Challenger accident on 10 June 1986. As in Apollo 204, from 
which the Committee drew its precedent, hearings were delayed until the 
Commission report was published. The Committee conducted 10 days of 
hearings, questioning senior NASA and Morton Thiokol officials, as well as 
members of the Commission, astronauts, and Morton Thiokol engineers.” 
While the Committee endorsed the findings of the Commission, their report 
went further: 
The Committee feels that the underlying problem which led 
to the Challenger accident was not poor communication or 
inadequate procedures as implied by the Rogers Commission 
conclusion. Rather the fundamental problem was poor tech- 
nical decision-making over a period of several years by top 
NASA and contractor personnel, who failed to act decisively 
to solve the increasingly serious anomalies in the Solid Rocket 
Booster joints.38 
Neither the Commission nor the Committee explicitly laid blame at the 
feet of any individuals. However, their criticisms of management at NASA’s 
35. Feynman and Leighton, What Do You Care What  Other People Think? pp. 199-205. 
36. Presidentd C o m s s i o n  on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, p. 94. 
37. House Commttee on Science andTechnology, Investigation ofthe Challenger Accident: Report ofthe 
38. Ibid., p. 5. 
Committee on Science and Echnology, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986, pp. 37-38. 
388 CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
Marshall Space Flight Center and at Morton Thiokol were duly noted by 
those organizations. Most of Morton Thiokol management involved in the 
launch decision were reassigned, retired, or resigned, including Jerald Mason 
and Robert Lund. At NASA, Associate Administrator for Space Flight Jesse 
Moore resigned, while MSC Director William Lucas and booster project 
manager Lawrence Mulloy both retired early.39 
COLUMBIA 
On 16 January 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbiu launched from Kennedy 
Space Center on mission 107. There were seven astronauts on board: Rick 
Husband, William McCool, Michael Anderson, David Brown, Kalpana 
Chawla, Laurel Clark, and Ilan Ramon. Fifty-seven seconds after launch, at 
around 10:40 a.m. EST, the Columbia entered a period of unusually strong 
wind shear, which created a low-frequency oscillation in the liquid oxygen 
in the External Tank.40 At 81.7 seconds after launch, at least three pieces of 
Thermal Protection System foam detached from the left bipod ramp of the 
External Tank and fell backwards at between 416 and 573 miles per hour, 
smashing through the leading edge of the left wing of the orbiter. The largest 
piece of foam was around 2 feet long and 1 foot wide. The launch was other- 
wise without incident, and Columbia arrived in orbit by 11:39 a.m. EST. 
On 23 January, Mission Control e-mailed commander Husband and pilot 
McCool to inform them of the foam strike, informing them that some foam 
had hit the orbiter but reassuring them that “we have seen this phenomenon 
on several other flights and there is absolutely no concern for entry.”41 
On 1 February 2003, after a successful 17-day mission, the orbiter reen- 
tered the Earth’s atmosphere for a landing at Kennedy Space Center. As the 
orbiter reentered, superheated air penetrated the left wing through the foam 
strike in the leading edge and started to melt away the wing from the inside. 
At around 9:OO a.m. EST, the orbiter broke up under severe aerodynamic 
load and disintegrated over the Southwest of the United States. There were 
no survivors. 
Around 1O:OO a.m. on 1 February 2003, NASA Administrator Sean 
O’Keefe declared a Shuttle Contingency and, acting under procedures set in 
place after the Challenger accident, established the International Space Station 
39. Claus Jensen, No Downlink: A Dramatic Narrative About the Challenger Accident and Our Time, 
1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996), pp. 354-355; Richard S. Lewis, Challenger: 
The Final Voyage (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 222-223. 
40. Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: NASA and GPO, 
41. Ibid., p. 159. 
2003), pp. 33-34. 
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and Space Shuttle Mishap Interagency O’Keefe named Admiral 
Harold Gehman as Chair of the Board. Gehman was retired from the Navy 
and had recently headed the investigation into the terrorist attack on the USS 
Ex officio, there were immediately seven Board members: four mili- 
tary officers with responsibilities for safety in their home services, a Federal 
Aviation Administration representative, a Department of Transportation rep- 
resentative, and a NASA Center Director. O’Keefe soon thereafter named 
both NASA’s Chief Engineer and the counsel to Glenn Research Center to 
the Board. Over the next six weeks, five more members were appointed to the 
renamed Columbia Accident Investigation Board. They included an aeronau- 
tical engineer and former Air Force Secretary, a physicist, a former astronaut 
and Challenger Commission member, a space policy expert, and the retired 
CEO of a major defense c~n t rac to r .~~  Over the first six months of 2003, the 
Board held hearings and conducted investigations into the Columbia accident 
and, on 26 August 2003, released its report. 
The CAIB report identified the physical cause of the accident as the 
foam strike on the left wing leading edge. But unlike the Apollo 204 Board, 
which briefly mentioned organizational and other factors, or the Challenger 
Commission, which described these factors as contributory, the CAIB empha- 
sized that factors other than the proximate physical cause were as, if not more, 
important in understanding the Columbia accident: 
Many accident investigations make the same mistake in defin- 
ing causes. They identify the widget that broke or malfunc- 
tioned, then locate the person most closely connected with the 
technical failure: the engineer who miscalculated an analysis, 
the operator who missed signals or pulled the wrong switches, 
the supervisor who failed to listen, or the manager who made 
bad decisions. When causal chains are limited to technical 
flaws and individual failures, the ensuing responses aimed at 
preventing a similar event in the future are equally limited: 
they aim to fix the technical problem and replace or retrain the 
individual responsible. Such corrections lead to a misguided 
and potentially disastrous belief that the underlying problem 
has been solved. The Board did not want to make these errors. 
A central piece of our expanded cause model involves NASA 
as an organizational whole. 
42. Ibid., pp. 231-232. 
43.William Langewiesche, “Columbia’s Last Flight,” Atlantic Monthly (November 2003): 65-66. 
44. CAIB, Report, p. 232. 
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The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the 
Space Shuttle Program's history and culture, including the 
original compromises that were required to gain approval for 
the Shuttle Program, subsequent years of resource constraints, 
fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterizations 
of the Shuttle as operational rather than developmental, and lack 
of an agreed national vision. Cultural traits and organizational 
practices detrimental to safety and reliability were allowed 
to develop, including: reliance on past success as a substitute 
for sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand 
why systems were not performing in accordance with require- 
ments/specifications); organizational barriers which prevented 
effective communication of critical safety information and 
stifled professional differences of opinion; lack of integrated 
management across program elements; and the evolution of an 
informal chain of command and decision-making processes 
that operated outside the organization's rules. 
In the Board's view, NASA's organizational culture and 
structure had as much to do with this accident as the External 
Tank foam.45 
Seventeen years after Challenger, the Board concluded that many of 
the findings of the Challenger Commission were still applicable to the Space 
Shuttle program in the early 21st century. They were critical of the similarities 
between the Challenger and Columbia accidents, noting in the Columbia acci- 
dent flawed decision-making processes, a silent safety program, and schedule 
pressure. The Board also observed that the causes of these failures were rooted 
in NASA's history and culture; the history of the Space Shuttle program had 
been a history of the normalization of deviance. Increasingly large engineer- 
ing problems that had not caused catastrophic failures had been incorporated 
into NASA's experience base instead of raising safety concerns. NASA had 
come to rely on past success (or lack of past catastrophe) rather than rigorous 
testing and analysis. NASA's safety system was still silent. Decision-making 
was still flawed, with managers and engineers still unable to communicate 
effectively about risk. 
The Commission recommended design changes to the Thermal Protection 
System on the External Tank, reform of the Space Shuttle Integration Office, 
training for the Mission Management Team, the establishment of an indepen- 
45. Ibid., p. 177. 
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dent Technical Engineering Authority with safety responsibilities, and ren- 
dering the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance independent and 
with total oversight of the Space Shuttle program safety ~rganization.~~ 
READING ACCIDENT REPORTS A  HISTORY 
The Apollo 204 report is almost exclusively devoted to an analysis of 
the engineering problems that the Board argued caused the fire. It divides its 
analysis into two parts, parts IV and V of the report.47 Part IV, “History of 
the Accident,” provides a chronology of the accident from August 1964 until 
28 January 1967. The sections discussing the fabrication, delivery, and inspec- 
tion of the CSM spacecraft, which cover the period from August 1964 until 
December 1966, take up less than 10 percent of the report. The remainder of 
the history of the accident is a detailed chronology of the Plugs-Out Integrated 
Test of CSM 012, starting around 5 hours and 30 minutes before the acci- 
dent. Part V, “Investigation and Analysis,” has four sections: “Inspection and 
Disassembly,” “Chronology,” “Data Analyses,” and “Cause of the Fire.” Both 
the “Inspection and Disassembly” and “Chronology” sections are strictly nar- 
rative. “Data Analyses” discusses analyses of spacecraft telemetry data and 
crew voice transmissions from less than a minute before the accident, while 
the “Causes of the Fire” section notes deficiencies in electrical equipment 
and wiring insulation, the effects of electrical arcs on wiring and coolant 
on other equipment, and the effects of a cabin environment of pure oxygen 
under pressure. The sole mention of other, larger contributory factors is the 
final paragraph, noting that these engineering problems came about through 
deficiencies in design and man~facturing.~’ 
But none of the political circumstances surrounding the Apollo pro- 
gram-its iconic status as the martyred President Kennedy’s legacy, as a vis- 
ible symbol of American technical prowess, as a marker of position in the 
Cold War-were identified as contributory. Nor was NASA’s organizational 
structure or its culture. No individuals were identified as bearing particular 
responsibility for the accident. The report makes clear that poor engineering 
practice, whether design, management, or operation, was to blame. 
The report ofthe Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger 
Accident is a striking contrast to the Apollo 204 report. Even superficially, 
the reports are dissimilar. The Apollo 204 report looks like a report-it is 
46. Ibid., chap. 11. 
47. Parts I, I f ,  and 111 describe the Board’s legal authority, the biographies of its members, and 
48. Apollo 204 Review Board, Report to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space 
the proceedings of the Board. 
Administration (Washington, DC: GPO, 1967), pp. 5-12. 
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monochromatic, printed in standard Government Printing Office format, and 
appears very similar to a multitude of other NASA reports. The report on the 
Chullengev accident looks more like a magazine or coffee table book. It has large 
sections of color photographs used as visual evidence by the Commission, was 
printed on glossy paper, and was written in a narrative form familiar to readers 
of nonfiction. It opens with a preface and an introduction, outlining the task 
of the Commission and contextualizing the development of the Space Shuttle. 
The report goes on to outline the events of 28 January 1986 and from there 
leads into its analysis of the physical cause of the accident in a chapter simply 
titled “The Cause of the Accident.’”’ The remainder of the report analyzes 
the series of events that contributed to the accident: the chain of decisions that 
led to the decision to launch, the history of design problems with the O-ring 
system, the political and organizational pressures to launch, and the failure of 
the safety system.50 In seeking to understand the contributory causes of the 
accidents, the Commission’s report does not explicitly draw on any theoretical 
work. The report’s footnotes are to transcripts of Commission hearings or to 
original NASA and Morton Thiokol documents, rather than any other writ- 
ings on accidents or safety. 
The Presidential Commission was clear that there were physical causes 
for the accident-in this case, the failure of the O-rings to seal correctly. 
But unlike the Apollo 204 Review Board, the Commission saw secondary 
contributing causes. These secondary causes were the flawed launch deci- 
sion, political pressures on the launch schedule, and a silent safety system. The 
1967-model report, setting out an understanding of engineering failures to be 
fixed with engineering solutions, was changed into a critique of both engi- 
neering and management with separate solutions for each area of endeavor. 
The report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was 
even more like a magazine. Unlike the Apollo 204 and Chullengev reports, 
the CAIB report has its own logo and its own page headers and footers. The 
report contains sidebars to provide contextual or background material and is 
illustrated with images of the Columbia in preparation and in flight and images 
of the Columbia crew both before and during the 107 mission. 
Like the Chullengev report, the CAIB report devotes only one chapter, 
chapter 3, to the proximate physical cause of the accident-the separation of 
Thermal Protection System (TPS) foam from the External Tank and its subse- 
quent impact on the leading edge of the orbiter. But the report has four chap- 
ters, chapters 5 to 8, discussing the context of the decision-making that led 
to the breakup of the orbiter on reentry. Chapter 3 discusses the engineering 
49. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, vol. 1, 
50. Ibid., chaps. 5 through 8, respectively. 
chap. 4. 
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analyses the Board performed, the history of External Tank design decisions, 
and the conclusions to be drawn from these, but it does so without using any 
theory, simply presenting this engineering section as needing no context or 
justification. It is only where the Board starts to examine the decision-mak- 
ing of NASA engineers and managers that led to the Columbia disaster that 
more sophisticated explanatory frameworks are needed. The Board drew on 
a variety of theoretical perspectives, considering Charles Perrow’s theory of 
normal accidents and the work of both Scott Sagan and Todd La Porte on 
high-reliability theory.51 
Perhaps most interestingly, the CAIB report drew heavily on the work 
of Diane Vaughan. Vaughan’s 1996 book, The Challenger Launch Decision, set 
out a sociological explanation for the flawed decision, arguing that, far from 
the managerial misconduct identified by the Challenger report, the accident 
can best be understood in terms of the normalization of deviance, the cul- 
ture of production at NASA and Morton Thiokol, and structural ~ecrecy.~’ 
Vaughan argued: 
This book explicates the sociology of mistake. It shows how 
mistake, mishap and disaster are socially organized and sys- 
tematically produced by social structures. No extraordinary 
actions by individuals explain what happened: no intentional 
managerial wrongdoing, no rule violations, no conspiracy. 
The cause of disaster was a mistake embedded in the banality 
of organizational life.53 
This perspective informed chapter 8 of the CAIB report, where the Board 
drew explicit links between the Challenger and Columbia accidents, applying 
the components of Vaughan’s analysis to Columbia. The Board concluded: 
First, the history of engineering decisions on foam and O-ring 
incidents had identical trajectories that “normalized” these 
anomalies, so that flying with these flaws became routine and 
acceptable. Second, NASA history had an effect. In response 
to White House and Congressional mandates, NASA leaders 
took actions that created systemic organizational flaws at the 
time of Challenger that were also present for Columbia.54 
51. CAIB, Rep0rt.p. 180. 
52. Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at 
53. Ibid., p.  xiv. 
54. CAIB, Report, p. 195. 
NASA (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
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Unlike the Challenger report, the CAIB report gives equal weight to the organi- 
zational causes of the accident, arguing that while mistakes were made, the orga- 
nizational structure of NASA was more to blame that any individual failings. 
The three reports suggest a story of growing separation of management 
and engineering. As Peter Galison has suggested, this may simply be a result 
of the instability between frames of analysis: the desire both to localize and to 
diffuse the locus of causation, to find a single physical cause, and to explain 
the accident in terms of larger organizational and cultural  problem^.^' But it is 
interesting to note that these two activities are not only juxtaposed as possible 
sources of accidents, but also understood and analyzed in different ways. There 
has been a growing sophistication in the ways that decision-making and its 
contexts have been understood. There is a transition from Apollo 204’s one- 
paragraph analysis of larger causes, to Chullenger’s inclusion of organizational 
and political factors as contributory, to Columbia’s equal pairing of technical 
and social causes. There is a corresponding increase in the contextualization 
of these social elements of the analysis, from rudimentary mentions in Apollo 
204 to a full examination and consideration of sociological and organizational 
theory literature in Columbia. 
But there is an interesting asymmetry in these reports as well. As analy- 
ses of decision-making and its historical and cultural contexts have grown 
ever more sophisticated in these accident reports, the discussions of physical 
causes have remained remarkably similar. In each accident report, a number 
of possible causes are considered and eliminated before attention is turned to 
the actual cause. In each of the sections of the reports dealing with physical 
cause, there is little or no contextualization of engineering and design deci- 
sion-making and no attempt to locate the discussion in a body of literature. 
This separates the physical and technical causes of accidents from their con- 
texts and sets up the two activities-engineering and decision-making about 
engineering-as two quite different activities, to be understood and analyzed 
in different terms. In this formulation, engineering seems to be understood on 
its own terms, as a context-free and ahistorical activity, whereas management 
decision-making is understood as contingent and located within a complex 
historical and cultural framework. 
This asymmetry immediately opens two questions. First, what historical 
processes caused the separation of engineering and management in the manned 
space program from 1967 to the present day? Second, what changes in engi- 
neering over the same period can be seen in the three accident reports and 
might provide the basis for understanding engineering in its own historical and 
cultural context? The disciplines of the history of technology and the history of 
science provide some directions to go look for answers to these questions. 
55. Galison, “An Accident of History,” p. 4. 
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Engineering accidents can be understood in a similar way to scientific 
controversies. A scientific controversy is resolved when the winners declare 
that their account is true and opponents are no longer taken seriously by the 
relevant scientific community.56 Just as scientific controversies open up the 
inner workings of a laboratory or research group, so accidents open up the 
internal practices and politics of engineering. But accidents also provide a way 
to examine how engineers go about activities other than design and innova- 
tion. Most studies of engineers and engineering focus on design because it is 
the most creative and innovative element of the engineer’s craft.57 However, 
the vast majority of time spent by engineers is taken up with the development 
and operation of technologies rather than their design. Accident investigations 
take a comprehensive look at the design, manufacture, and operation of the 
broken artifact or system and so provide a way to look at engineering work 
at the routine, everyday level, as well as at the creative design level. The pro- 
cess of investigating an accident results in the extensive description of these 
everyday routines, routines that are often seen as so mundane as to leave little 
trace in the documentary record of the project. Thus, if these NASA acci- 
dent reports are examined as a historian might examine them, they can trace 
changes in both design and routine engineering. 
By treating accidents and their investigations as windows into engineer- 
ing at NASA, there are at least three aspects of engineering at NASA that have 
changed since the 1960s-the widespread use of computers in engineering, the 
emergence of astronautical engineering as a new hscipline, and a move away 
from systems engineering as an organizing philosophy for large projects. 
Computing 
Since the 1960s, computers have become ubiquitous, and there is a growing 
literature that points to the ways in which interaction with computers reshapes 
56. This particular interpretation of scientific controversy is taken from the works of Bruno 
Latour and Wiebe BiJker in particular. See Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists 
and Engineers through Society (Cambridge, M A  Harvard University Press, 1987); Bruno Latour and 
Steve Woolgar, Laboratory L@: The Construction ofScientijicFacts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1986); Wiebe E. Bgker, Thomas Parke Hughes, and T. J. Pinch, The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1987). 
57. This point was well made by John Staudenmaier in his surveys of the field of history of 
technology. See John M. Staudenmaier, Technology’s Storytellers: Reweaving the Human Fabric 
(Cambridge, MA: Society for the History of Technology and the MIT Press, 1985); John M. 
Staudenmaier, “Recent Trends in the History of Technology,” American Historical Review 95, no. 3 
(1990). For examples of this focus on design to the exclusion of other aspects of engineering, see, 
for example, Walter G .  Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How They Know It: Analytical Studies 
fiom Aeronautical History, Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins, 1990); Henry Petroski, To Engineer Is Human: The Role OfFailure in Successjul Design (New 
York St. Martin’s Press, 1985). 
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the ways people live and work.58 Just like scientists, the engineering profession 
has adopted computing extensively, with almost all elements of engineering 
activity now mediated through computers-design, simulation modeling, 
communications, logistics, financial management, and admini~tration.~~ Over 
the period 1967-2003, modeling, testing, and simulation moved from being 
largely hand-calibrated to being almost exclusively computer-mediated.60 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board report shows, however, that this 
process involved the loss of much of the transparency of older techniques. 
A brief history of the modeling tool Crater illustrates this process well. 
Crater was originally built in 1966 by Allen Richardson at Rockwell. It was 
designed in conjunction with NASA engineers to predict the effects of hyper- 
velocity impacts on multilayer surfaces like those of the Apollo CSM. Crater 
was a curve fit from a data set generated in part from Gemini experience and 
in part from testing performed by General Motors and NASA on aluminum 
honeycomb materials. Crater could predict threshold velocities and penetra- 
tion damage but was complex to use; the number and complexity of calcula- 
tions needed to derive a result made it time-consuming and prone to error. 
Crater was validated using small pieces of foam and ice on single tiles. During 
the process of turning empirical data into a predictive equation, the limita- 
tions and contingencies of these initial data sets were lost.61 Furthermore, the 
process of computerization of Crater rendered the uncertainties inherent in 
the tool even more invisible, and the specific mode of computerization, a 
plug-in-the-numbers spreadsheet, gave a false sense of clarity and certainty to 
the results. Thus, an engineer unaware of the history of the tool and its limita- 
58. See Sherry Turkle, The Second Se2f: Computers and the Human Spirit (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1984); and Sherry Turkle, L$e on the Screen: Identity in the Age ofthe Internet (New 
York Simon & Schuster, 1995), for an examination of how interaction through the mediation 
of computers changes identity. More specifically, Dominique Vinck and Eric Blanco, Everyday 
Engineering: A n  Ethnography of Design and Innovation, Inside Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2003), and Susan Leigh Star, The Cultures of Computing (Oxford, U.K., and Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1995), start to address how engineering and scientific work has changed. 
59. For a general overview of computing since World War 11, see Paul E. Ceruzzi, A History 
$Modern Computing, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). Paul E. Ceruzzi, Beyond the 
Limits: Flight Enters the Computer Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), provides a good outline 
of the introduction of computers into aerospace, although the focus of the work is on-board com- 
puters rather than ground equipment or design tools. Gary Lee Downey, The Machine in Me: A n  
Anthropologist Sits among Computer Engineers (New York: Routledge, 1998), and Louis L. Bucciarelli, 
Designing Engineers, Inside Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), both provide ethnogra- 
phies of engineering that discuss the effects of the ubiquity of computers in the workplace. 
60. For a good overview of this topic, see Sergio Sismondo and Snait Gissis, “Practices of 
Modelling and Simulation,” Special Issue of Science in Context 12 (1999). George E. Smith, “The 
Dangers of Cad,” Mechanical Engineering (February 1986), gives an early warning of the dangers of 
increasingly closed simulation tools. 
61. Allen Richardson interview, by A. Brown, 15 February 2005. 
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tions, as was the Boeing engineer who did the Columbia analysis, could not 
know that the predictive powers of Crater were unknown outside a limited 
range of values. The piece of foam that fell from Columbia’s external tank was 
640 times larger than Crater’s valid range. The Crater model predicted that 
the foam strike would have broken entirely through the Thermal Protection 
System of the Shuttle and exposed the aluminum wing structure.62 But because 
the engineers were aware that there were limitations to the tool, but not aware 
of how to correct or modify the model, they dismissed their results as too 
conservative and not predictive of a problem. 
This example shows that the Boeing engineers were working in a mode 
of engineering where their relationships to the materials and objects that they 
build and study were profoundly mediated through a computer and pro- 
foundly dependent on the uncritical acceptance of the findings and assump- 
tions of previous generations of engineers. In January 2003, Boeing engineers 
and NASA’s Debris Assessment Team had no choice but to accept the results 
of their Crater analysis. Their reliance on a computer model, with the inher- 
ent lack of access to the mechanics of the model, let alone the assumptions 
and uncertainties underlying it, had profoundly affected their ability to make 
engineering judgments. A similar story can be told about the External Tank 
bolt catchers-their safety margin, flagged by the Board as dangerously low 
and a possible source of disaster, was computed using ancient data sets whose 
origins and limitations had been obscured by computeri~ation.~~ 
Engineering Education 
There is a growing trend in the history of science to look towards peda- 
gogy as a lens through which to understand how science and scientists come 
to be.64 David Kaiser writes, “Scientists are not born, they are made. The 
ways in which this happens bears the marks of time and place.”65 This obser- 
vation holds equally true for engineers. Engineering education has changed 
since Apollo 1. In the late 1960s, engineering schools started to move towards 
62. CAIB, Report, pp. 144-145. 
64. David Kaiser, Pedagogy and the Practice o f  Science. Historical and Contemporary Perspectives 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), is a collection of essays examining science pedagogy over a 
variety of disciplines, places, and times. Andrew Warwick, Masters of Theory: Cambridge and the Rise 
of Mathematical Physics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), a study of mathemati- 
cal training in 19th-century Cambridge and its relationship to 19th-century physics in Britain, is 
perhaps the most sustained development of the argument for the value of the study of pedagogy. 
Sharon Traweek, Beamtimes and L$fimes. The World o f  Hzgh Energy Physicists (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), examines contemporary Japanese physicists and identifies educa- 
tion as critical in the formation of a distinctively Japanese way of doing physics. 
. 63. Ibid , pp. 86-88. 
65. Kaiser, Pedagogy and the Practice of Science, p. 1. 
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engineering science and away from engineering design as a model for the dis- 
cipline.66 Engineering students were required to take classes in physics, math, 
and chemistry to give them a thorough grounding in the physical sciences 
before going on to engineering classes. The ongoing effects of the National 
Defense Education Act of 1958 meant changes towards more easily teachable 
and assessable modes of learning as educators struggled to manage massive 
expansions in class sizes.67 The combination of these two trends meant that 
for many freshmen and sophomores in the 1970s, engineering meant doing 
physics and math problem sets rather than sketching, building, and working 
with their hands.68 This mode of learning fit well with the growing presence 
of computers in education, providing students with the mathematical tools 
needed to build and use their own software. As computers became ubiquitous, 
so engineering schools brought computing into engineering education. 
These changes served to both render engineering more abstract and 
arcane, less connected to its objects of study, and to make it more automated. 
Both the Challenger and Columbia reports are critical of the relationships 
between NASA and its contractors, and particularly critical of the lack of 
engineering design and development capacity amongst some of the contrac- 
t o r ~ . ~ ~  Embodying engineering judgment in computer programs can devalue 
that judgment when embodied in engineers, leading to downgrading of the 
institutional value placed on engineers as employees. This leaves engineers 
and their skills more vulnerable to privatization and commodification and 
hence leads to the downgrading of the engineering design capacity of com- 
mercial organizations. 
The new discipline of astronautics or astronautical engineering was also 
emerging over this period, intertwined with the development of NASA as an 
66. Rosalind H. Williams, Retooling: A Historian Confronts Technological Change (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2002), pp. 40-42. 
67. Barbara Barksdale Clowse, Brainpower for the Cold War: The Sputnik Crisis and National Defense 
Education Act of 1958 (Westport, C T  Greenwood Press, 1981), examines the initial responses to the 
Sputnik crisis. David Kaiser, “Scientific Manpower, Cold War Requisitions, and the Production 
of American Physicists after World War 11,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 33 
(fall 2002), looks specifically at the relationship between Cold War geopolitics and changing styles 
of science and education during this period. 
68. Both Kathryn Henderson, On Line and on Paper: Visual Representations, Visual Culture, and 
Computer Graphics in Design Engineering, Inside Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), and 
Eugene S. Ferguson, Engineering and the Mind’s Eye (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), examine 
the changes in engineering brought about by changes in the ways in which students learn to inter- 
act with the material world. Ferguson discusses the loss of a visual intuitiveness amongst young 
engineers brought about by a move to a more analytic style of engineering in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Henderson looks at the ways in which engineering knowledge and practices are transformed when 
computer visualization tools are introduced into the workshop and drafting room. 
69. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Report to the President, pp. 
194-195; CAIB, Report, pp. 110-118. 
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organization.7O The new discipline drew heavily on the principles of aeronau- 
tical engineering but taught students how to apply these principles in higher 
stress environments-at higher temperatures and pressures, with higher aero- 
dynamic loads, in high-radiation environments, using finer tolerance manu- 
facturing, and with larger and more complex vehicle systems. The new 
discipline of astronautical engineering had to learn how to manage problems 
with testing the massive vehicles it built. In many cases, it was physically 
impossible to adequately test astronautical hardware, and so new methods of 
producing knowledge about complex systems like computer modeling and 
simulation were developed. The Apollo 204 report illustrates the engineering 
challenges that accompanied the transition from designing and developing 
craft to operate within the atmosphere to craft designed to operate in the 
space environment. As the report makes clear, the levels of both precision and 
complexity needed to build a spacecraft grew dramatically, perhaps beyond 
the capacity of North American Aviation engineers to keep up. As astronau- 
tics developed, engineering scale, engineering knowledge, and engineering 
management changed. 
The Systems Approach 
Systems engineering as a philosophy emerged from the complex military 
defense projects of the 1950s. It can be best described as a “set of organi- 
zational structures and processes to rapidly produce a novel but dependable 
technological artifact within a predictable budget.”71 Systems engineering was 
one element in a long history of the application of scientific and engineering 
principles to complex commercial or organizational problems, a history that 
started with Taylorism and scientific management in the late 19th ~entury.’~ 
Systems engineering involved the use of engineering ideas to organize large 
engineering projects-most profoundly, systems engineering defines project 
70. W. Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo:]ames E .  Webb of N A S A  (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 
1995); W. Henry Lambright, Edwin A. Bock, and Inter-university Case Program, Launching 
NASA’s Sustaining University Program (Syracuse, N Y  Inter-universay Case Program, 1969); 
Howard E. McCurdy, Inside N A S A :  High Technology and Organizational Change in the U.S. Space 
Program (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1993). 
71. Stephen B. Johnson, The Secret of Apollo: Systems Management in American and European Space 
Programs (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2002), p. 17. 
72. See James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the 
Information Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), and JoAnne Yates, Control 
through Communication: The Rise ofSystem in American Management (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1989), 
for a brief introduction to the literature on system and scientific management. Robert Kanigel, 
The One Best Way: Frederick Window Taylor and the Enigma ofEfficiency (New York: Viking, 1997), 
and Hugh G. J. Aitken, Scientific Management in Action: Taylorism at Watertown Arsenal, 1908-1915 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), both provide excellent introductions to Taylor 
and scientific management. 
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management as an engineering problem best solved by engineers and engineer- 
ing practice. In this philosophy, management becomes a subset of engineering 
practice. The large SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) air defense 
and Atlas missile projects trained a generation of engineers how to apply sys- 
tems engineering ideas to complex research, development, and manufacturing 
pr0.jects.7~ Systems management experts from the Air Force and the aerospace 
industry were brought into NASA to manage the Apollo program as it grew 
in the 1960~:~ The Apollo 204 accident marks the moment of transition into a 
full acceptance of systems engineering as the guiding philosophy of the space 
program, whereas throughout the early part of the 1960s, there was tension 
between the aircraft manufacturers and the missile-program-trained NASA 
engineering managers. Indeed, the most common historiographical interpre- 
tation of the larger significance of Apollo 204 is simply that-the fire forced 
NASA and its contractors to find new ways of managing the complexity of the 
Apollo program, and systems management was the new ~ a y . 7 ~  
The manned spaceflight community within NASA made the transition 
from research and development to being primarily an operational organi- 
zation in the 1980s and 1990s, as the focus of the U.S. manned spaceflight 
program moved from exploration to ready access to low-Earth orbit. Systems 
engineering as an overarching philosophy for the management of complexity 
was replaced with new approaches drawn from both the business and gov- 
ernment worlds. This does not mean that the tools that collectively made up 
systems engineering-configuration control boards, integrated management 
73. Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas Parke Hughes, Systems, Experts, and Computers: The Systems 
Approach in Management and Engineering, World War I I  and After, Dibner Institute Studies in the History 
of Science and Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Thomas Parke Hughes, Rescuing 
Prometheus, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998); and Kent C. Redmond and Thomas M. 
Smith, From Whirlwind to Mitre: The R G D  Story of the S A G E  Air Defense Computer (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2000), all discuss the origins of systems management in the ballistic missile and 
air defense programs of the 1950s. 
74. Johnson’s The Secret of Apollo: Systems Management in American and European Space Programs is 
by far the most comprehensive examination of the rise of systems management in the U.S. space 
program. See also Arnold S. Levine, Managing N A S A  in the Apollo Era (Washington, DC: NASA 
SP-4102, 1982); John M. Logsdon, Managing the Moon Program: Lessons Learned from Project Apollo: 
Proceedings ofan Oral History Workshop (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4514, 1999). 
75. For examples of this type of interpretation, see Andrew Chaikin and Tom Hanks, A Man on 
the Moon: The Voyages ofthe Apollo Astronauts (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), chap. 1; Charles 
A. Murray and Catherine Bly Cox, Apollo, the Race to the Moon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1989), chaps. 15-16; William E. Burrows, This New Ocean: The Story ofthe Space Age, 1st ed. (New 
York: Random House, 1998), pp. 406-415. Astronaut and flight controller biographies make a 
similar point. See, for example, Frank Borman and Robert J. Serling, Countdown: A n  Autobiography, 
1st ed. (New York: W. Morrow, 1988), chap. 9; Michael Collins, Carrying the Fire: A n  Astronaut’s 
Journeys (New York: Farrar, 1974), pp. 269-275; Christopher C. Kraft, Flight: M y  Lije in Mission 
Control (New York: Dutton, 2001), pp. 269-278; Gene Kranz, Failure Is Not an Option: Mission 
Controlfrom Mercury to Apollo 13 and Beyond (New York: Simon & Schuster, ZOOO), pp. 208-214. 
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systems, resident program offices at contractors-ceased to be used, but rather 
that the philosophy that a collection of these tools was the best way to manage 
a program was replaced by other ways of 
Total Quality Management, reengineering, and “faster, better, cheaper” 
took the place of systems engineering in the 1990s, part of a larger cultural 
trend in the United States that valorized the business approach to organization 
and emphasized the merits of private free-enterprise solutions to problems 
previously thought the realm of government.” The idea of using scientific 
and engineering principles to solve business and organizational challenges was 
replaced by the application of business and commercially derived management 
philosophy to an engineering organization. 
Changes in engineering practice over the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s meant 
that engineers in the manned space program were working in the increas- 
ingly mediated environment of computer-based engineering whilst working 
on technological systems that were becoming increasingly complex, difficult 
to test, and designed to operate at an increasingly high performance envelope. 
Margins for error grew ever smaller, whilst the computer-based tools being 
used to manage that margin grew increasingly less transparent. At the same 
time, the shared organizational philosophy of systems engineering was being 
abandoned by senior management in favor of more commercially oriented 
ideas, while engineers still used the tools of systems management. 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are several areas that call for further research in order to put 
together a picture of changes in engineering in the U.S. manned space pro- 
gram. The first area is studies of engineering in practice in the late 20th 
century. Although the genre of engineering ethnographies is growing, it is 
still small. Some of these studies examine the impact of computers in the 
engineering workplace, but none do so in the context of aeronautics or astro- 
nautics. Howard McCurdy’s work on NASA culture provides an excellent 
base to work from but focuses on organizational change rather than engineer- 
ing change from the 1970s Furthermore, the field needs not just 
in-depth studies of engineering practice, but broad-scope surveys comparable 
to Sylvia Fries’s NASA Engineers in the Age of Apoll0.7~ We do not yet know 
76. See CAIB, Report, pp. 105-110. 
77. Howard E. McCurdy, Faster, Better, Cheaper: Low-Cost Innovation in the U.S. Space Program 
78. McCurdy, Inside N A S A :  High Technology and Organizational Change in the U.S. Space Program; 
79. Sylvia Doughty Fries, N A S A  Engineers and the Age of Apollo (Washington, DC: NASA SP- 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2001). 
McCurdy, Faster, Better, Cheaper: Low-Cost Innovation in the U. S.  Space Program. 
4104, 1992). 
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enough about the educational and demographic characteristics of NASA engi- 
neers from the 1970s onwards. 
There is a need for a body of literature on the recent institutional and 
cultural history of engineering comparable to the literature on the rise of the 
engineering profession in the later half of the 19th century. We know much 
about the ways in which engineers developed a clearly articulated profes- 
sional identity, created a standardized curriculum and accreditation process, 
and made themselves middle-class in the late 19th century.80 We know much 
about the engineering triumphs of the early 20th century and the involve- 
ment of engineers in the winning of World War I1 and the Cold War, both 
as producers of military technology but also as the creators of the consumer 
society.*’ But we know little about how engineers have responded to changing 
economic and cultural circumstances since the 1960s. 
We need more nuanced histories of the NASA of the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s. Reflecting the ongoing cultural legacy of the Apollo program, much of 
the literature on the U.S. manned spaceflight program focuses on the triumphs 
of the 1960s. Those histories that do attempt to cover the entire history of the 
program tend to fall into a declensionist mode of writing, discussing NASA’s 
decline and fall from Apollo. A more nuanced understanding of the legacy of 
the Apollo program, including a more realistic assessment of the relative safety 
of Apollo and Shuttle missions, might serve to provide a new framework in 
which to understand the history of NASA over this period. 
80. For example, see Edwin T. Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the 
American Engineering Profession (Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1971); 
George S. Emmerson, Engineering Education: A Social History (New York: David & Charles; Crane, 
1973); David F. Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise ofcorporate Capitalism, 1st 
ed. (New York: Knopf, 1977); Brendan Patrick Foley, “Fighting Engineers: The U.S. Navy and 
Mechanical Engineering, 1840-1905” (Ph.D. thesis, MIT, June 2003). 
81. See Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological 
Enthusiasm, 1870-1970 (New York: Penguin Books, 1990); David A. Hounshell, From the American 
System to Mass Production, 1800-1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United 
States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1984); Terry S. Reynolds, The Engineer in America: A Historical 
Anthology from Technology and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
CHAPTER 13 
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES FOR CONTINUED 
SPACE XPLORATION: HIGH-RELIABILITY SYSTEMS 
ACROSS MANY OPERATIONAL GENERATIONS- 
REQUISITES FOR PUBLIC CREDIBILITY~ 
Todd R. La Porte 
ighlighting critical issues arising from the evolution of a large govern- H ment enterprise is both important and occasionally painful and some- 
times provides a basis for exciting next steps. Calling out critical technical 
issues from past developments inspires engineers and makes visible to policy- 
makers likely requests for program funding to address them. A “critical issues” 
focus also holds the promise of exploring other sorts of issues: those that arise 
in deploying technologies.’ These are particularly interesting when they entail 
large-scale organizations that are judged to be highly hazardous. 
This paper highlights the challenges and issues involved when we wish 
large, technically rooted organizations to operate &Y mow effectively, with 
much less error than they should be expected to exhibit-given what we know 
about organizations more generally. Recall that “Murphy’s Law” and trial- 
and-error learning are reasonably accurate descriptors of how all organiza- 
tions generally behave. Routinely expecting otherwise is quite remarkable. 
First, let us set a context. In your mind’s eye, imagine space-related activi- 
ties two or three decades into the future. President George W. Bush’s current 
vision for NASA focused the Agency’s efforts in the early 21st century, and 
1. This paper draws on presentations to the Workshop on Space Policy held by the National 
Academies of Science in Irvine, CA, 12-13 November 2003; the National Academies’ Board 
on Radioactive Waste Management Panels on “Principles and Operational Strategies for Staged 
Repository Systems,” 27 June 2001, and “Long-Term Institutional Management ofHazards Sites,” 7 
August 2001, both held in Washington, DC; and the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science (AAAS) symposium, “Nuclear Waste: File and Forget? Institutional Challenges for High- 
Reliability Systems Across Many Operational Generations-Can Watchfulness Be Sustained?” held 
in Denver, CO, 18 February 2003. Since these presentations were given to quite different, nearly 
mutually exclusive audiences, the various conference sponsors have agreed to this repetition. 
2. This conference on “Critical Issues” casts a wider net and includes issues relevant to the under- 
standing of policy development, technical operations as well as systems safety, and the conduct of 
historical studies of large systems per se. 
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our reach has extended to periodic flights to the Moon and to an international 
space p la t f~rm.~  With international cooperation, three to four major launches 
and recoveries a year have become more or less routine. Another six or seven 
unmanned launches resupply the Station and various probes for scientific pro- 
grams. Assume that national intelligence and communications demands require 
another half dozen annually. And imagine that commercial spaceflight enthu- 
siasts have found enough “venture capitalists” and adventurers to sustain sev- 
eral highly visible, elite space experiences. This is edging toward 20 launches a 
year and evokes images of science fiction and early Stur Trek tableaux. 
This sort of future moves us well beyond the sharply defined, novel images 
of machinery and spectacularly framed astronauts spacewalking against the black 
of the heavens. It conjures the extraordinary organizations that these activities 
imply. There would be the early vestiges of, say, a U.S.-European Union space 
traffic control-analogous to the existing global air traffic control system-alert 
to tracking both space vehicles and the detritus of former flights, closely con- 
centrating on bringing each flight to rest without encountering objects aloft or 
mishaps ofhuman or mechanical origin. Operational scope would be widespread 
and expected to continue indefinitely. This organizational reach is extraordinary. 
It immediately raises the question of the “operational sustainability” of NASA’s 
space missions, especially those that propel humans into space. 
The missions and the technologies that typify NASA and its industrial 
contractors prompt demands that NASA programs exhibit highly reliable, 
humanly safe operations, often projected to continue for a number of manage- 
ment generations (say some 10 to 15 years each). NASA has, in the past, taken 
up these challenges emphasizing both engineering controls and administrative 
controls that embrace safety and effective performance. 
This paper highlights a third emphasis: the organizational relationships 
and safety culture of the Agency and its contractors that would manage an 
astonishing array of complicated technical systems and far-flung facilities 
making up a global space complex. It draws on work examining the opera- 
tions of several mature, large-scale technical systems. Then it considers in this 
light the qualities likely to be necessary in the evolution of NASA’s humans- 
in-space activities if they are routinely to achieve a high degree of public 
acceptance and sustained credibility. 
Putting the question directly: What organizational conditions have arisen 
when the operating technologies are so demanding or hazardous that trial- 
~ 
3 .  President George W. Bush, “A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President’s Vision for 
U.S. Space Exploration,” 14 January 2004, folder 12886, NASA Hlstorical Reference Collection, 
Washington, DC. For NASA’s most recent expression of this declaration, see NASA, “The New 
Age of Exploration: NASA’s Direction for 2005 and Beyond,” February 2005, same folder. The 
operative portion from the mission: “To understand and protect our home planet, To explore the 
universe and search for life, To inspire the next generation of explorers.” 
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and-error learning, while likely, no longer seems to be a confident mode of 
learning and when the next error may be your last trial? 
What can be said about managing large-scale technical systems, respon- 
sible for often highly hazardous operations on missions that imply operational 
stability for many, many years? The institutional design challenges are to pro- 
vide the work structures, institutional processes, and incentives in such ways 
that they assure highly reliable operations4 over the very long term-perhaps 
up to 50 years5-in the context of continuously high levels of public trust and 
confidence.6 My purpose here is less to provide a usable explication of these 
concepts (see the supporting references) and more to demonstrate, by a bliz- 
zard of lists, the complexity and range of the institutional conditions implied 
by NASA’s program reach. I foreground properties that are especially demand- 
ing, keeping these questions in mind: How often and at what effort does one 
observe these characteristics in the organizational arenas you know best? Could 
one imagine such an ensemble within NASA in the foreseeable future? 
PURSUING HIGHLY RELIABLE OPERATIONS 
Meeting the challenges of highly reliable operations has been demon- 
strated in enough cases to gain a rough sense of the conditions that seem asso- 
ciated with extraordinary performance. These include both internal processes 
and external relations. What can be said with some confidence about the 
qualities NASA managers and their overseers could seek?7 (See table 13.1.) 
4. Initial empirical work included close study of the operations of U.S. An Traffic Control, aircraft 
carriers at sea, and nuclear power plants. For summaries, see G. I. Rochhn, “Reliable Organizations. 
Present Research and Future Directions,” andT. R. La Porte,“High Reliabdity Orgaruzations: Unlikely, 
Demanding and at ksk,” both injournal of Crisis and Contingency Management 4, no. 2 (June 1996): 55- 
59 and 60-71, respectively; T. R .  La Porte and P. M. Consohni,“Workmg in Prachce but not inTheory: 
Theoretical Challenges of High Rehability Organizations,”Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 1, no. 1 (January 1991): 19-47; K. H. Roberts, “New Challenges to Orgmzahond Research: 
High Rehabihty Organizations,” Iadustrial Crisis Quarterly 3 (1989): 11 1-125. 
5. Prompting the concept of‘hstitutional constancy.” See mscussion later in thls chapter, along with 
T. R. La Porte and A. Keller, “Assuring Institutional Constancy. Requisites for Managing Long-Lived 
Hazards,” Public Administration Review 56, no. 6 (November/December 1996): 535-544. 
6. In the context of this paper, sustaining public trust and confidence, while a very important 
consideration, takes second seat to the issues of reliable operations across multiple generations. 
Public trust is  a condition that evokes high institutional demands and calls for a discussion that 
extends beyond the limitations of this paper. See, for example, U.S. Department ofEnergy (DOE), 
“Earning Public Trust and Confidence. Requisite for Managing Radioactive Waste. Report of the 
Task Force on Radioactive Waste Management, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board,” November 
1993, available online at kttp. //www.seab.enevgy.gov/pubhcations/trust.pdf; T. R. La Porte and D. 
Metlay, “Facing a Deficit of Trust: Hazards and Institutional Trustworthiness,” Public Administration 
Review 56, no. 4 (July-August 1996): 341-347. 
7. Draw generalized inferences from this discussion with care. These findings are based mainly on 
three types of organizations, each with a limited number of cases, and bits from others (e.g., K. H. 
continued on the next page 
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Table 13.1. Characteristics of Highly Reliable Organizations (HROs) 
Internal Processes 
1. Strong sense of mission and operational goals, commitment to highly reliable 
operations, both in production and safety. 
2. Reliability-enhancing operations. 
A. Extraordinary technical competence. 
B. Sustained, high technical performance. 
C. Structural flexibility and redundancy. 
D. Collegial, decentralized authority patterns in the face of intense, 
high-tempo operational demands. 
E. Flexible decision-making processes involving operating teams. 
F. Processes enabling continual search for improvement. 
G. Processes that reward the discovery and reporting of error, even 
one’s own. 
3. Organizational culture of reliability, including norms, incentives, and 
management attitudes that stress the equal value of reliable production and 
operational safety. 
External Relationships 
1. External “watching” elements. 
A. Strong superordinate institutional visibility in parent organization. 
B. Strong presence of stakeholding groups. 
2. Mechanisms for “boundary spanning” between the units and these watchers. 
3. Venues for credible operational information on a timely basis. 
continued from the previous page 
Roberts, “Some aspects of organizational cultures and strategies to manage them in reliabllity enhanc- 
ing orgamzations,”]or*rnal of Managerial Issues 5 [1993]: 165-1 81).Though these organizations operate 
in quite chfferent instituQonal d e u s ,  we cannot say they represent a systematic sample. No one now 
knows what the population of HROs mght  be. And hghly rehable operations are keenly sought for 
situations that are not so dramancally hazardous in the physical sense, e.g., HRO operations in financial 
transactions or in the performance of soplsticated computer chips or large software programs. See 
K. H. Roberts and C. Libuser, “From Bhopal to b h n g :  Orgamzational design can mtigate risk,” 
Ovganizational Dynamics 21 (1993): 15-26. In these situahons, motivahon stems &om fear of serious 
financial losses that are seen as amounting to institunonal, not physical, death. 
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Internal Processes’ 
Oyunizationally defined intention. High-reliability organizations (HROs) 
exhibit a strong sense of mission and operational goals that stress assuring ready 
capacity for production and service with an equal commitment to reliability in 
operations and a readiness to invest in reliability-enhancing technology, pro- 
cesses, and personnel resources. In cases such as our space operations, these goals 
would be strongly reinforced by a clear understanding that the technologies 
upon which the organizations depend are intrinsically hazardous and poten- 
tially dangerous to human and other organisms. It is notable that for U.S. space 
operations, there is also high agreement within the operating organizations 
and in the society at large about the seriousness of failures and their potential 
costliness, as well as the value ofwhat is being achieved (in terms of a combina- 
tion of symbolic, economic, and political factors). This consensus is a crucial 
element underlying the achievement of high operational reliability and has, 
until recently, increased the assurance of relatively sufficient resources needed 
to carry out failure-preventing/quality-enhancing activities. Strong commit- 
ment also serves to stiffen corporate or agency resolve to provide the organiza- 
tional status and financial and personnel resources such activities require. But 
resolve is not enough. Evidence of cogent operations is equally crucial. 
Reliability-enhancing operations. These include the institutional and opera- 
tional dynamics that arise when extraordinary performance must be the rule 
of the day-features that would be reinforced by an organizational culture of 
reliability, i.e., the norms and work ways of operations.’ A dominant quality 
of organizations seeking to attain highly reliable operations is their intensive 
technical and social interdependence. Characterized by numerous specialized 
functions and coordination hierarchies, this prompts patterns of complexly 
related, tightly coupled technical and work processes which shape HROs’ 
social, structural, and decision-making character.” 
8. This section draws strongly from La Porte and Consolini, “Working in Practice but not 
in Theory”; Rochlin, La Porte, and Roberts, “The self-designing high-reliability organization: 
Aircraft carrier flight operations at sea,” Naval War College Review 40, no. 4 (1987): 76-90; La 
Porte, “High Reliability Organizations”; Rochlin, “Reliable Organizations: Present Research 
and Future Directions,” pp. 55-59; T. R .  La Porte, “High Reliability Organizations: Unlikely, 
Demanding and at Risk,” pp. 60-71; K. H. Roberts, “Some characteristics of high reliability 
organizations,” Organization Science 1, no. 2 (1990): 160-177; P. R. Schulman, “Negotiated Order 
of Organizational Reliability,” Administration G Society 25, no. 3 (November 1993): 356-372. 
9. K. E.Weick,“Organizational culture as a source of h g h  reliability,” CaliJornia Management Review 29 
(1987): 112-127; K. H. Roberts,“Some aspects of organizational cultures and strategies to manage them 
in reliabdity enhancing organizations,”Journal of Managerial Issues 5 (1993): 165-181. 
10. La Porte and Consolini, “Working in Practice but not in Theory”; Rochlin, “Reliable 
Organizations: Present Research and Future Directions”; C. Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living With 
High-Risk Technologies (New York: Basic Books, 1984); K. H. Roberts, K. H. and G. Gargano, 
“Managing a High Reliability Organization: A Case for Interdependence,” in Managing Complexity 
in Hkh Technology Industries: Systems and People, ed. M. A. Von Glinow and S. Mohrmon (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 147-159. 
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The social character of the HRO is typified by high technical/profes- 
sional competence and performance, as well as thorough technical knowledge 
of the system and awareness of its operating state. 
1. Extraordinary technical competence almost goes without saying. But 
this bears repeating because continuously attaining very high quality 
requires close attention to recruiting, training, staff incentives, and 
ultimately the authority relations and decision processes among oper- 
ating personnel who are, or should be, consummately skilled at what 
they do. This means there would be a premium put on recruiting 
members with extraordinary skills and an organizational capacity to 
allow them to burnish these skills in situ via continuous training and 
an emphasis on deep knowledge of the operating systems involved. 
Maintaining high levels of competence and professional commitment 
also means a combination of elevated organizational status and visibil- 
ity for the activities that enhance reliability. This would be embodied 
by “high reliability professionals”” in positions with ready access to 
senior management. In aircraft carrier operations, this is illustrated 
where high-ranking officers are assigned the position of Safety Officer 
reporting directly to the ship’s captain. 
2. HROs also continuously achieve high levels of operational perfor- 
mance accompanied by stringent quality assurance (QA) measures 
applied to maintenance functions buttressed by procedural acuity.” 
Extensive performance databases track and calibrate technical opera- 
tions and provide an unambiguous description of the systems’ oper- 
ating state. NASA’s extraordinary investment in collecting system 
performance data is a prime example of this characteristic. These data 
inform reliability statistics, quality-control processes, accident mod- 
eling, and interpretations of system readiness from a variety of per- 
spectives. In some organizational settings, the effectiveness of these 
analyses is enhanced by vigorous competition between groups for- 
mally responsible for safety.13 
11. P. Schulman, E. Roe, M. van Eeten, and M. de BruiJne, “High Reliability and the 
Management of Critical Infrastructures,” Journal of Crisis and Contingency Management 12, no. 1 
(March 2004): 14-28. Also see David Mindell’s chapter in this book and his attention to the self 
“identity” of technical operators. 
12. Schulman, “Negotiated Order of Organizational Reliability”; M. Bourrier, “Organizing 
Maintenance Work at Two American Nuclear Power Plants,” Journal of Crisis and Contingency 
Management 4, no. 2 (June 1996): 104-112. 
13. T. R .  La Porte and C. Thomas, “Regulatory Compliance and the Ethos of Quality 
Enhancement: Surprises in Nuclear Power Plant Operations,” Journal ofpublic Administration Research 
and Theory 5, no. 4 (December 1994): 250-295. 
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HROs’ operations are enabled by structural features that exhibit opera- 
tional flexibility and redundancy in pursuit of safety and performance, and 
overlapping or nested layers of authority relationships. 
3.  Working with complex technologies is often hazardous, and opera- 
tions are also carried out within quite contingent environments. 
Effective performance calls for flexibility and “organizational slack” 
(or reserve capacity) to ensure safety and protect performance resil- 
ience. Such structural flexibility and redundancy are evident in three 
ways: key work processes are designed so that there are parallel or 
overlapping activities that can provide backup in the case of overload 
or unit breakdown and operational recombination in the face of sur- 
prise; operators and first-line supervisors are trained for multiple jobs 
via systematic rotation; and jobs and work groups are related in ways 
that limit the interdependence of incompatible  function^.'^ NASA has 
devoted a good deal of attention to aspects of these features. 
The three characteristics noted so far are, in a sense, to be expected 
and command the attention of systems engineering and operational manag- 
ers in NASA and other large-scale technical programs. There is less explicit 
attention to understanding the organizational relationships that enhance their 
effectiveness. I give these a bit more emphasis below. 
4. Patterns of formal authority in large organizations are likely to be 
predominately hierarchical (though this may have as much to do with 
adjudicative functions as directive ones). And, of course, these pat- 
terns are present in HROs as well. Top-down, commandlike author- 
ity behaviors are most clearly seen during times of routine operations. 
But importantly, two other authority patterns are also “nested or over- 
laid” within these formal relations. Exhibited by the same participants 
who, during routine times, act out the roles of rank relations and 
bureaucrats, in extraordinary times, when the tempo of operations 
increases, another pattern of collegial and functionally based author- 
ity relationships takes form. When demands increase, those members 
14. For work on functional redundancy, see especially M. Landau, “Redundancy, Rationality, 
and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap,” Public Administration Review 27 (July/August 1969): 
346-358; A. W. Lerner, “There is More Than One Way to he Redundant: A Comparison of 
Alternatives for the Design and Use of Redundancy in Organizations,” Administration G Society 
18 (November 1986): 334-359; D. Chisholm, Coordination Without Hierarchy: Inzormal Structures in 
Multi-organizational Systems (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); C. F. L. Heimann, 
“Understanding the Challenger Disaster: Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable 
Systems,” American Political Science Review 87 (June 1993): 421-435. 
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who are the most skilled in meeting them step forward without bid- 
ding to take charge of the response, while others who may “outrank” 
them slip informally into subordinate, helping positions. 
And nested within or overlaid upon these two patterns is yet 
another well-practiced, almost scripted set of relationships that is acti- 
vated during times of acute emergency. Thus, as routine operations 
become high-tempo, then perhaps emergencies arise, observers see 
communication patterns and role relationships changing to integrate 
the skills and experience apparently called for by each particular situ- 
ation. NASA has had dramatic experience with such patterns. 
Within the context of HROs’ structural patterns, decision-making 
dynamics are flexible, dispersed among operational teams, and include 
rewards for the discovery of incipient error. 
5. Decision-making within the shifting authority patterns, especially 
operating decisions, tends to be decentralized to the level where 
actions must be taken. Tactical decisions often develop on the basis 
of intense bargaining and/or collegial interaction among those whose 
contributions are needed to operate effectively or problem-solve. 
Once determined, decisions are executed, often very quickly, with 
little chance for review or a1terati0n.I~ 
6. Due in part to the irreversibility of decisions once enacted, HROs put 
an unusual premium on assuring that decisions will be based on the best 
information available. They also try to insure that their internal techni- 
cal and procedural processes, once put in motion, will not become the 
sources of failure.This leads, as it has within NASA, to quite formalized 
efforts, continually in search of improvement via systematically gleaned 
feedback, and periodic program and operational reviews. These are fre- 
quently conducted by internal groups formally charged with searching 
out sources of potential failure, as well as improvements or changes in 
procedures to minimize the likelihood of failure. On occasion, there 
may be several groups structured and rewarded in ways that puts them 
in direct competition with each other to discover potential error, and, 
due to their formal attachment to different reporting levels of the man- 
agement hierarchy, this encourages the quick forwarding of information 
about potential flaws to higher authority.16 
15. Roberts, “Some characteristics of high reliability organizations”; Schulman, “Negotiated 
Order of Organizational Reliability.” 
16. La Porte and Thomas, “Regulatory Compliance and the Ethos of Quality Enhancement”; 
Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
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Notably, these activities, due to their intrinsic blame-plac- 
ing potential, while they may be sought by upper management in 
a wide variety of other types of organizations, are rarely conducted 
with much enthusiasm at lower levels. In response, HROs exhibit a 
most unusual willingness to reward the discovery and reporting of 
error without peremptorily assigning blame for its commission at the 
same time. This obtains even for the reporting of one’s own error in 
operations and procedural adherence. The premise of such reward 
is that it is better and more commendable for one to report an error 
immediately than to ignore or to cover it up, thus avoiding untoward 
outcomes as a consequence. These dynamics rarely exist within orga- 
nizations that operate primarily on punishment-centered incentives, 
that is, most public and many private organizations. 
Organizational culture of reliability. Sustaining the structural supports for 
reliability and the processes that increase it puts additional demands on the 
already intense lives of those who operate and manage large-scale, advanced 
technical systems. Operating effectiveness calls for a level of personal engage- 
ment and attentive behavior that is unlikely to be manifest merely on the basis 
of formal rules and economic employee contracts. It requires a fully engaged 
person responding heedfully to norms of individual and group relations that 
grow out of the particular demands and rewards of the hazardous systems 
involved.” For lack of a better concept to capture these phenomena, let us 
accept the slippery concept of “organizational culture” as a rough ordering 
notion.” A culture of organizational reliability refers to the norms, shared 
perceptions, work ways, and informal traditions that arise within the operat- 
ing and overseeing groups closely involved with the systems of hazard.” 
Recall that HROs strive equally for high levels ofproduction and safety.20 
HROs face the challenge of being reliable both as producers (many under all 
manner of demanding conditions) and as safety providers (under conditions 
of high production demands). While most organizations combine varying 
17. Weick, “Organizational culture as a source of high reliability”; Roberts, “Some aspects of 
organizational cultures.” 
18. The concept of organizational culture captures the sense that there are norms, values, and 
“taken for granted” modes of behavior and perceptions that shape interpersonal and group relations. 
At the same time, the concept retains a high degree operational ambiguity, its use subject to stiff 
criticism. See J. S.  Ott, The Organizational Culture Perspective (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1989); Roberts, 
“Some aspects of organizaaonal cultures”; G. I. Rochlin, “Les organizations ‘a’ haute fabilite’: bilan et 
perspective de recherche” (Highly Reliable Organizations: Exploration and Research Perspectives), 
chap. 2 in Organiser lajabilite, ed. M. Bourrier (Paris: L‘Harmattan, 2001). 
19. Roberts, “Some characteristics ofhigh reliability organizations”; “Nuclear Power Operations: 
A Cross-Cultural Perspective,” Annual Review DfEnergy and the Environment 19 (1994): 153-187. 
20. Cf. Rochlin, “Reliable Organizations: Present Research and Future Directions”; Schulman, 
“Negotiated Order of Organizational Reliability.” 
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degrees of production plus service/safety emphasis, HROs have continuously 
to strike a balance. In times of routine, safety wins out formally (though 
watchfulness is harder to sustain); in times of high tempo/surge, this becomes 
reordered (though watchfulness is much more acute). This suggests an orga- 
nizational culture integrating the familiar norms of mission accomplishment 
and production with those of the so-called safety culture.21 
Elements of the results are operator/member ilan, operator autonomy, 
and intrinsic tension between skilled operators and technical experts. 
Operating personnel evince an intense ilan and strongly held expec- 
tations for themselves about the value of skilled performance. In the 
face of hazard, it takes on a kind of prideful wariness. There are often 
intense peer-group pressures to excel as a highly competitive team and 
to cooperate with and assist each other in the face of high operating 
demands. This includes expectations of fulfilling responsibilities that 
often go well beyond formal role specifications. For example, there is 
a view that “whoever spots a problem owns it” until it is mitigated or 
solved in the interest of full, safe functioning. This sometimes results in 
operators realizing that, in the face of unexpected contingencies, they 
may have to “go illegal,” i.e., to go against established, formal proce- 
dures if the safety operating procedures appear to increase the diffi- 
culty of safely meeting the service demands placed on the organization. 
Operator ilan is reinforced by clearly recognized peer-group incen- 
tives that signal high status and respect, pride in one’s team, emphasis 
on peer “retention” and social discipline, and reward for contributing 
to quality-enhancing, failure-preventing activities. 
Hazardous operations are often time-critical, where effectiveness 
depends on keen situational awareness. When it becomes clear that 
speedy, decisive action must be taken, there is little opportunity for 
assistance or approval from others.22 Partly as a result, HRO opera- 
tors come to develop, indeed insist upon, a high degree of discretion, 
autonomy, and responsibility for activities “on their watch.”23 Often 
typified as being “king of my turf,” this is seen as highly appropriate 
by both other operators and supervisors. 
21. See G. I. Rochlin, “Safe operations as a social construct,” Ergonomics 42, no. 11 (1999): 
1549-1560; cf. Weick, “Organizational culture as a source of high reliability.” 
22. See K. E.Weick, K. M. Sutchffe, and D. Ohsdeld,“Orgamzing for high reliabdity: Processes of col- 
lechve mmdfulness,” Research in Ovgnnizational Behavior 21 (1999): 81-123, for a related perspective. 
23. K. H. Roberts, D. M. Rousseau, and T. R .  La Porte, “The culture of high reliability: 
Quantitative and qualitative assessment aboard nuclear powered aircraft carriers,” journal of High 
Technology Management Research 5 ,  vol. 1 (spring 1994): 141-161. 
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But operator autonomy is often bought at a moderate price. The HROs 
we studied all operated complex technical systems that put a premium 
on technical engineering knowledge as well as highly skilled operat- 
ing knowledge and experience. These two types of skills are usually 
formally distinguished in the occupational roles designations within 
HROs. Each has a measure of status; each depends on the other for 
critical information in the face of potential system breakdown and 
recovery if problems cannot be contained. But in the operators’ eyes, 
they have the ultimate responsibility for safe, effective operation. They 
also have an almost tactile sense of how the technical systems actu- 
ally function in the organization’s operating environments, environ- 
ments that are likely to be more situationally refined and intuitively 
more credibly understood than can be derived from the more abstract, 
cognitively based knowledge possessed by engineers. The result is an 
intrinsic tension between operators and technical experts, especially 
when operators judge technical experts to be distant from actual oper- 
ations, where there is considerable confidence placed on tacit knowl- 
edge of system operations based on long operating e~pe r i ence .~~  
These dominant work ways and attitudes about behavior at the operating 
levels of HROs are prompted by carrying out activities that are closest to the 
hazards and suggest the important affective nature of HRO dynamics. These 
patterns provide the basis for the expressive authority and “identitive compli- 
a n ~ e ” ~ ’  norms that sustain the close cooperation necessary when facing the 
challenges of unexpected high-tempo/high-surge situations with minimum 
internal harm to people and capital equipment. But HROs operate in the 
context of many interested outsiders: sponsors, clients, regulators, and sur- 
rounding neighborhoods. Relations with outside groups and institutions also 
play a crucial role. 
External Relationships 
HRO performance is clearly dependent on extraordinarily dense patterns 
of cooperative behavior within the organization. These are extensive, often 
quite intense, and unusual both in terms of achieving continuous reliability and 
in higher costs. As such, they are difficult to sustain in the absence of external 
reinforcement. Continuous attention both to achieving organizational missions 
and to avoiding serious failures requires repeated interactions with-one might 
24. G. I. Rochlin and A. von Meier, “Nuclear Power Operations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective,” 
25. See A. Etzioni, “Organizational Control Structure,” chap. 15 in Handbook .f Organizutions, 
pp. 153-187; Rochlin, “Safe operations.” 
ed. J. G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 650-677. 
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say pressures from-elements in the external environment, not only to insure 
resources, but, as importantly, to buttress management resolve to maintain the 
internal relations outlined above and to nurture HROs’ culture of reliability. 
These cultural characteristics are the most important of all the properties of 
HROs, for if they are absent, the rest are difficult to achieve and sustain. 
NASA has certainly learned how external interests-we will call them 
“the watchers”-can enter into the Agency’s everyday life, especially when 
major failures are seized upon as a chance to ventilate concerns about opera- 
tional reliability.26 “Watchers” include externally situated, independent public 
bodies and stakeholding interest groups and the institutional processes that 
assure their presence, efficacy, and use of tools for external monitoring in the 
interest of hazard evaluations. 
Aggressive, knowledgeable “watchers” increase the likelihood that a) 
reliability-enhancing operations and investments will be seen as legitimate by 
corporate and regulatory actors, b) such costs should be absorbed, and c) regu- 
lations and internal social demands should be allowed in the interest of safety. 
This may mean investing, on one hand, in developing and training external 
review groups and in some instruments of behavioral surveillance, e.g., ran- 
dom drug tests, and, on the other, assuring these “watchers” that HRO lead- 
ers will quickly be held accountable for changes that could reduce reliability 
in service or safety. These watching groups may be either formal or informal 
and are found both within the HRO’s immediate institutional environment, 
e g ,  congressional committees, and outside it. 
It is crucial that there be clear institutional interests in highly reliable 
performance. This should be evident in strong, superordinate institutional ele- 
ments of the parent organization, such as agency and corporate headquarters 
or command-level officers (e.g., utility corporate headquarters, higher mili- 
tary command, and Washington agency headquarters), and sometimes indus- 
trial association watchdogs (e.g., the nuclear industry’s Institute for Nuclear 
Power Operators, or INPO).27 
At the same time, the persistent presence of external stakeholding groups 
assures attentiveness (and occasional resentment). These groups range from 
quite formal public watchers, such as regulatory overseers (e.g., state Public 
Utility Commissions, Nuclear Regulatory Commissions, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration), user and client groups (e.g., 
instrument-rated pilots using air traffic control services and Congresspersons), 
to a wide sweep of “public interveners” (e.g., state, local governments, land- 
26. Diane Vaughan’s work (cited above) and conference paper contrasting the Challenger and 
27. T. Rea, Hostages to Each Other (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
Columbia accident reports gives eloquent testament to the dynamics of intense external scrutiny. 
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use advocates, and citizen interest groups). Finally, this important function is 
also played by professional peer bodies and by HRO alumni who are seen as 
operationally knowledgeable observers. They are likely to be accorded respect 
both by other outsiders and by the HRO operators themselves. 
An abundance of external watchers seems crucial in attaining continu- 
ous, highly reliable operations and a culture of reliability. So are boundary- 
spanning processes through which encouragement and constraints are exercised 
in the interest of product/safety reliability. Two types are evident. First, there 
are formally designated positions and/or groups who have external oversight 
responsibilities. Two examples of formalized channels are Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission On-site Residents, two or three of whom are assigned to each 
nuclear power plant, with nearly complete access to power plant information, 
review meetings, etc., and, second, military liaison officers who are permanently 
assigned to air traffic control centers. Sometimes these boundary-spanning 
activities are expressed in aircraft carriers’ operations via dual reporting 
requirements for nuclear engineering officers to report problems immediately, 
not only to the ship’s captain, but to a central nuclear affairs office at naval 
headquarters in Washington, DC, as well. 
Boundary spanning, and with it increased transparency, also occurs 
intermittently in the form of periodic formal visits from “check” or review 
groups, who often exercise powerful sanctions if their reviews do not measure 
up. These activities come in a number offorms, for example, phased inspections 
and training checks in aircraft carrier combat preparations, as well as the more 
familiar Inspector General reviews, and nuclear power utilities requirements to 
satisfy rigorous performance in responding to the NRC-mandated, biannual 
activation of power plant emergency scenarios in which all the relevant local 
and state decision-makers engage in a daylong simulation leading to possible 
regional evacuation under the watchful eye of NRC and FEMA inspectors.28 
Finally, external watchers, however well provided with avenues of access, 
must have available full, credible, and current information about system per- 
formance. This almost goes without saying, for these data, often in the form 
of annual evaluations, hazard indices, statistical summaries noted above, and 
indicators of incipient harm and the early onset of danger, become a crucial 
basis for insightful reviews and public credibility. 
This is a formidable array of conditions for any organization to seek or to 
sustain, even for the short term. To what degree would they suffice over the 
long term? This will become a major challenge for NASA as missions take on 
multiyear scope and programs are premised on a long-term human presence 
in space. 
28. La Porte and Thomas, “Regulatory Compliance and the Ethos of Quality Enhancement.” 
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ASSURING INSTITUTIONAL CONSTANCY AND 
FAITHFULNESS IN THE FUTURE 
Many highly reliable organizations operate systems whose f d  range of 
positive and negative outcomes can be perceived more or less i~nmediately.~~ 
When this happens, organizational leaders can be rewarded or held account- 
able. But when operating systems are also capable of large-scale and/or widely 
distributed harm which may not occur or be detected for several operational 
generations, our familiar processes of accountability falter and overseers and the 
public are likely to be concerned that such HROs be worthy of the trust placed 
in them across several generations. In NASA’s case, these challenges stem from 
the extraordinary reach of the administration’s vision for the Agency’s future. 
NASA is contemplating missions that will send humans in space for sev- 
eral years to facilities that are likely to be designed to last 10 to 20 years (two 
management generations). Add to this any of half a dozen hoped-for lunar 
and exploratory missions. In a much more extreme case, the management of 
nuclear materials, obligations can be expected to continue for at least 50 to 100 
years, perhaps ~enturies.~’ These cases suggest that shouldering an obligation 
to demonstrate the faithful adherence to a mission and its operational impera- 
tives for a remarkably long time is inherent in accepting the program-even 
in the face of a variety of social and institutional environmental changes. As 
the longer term effects of such technologies become more clear, trying to take 
into account their transgenerational nature presents particularly troublesome 
challenges for managers and for students of ~rganizat ion.~~ And it is this aspect 
of highly reliable operations about which the social and management sciences 
have the least to say. 
29. This section draws from portions of T. R. La Porte and A. Keller, “Assuring Institutional 
Constancy: Requisite for Managing Long-Lived Hazards,” Public Administration Review 56, no. 6 
(November/December 1996): 535-544. It is also informed by my work at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL) exploring the organizational challenges posed for the laboratory by its missions 
of science-based stockpile stewardship (of nuclear weapons), nuclear materials stewardship, and 
sometimes environmental stewardship. While the operations of the first two, contrasted to the 
latter, are very different, the challenges provoked by the longevity of the materials involved 
prompt very similar organizational puzzles. For a similar rendering, see T. R. La Porte, “Fiabilite 
et legitimaite soutenable” (Reliability and Sustainable Legitimacy), chap. 3 in Ovganiser lafiabiltte, 
ed. M. Bourrier (Paris: L‘Harmattan, 2001). 
30. Readers can add other technically oriented programs or activities that have a similar extraor- 
dinary property, say in the environmental or public works domain. 
31. Two conditions, noted here, increase the public demands for constancy because they under- 
mine our typical means of ensuring accountability and are sometimes characteristic of hazardous 
technical systems. These two are 1) when the information needed to provide unequivocal evidence 
of effects is so extensive and costly that the public comes to expect that it will not be forthcom- 
ing and 2) if harmful effects occur, they are unlikely to be unequivocally detected for some time 
into the future due to the intrinsic properties of the production processes and their operating 
continued on the next page 
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A partial remedy is to consider what we might call “institutional con- 
stancy.” More formally, institutional constancy refers to “faithful, unchanging 
commitment to, and repeated attainment of performance, effects, or outcomes 
in accord with agreements by agents of an institution made at one time as 
expressed or experienced in a future time.”” An organization exhibits con- 
stancy when, year after year, it achieves outcomes it agreed in the past to pur- 
sue in the spirit of the original public policy bargain.33 
Conditions Encouraging Institutional Constancy34 
What little systematic examination of this remarkable intention there is 
suggests that institutional constancy requires demonstrating to the public or 
its major opinion leaders that the agency, public contractors, or firms in ques- 
tion (for example, NASA operating very reliably) can both be trusted to keep 
its word-to be steadfast-for long into the future and to show the capacity 
to enact programs that are faithful to the original spirit of its  commitment^.^^ 
What condtions signal continued political and institutional will, steadfastness in 
“keeping the faith”? What conditions assure the capacity to follow through for 
many years, i.e., the organizational infrastructure of institutional constancy? 
Institutional purpose. Constancy is about future behavior, and the organi- 
zation must signal its collective resolve to persist in its agreements, especially 
continued from the previous page 
environments. While the mind’s eye turns quickly to public organizations for examples, the argu- 
ment applies with nearly equal force to the private sector in the United States, especially to those 
firms responding to the strong economic incentives for short-term gain with the systematic deferral 
of costs for some time. 
32. T. R. La Porte and A. Keller, “Assuring Institutional Constancy.’’ 
33. Think, for example, of the FAA‘s air traffic control operations, together with air carriers. 
They have consistently achieved high levels of flight safety and traffic coordination in commercial 
aviation and flight operations at sea. And the Navy has a long-term record of exceptional safety 
aboard nuclear submarines. Electrical utilities have made remarkably high levels of electrical power 
available. Great universities exhibit constancy in commitments to intellectual excellence, genera- 
tion after generation, through producing very skilled undergraduates and professionals as well as 
pathbreaking research. 
34. Note: There are strong analytical and practical limitations to attaining institutional constancy 
over many generations, especially a) weak analytical bases for confidently predicting the outcomes 
of institutional activities over long periods of time, b) limited means to reinforce or reward genera- 
tions of consistent behavior, and c) scanty knowledge about designing institutional relationships 
that improve rather than degrade the quality of action-taking in the future that is faithful to the 
spirit of present commitments and agreements. Incentives to improve conditions that would assure 
constancy of institutional capacities are scant. And so is interest in analysis that would improve our 
understanding of institutional and administrative design. Indeed, there is almost nothing insightful 
in the literature about increasing institutional inertia or constancy. It is still an analytical puzzle. 
35. While these two qualities are closely related, one can imagine succeeding at one without 
achieving the other. An HRO might be able to persuade the public that it was firmly committed to 
certain objectives but actually turn out to be in no position to realize them. Conversely, an HRO 
could very well be situated, motivated, and structured to carry out its commitments for years to 
come but be unable to convince the public of its steadfastness. 
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with strong commitments to trusteeship in the interests of future generations. 
Measures that reinforce this perception are as follows: 
* The necessary formal, usually written goal of unswerving adherence to 
the spirit of the initial agreement or commitment; documents that can 
be used in the future to hold each generation’s organizational leaders 
accountable for their actions. 
* Strong, public articulation of commitments to constancy by high-status 
figures within an agency or firm, calling especially on professional staff 
and perhaps key labor representatives to emphasize the importance of 
constancy. Coupled with formal declarations, consistent emphasis upon 
steadfastness within an organization reinforces the otherwise difficult 
commitments of energy and public witness that are needed by key 
members of the technical staff and workforce. 
Strong evidence of institutional norms and processes that nurture the 
resolve to persist across many work generations, including, in the pub- 
lic sector, elements in labor contracts that extend over several political 
 generation^.^^ When these exist, they bind workers and their leaders 
to the goals of the agency, often transcending episodes of leadership 
succession. The content of these norms and the processes that rein- 
force them are now not well calibrated, though examples are likely 
to be found in public activities that draw the deep loyalty of technical 
staff and former members. This seems to be the case for elite mili- 
tary units, e.g., the U.S. Marine Corps and Navy Seals; groups within 
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and some other public health 
activities; and some elements within U.S. air traffic control circles. A 
close examination of the internal processes of socialization the produce 
such loyalty is ~arranted.~’  
* Commitments to courses of action, particularly those where benefits 
may be delayed until a succeeding management or political genera- 
36. This point IS akin to the arguments made classically by P. Selznick, Leadership in Administration 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1957), and J. Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What  Government Agencies Do and 
W h y  They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989), pp. 99-102, about the importance of institutional 
leadership and the character of the organization’s sense of mission. 
37. For an early exploration of this aspect, see Selznick, Leadership in Administration, and his dis- 
cussion of the transformation of an instrumental organization into one that has been “infused with 
value,” i.e., that becomes an “institution.” For a recent project attempting to address these ques- 
tions, see A. Boin, “The Early Years of Public Institutions: A Research Agenda” (paper issued by 
the Department of Public Administration, Leiden University, Netherlands, 2004). 
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tion, are difficult to sustain in the face of U.S. political metabolism. 
Therefore, vigorous external reinforcement from both regulatory 
agencies and “public watching” groups must be present to assure that 
the relevant agencies and their contractors will not flag in attending to 
the performance promised by one generation to the next. This would 
include reinforcing the vigor of outside groups by regularly assuring 
their formal involvement and providing sufficient resources to sustain 
their expectations and prompt their demands for consultation if the 
next generation of leaders wavers in its resolve. The optimum would 
be when these measures lead to laws, formal agreements, and foun- 
dation/nongovernmental funding and infrastructure for continual 
encouragement and sanctions for “keeping the faith.” 
The infvastructure of constancy. While strong motivations and earnestness 
are necessary, they alone do not carry the day. Other conditions should also 
be present to assure interested outsiders that actions will, in fact, be carried out 
in realizing important commitments across multiple generations. As I outline 
Table 13.2. Characteristics Associated with Institutional Constancy 
(Le., Organizational Perseverance, Faithful Adherence to the Mission and 
Its Operational Imperatives) 
1. Assurance of steadfast political will. 
A. Formal goal of unswerving adherence to the spirit of the initial agreement. 
B. Strong articulation of commitments by high-status agency leaders calling 
C. Clear evidence of institutional norms that nurture the persistence of com- 
D. Vigorous external reinforcement from regulatory agencies and public 
on staff in achieving constancy. 
mitments across many generations. 
watching groups. 
2. Organizational infrastructure of constancy. 
A. Administrative and technical capacity to carry out constancy-assurance 
activities reinforced by agency rewards. 
B. Adequate resources to assure the “transfer” of requisite technical and 
institutional knowledge across worker and management generations. 
C. Analytical and resource support for “future impact analyses.” 
D. Capacity to detect and remedy the early onset of likely failure that threat- 
ens the future, with the assurance of remediation if failures occur. 
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these, return in your mind’s eye to the US. space community and the many 
organizations revolving satellite-like around the central sudstar of NASA. 
How many of the conditions I will suggest below already exist within NASA? 
How difficult would their introduction and persistence likely be? If these 
seem sparse, or absent, this points to a “critical institutional issue.” 
These conditions of constancy include the following: 
* The technical capabilities and administrative infrastructure which 
are needed to assure performance, along with agency or contractor 
rewards and incentives for articulating and pursuing measures that 
enhance constancy and intergenerational fairness. These would include 
executive socialization and training processes to reinforce commit- 
ments and long-term perspectives to nurture a culture of constancy. 
Such processes and resources are rarely provided in today’s institu- 
tional environments. Rather, perspectives and rewards are intensely 
generation-centric, characterized by quite short-term evaluations, and 
strongly reinforced by contemporary business and legislative cycles. 
In addition to assuring consistency in organizational culture, the 
resources and activities needed to “transfer” or “pass on” the organi- 
zation’s critical operating, technical, and institutional knowledge from 
one work and management generation to the next are crucial. This 
includes systematic capture of critical skills and operating histories, as 
well as continuous training and evaluation of each generation’s capa- 
bilities. Some portion of each future generation should be present in 
the current one. 
The remaining conditions point to keen powers of analysis in service to 
the future. 
* Analytical supports should be evident for analysis and decision-making 
which take into account the interests of the future and enable work, 
such as “future impact analyses,” that seeks to identify the effects of 
present institutional actions on future capabilities. Something like this 
goes on during budgetary planning efforts, but, in the U.S. system, 
the timeframes are invariably merely short-term, tied to legislative 
or corporate profit reporting cycles. Scanning further into an insti- 
tution’s future-at least beyond the present generation-is also called 
for. Analytical capabilities to do this are likely to require at least a 
small cadre of highly skilled professionals, systems for rewarding their 
efforts, and organizational and agency venues where their reflections 
will have a respected voice. 
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* And, perhaps most important, publicly obvious, effective capacity 
would be in place to detect the early onset of likely failures related to 
the activities that could threaten the future. This analytical capacity 
should then be joined with institutional capabilities to initiate rem- 
edies, along with the assurance of remediation resources in the event 
failures should occur.38 Without quite visible, publicly evident, and 
well-exercised capacity for early warning and preemptive remediation, 
the public is likely to remain skeptical, potentially suspicious, and ripe 
for mobilization into recalcitrant opp~s i t i on .~~  
This suite of conditions intended to assure institutional constancy is very 
demanding and costly. Whether leaders would consider developing them is 
likely to be contingent upon external demand. Pressure to try is increased 
when programs exhibit three characteristics. There will be particularly 
aggressive insistence on faithfulness when agency programs a) are perceived 
to be large-scale efforts whose activities may occur across broad spatial and 
temporal spans and seem to pose potentially irreversible effects; b) are seen as 
intensely hazardous, even if the likelihood of failure is small and accompanied 
by substantial gains for the program’s prime beneficiaries; and c) pose signifi- 
cant risks whose costs are likely to be borne by future generations who receive 
little benefit. 
This third characteristic-temporal asymmetry of benefits and costs- 
raises a particularly difficult dilemma. Put in question form: should current 
populations endure costs today so that future populations will not have 
In NASA’s case, this would include investing to avoid future risks against the 
accrual of present benefits, say, in symbolic returns, or perhaps knowledge 
that is potentially useful in providing novel artifacts. These long-term benefits 
38. See, for example, T. R. La Porte and C.  Thomas, “Regulatory Compliance and the 
Ethos of Quality Enhancement: Surprises in Nuclear Power Plant Operations,” Journal of Public 
Admmistration Research and Theory 5, no. 4 (December 1994): 250-295. Cf. K. Shrader-Frechette, 
“Risk Methodology and Institution Bias,” Research in Social Problems and Public Policy 5 (1993): 207- 
223; dnd L. Clarke, “The Disqualification Heuristic: When Do Organizations Misperceive Risk?” 
Research in Social Problems and Public Policy 5 (1993): 289-312, for discussions ofthe conditions that 
result in operator misperception of risk, conditions that would require strong antidotes if constancy 
is to be assured. 
39. This seems clearly to be the case for the many years of political and legal travail experienced 
by the Department ofEnergy. See DOE, “Earning Public Trust and Confidence.” 
40. See, for example, R .  M. Green, “Inter-generational Distributive Justice and Environmental 
Responsibility,” in Responsib es to Future Generations: Environmental Ethics, ed. E. D. Partridge 
(Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1980), R. Howarth, “Inter-generational Competitive Equilibria 
Under Technological Uncertainty and an Exhaustible Resource Constraint,”Journal ofEnvironmental 
Economics and Management 21 (1991): 225-243; B. Norton, “Environmental Ethics and the Rights 
of Future Generations,” Environmental Ethics (winter 1982): 319-338; P. Wenz, “Ethics, Energy 
Policy, and Future Generations,” Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 195-209. 
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would have to be balanced against present costs and, as importantly, future 
industrial environmental damage from large-scale facilities, or having to 
abandon teams of astronauts due to the inability to retrieve them, and, more 
remotely, infecting terrestrial populations with extraterrestrial organisms. 
Uncertainty about the knowledge and technological capacity of future 
generations exacerbates the problem. An optimistic view assumes that dif- 
ficult problems of today will be more easily solved by future generations? 
No problem today is too big for the future. Skepticism about this, however, 
makes it an equivocal basis for proceeding with multigenerational programs. 
An inherent part of assuring constancy would be an agreed-upon basis, an 
“ethic,” of how costs and benefits should be distributed across generations. 
This is especially true when operational effects extend well into the future, for 
it demands that generation after generation respond to new information and 
changing value structures in coping with long-term effects. 
This array of constancy-enhancing characteristics raises serious, unre- 
solved operational, political, and ethical questions. If an organization’s pro- 
gram provokes demands for nearly error-free operations, then assurances of 
institutional constancy in meeting the conditions for reliability are likely to 
be demanded as a substitute for accountability!’ Apprehensive publics seek 
assurances that these institutions, such as NASA, will be uncompromising in 
their pursuit of highest quality operations through the relevant lifetimes of the 
systems in question. 
When harmful effects may be visited upon future generations, assur- 
ances of continuity or institutional constancy take on increasing imp~r t ance .~~  
Why would this be the case? Those who implement such programs could 
quite probably escape accountability for failures. They would have retired, 
41. For comment on how responsibility should be divided between generations that accounts for 
changes in knowledge, see W. Halfele, “Energy from Nuclear Power,” Scientrfic American 263, no. 3 
(September 1990): 136-144; C. Perrings, “Reserved Rationality and the Precautionary Principle: 
Technological Change, Time and Uncertainty in Environmental Decision Making,” in Ecological 
Economics: The Science and Management of Sustainabihty, ed. R. Costanza (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991). 
42. For those HROs whose technical operations and consequences of failure can be seen as hav- 
ing constancy-evoking characteristics, ignoring “constancy magnets” is an institutionally risky 
business. This is especially the case for the combination of uneven distribution of benefits and 
costs among generations and the potential for a long lag in discovering information about possibly 
grievous damages. Setting these matters aside allows festering seeds of suspicion to multiply, and, 
if coupled with conditions that also evoke “reliability and regulatory magnets,” they are likely 
grounds for political opposition and demands for increasing rigorous regulation as a condition for 
even initial approval for new projects. But if organizational remedies are called for, how much 
additional effort and evolution of institutional capabilities could be entailed? 
43. While the mind’s eye turns quickly to public organizations, the argument applies equally to 
the private sector in the United States, especially those firms responding to the strong economic 
incentives for short-term gain and deferral of costs. 
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died, or moved on. Leaders of such institutions, therefore, are quite likely 
to be pressed to assure the public (especially able opinion leaders) that, as a 
condition of winning approval and resources to initiate or continue programs, 
agencies and corporate contractors involved should credibly be expected to 
keep agreements and commitments with potentially affected communities far 
into the future. 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
The reach of NASA’s space programs continues to levy remarkable oper- 
ational demands, for the programs imply very long-term management of both 
the unmanned and manned aspects of space exploration and possibly commer- 
cial and security exploitation. This rather cryptic application to NASA’s space 
exploration programs of work done in other technical domains hints at the 
challenges involved when we insist on extraordinary levels of reliability that 
should go on for a number of management generations. It suggests an array of 
conditions that would become increasingly salient as NASA seeks to regular- 
ize and sustain its space traffic regime. 
These are very demanding conditions for organizational leaders to con- 
sider, much less actively insist upon, encourage, and nurture, even if we knew 
how to establish organizational patterns I have ~umrnarized.~~ It is notable that 
my discussion is based on work dealing with operations that, unlike NASA 
spucejights, were quite mature, pretty routine, and had managed to continue 
for some time. Although the HRO field work involved nearly 10 years of 
observing and intensive subjective onsite experience with each of three large 
technical systems in the study, it was not so intensive as discovering the pro- 
cess through which these organizations had gone to result in the variegated 
patterns that were described. We do not know exactly how they got there. 
If the constructs I have outlined here are taken seriously, it is likely to 
pose unwelcome challenges to agency and program leaders. Our workshop 
discussions called out a range of critical institutional (as well as historiographi- 
cal) issues and point toward matters of serious design examination. But the 
analytical bases for designing and assuring institutional forms at substantial 
44. They are also conditions that are not likely to flourish without a high degree of public 
trust and confidence in operating and overseeing institutions-something that is in increasingly 
short supply in contemporary American culture. NASA has skated across the increasingly thin 
ice of waning public confidence in programs involving humans in space. The several high-profile 
congressional investigations and the Agency’s agony over the past decade have eroded a general 
sense of public confidence in future operations. This in itself should be seen as a major critical 
institutional issue. For an earlier consideration of this, see T. La Porte, “Institutional Challenges 
for Continued Space Exploration: High-reliability systems across many operational generations. 
Are these aspirations publicly credible?” (presented at the Workshop on Space Policy, National 
Academies of Science, Irvine, CA, 12-13 November 2003). 
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scale are limited at be~t .4~  For example, there is scant work on effecting insti- 
tutional constancy per se, and only limited study of the evolution of highly 
reliable organizations. A remedy to these important gaps in understanding 
requires both analytical and experimental efforts to calibrate the dynamics of 
highly reliable operations, and especially probing the requisites for long-term 
institutional constancy and trustworthiness. 
At least three additional aspects of this challenge are apparent; each 
prompts a demanding set of research imperatives (see table 13.3). 
First, we need to improve our knowledge about the wider institutional 
currents within U.S. patterns of public and corporate governance that pro- 
voke repeated, stubborn resistance to the organizational changes needed to 
sustain very reliable operations, and reassure citizens that the responsible insti- 
tutions will be able to keep their word through the relevant program time- 
frames-and do so in ways that enhance their trustworthiness. Even if there 
is a reasonably benign political and social environment, these are qualities that 
are very difficult to establish and maintain. In answering “Why can’t we do 
Table 13.3. Research Directions: When Highly Reliable Operations, 
Long-Term Institutional Constancy, and Trustworthiness Are Indicated 
Q: Why can’t we do it? 
A: Institutional impediments to conditions sustaining very reliable operations, 
institutional constancy, and trustworthiness. 
Q: Why do we have to? 
A: Technical imperatives requiring very reliable operations over multiple political 
generations. (Seek technical design alternatives having equivalent physical and 
organic effects without HRO or institutional constancy imperatives.) 
Q: Why do we need to? 
A: Alternatively, there are institutional activities that reduce the public’s 
1. risk-averse demand for very reliable operations of intrinsically hazardous 
2. worry about the longer term consequences of operational errors, and 
3. sense of vulnerability that fosters a demand for trustworthy public 
systems, 
institutions. 
45. Some of these are highlighted in the chapters by Diane Vaughan and Philip Scranton. 
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it?” historical insight surely can be brought to bear. NASA is a particularly 
visible case, certainly not the only instance in which a public agency seems 
unable to alter its internal dynamics so that it avoids repeating what outsid- 
ers perceive (invariably after a serious mishap) to be dysfunctional organiza- 
tional patterns. Observers of the Department of Energy’s Radioactive Waste 
Programs are also likely to regard these efforts as deeply flawed. In these 
and other cases, such evaluations arise during nearly each generation of new 
management. For NASA, it is observed that dysfunctions have afflicted each 
of the last seven Administrators with repeated problems in the evolution of 
NASA’s institutional culture. The conference papers contributed by Scranton 
and Vaughan give witness to many of these debilitating dynamics. Some of 
this is internally self-inflicted, to be sure. But for my part, I suspect more 
important sources lurk in NASA’s relations with Congress and the Agency’s 
extensive contractual community. In the early pages of the Columbia report, 
these sources of dysfunction were noted. They then escaped detailed exami- 
nation thereafter. In the future, these should be the objects of as much analysis 
as NASA’s internal dynamics. The historical community seems particularly 
positioned to furnish keen insight into what-in repeated instances-seems 
likely to be the result of a much deeper structural relationship than merely a 
series of very able people somehow succumbing to individual weakness and 
local bureaucratic perversity. 
Second, we need to deepen our understanding of the technical sources 
that drive systems operators toward “having to” attain very high reliabil- 
ity. Technologies vary in the degree they require closely harmonized opera- 
tor behavior. They also vary in their intrinsic hazardousness. Both of these 
characteristics can be shaped by the engineering design teams who provide 
the technical heart of operating systems. What is it about technical com- 
munities that prompts their members to propose technologies that require 
extraordinary behavior as a condition of delivering the hoped-for benefits? Is 
this intrinsic to some technical domains and not others? This suggests studies 
that calibrate the degree to which present technical and operational directions 
in the development of, at least, environmentally sensitive operations, materials 
management, and transportation and biological technologies a) require highly 
reliable operating organizations, b) imply long-term operating trajectories and 
potentially negative effects, and hence c) produce a requirement for high lev- 
els of public trust and confidence. In-depth sociological and historical studies 
could, one imagines, shed light on these matters. 
A better understanding of these relationships can be crucial in demo- 
cratic societies. It can be argued that the more the requirements for HRO, 
institutional constancy, and public trust and confidence are present, the more 
demanding the institutional challenges will be in sustaining public legitimacy. 
A closely related emphasis follows: what changed within technical design com- 
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munities would be necessary for them aggressively to seek technical design 
alternatives that provide equivalent physical and organic effects varying the 
degree to which they produce demands for high-reliability operations over 
many work generations. 
But wait, wait! Is there an alternative to the two research and develop- 
ment vectors just noted? They are very demanding R&D domains. Actually 
realizing the organizational imperatives that lurk within such designs is even 
more difficult to assure within private or public enterprises in the U.S. and 
abroad. Indeed, even entertaining the desirability of such changes is disputed 
by institutional leaders and provokes strong managerial reluctance to consider 
them seriously. So why are we trying? “Why do we need to?” 
The need to try (or act as if we were trying) stems, importantly, from the 
public’s expressed worry about their own exposure to what they perceive to be 
“risky systems.” They worry and appear to have a very low tolerance for risk- 
taking. It could be argued, we need to try because “they” demand it. However, 
an alternative program of research and activities could be launched. 
What activities could be carried out which would reduce the public’s risk- 
averse demand for very reliable operations of intrinsically hazardous systems, 
reduce the public’s worry about the longer term consequences of operational 
errors, and lessen the public’s sense of vulnerability that nourishes a deep long- 
ing for trustworthy public institutions? As far as I know, there is very little 
systematic work exploring the grounds upon which alert publics would come 
to understand the rationality of accepting the likelihood of increased exposure 
to malfunctions of hazardous technical systems in the interest of smoothing 
production flows or stabilizing revenue streams for major investors. Nor do I 
know of any efforts to understand the basis for convincing the public explic- 
itly that it would be acceptable to engage in developments that promise attrac- 
tive short-term benefits which would export severe costs across several future 
generations to their grandchildren’s children. Worries about the potential for 
immediate exposure to personal injury or environmentally derived insult, and 
a more diffuse concern that important dangers may await our children some 
years from now, continue to spawn irritating (probably irrational) objections 
to developing and deploying exciting new technical possibilities. Well, per- 
haps they could produce untoward surprises, but they are (probably) manage- 
able. We can count on clever technical solutions. 
“Why can’t they trust us?” Indeed, this deserves analytical attention as well. 
Why do alert publics feel so vulnerable that they increasingly wish for trust- 
worthy institutions? What developments could be devised that publics would 
relax their demand for trustworthiness and accept technical leaders and provide 
support for the technical future we designers see? In effect, “Why,” as Henry 
Higgins and one technical designer put it, “why can’t they be more like us?” 
SECTION VI 
SPACE HISTORY: 
STATE O F  THE ART 

INTRODUCTION 
hat is the current state of space history as the 21st century commences W and the Space Age reaches its 50th anniversary? Is it a vibrant marketplace 
of ideas and stimulating perspectives? Is it a moribund backwater of historical 
inquiry with little of interest to anyone and nothing to offer the wider historical 
discipline? As the four essays in this section demonstrate, space history is at neither 
extreme of this dichotomy. It has been energized in the last quarter century by 
a constant stream of new practitioners and a plethora of new ideas and points of 
view. A fundamental professionalization of the discipline has brought to fruition 
a dazzling array of sophisticated studies on all manner of topics in the history of 
spaceflight.Yet, as the collective authors of the section argue, there is much more 
to be done, and each offers suggestions for how historians might approach the 
field in new and different ways, each enriching what already exists. 
This section opens with an essay by Asif A. Siddiqi assessing the state of 
U.S. space history. He asserts that scholars have concentrated their work in 
one of four subfields that collectively may be viewed as making up the whole. 
As Siddiqi writes, “Some saw the space program as indicative of Americans’ 
‘natural’ urge to explore the frontier; some believed that the space program 
was a surrogate for a larger struggle between good and evil; others wrote of a 
space program whose main force was modern American technology; and oth- 
ers described a space program whose central actors were hero astronauts, rep- 
resenting all that was noble in American culture.” He notes that space history 
started as a nonprofessional activity undertaken by practitioners and enthu- 
siasts, always viewing the field from the top down and producing an excep- 
tionally “Whiggish” perspective on the past. In the 1980s, the field began to 
broaden, deepen, and expand through the entry of a number of professionally 
trained historians who brought new skills and new interests to the subject. A 
number of pathbreaking works have emerged, especially in the realm of the 
history of space policy, and the current state of the subdiscipline is vibrant. 
Lest space historians become complacent, however, Siddiqi concludes 
that there is still much to be done. He points to several specific areas that offer 
tantalizing possibilities for future research. These include studies on political, 
social, technological, and cultural history using themes and methodologies 
borrowed from the larger historical community. Good work has already been 
done, and Siddiqi analyzes some of this work, but many opportunities for 
additional study are present. Siddiqi expends considerable effort documenting 
a future research agenda and goes far toward identifying potentially fruitful 
avenues of research for new scholars seeking entrance into the field. 
Siddiqi also comments on the interesting and unusual circumstance of 
government sponsorship of space history and the possibility that this might 
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taint the published product in some way. Many of the historians working in the 
field have been sponsored in some measure by NASA, the United States Air 
Force, or the Smithsonian Institution, either as employees of these entities or 
as contractors or fellows. What does this connection mean for the work done, 
Siddiqi asks? Clearly it plays a role, but what role? This issue itself might be a 
useful avenue of study, relating as it does to the concerns raised in the work of 
Peter Novick and others about the pursuit of objectivity in historical studies.’ 
For many years, a stigma has existed among some academic historians 
against sponsored history; such a view is usually misplaced and not a little 
naive. Those who criticize such work invariably invoke the characterization 
“court historian” to damn the effort. There are, of course, some instances 
of influence that all can point to. But the reality is that historical truth is 
elusive in any setting. Historians usually have a clientele, whether writing 
for other academic specialists in whatever field is under investigation; or for 
groups bound together by religion, ethnicity, labor, etc.; or for any number 
of identifiable groups that have an interest in the subject.2 Consciously or 
unconsciously, historians-even if they have not been formally hired to pre- 
pare histories for the group-shape their discourses to provide understanding 
about the past in relationship to ideas already present among those with an 
interest in the subject. If one strays too far afield from the major streams of 
understanding about the subject, the historian may be unable to find an outlet 
for publication, may be censured in reviews, may have his or her livelihood 
destroyed by not receiving tenure, or may lose whatever reputation he or she 
had. All of that takes place, even without serving some formal client that may 
have a vested interest in ensuring that a historian tells a story in a certain way.3 
Still, a study of the influence of government sponsorship on the field of space 
history would prove a fascinating subject of study. 
In chapter 15, Stephen B. Johnson presents a lengthy discussion of the 
historical study of military space history from the 1950s to the present. In 
this exhaustive review, Johnson divides his analysis into major sections, con- 
forming to the various missions that the Department of Defense undertakes 
relative to space operations. After a review of overview sources of military 
history, the author undertakes an analysis of the development and fielding of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and space launchers, which defined 
the strategic defense capabilities of the United States during the Cold War. 
1. Peter Nonck, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession 
2. See Roger D. Launius, “NASA History and the Challenge of Keeping the Contemporary 
3. See Roger D. Launius, “Mormon Memory, Mormon Myth, and Mormon History,”Journal o j  
(NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
Past,” Public Historian 21 (summer 1999): 63-81. 
Mormon History 21 (spring 1995): 1-24. 
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From there, Johnson moves on to discussions of early-warning and space sur- 
veillance; command and control; communications; ballistic-missile defense; 
robotic intelligence and reconnaissance; military human spaceflight; weather 
and science; navigation; antisatellite and space warfare; organization, man- 
agement, and acquisition of space systems; and space power theory. Johnson 
concludes with a gap analysis of “holes in the literature” and offers suggestions 
for future historical study. 
Margaret A. Weitekamp follows with a discussion of how historians 
working in space history might consider the topic with new “tools” drawn 
from social and cultural studies. Indeed, one of the most exciting areas of 
historical inquiry in the last 20 years has been the postmodern analysis of 
history. Weitekamp acknowledges that richness, which ensures within space 
history, as it has elsewhere, “the proliferation of subject areas created when 
historians wrestling with questions of race, class, ethnicity, and gender chal- 
lenged the artificial nature of the consensus school’s master narrative.” She 
then surveys the field, noting important developments in the application of 
themes in social and cultural studies to the subject of space history, but more 
importantly, Weitekamp then explores the relationship between space history 
and this larger discourse. She finds that “space history exists both in ‘relation 
to’ other history subdisciplines (a terminology which implies separation from 
the other subfields and an internal cohesion within space history, two points 
that deserve questioning in their own right), and in a continually evolving 
‘relationship with’ the rest of the discipline.” 
Weitekamp also finds that the application of “critical theory” to the his- 
tory of spaceflight may offer uniquely useful perspectives on the subdisci- 
pline. She defines “critical theory” as “an umbrella term that encompasses the 
diverse and often divergent theoretical schools of structuralist, poststructural- 
ist, feminist, Marxist, postmodern, and psychoanalytic theory that emerged 
since the 1970s in literary and anthropological analysis.” Already intriguing 
possibilities for this area have been opened through the work of Jodi Dean, 
Constance Penley, M. G. Lord, De Witt Douglas Kilgore, and  other^.^ Greater 
use of these methods of historical inquiry has the potential to transform the 
field of study. 
This section closes with an intriguing and stimulating essay by David H. 
DeVorkin on the importance of the artifact in the study of the history of tech- 
nology. Most historians, he asserts, do not pay much attention to the objects 
4. Jodi Dean, Aliens in America: Conspiracy Cultures j o m  Outerspace to Cyberspace (Ithaca, N Y  
Cornell University Press, 1998); M. G. Lord, Astro Turf: The Private L$e of Rocket Science (New 
York: Walker & Co., 2005); De Witt Douglas Kilgore, Astrofuturicm: Science, Race, and Visions of 
Utopia in Space (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003); Constance Penley, NASA/ 
T R E K :  Popular Science and Sex in America (New York: Verso, 1997). 
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that they write about. They use quite traditional sources-manuscript materi- 
als and other written work-but fail to observe carefully the actual spacecraft, 
rocket, or other physical object that performed the work under study. He asks 
the important question, “Are artifacts historical evidence? ” Of course they 
are, he notes, but few historians exploit them effectively in their own work. 
Perhaps that is because they fail to grasp their significance, but more impor- 
tantly, it is probably because they do not understand how they work and why 
they were constructed in the way they were. DeVorkin argues for a greater 
appreciation of the artifact in the enterprise of historical study and the central- 
ity of it in the narratives fashioned by historians of spaceflight. 
Collectively, these four essays point up the richness of the study of the 
history of the American effort to fly in space since the 1950s. As such, they 
represent a report from the field of its status and possibilities for the future. 
Most important, each essay points the direction for future efforts. 
CHAPTER 14 
AMERICAN SPACE HISTORY 
LEGACIES, QUESTIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH’ 
Asif A. Siddiqi 
n the 35 years since astronauts Neil A. Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin set I foot on the Moon, no space achievement has quite captured people’s 
imaginations as Apollo. Thirty-five years after that singular event, the 
specter of Apollo still looms large as a benchmark for all that came later. 
In the context of the current inertia of the American space program-the 
Space Shuttle temporarily grounded while astronauts take to orbit in Russian 
rockets for unimaginative tours of the International Space Station-Apollo 
retains an even stronger pull to those seeking adventure and exploration.2 
Given Apollo’s centrality in popular conceptions of the history of the space 
program, it is not surprising that historical writing-both popular and 
academic-has been shaped profoundly by the experience of the Moon 
landings. Even those areas of space history that have no apparent connection 
to Apollo, such as military space history, for example, assume their historical 
places in our memory in relation to Apollo. Because of the project’s status as 
being emblematic of a lost, young, and adventurous America, space historians 
negotiating the delicate boundaries between memory and nostalgia have 
typically veered from the former to the latter with an ease that underscores 
more about the state of the current space program than the one that actually 
happened. In addition, Apollo’s huge shadow has helped to marginalize many 
important but unexplored areas of space history. 
In the past 40 years ofspace history, historians have worked within several 
interpretive approaches to space history, all of them defined and demarcated 
by the shadow of Apollo and its political backdrop, the Cold War. This essay 
is an attempt to revisit that historiography in search of some common unify- 
1. I would like to thank Dwayne A. Day, Steven J. Dick, Roger D. Launius, and Michael J. 
2. For the current crisis, see Roger D. Launius, “After Columbia: The Space Shuttle Program and 
Neufeld for their helpful comments. 
the Crisis in Access to Space,” Artropolitics 2 (July-September 2004): 277-322. 
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ing  theme^.^ The goal is to identify certain interpretive and narrative patterns 
and then elaborate on areas where scholarship is lacking or where important 
questions remain unexplored? A close reading of the literature shows that his- 
torians have located their work within four different narratives based around 
exploration, competition, technology, and the astronauts. These interpretive 
paradigms continue to dominate and define our understanding of the origins, 
evolution, and nature of the American space program. The categories were 
not mutually exclusive, and the approaches have overlapped over time, but 
these four guiding themes have remained as important explanatory devices. 
Some saw the space program as indicative of Americans’ “natural” urge to 
explore the frontier; some believed that the space program was a surrogate 
for a larger struggle between good and evil; others wrote of a space program 
whose main force was modern American technology; and others described a 
space program whose central actors were hero astronauts, representing all that 
was noble in American culture.’ 
In all of the four schools, which continue to flourish today, historians 
have typically examined the history from the top looking down, describing 
only the tallest trees of a vast forest of society and culture. The first generation 
of scholarship was distinguished by a focus on linear, narrow, and progress- 
oriented narratives unencumbered by context, critique, or culture. Historians 
also shared a nostalgic yearning for the 1960s, the halcyon period of American 
space exploration. Like the space program itself, historians repeatedly romanti- 
cized the claimed victories of Apollo without questioning many of the incon- 
trovertible motivations and repercussions of the space program. 
Starting in the 1980s but really coming to fruition in the 1990s, a “new 
aerospace history” began to emerge. Building on a few notable works pub- 
lished during the late Cold War, a new generation of historians tackled the 
history of American space exploration from different perspectives involving 
politics, society, and culture. These new works distinguished themselves from 
the older canon because they revisited, cajoled, and questioned some of the 
basic foundational notions of the received space history. Some did so explic- 
3. For earlier works on the historiography ofAmerican space exploration, see Richard P. Hallion, “A 
Source Guide to the History of Aeronautics and Astronautics,” American Studies International 20, no. 3 
(1982): 3-50; Hunter A. Dupree, “The History ofthe Exploration ofspace: From Official History to 
Contributions to Historical Literature,” Public Historian 8 (1986): 121-128; Pamela E. Mack, “Space 
History,” Technology and Culture 30 (1989): 657-665; Roger D. Launius, “The Historical Dimension 
of Space Exploration: Reflections and Possibilities,” Space Policy 16 (2000): 23-38. 
4. In the paper, I do not distinguish between the often false dichotomy of academic versus popu- 
lar works. Important contributions to space history have come from both ends ofthe spectrum, and 
both have had their strengths and weaknesses. I also do not explore the study ofinternational coop- 
eration in space history, a vast topic covered by others in this volume. Finally, due to limitations of 
length, I omit discussion of those histories dedicated to the events of the pre-Sputnik era. 
5. I list and describe representative examples from each group in the main body of the essay. 
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itly, others more implicitly. The new history also moved beyond the lenses of 
competition, exploration, technology, or astronauts. In some cases, the litera- 
ture built upon the older models, while in others, it made a clean break from 
the older canon. 
Historians also moved into new areas of political, technological, social, 
and cultural history benefiting from a shared interest in new sources and new 
methodological approaches. Simultaneously, the old Cold War paradigm of 
historiography continues to flourish, propagated especially in several synthe- 
ses, creating an interpretive tension between the old and new writing that may 
promote a middle ground in the future. Whether this mix will generate new, 
interesting, and challenging ideas remains to be seen, but it has been healthy 
for the field to expand beyond the previously narrow borders, if for nothing 
else to link and relocate space history, not as something peculiar and unique, 
but as part of a broader inquiry into American history. 
EXPLORATION 
The most common motif in space historiography has been that of locating 
space exploration as part of an eons-long human urge to push the geographi- 
cal frontiers of existence. Prescriptive works on space exploration published 
in the pre-Sputnik era-some of which assumed iconic status in later years- 
firmly established such an approach to history. A harbinger of this paradigm 
was Willy Ley, a veteran of early amateur German rocketry groups from the 
1930s. Updating a book he had first authored in 1944 through 21 printings, 
Ley’s Rockets, Missiles, and Man in Space (1968) was a landmark publication that 
former NASA Chief Historian Roger D. Launius has called “one of the most 
significant textbooks available in the mid-twentieth century on the possibili- 
ties of space travel.”6 A popular historical narrative tracing the evolution of 
rocket technology from the ancient Babylonians to the mid-l960s, Ley’s work 
weaved together human imperatives and technical evolution in a seamless 
whole. From the beginning, he described his book as “the story of the idea that 
we possibly could, and if so should, break away from our planet and go explor- 
ing to others, just as thousands of years ago men broke away from their islands 
and went exploring to other coasts.’” By focusing on a few scattered, talented 
individuals with a vision of space travel, Ley delineated the history of space 
6. Roger D. Launius, Frontiers of Space Exploration (Westport, C T  Greenwood Press, 1998), 
p. 190; Willy Ley, Rockets, Missiles, and Men in Space (New York: Viking Press, 1968). Ley also 
published an abridged and slightly updated version of his book the following year as Events in Space 
(New York: D. McKay, 1969). 
7. Willy Ley, Rockets: The Future of Travel Beyond the Stratosphere (New York: The Viking Press, 
1945), p. 3. In popular history, others have connected space history to the exploration paradigm. 
See, for example, Daniel J. Boorstin, The Discoverers (New York: Random House, 1983). 
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exploration as essentially one with an individualistic character. In Ley’s world, 
technology, i.e., the means to fulfill these singular visions, was subordinated 
to the needs and whims of resourceful scientists or engineers whom he called 
“Prophets of Some Honor.” Thus, the principal actors behind space explora- 
tion were neither nations nor states, but noble visionaries. Ley also established 
a pantheon of icons for the future history of space; by giving currency to such 
names as Konstantin Tsiolkovskiy, Hermann Oberth, and Robert Goddard, 
he gave a face to the technology.8 German rocketry pioneer Wernher von 
Braun’s History ofRocketry and Space Travel (1966) (cowritten with Frederick I. 
Ordway 111) built upon Ley’s work and cemented a number of unquestioned 
narratives about the origins of the “Space Age,” including the centrality of 
von Braun’s V-2 “rocket team” in the postwar American rocket and space 
program, thus marginalizing a number of other equally important indigenous 
innovators in the American context such as the Guggenheim Aeronautical 
Laboratory at Caltech (GALCIT) and the American Rocket S~c ie ty .~  So pow- 
erful was this synthesis that to this day, almost all history books on space 
exploration begin by invoking Tsiolkovskiy, Oberth, and Goddard-and then 
move to von Braun’s rocket team. 
What these pioneers had in common was a sustained belief that the 
human spirit was possessed of an indomitable urge to explore and, as a corol- 
lary, to seek knowledge. In one of his most oft-repeated quotes, the Russian 
theoretician Konstantin Tsiolkovskiy (1857-1935) had written that “the earth 
is the cradle of reason, but one cannot live in a cradle forever.”” For the his- 
torian of the American space program, reason was combined with a modern 
version of manifest destiny, a marriage of the near-spiritual urge to explore 
new frontiers and the cold, hard rationale of technology. One of the earliest 
scholarly works to equate the idea of the American West with the space fron- 
8. For biographies, see Helen B. Walters, Hermann Oberth. Father of Space Travel (New York: 
Macmillan, 1962); Hans Barth, Hermann Oberth: Vater der Raumfhrt: autorrsierte Biographie 
(Esslingen: Bechtle, 1991); David A. Clary, Rocket Man: Robert H .  Coddard and the Birth of the 
Space Age (New York: Hyperion, 2003); Milton Lehman, This High Man: The Ltfe of Robert H .  
Goddard (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1963); A. Kosmodemiansky, Konstantin Tiolkovsky, 1857-1935 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1985). 
9. Wernher von Braun and Frederick I .  Ordway 111, History ofRocketry and Space Travel (New 
York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Company, 1966). The book was published in revised editions in 1969, 
1975, and 1985. The final edition was published as Space Travel: A History (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1985). 
10. K. Tsiolkovskii, “lssledovanie mirovykh prostranstv reaktivnymi priborami (1911-1912 
gg.),” in Izbrannye trudy, ed. B. N. Vorob’ev and V. N. Sokol’skll (Moscow: Nauka, 1962), p. 
196. The original phrase was ‘ ‘ n A a H e T a  e C T b  KOAbI6eAb  p a 3 y M a ,  HO Hen6311  BeYHO X X T b  
B KOAbI6eAH,” or “Planeta est’ kolybel’ razuma, no nel’zia vechno zhit’ v kolybeli.” For typical refer- 
ences to the quote, see A. A. Kosmodemyansky, K.  E. Tsrolkovsky-His Ltfe and Work (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1960), p. 153; William Shelton, Soviet Space Exploration: The First Decade (New York: 
Washington Square Press, 1968), pp. 12-13; Roger D. Launius, Space Stations: Base Camps to the 
Stars (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2003), p. 9. 
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tier was The Railroad and the Space Program: A n  Exploration in Historical Analogy 
(1965), a collection of essays which used the American railroad as a metaphor 
for the slow human migration into space.” These early works foreshadowed 
and exemplified an important thread in the future of space history, equating 
the American frontier in the West with the space frontier beyond the Earth. 
Through the past 50 years, those looking ahead, such as policy-makers 
and spaceflight advocates from John F. Kennedy to Wernher von Braun to 
Mars Society President Robert Zubrin, have used Frederick Jackson Turner’s 
frontier motif to inspire, justify, and advocate space exploration on a grand 
scale.” Those looking back, especially space historians, have also invoked the 
frontier thesis to explain the majesty of the early years of American space 
exploration; they have explained not only how engagement with the frontier 
has shaped American society and culture, but also how the foundations of 
American society and culture-particularly democracy and individualism- 
have shaped space exploration. The frontier ideal resonated partly because, 
like space explorers, many of the original explorers of the West shared uto- 
pian ideals.13 The space program represented a potent union of two powerful 
strands of American culture, the search for utopia and the belief in the power 
of technology, a manifestation of 20th-century technological   to pi an ism.'^ 
In the 1960s, at a time when the emerging reevaluation of the frontier thesis 
and its attendant costs to both the environment and the native peoples of the 
continent had yet to enter the mainstream discourse in American history, the 
use of the West as a guiding analogy for space exploration implied expansion, 
development, freedom, and ultimately liberation from the chains of previous 
existence. If there were pitfalls in exploration, they were minimal at best.15 
These markers of frontier exploration resonated deeply with many histori- 
11. Bruce Mazlish, ed , The Railroad and the Space Program: A n  Exploration in Historical Analogy 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1965). 
12. For Frederick Jackson Turner’s original works on the frontier thesis, see John Mack Faragher, 
ed., Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: The  Signtjicance o f  the Frontier in American History and Other 
Essays (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); George Rogers Taylor, The Turner Thesis: 
Concerning the Role of the Frontier in American History, 3rd ed. (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1972). For 
the frontier’s resonance in modern times, see Richard Slotkin, Gnafighter Nation: The Myth ofthe 
Frontier in Twentieth Centnry America (New York: Atheneum, 1992). Roger D. Launius gives some 
notable examples ofprominent advocates invoking the frontier thesis in the 1960s in his “Historical 
Dimension of Space Exploration.” 
13. Roger D. Launius, “Perfect Worlds, Perfect Societies: The Persistent Goal of Utopia in 
Human Spaceflight,”Journal ofthe British Interplanetary Socrety 56 (2003): 338-349. 
14. For an excellent look at the origins of technological utopianism in American culture, see 
Howard P. Segal, Technological Utopianism in American Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1985). 
15. For critiques of the frontier thesis, see Patricia Nelson Limerick, Clyde A. Milner 11, and 
Charles E. Rankin, eds., Trails: Toward a New Western History (Lawrence: University Press ofKansas, 
1991); Richard White, It’s Your Misfrtune and None ofMy Own: A New History ofthe American West 
(Norman. Oklahoma University Press, 1991). 
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ans, enough that many still invoke them in the 21st century. Describing the 
parallel paths of the Russian and American space programs, author Robert 
Zimmerman, in Leaving Earth: Space Stations, Rival Superpowers, and the Quest 
for Interplanetary Travel (2003), compared them to colonization of Earthly 
landscapes: “The ancestors of both peoples were pioneers . . . . The land both 
groups settled was harsh, brutal, and unyielding. Death was omnipresent. Out 
of these two pioneer struggles have risen nations able to forge in the sky the 
first rockets, the first spacecraft, and the first tentative and grand attempts to 
colonize the stars.”16 Similar notions run through Bruce C. Murray’s Journey 
into Space: The First Three Decades of Space Exploration (1989) and William 
E. Burrows’s Exploring Space: Voyages in the Solar System and Beyond (1990), 
both of which explicitly deal with deep space exploration by robotic probes.” 
That Earthly exploration remains a powerful motif for making sense of space 
exploration is exemplified best by Where Next, Columbus? The Future of Space 
Exploration (1994), a collection of meditations by prominent historians that 
link Columbus’s seabound trip to the early years of space exploration.’* 
Once the landing of Apollo astronauts on the Moon in July 1969 effec- 
tively ended the “space race” for the United States, historians took up the 
challenge of chronicling this extraordinary technological achievement in a 
multitude of works, many of which framed the project as part of the human 
exploration imperative. Unlike many other programs of the 1960s, or indeed 
since, the Apollo program represented a perfect distillation of interpre- 
tive approaches that focused on exploration since the Apollo missions had 
geographical delimiters that paralleled exploration of the West: beginning 
from the known, the Earth, voyagers set out in a very physical way for the 
unknown, the Moon. In contrast, the hundreds of Earth-orbital missions since 
1972, while risky and adventurous, have not represented physical movement 
in the same way Apollo did.” NASA managers early on recognized Apollo’s 
exceptionalist nature within the space program. In the introduction to one of 
the first volumes to reflect on Apollo, then-NASA Administrator James C. 
Fletcher explicitly located the Apollo expeditions as part of a tradition stretch- 
16. Robert Zimmerman, Leaving Earth: Space Stations, Rival Superpowers, and the Quest for 
Interplanetary Travel (Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press, 2003), p. 460. 
17. Bruce C. Murray, Journey into Space: The First Three Decades of Space Exploration (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1989); William E. Burrows, Exploring Space: Voyages in the Solar System and Beyond 
(New York: Random House, 1990). 
18. Valerie Neal, ed., Where Next,  Columbus? The Future oJSpace Exploration (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994). See also Peter Bond, Reaching for the Stars: A n  Illustrated History oJManned 
Spacefight, 2nd ed. (London: Cassell, 1996). 
19. Deam argues that “this shift has essentially emptied the [space] program of its public charac- 
ter, moving spaceflight from an open embrace of political action to closed concerns with economics 
and technological determinism” (Dirk Deam, “Public Space: Exploring the Political Dimensions of 
the American Space Program” [Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, 19991). 
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Since the time of the Apollo 11 Moon landing in 1969, space history has matured 
into a much more rigorous and complex area of study, one with which the theme of 
exploration has long been associated. No photograph better illustrates this connection 
than the image of Buzz Aldrin on the Moon. It has assumed iconic proportions in 
modern society. (NASA image no. ASll-40-5903) 
ing back to the Pilgrims at Plymouth and Darwin’s voyages on the HMS 
Beugle; both were “ventures into uncharted Similarly, Harry Hurt 
111, in his For All Munkind (1988), compared the Apollo missions to Earthly 
explorations, specifically invoking “Christopher Columbus’s daring voyage to 
the New World.”21 
20. James C. Fletcher, “Foreword,” in Apollo Expeditions to the Moon, ed. Edgar M. Cortright 
21. Harry Hurt 111, For All Mankind (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press Book, 1988), p. xiii. 
(Washington, DC: NASA, 1975). 
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Beyond linking the great Earthly explorations and migrations with the 
Apollo expeditions, early works on Apollo, such as the Apollo 11 astronauts’ 
(ghostwritten) First on the Moon (1970) and Richard Lewis’s The Voyages of 
Apollo: The Exploration ofthe Moon (1974), focused predominantly on the people 
at the tip of the iceberg, i.e., the astronauts who performed the missions.22 Two 
decades later, Andrew Chaikin’s landmark A Man on the Moon (1994) continued 
in this vein, merging the exploration motif with the astronauts’ perspectives on 
the project while omitting any interpretive look at the broader political, social, 
or cultural factors behind A p ~ l l o . ~ ~  By focusing exclusively on the thoughts 
of the astronauts, the details of the missions, and the nuances of the technol- 
ogy, Chaikin masterfully conveyed the experience of Apollo as if it were one 
in which only a few dozen people were involved. Context was provided only 
to the extent that the news media reported it at the time of the Apollo mis- 
s i o n ~ . ~ ~  Thus, in one sense, in the historiography of the space program, Apollo 
became a national, even global experience that was conceived, executed, and 
directly experienced by a few chosen ambassadors. This contradiction may not 
be as irreconcilable as it appears, for Apollo was a unique artifact of its time. 
Millions of people witnessed the first landing of humans on another celestial 
body through their black-and-white TVs in the comfort of their homes. Such 
vicarious exploration had no precedent. If the import of Apollo was ultimately 
global, signaling human migration off the planet, then its immediate commu- 
nicative power was ultimately largely private, in homes and offices. 
Historically, many of those who advocated space exploration emphasized 
science as an important rationale for exploration. The literature on the his- 
tory of space-based science has, however, not been significant. Several factors 
explain the weakness of a unified tradition of writing on space science history. 
These include the fragmentary nature of the field, where much of the work is 
generated from other history-of-science subdisciplines such as the history of 
physics, astronomy, life sciences, meteorology, and oceanography. The con- 
tributions in two volumes of essays separated by 10 years, Space Science Comes 
ofAge: Perspectives in the History ofthe Space Sciences (1981) and A Spacefdring 
Nation: Perspectives on American Space History and Policy (1991), underline the 
difficult struggles of nascent space-based science constituencies (within solar 
science and planetary science) to escape the shadow of their parent communi- 
22. Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins, and Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., with Gene Farmer and Dora Jane 
Hamblin, First on the Moon (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1970); Richard S. Lewis, The 
Voyages ofApollo: The Exploration of the Moon (New York: Quadrangle, 1974). 
23. Andrew Chaikin, A Man on the Moon: The  Voyages of the Apollo Astronauts (New York: Viking, 
1994). 
24. For media treatments of the space program, see Andrew A. Klyukovski, “The Space Race as 
the American Dream: Fantasy Theme Analysis of ‘The New York Times’ Coverage” (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002). 
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ties (physics and astronomy) .25 Additionally, science has traditionally played a 
secondary (if not tertiary) role in the American space program, behind politi- 
cal and military imperatives. For space historians who have chronicled the 
American space program as political, nationalistic, or technological enter- 
prises, space science has been a corollary theme rather than a central one.26 
Two volumes of NASA’s Exploring the Unknown series chronicling the history 
of American civilian space exploration are the most important contributions 
to space science history, but the editors’ consignment of space sciences to 
volumes 5 and 6 in the series underscores the subfield’s priority in the sche- 
matic of space history Finally, historians have frequently seen space 
science as deeply connected to rationales of militarization or exploration. As 
such, space science history remains embedded with these other narratives. For 
example, in his Science with a Vengeance: How the Military Created the US Space 
Sciences after World War I1 (1992), David DeVorkin argued that space science 
was created largely due to the existence of the German V-2 missile, a weapon 
of war whose development had nothing to do with either the search for scien- 
tific knowledge or exploration.28 
25. Paul A Hank and Del Chamberlain, eds., Space Science Comes ofAge. Perspectives in the History 
.f Space Sciences (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1981). See also Karl Hufbauer, 
“Solar Observational Capabilities and the Solar Physics Community Since Sputnik, 1957-1988”; 
Joseph N. Tatarewicz, “Space Technology and Planetary Science, 1950-1985,” in A SpacPfanng 
Nation: Perspectives on American Space History and Policy, eds. Martin J. Collins and Sylvia D. Fries 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), pp. 77-114, 115-132. 
26. Two important works on science performed during Apollo are framed as part of program- 
matic “mission-oriented” histories. See William David Compton, Where No  Man Has Cone Bejore: 
A History of Apollo Lunar Exploration Mtssions (Washmgton, DC: NASA SP-4214, 1989); David 
M. Harland, Exploring the Moon: The Apollo Expeditions (London: Springer, 1999). A third, lesser- 
known but more accomplished work focuses exclusively on the science rather than the missions: 
Donald A. Beattie, Taking Science to the Moon: Lunar Experiments and the Apollo Program (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins, 2001). 
27. See particularly the excellent introductory essays in John M. Logsdon, ed., Exploring the 
Unknown: Selected Documents in the History .f the U.S. Civil Space Program, vol. 5, Exploring the 
Cosmos (Washington, DC: NASA SP-2001-4407, 2001); John M. Logsdon et al., eds., Exploring 
the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U S .  Civil Space Program, vol. 6, Space and 
Earth Science (Washington, DC: NASA SP-2004-4407, 2004). For the few other notable works 
on the history of space science, see Charles A. Lundquist, Skylab’s Astronomy and Space Sciences 
(Washington, DC: NASA, 1979); John A. Pitts, The Human Factor: Btornedicine in the Manned Space 
Program to 2980 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4213, 1985; John E. Naugle, First Among Equals: 
The Selection of NASA Space Science Experiments (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4215, 1991); David 
Leverington, New Cosmic Horizons: Space Astronomy from the V-2 to the Hubble Space Telescope (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
28. David H. DeVorkin, Science with a Vengeance: How the Military Created the US Space Sciences after 
World War I I  (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1992); David H. DeVorkin, “Military Origins of the 
Space Sciences in the American V-2 Era,” in National Military Establishments and the Advancement of 
Science and Technology, eds. Paul Forman and Josk M. SLnchez-Ron, Studies in Twentieth Century 
History (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996). See also DeVorkin’s “Solar Physics,” in 
Exploring the Unknown, vol. 6 ,  pp. 1-37. 
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COMPETITION AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
The exploration motif overlaps with a second theme running through 
the historiography of space exploration, that of competition. Richard Lewis, 
in his From Vinland to Mars: A Thousand Years ofExploration (1976), eloquently 
illustrated the ways in which competition over resources and land spurred 
exploration. He found a common imperative existing from the Greenland 
and Vinland voyages of the Viking Eric the Red all the way to the Viking 
spacecraft landings on Mars in the bicentennial year of 1976. Framing his 
narrative around this coincidence of names, Lewis focused on competition as 
a guiding metaphor for space exploration: 
The common denominator [in all exploration] is intraspe- 
cific competition . . . : deadly competition among men and 
families for land, among nations for power and wealth. This 
is the force that drove the have-nots in medieval Scandinavia 
across uncharted seas, impelled Renaissance Europe to seek 
the wealth of the Indies and circumnavigate the planet, urged 
Amundsen and Scott on the tragic race to the geographic south 
pole, and launched Americans to the Moon.29 
Like Lewis, many space historians have used competition-specifically, 
the Cold War-as a second defining lens to understand space history. Most 
popular accounts of the space race, and many from an academic perspective, 
have framed the American adventure in space as competition with an adver- 
sary who did not share the same moral commitment to freedom and equality. 
In the canon, both Sputnik and Apollo emerge, at least implicitly, as material 
representations embedded with notions of two ideologically opposed systems 
of governance. To a large degree, such evaluations of Apollo reflected rheto- 
ric from the 1960s-from American politicians, the American media, and 
from participants in the Apollo project itself. But because accounts of the 
space race have been typically undergirded by implicit claims about morality 
of national cultures, historians rarely engaged in critiques of Apollo or the 
space program in general, since such methodological approaches would be 
tantamount to challenging the moral authority of the United States. In his 
recent Apollo: The EpicJourney to the Moon, an engaging and awe-inspiring 
account of the Apolio project, David West Reynolds distills this rationale 
succinctly and emotionally: 
29. Richard S. Lewis, From Vinland to Mars: A Thousand Years of Exploration (New York: 
Quandrangle, 1976), p. xii. 
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[The Moon race] was a Cold War battle to demonstrate the 
superior ability of the superior system, capitalism versus com- 
munism . . . . And the battle did prove out the more capable 
system. . . . The reasons are many, but among them the power 
of free enterprise ranks high . . . . Free competition motivated 
American workers whose livelihoods were related to the qual- 
ity and brilliance of their work, and we saw extraordinary, 
impossible things accomplished by ordinary Americans. The 
American flag on the Moon is such a powerful symbol because 
it is not a vain one. America, like no other nation, was capable 
of the Moon.30 
Beyond linking Cold War competition to celebratory nationalistic 
impulses, others used competition to revisit seminal events in space history. 
John M. Logsdon’s T h e  Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the 
National Interest (1970), the classic study of the original imperatives that gave 
rise to Apollo, was one of the earliest.31 Kennedy’s actual decision to go to 
the Moon stemmed from a series of politically inopportune precipitates, 
including the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion and Yuri Gagarin’s historic first 
flight into space in April 1961. Keen to respond to the unending humilia- 
tions in the new space frontier, Kennedy enlisted the aid of Vice President 
Lyndon B. Johnson to formulate an ambitious but realistic response to the 
Soviets. By the end of May, after extensive consultations with their advisers, 
Kennedy and Johnson had their goal: send Americans to the Moon before 
the end of the decade, an announcement the President made to a joint ses- 
sion of Congress on 25 May 1961. By synthesizing the disparate threads of 
the events of 1961 using primary documentation, Logsdon laid the 
groundwork for understanding a seminal event in U.S. space policy and thus 
built the foundation for a new interpretive school of space history, space 
policy history.32 
Cold War competition has loomed large in the vast subgenre of space 
policy history, and a number of works have sought to explain the twists and 
turns of American space policy through its interdependence with Cold War 
30. David West Reynolds, Apollo: The Epicjourney to the Moon (New York: Tehabi, 2002), p. 257. 
31. John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970). 
32. For collections that include essays on the history of space policy, see Radford Byerly, Jr., 
ed., Space Policy Reconsidered (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989); Radford Byerly, Jr., ed., Space 
Policy Alternatives (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992); Roger D. Launius, ed., Organizing& the 
Use of Space: Historical Perspectives on a Persistent Issue (San Diego: Univelt, 1995); Eligar Sadeh, 
ed., Space Politics and Policy: A n  Evolutionary Perspective (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2003). 
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politics on an international scale.33 The results of several history conferences 
in the 1980s-hosted by NASA and the National Air and Space Museum- 
broke new ground in the field of space policy history by going beyond the 
original Cold War competition dynamic.34 A number of these papers departed 
from much of the early historiography by focusing on post-Apollo efforts 
including the space station Freedom and the Hubble Space Telescope. In explor- 
ing, for example, how NASA’s Space Station Task Force convinced a luke- 
warm White House to support the original Freedom proposal in the early 
1980s, Howard McCurdy highlighted the influence of government agencies 
over governmental policy.35 Others explored the dynamics of space policy 
through specific presidential administrations, thus analyzing the causes why 
some space projects survive and others don’t, depending on politics at the 
highest 
A number of space policy histories took an overtIy critical stance to NASA 
and its mission, focusing often on the lack of foresight exhibited by policy- 
makers and managers at NASA, the Congress, and the Executive Branch.37 
Amitai Etzioni’s The Moon Doggle: Domestic and International Implications of the 
Space Ruce (1964), although not a history book, was one such early critique 
which called the entire enterprise of Apollo into doubt since he believed that 
33. See, for example, William H. Schauer, The Politlcs of Space: A Comparison of the Soviet and 
American Space Programs (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1976); Xavier Pasco, La 
Politique Spatiale des Etats-Unis: 1958-1995: Technologre, in&& national et dtbat public (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 1997); Matthew J. Von Bencke, The Politics ofspace: A History ofU.S.-Soviet/Russian 
Competition and Cooperation in Space (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); Dale L. Hayden, The 
International Development of Space and Its Impact on U S .  National Space Policy (Maxwell AFB, AL: 
Airpower Research Institute, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, Air 
University, 2004). 
34. For the proceedings of the 1981 and 1987 conferences, see Hade  and Chamberlain, Space 
Science Comes of Age; Collins and Fries, Spacefaring Nation. The proceedings of a similar confer- 
ence hosted by Yale University in 1981 were published as Alex Roland, ed., A Spacefriug People: 
Perspectives on Early Spacefight (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4405, 1985). 
35. Howard E. McCurdy, “The Space Station Decision: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Making 
of Public Policy,” in Spacefaring Nation, ed. Collins and Fries, pp. 9-28. 
36. Linda T. Krug, Presidential Perspectives on Space Exploration: Guiding Metaphors From Eisenhower 
to Bush (New York: Praeger, 1991); Derek W. Eliott, “Finding an Appropriate Commitment: 
Space Policy Development Under Eisenhower and Kennedy, 1954-1963” (Ph.D. diss., George 
Washington University, 1992); Howard E. McCurdy, The Space Station Decision: Incremental Politics 
and Technological Choice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1990); Mark Damohn, Back Down to Earth: The 
Development of Space Policy for N A S A  During thejimmy Carter Administration (San Jose, CA: Authors 
Choice Press, 2001). 
37. Erik Bergaust, Murder on Pad 34 (New York: Putnam, 1968); Erlend A. Kennan and Edmund 
H. Harvey, Jr., Mission t o  the Moon: A Critical Reexamination of N A S A  and the Space Program (New 
York: Morrow, 1969); Hugo Young, Brian Silcock, and Peter Dunn, journey to Tranquillity: The  
History ofMan’s Assault on the Moon (London: Cape, 1969); Roger Handberg, Reinventing N A S A :  
Human Spaceflight, Bureaucracy and Politics (Westport, C T  Praeger, 2003); Greg Klerkx, Lost in 
Space: The Fall of N A S A  and the Dream of a New Space Age (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004). 
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it represented a cynical public relations exercise diverting attention away from 
more pressing domestic issues such as the War on Poverty.38 
Since the mid-l980s, a number of important works used the Cold War 
competition paradigm but focused specifically on national security programs, 
which constituted about half of all national expenditures on spaceflight yet 
received relatively little scrutiny from historians. The earliest academic work 
in this subfield was Paul B. Stares’s The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 
1945-1984 (1985), which examined the rise of the American space weapons 
program and its largely unrecorded but substantial influence over American 
military policy.39 Writing during a time of extreme tension between the 
Soviet Union and the United States, Stares argued that the arms race was 
migrating to the arena of space by the mid-1980s. Equally groundbreaking 
was journalist William E. Burrows’s Deep Black: Space Espionage and National 
Security (1986), in which he focused on the development of highly classified 
photoreconnaissance satellites which spy on other nations. Using anonymous 
sources and declassified materials, he wove a story of a secret world that in fact 
consumed a substantial share of the American space budget but whose very 
existence was never explicitly acknowledged by the U.S. g~ve rnmen t .~~  
The early work of Stares and Burrows was overshadowed by CIA- 
sponsored post-Cold War declassification initiatives. In 1995, the U.S. gov- 
ernment revealed details of one of the biggest secrets of the Cold War, the 
United States’ first operational spy satellite system, CORONA, whose satellites 
flew dozens of missions in the 1960s over secret targets in the Soviet Union, 
China, Vietnam, and elsewhere. If earlier writing on the genesis of the U.S. 
space effort emphasized civilian programs such as Vanguard and Explorer, 
the CORONA revelations helped to reframe the early years of the American 
space program as parallel and sometimes interconnected civilian and military 
38. Amitai Etzioni, The Moon Doggle: Domestic and International Implications of the Space Race 
(Garden City, N Y  Doubleday, 1964). For other contemporary works, see Edwin Diamond, The 
Rise and Fall of the Space Age (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964); Vernon van Dyke, Pride and 
Power: The Rationale ofthe Space Program (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964). 
39. Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1985). I differentiate here between military space programs and intelligence space programs, 
both of which fall under national security programs. The former include weapons development, 
while the latter include reconnaissance satellites. The earliest open work to explore the American 
military and intelligence space programs was Phillip Klass’s Secret Sentries in Space (New York: 
Random House, 1971). Anthony Kenden was another pioneering scholar in the field. See his “U.S. 
Reconnaissance Satellite Program,” Journal o j  the British Interplanetary Society (July 1978), and “A 
New U.S. Military Space Mission,” Journal of the British Interplanetary Society (October 1982). 
40. William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York: Berkley 
Books, 1986). For a Cold War-era look at space weaponization, see Curtis Peebles, Battlefor Space 
(Dorset, U.K.: Blandford, 1983). Another important contribution in the pre-CORONA-revela- 
tion era was Jeffrey T. Richelson’s America’s Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Spy  Satellite 
Program (New York: Harper & Row, 1990). 
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projects. Where civilian efforts, especially the human spaceflight program, 
had assumed center stage in the historiography, CORONA highlighted how 
much of the old history had told only half the story. The CIA’S first deputy 
director for science and technology, Albert D. “Bud” Wheelon, who man- 
aged the CORONA program in the mid-l960s, wrote in Eye in the Sky:  The 
Stovy ofthe CORONA Spy Satellites (1998): 
When the American government eventually reveals the full 
range of reconnaissance systems developed by this nation, the 
public will learn of space achievements every bit as impres- 
sive as the Apollo moon landings. One program proceeded in 
utmost secrecy, the other on national television. One stead- 
ied the resolve of the American public; the other steadied the 
resolve of American  president^.^^ 
Photoreconnaissance satellite programs such as CORONA and its suc- 
cessors, such as the KH-9 HEXAGON and KH-11 KENNAN, consumed a 
lion’s share of the U.S. “black” space program and, in fact, drove much of early 
U.S. space policy. Historical details of other important programmatic elements 
of American national security projects, such as early-warning systems, signals 
intelligence, military communications, meteorology, navigation, antisatel- 
lite, and (abandoned) human military spaceflight projects, have come to light 
owing to the research of several historians including R. Cargill Hall, Jeffrey T. 
Richelson, and Dwayne A. Day, whose works represented a major shift in the 
scholarship on military space programs, moving from speculative works based 
on rumor, leaks, and analysis of orbital parameters to using primary documen- 
tation.42 Day’s work has been particularly groundbreaking, opening up previ- 
41. Albert D. Wheelon, “CORONA: A Triumph of American Technology,” in Eye in the Sky: 
The Story ofthe CORONA Spy Satellites, ed. Dwayne A. Day et al. (Washington, DC: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1998), p. 38. 
42. For a discussion of early warning, see Jeffrey T. Richelson, America’s Space Sentinels: DSP 
Satellites and National Security (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999); R .  Cargill Hall, 
“Missile Defense Alarm: The Genesis of Space-Based Infrared Early Warning,” Quest: The History 
ofSpaceflight Quarterly 7, no. 1 (1999): 5-17. For naval strategy and military space programs, see 
Norman Friedman, Seapower and Space: From the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-Centric Wafare 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000). For manned military programs, see Roy F. Houchin 
11’s “Why the Air Force Proposed the Dyna-Soar X-20 Program” and “Why the Dyna-Soar X-20 
Program Was Cancelled,” both in Quest: The History of Spaceflight Magazine 3, no. 4 (1994): 5-12 
and 35-37, respectively; Steven R. Strom, “The Best Laid Plans: A History ofthe Manned Orbiting 
Laboratory,” Crosslink 5, no. 2 (2004): 11-15. For weather satellite programs, see Dwayne A. Day, 
“Dark Clouds: The Classified Origins of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program,” Spaceflight 
43 (2001): 382-385; R. Cargill Hall, “A History of the Military Polar Orbiting Meteorological 
Satellite Program,” Quest: The Hkfory of Spacefight Quarterly 9, no. 2 (2002): 4-25. For navigation 
satellites, see Bradford W. Parkinson et al., “A History of Satellite Navigation,” Navigation:Journal 
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ously hidden aspects of geodetic, signals intelligence, and photoreconnaissance 
satellite pr0jects.4~ His recent work on the Air Force’s interest in developing a 
dual human space capsule and reconnaissance satellite in the late 1950s adds to 
our understanding of the motivations and strategies institutions used to achieve 
specific goals in the early days of space e~plorat ion.~~ 
This substantive (and generational) shift in scholarship, made possible by 
post-Cold War declassifications, has allowed the study of American mil 
space history to focus on questions common to the study of American military 
history and intelligence collection, such as civil-military relations, interser- 
vice and interorganizational rivalry, and the relationship between techno- 
logical development and mission requirements. Day, for example, produced 
important scholarship on the uses of satellite intelligence in monitoring the 
supersecret Soviet human lunar landing project in the 1960s, thus illuminating 
the hitherto unknown ways in which the civilian NASA interacted with the 
intelligence community.45 Richelson’s groundbreaking The Wizurds of Lungley 
(2001), a history of the CIA’S Directorate of Science and Technology which 
developed and deployed both photoreconnaissance and signals intelligence 
systems during the Cold War, also exemplifies this new generation. Weaving 
continued from the previous page 
of the Institute of Navigation 42, no. 1, special issue (1995): 109-164; Chris Banther, “A Look into 
the History of American Satellite Navigation,” Quest: The History of Spaceflight Quarterly 11, no. 3 
(2004): 40-48. For antisatellite projects, see Wayne R .  Austerman, Program 437: The Air Force’s First 
Antisatellite System (Peterson AFB, CO: Office of History, 1991); Dwayne A. Day, “Arming the 
High Frontier,” Spaceflight 46 (2004): 467-471. For organizational histories, see Harold M. Sapolsky, 
Science and the Navy: The History o f  the O f f e  o f  Naval Research (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990); David N. Spires, Beyond Horizons: A Hagcentury $Air Force Space Leadership (Peterson 
AFB: Air Force Space Command, 1997); James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret 
National Security Agency (New York: Anchor Books, 2001); Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Wizards of 
Langley: Inside the CIA’S Directorate o f  Science and Technology (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001). 
For command and control, see David C. Arnold, Spying from Space: Constructing America’s Satellite 
Command and Control Systems (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005). 
43. Day has published a series of articles on these topics. For geodetic projects, see “Mapping the 
Dark Side ofthe World: Part 1: The KH-5 ARGON Geodetic Satellite” and “Mapping the Dark Side 
ofthe World: Part 2: Secret Geodetic Programmes after ARGON,” both in Spaceflight 40 (1998): 264- 
269 and 303-310, respectively. For signals intelligence satellites, see “Tinker, Tailor, Radar, Spy: Early 
American Ferret and Radar Satellites,” Spaceflight 43 (2001): 288-293; “Ferrets Above: American 
Signals intelligence Satellites During the 1960s,” Internationaljournal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 
17, no. 3 (2004): 449-467. For photoreconnaissance, see “A Sheep in Wolf‘s Clothing: The Samos 
E-5 Recoverable Satellite, Part 1,” Spaceflight 44 (2002): 424-431; “A Square Peg in a Cone-Shaped 
Hole: The Samos E-5 Recoverable Satellite, Part 2,” Spaceflight 45 (2003): 71-79; “From Cameras to 
Monkeys to Men: The Samos E-5 Recoverable Satellite, Part 3,” Spaceflight 45 (2003): 380-389. 
44. Day, “From Cameras to Monkeys to Men.” 
45. Dwayne A. Day and Asif A. Siddiqi, “The Moon in the Crosshairs: CIA Intelligence on 
the Soviet Manned Lunar Programme,” Spaceflight 45 (2003): 466-475 and 46 (2004): 112-125; 
Dwayne A. Day, “From the Shadows to the Stars: James Webb’s Use of Intelligence Data in the 
Race to the Moon,” Air Power History 51, no. 4 (winter 2004): 30-39. See also Roger D. Launius, 
“NASA Looks to the East: American Intelligence Estimates of Soviet Capabilities and Project 
Apollo,” Air Power History (fall 2001): 5-15. 
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an intricate story ofvarious projects that “represented a quantum leap in U.S. 
intelligence capabilities,” he locates the development of these systems in a 
broader context involving relationships with influential scientists outside the 
agency, the necessity to fill gaps in intelligence collection, and the connec- 
tions between satellite development and intelligence 
The two most important works on CORONA, Day et al.’s Eye in the S k y  
and McDonald’s CORONA, included contributions from individuals who 
participated in CORONA development in the late 1950s and early 1960s; as 
such, they can be characterized as semiofficial histories.47 Both unequivocally 
extolled the technological, managerial, and operational successes of the proj- 
ect. Its history was framed as part of a singularly powerful story about the eff- 
cacy of good management and high technology to benefit the national interest 
of the United States, which was synonymous with engendering peace and 
freedom abroad. Writing about CORONA’S use in monitoring compliance 
with arms control agreements, historian Ernest R .  May concluded his essay by 
suggesting that “probably . . . the best one-line epitaph for CORONA would 
read: ‘It helped keep peace in the nuclear age’.’Y8 
The end of the Cold War-specifically the collapse of the Soviet 
empire-validated, to some degree, the moral ground for historians writing 
of American military space programs. The writing on CORONA echoed 
a powerful strand of post-1991 historiography of the Cold War in general, 
which celebrated American motives over ideologically and morally suspect 
Soviet intentions. The post-Cold War self-congratulatory climate insulated 
the history of CORONA or other U.S. military space programs from cri- 
tiques of their relationship to the Cold War military-industrial complex or 
46. Richelson, Wtzards of Langley, p. 287. For a poor example of the “new” history-on the 
understudied topic of intelligence analysis-see David T. Lindgren, Trust But Vertfy: Imagery Analysis 
zn the Cold W a r  (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000). For civil-military interactions, see 
John Cloud, “Imaging the World in a Barrel: CORONA and the Clandestine Convergence of the 
Earth Sciences,” Social Studies of Science 31, no. 2 (2001): 231-251; John Cloud, “Re-Viewing the 
Earth: Remote Sensing and Cold War Clandestine Knowledge Production,” Quest: The History 
of Spaceflight Quarterly 8 ,  no. 2 (2001): 4-16; Ronald E. Doel, “Constituting the Postwar Earth 
Sciences: The Military’s Influence on the Environmental Sciences in USA After 1945,” Social 
Studies ofscience 33, no. 5 (2003): 635-666. 
47. Day et al., Eye in the Sky;  Robert McDonald, ed., C O R O N A :  Between the Sun G the Earth: The 
First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space (Bethesda, MD: American Society for Photogrammetry and 
Remote Sensing, 1997). FrJr derivative works based on the above, see Curtis Peebles, The Corona 
Project: America’s First Spy Satelhtes (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997); Philip Taubman, 
Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the C I A ,  and the Hidden Story of America’s Space Espionage (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2003). For an overview of the literature on CORONA, see Dwayne A. Day, 
“Rashomon in Space: A Short Review of Official Spy Satellite Histories,” Quest: The  History of 
Spaceflight Quarterly 8 ,  no. 2 (2000): 45-53. 
48. Ernest R. May, “Strategic Intelligence and U.S. Security: The Contributions of CORONA,” 
in Eye in the Sky,  p. 28. 
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as part of American interventionist aims in global conflicts played out in the 
developing world (in, for example, Southeast Asia and Central America) .49 
While the contextual touchstone of U.S. military space history is the 
Cold War, the literature has remained woefully disconnected from many of 
the broader intellectual debates that have characterized the historiography 
of the Cold War through the past 40 years and now in the post-Cold War 
era. Beginning with the historians who defended the policy of containment 
against expansionist Soviet intentions, to the generation of revisionists who 
argued the left-liberal position that American economic interests on a global 
level contributed to the Cold War, to the postrevisionists who emphasized 
misperception and misunderstanding to explain much of the Cold War, the 
canon has passed through many  transformation^.^^ From the 1980s, and espe- 
cially in the post-Cold War period, several new threads emerged as diplo- 
matic, social, and cultural historians contributed richly to understanding not 
only international relations, but also domestic American cultural currents that 
formed part of the mosaic of the country’s trajectory through the Cold War. 
For example, a new generation of historians is now looking at how domestic 
culture affected foreign policy.51 
In terms of international competition-the principal context for the ori- 
gins of the American space program-the biggest public splash was made by 
John Lewis Gaddis’s We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War Histovy (1997), which 
harked back to the original view that Stalin’s personality, Soviet authoritari- 
anism, and communist ideology were principal reasons for the Cold War.52 
49. For a rare example on the strategic dimension ofspace support during wartlme, see Henry W. 
Brandli, “The Use of Meteorological Satellites in Southeast Asia Operations,” Aerospace Historian 
29, no. 3 (1982): 172-175. 
50. For useful summaries of the enormous transformations in Cold War hlstoriography, see 
Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Cold War: What Do ‘We Know NOW’?’’ American Historical Review 104, 
no. 2 (1999): 501-524; Timothy J. White, “Cold War Historiography ew Evidence Behind 
Traditional Typographies,” International Social Science Review 1, no. 1 (fall-winter 2000). 
51. David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992); Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black 
Americans and U.S.  Foreign Affairs, 1935-2960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1996); Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1997); 
Frank Costigliola, ‘“Unceasing Pressure for Penetration’: Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in 
George Kennan’s Formation of the Cold War,”Journal of American History 84 (1997): 1309-1339; 
Robert D. Dean, “Masculinity as Ideology,” Diplomatic History 22 (1998): 29-62. 
52.John Lewis Gaddis, We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1997). 
See also Gaddq “Rethinking Cold War History: A Roundtable Discussion,” in A t  the End of the 
American Century: America’s Role in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Robert L. Hutchins (Baltnnore: Johns 
Hopkins, 1998), pp. 52-66; Douglas J. Macdonald,“Commumst Bloc Expansion in the Early ColdWar: 
Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism,” International Security 20 (1995-1996): 152-188. For sirm- 
lar perspectives on the Soviet side, seeVladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s 
Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchw (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996);Vojtech Mastny, 
The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity:The Stalin Years (NewYork: Oxford Umversity Press, 1996). 
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Gaddis’s arguments were countered by many who emphasized and explored 
ideology on both sides, the organization of overseas propaganda by both 
governments, transnational global relations, the relationship between mili- 
tary capabilities and diplomatic policies, the end of colonialism, and conflicts 
played out between “strong” and “weak” powers.53 Military space historians 
whose objects of study are firmly embedded in the Cold War have yet to 
evolve through these larger debates. The recent works on CORONA, for 
example, implicitly and closely follow the “Gaddis school,” remaining discon- 
nected from equally compelling but entirely different narratives of the history 
of the Cold War.54 In The Devil We Knew: Aweticans and the Cold War (1993), 
respected diplomatic historian H. W. Brands argued that the battle with the 
Soviet Union served a spectrum of psychological, economic, strategic, and 
political imperatives. He claimed that the United States subverted some of the 
nation’s best principles to win the Cold War. Thus any proclaimed victory 
was, at best, ambigu~us .~~  How does the success of CORONA fit into such 
thinking? We may have much to learn from an exploration of this question. 
ARTIFACTUAL AND PROGRAMMATIC HISTORIES 
Beyond exploration and competition, a third large body of space history 
represents history centered on artifacts and/or programs. Willy Ley’s early 
works-as well as those of David Lasser, Chas G. Philp, and P. E. Cleator- 
pioneered the artifact-centered history by merging the canon ofpopular science 
with popular history.56 This school focused mainly on explaining how particu- 
53. See for example, Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States 
and Southern Afica in the Early Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Robert 
J. McMahon, The Cold W a r  on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994); David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and 
Atomic Energy, 1939-1954 (New Haven, C T  Yale University Press, 1994); Thomas Risse-Kappen, 
Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1995); Ilya Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: I. 
R. Dee, 1996); Steven J. Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall ofRussia’s Strategic 
Nuclear Forces, 1945-2000 (Washington, mithsonian Institution Press, 2002). 
54. For a balanced view of America ary space policy within the broader international 
context, see Michael E. O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses 
o f  Space (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2004). The few explicit critiques of the 
U.S. military space program, unfortunately, have been shrill and largely without value. See, for 
example, Jack Manno, Arming the Heavens: The  Hidden Military Agenda for Space, 1945-1995 (New 
York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1984); Loring Wirbel, Star Wars: U S  Tools of Space Supremacy (London: 
Pluto Press, 2004). 
55. H. W. Brands, The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
56. David Lasser, The Conquest of Space (New York The Penguin Press, 1931); Chas G. Philp, 
Stratosphere and Rocket Flight (Astronautics) (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1935); P. E. Cleator, 
Rockets Through Space:The Dawn o f  Interplanetary Travel (New York Simon & Schuster, 1936). 
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lar technologies worked, how they were developed, how they were tested, and 
finally, how they behaved during operational flights. De Witt Douglas Kilgore, 
in his recent Astrojuturism: Science, Race, and Visions of Utopia in Space (2003), 
calls the authors of this subgenre “scientists, engineers, and writers [who were] 
public apologists for the value of science.”57 Their works, grounded in scientific 
laws and mathematics, were not only accounts of past technological develop- 
ments, but also contained narratives about the immense potential of engineers 
and managers to solve engineering problems; on a fundamental level, they are 
narratives about the “myth of [technological] progress.”58 
The programmatic histories typically encompass an arc from the con- 
ception of the project (the first chapter) to the final successful mission (the 
last) while maintaining a perspective that renders extraprogrammatic perspec- 
tives invisible. By rejecting contingency and context and embracing narratives 
of chronology and progress, they represent the distillation of teleology and 
Whiggish notions in space history.59 The central actors in programmatic his- 
tories have typically been the artifact-the rocket engine, the launch vehicle, 
the spacecraft, and the ground complex. Such a focus reflects the organiza- 
tional approach of the early American space program, where any new space 
technologies-such as liquid-hydrogen propulsion technology, for example- 
were developed under discrete NASA programs (in this case, Centaur).60 As 
a result, programmatic histories have been frequently indistinguishable from 
artifactual histories. 
Building on the tradition of Ley, Lasser, and others, beginning in the 
1960s and continuing to the present, the NASA History Office has produced 
a series of works that have focused on particular programs. Although these 
studies were largely divorced from broader political, social, or cultural con- 
cerns, they served as important foundations for future historians to study 
how and why particular technologies emerged and how states and institutions 
arbitrate over questions of technology and management. An exemplary and 
excelIent first step in the field was The History of Rocket Technology: Essays on 
Research, Development, and Utility (1964), a collection of essays on the develop- 
ment of ballistic missiles and spacecraft by a number of important architects 
57. De Witt Douglas Kilgore, Astrofuturtsm: Science, Race, and Visions o f  Utopia in Space 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003). 
58. For a critique of the “myth of progress” in the history of technology, see John Staudenmaier, 
Technology’s Storytellers: Reweaving the Human Fabric (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985). 
59. The term “Whig history” originally comes from Herbert Butterfield’s The Whig Interpretation 
ofHistory (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1931), where, in his examination of British constitutional 
history, he found a historical canon that framed history from a presentist stance without taking into 
account the viewpoints prevailing during the times of the figures under study. His was also an early 
critique of narratives centered on the “march of progress.” 
60. For Centaur, see Virginia P. Dawson and Mark D. Bowles, Taming Liquid Hydrogen: The 
Centaur Upper Stage Rocket, 1958-2002 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-2004-4230,2004). 
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of the U.S. rocketry and space program, including Walter R. Dornberger, 
Frank J. Malina, and Wernher von Braun. In his preface, then-NASA Chief 
Historian Eugene M. Emme argued that rocket technology was of funda- 
mental importance to Western society, in effect restating the Cold War para- 
digm but linking it to the development of modern science and technology: 
“The eminence of Western science and technology-and all that this means, 
including but also beyond the connotations of national power-is not a little 
dependent upon the short and long-term success of technological progress in 
rocketry and astronautics.”61 All of these essays reflected prevailing interpre- 
tive trends in the relatively new field of history of technology, whose practi- 
tioners were fascinated with inventors, their inventions, and the effect of these 
inventions on society. In other words, these histories approached technology 
through deterministic and unidirectional perspectives where technology had 
profoundly impacted societies; the possibility of a reverse relationship was left 
unexplored. In his introduction to the 1964 volume, Emme encapsulated this 
view, suggesting that “rocketry has influenced the entire structure and con- 
duct of national and international politics and economics.”62 
Since the Emme volume, NASA has sponsored numerous works in the 
canon, many of which have contributed to recording and chronicling impor- 
tant aspects of the country’s efforts to explore space. The biggest subgroup- 
on human spaceflight-includes Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander’s This 
New Ocean: A History o f  Project Mercury (1966); Hacker and Grimwood’s O n  
the Shoulders of Titans: A History o f  Project Gemini (1977); Benson and Faherty’s 
Moonport: A History o f  Apollo Launch Fac es and Operations (1978); Brooks, 
Grimwood, and Swenson’s Chariots for  Apollo: A History o f  Manned Lunar 
Spacecraft (1979); Compton and Benson’s Living and Working in Space: A History 
o f  Skylab (1983); and Compton’s Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of 
Apollo Lunar Exploration Missions (1989) .63 Other NASA or NASA-sponsored 
books have focused on robotic missions, including NASA’s extraordinarily suc- 
cessful and impressive deep space and interplanetary programs.64 A recent work, 
-~ 
61. Eugene M. Emme, ed., The History of Rocket Technology: Essays on Research, Development, and 
62. Emme, History of Rocket Technology, p. 1. 
63. Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., et al., This New 0cean:A History of Project Mercury (Washington, DC: NASA 
SP-4201, 1966); Barton C. Hacker and James C. Grimwood, O n  the Shoulders $Titans: A History $ 
Project Gemini (Washmgton, DC: NASA SP-4203, 1977); Charles D. Benson and W&am Barnahy 
Faherty, Moonport:A History ofApollo Launch Fac es and Operations (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4204, 
1978); Courtney G. Brooks et al., Chariots forAp01lo:A History $Manned Lunar Spacecraft (Washmgton, 
DC: NASA SP-4205,1979);W. David Compton and Charles D. Benson, Living and Working in Space:A 
History $Skylab (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4208,1983); Compton, Where No  Man Has Gone Bejore. 
64. Richard Fimmel et al., Pioneer Odyssey (Washington, DC: NASA SP-394/396, 1977); 
Henry C. Dethloff and Ronald A. Schorn, Voyager’s Grand Tour: To The  Outer Planets and Beyond 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2003). 
Utility (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964), p. 1. 
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No aspect of space travel is more exciting or has received greater historical attention 
than the human component. Too many observers, however, are too enthralled with 
the spectacle of flight to probe the history of the activity deeply. Here IS the Return 
to Flight launch of Space Shuttle Discoveryand its five-man crew from Pad 395 at 
11:37 a.m., 29 September 1988, as Discoveryembarked on a mission of 4 days and 1 
hour. (NASA image no. 88PC-1001) 
To Reach the High Frontier: The History of U.S. Launch Vehicles (2002), updated 
Emme’s earlier seminal work by adding a number of essays on the technologi- 
cal development of the major American satellite launchers derived from Cold 
War-era warhorses such as the Atlas and Titan ICBMs.65 The book was a timely 
update on the history of efforts to develop efficient access to space. 
Beyond NASA, unofficial historians have devoted an enormous amount 
of ink and paper to the early American human spaceflight program. These 
works, which exploded in number in the late 1990s and the first decade of the 
21st century, represent the perfectly idealized form of the programmatic and 
artifactual history. Many of the artifactual histories, such as Dennis Jenkins’s 
65. Roger D. Launius and Dennis R. Jenkins, eds., To Reach the High Frontier: A History of 
U.S. Launch Vehicles (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002). See also the essays on 
launch vehicles and access to space in John M. Logsdon et al., eds., Exploring the Unknown: Selected 
Documents in the History .f the U.S. Civil Space Program, vol. 4, Accessing Space (Washington, DC: 
NASA SP-4407, 1999). 
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Space Shuttle: The History ofthe National Space Transportation System: The First 100 
Missions (2001), comprise extremely thorough and informative narratives, pro- 
viding an engineer’s perspective on the many technical decisions during design, 
testing, and operations of particular projects.66 Because of their distance from 
the original events, the prevailing context of a directionless American space 
program, and perceptions of American greatness compromised by liberals and 
social programs, these works communicate not only nostalgia, but also regret.67 
In Leaving Earth (2003), Robert Zimmerman notes, “Can we no longer imag- 
ine a future where humanity goes out and settles the far-flung stars? Have we 
become so small-minded that we cannot envision a tomorrow as idealistic and 
hopeful as that imagined by men like Ley, Korolev, and von Braun?”68 
Histories of robotic exploration have been less mired in the betrayal of the 
post-Apollo times. Like their human spaceflight counterparts, they are coher- 
ent and useful accounts of humanity’s first efforts to probe beyond circumter- 
restrial space. There exist comprehensive and technically detailed histories of 
Voyager, Galileo, Ulysses, and Mars Pathfinder, as well as broader histories of 
lunar and planetary e~plora t ion .~~ As part of its Exploring the Unknown series, 
NASA has also sponsored studies on scientific research by robotic probes.’’ 
The study of applications satellites (communications, weather, remote sens- 
ing, etc.) remains relatively neglected within the space history community, 
because it lacks the cachet of both human and deep space exploration, in part 
66. Dennis R .  Jenkins, Space Shuttle: The History of the National Space Transportation System: The 
First 100 Missions (Cape Canaveral, FL: D. R .  Jenkins, 2001). See also Richard S. Lewis, The 
Voyages of Columbia: The First True Spaceship (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). 
67. See, for example, Robert Zimmerman, Genesis: The Story of Apollo 8: The First Manned Fllght 
to Another World (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1998); Harland, Exploring the Moon; John 
Catchpole, Project Mercury: NASA’s First Manned Space Programme (London: Springer, 2001); David 
Shayler, Gemini: Steps to the Moon (London: Springer, 2001); David Shayler, Skylab: America’s Space 
Station (London: Springer, 2001); David Shayler, Apollo: The Lost and Forgotten Missions (London: 
Springer, 2002); Reynolds, Apollo; Reginald Turnill, The Moonlandings: A n  Eyewitness Account 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
68. Zimmerman, Leaving Earth, p. 463. 
69. Henry S. F. Cooper, Jr.. Imaging Saturn: The Voyager Flights to Saturn (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston, 1982); Murray, Journey into Space; Burrows, Exploring Space; Robert 
Reeves, The Superpower Space Race: A n  Explosive Rivalry Through the Solar System (New York: Plenum 
Press, 1994); Donna Shirley and Danelle Morton, Managing Martians (New York: Broadway Books, 
1998); Robert S. Kraemer, Beyond the Moon: A Golden Age of Planetary Exploration, 1971-1978 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000); David M. Harland, Jupiter Odyssey: The 
Story of NASA’s Galileo Mission (London: Springer, 2000); Judith Reeves-Stevens et al., Going to 
Mars: The Untold Story of Mars Pathfnder and NASA’s Bold New Missions for the 2Zst Century (New 
York: Pocket Books, 2000); David M. Harland, Mission to Saturn: Cassini and the Huygens Probe 
(London: Springer, 2002); Andrew Mishkin, Sojourner: A n  Insider’s View of the Pathfnder Mission 
(New York: Berkeley Books, 2003); Paolo Ulivi, Lunar Exploration: Human Pioneers and Robotic 
Surveyors (London: Springer-Verlag, 2003); Ben Evans with David M. Harland, NASA’s Voyager 
Missions: Exploring the Outer Solar System and Beyond (London: Springer, 2004). 
70. Logsdon et al., Exploring the Unknown, vol. 5. 
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because these satellites carry no people and go nowhere. In contrast to human 
and deep space robotic spaceflight, the services offered by applications satel- 
lite systems deeply shape social, political, and cultural dimensions of societies. 
The objectives, capabilities, and design of such systems are in turn profoundly 
shaped by social, political, and cultural needs. Although many such “civilian” 
technological systems developed from firm connections with military proj- 
ects, few historians have produced scholarship on their origins, performance, 
and ramifications.7l 
A number of historians and journalists have explored aspects of the many 
large-scale technological systems that were part of the American space pro- 
gram. These include management-focused histories such as Arnold s. Levine’s 
Managing N A S A  in the Apollo Era (1982) and Stephen B. Johnson’s The Secret 
ofApollo: Systems Management in American and European Space Programs (2002)? 
Two biographical works have enriched our understanding of the success of 
Apollo: Henry W. Lambright’s Powering Apol1o:James E. Webb o f N A S A  (1995) 
and Robert C. Seamans’s Aiming at Targets: The Autobiography o f  Robert C. 
Seamans (1996).73 Both Webb and Seamans played critical roles in facilitating 
one of the most impressive and largest technological systems in 20th-century 
America. Their own words will be crucial for future historians interested in 
relocating Apollo in the same kind of social, political, and cultural context 
that Thomas P. Hughes did for electrical systems in his landmark Networks of 
Power (1983) ?4 
T. A. Heppenheimer’s multivolume history of the Space Shuttle is an 
important contribution to the programmatic space history genre. Although it 
71. For the few works on applications projects, see Pamela E. Mack, Viewing the Earth: The Social 
Construction ofthe Landsat System (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990); David J. Whalen, The Origins 
of Satellite Communications, 1945-1965 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002); 
Donald H. Martin, Communications Satellites, 4th ed. (El Segundo, CA: Aerospace Press, 2000); 
Donna A. Demac, ed., Tracing New Orbits: Cooperation and Competition in Global Satellite Development 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); P. Krishna Rao, Evolution of the Weather Satellite 
Program in the U.S. Department ofCommerce: A Brief Outline (Washington, DC: NOAA, 2001); James 
M. Allen and Shanaka de Silva, “Landsat: An Integrated History,” Quest: The History of Spacefight 
Quarterly 12, no. 1 (2005): 6-22. See also the essays on satellite communications and remote sensing 
in John M. Logsdon et al., Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History ofthe U.S. Civilian 
Space Program, vol. 3, Using Space (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4407, 1998). 
72. Arnold S. Levine, Managing N A S A  in the Apollo Era (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4102, 
1982); Stephen B. Johnson, The Secret ofApollo: Systems Management in American and European Space 
Programs (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 2002). 
73. Henry W. Lambright, Powering Apollo:James E.  Webb of N A S A  (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 
1995); Robert C. Seamans, Aiming at Targets: T h e  Autobiography of Robert C. Seamans (Washington, DC: 
NASA SP-4106, 1996). See also the essays by Seamans, Webb, and other Apollo-era NASA manag- 
ers, including Robert R .  Gilruth, Wernher von Braun, George M. Low, Rocco A. Petrone, Samuel C. 
Phillips, and George E. Mueller, in Apollo Expeditions to the Moon, ed. Cortright. 
74. Thomas P. Hughes, Networks ofPower: Electr$cation in Western Society, 1880-2930 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins, 1983). 
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skirts social issues and references no literature from the academic historiogra- 
phy of American technology, it represents a fleshed-out narrative that expertly 
describes the interplay between politics and technology that affected key mile- 
stones in the Shuttle program, including the requirements for such a system 
and how those requirements evolved over time depending on claims made 
by constituencies within NASA and the Department of Defen~e.7~ Similarly, 
Roger D. Launius’s Space Stations: Base Camps to the Stars (2003) looks the- 
matically at the historical development of space stations and their central role 
in the evolution of both prescriptive and practical plans for the exploration 
of space, entrenched partly by what Dwayne A. Day has called the dominant 
“von Braun” paradigm of space 
NOSE CONE HISTORY 
The astronaut memoir (or, more broadly, the astronaut-centered history) 
constitutes one of the largest historical subgenres in the field of space history. I 
call these works “nose cone histories” since they describe a narrowly circum- 
scribed circle of events visible only to the astronauts and in which only the 
astronauts were visible. For the millions who followed the space program in 
the 1960s, astronauts-not engineers nor servicepersons nor managers-were 
the most visible human representations of the technological accomplishments 
of the early Space Age. Our natural urge to distill all the meaning of the 
space program-in particular its avatar Apollo-was embodied potently by 
the astronauts. As Tom Wolfe described in The Right Stuff(1979), these young, 
able, athletic, and short-haired men each seemed an idealized version of an 
American everyman, with a wife, a picket fence, a shiny car-and yet simul- 
taneously wrapped in myth and mystery?’ 
Some of the nose cone histories have added important dimensions of 
the story of the American human spaceflight program. For example, Apollo 
11 astronaut Michael Collins, in his fascinating memoir Carrying the Fire: A s  
Astronaut’s Journeys (1974), shows a deep empathy and understanding of the 
role of astronauts in the halcyon days leading up to the epic Moon landing 
in 1969. Collins’s narrative provided the first glimpse behind the iconogra- 
75. T. A. Heppenheimer, The Space Shuttle Decision: NASA’s Search for a Reusable Space Vehicle 
(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4221, 1999); Heppenheimer, Development of the Space Shuttle, 1972- 
1981 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002). 
76. Launius, Space Stations. See also the equally fine Giovanni Caprara, Living in Space: From Science 
Fiction to the International Space Station (Willowdale, Ontario: Firefly Books, 2000). Less successful is 
Zimmerman’s Leaving Earth, which is a sprawling and flawed attempt to locate the development of 
space stations in domestic and international politics. For the “von Braun paradigm,” see Dwayne A. 
Day, “The Von Braun Paradigm,” Space Times 33 (November-December 1994): 12-15. 
77. Tom Wolfe, The Right StuJ(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1979). 
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phy of the astronaut-as-unidimensional-hero of popular American culture, 
a self-sustaining myth given birth after the “original seven” Mercury astro- 
nauts were presented to the American media in 1959.78 Collins described his 
colleagues as a complex group with diverse personality traits spanning the 
whole gamut: overachieving, academic, adventurous, risk-averse, emotion- 
ally distant, publicity-seeking, insecure, and brilliant. All were fully ready 
to do the job they were given. Further astronaut memoirs, particularly Walt 
Cunningham’s All-American Boys (1977) and Gene Cernan’s The Last Man on 
the Moon (1999), were, like Collins’s pioneering work, candid about the singu- 
larly unique experiences of the NASA astronauts of the 1960s, especially their 
relationship to top management, their competitiveness among themselves, 
and their often complicated private l i~es .7~ Astronaut Donald “Deke” Slayton, 
the man responsible for selecting every American space crew between 1965 
and 1975, added important historical details to how astronaut crews were 
picked-including Armstrong and Aldrin for the first lunar landing-in his 
posthumously published memoir, Deke! A n  Autobiography (1995) .80 
Fully fleshed, well-researched, and contextual biographies can say some- 
thing profound not just about an individual, but also the period under study; 
yet most nose cone space histories have been narrow, hagiographic, or self- 
serving. They reinforce rather than explore the mythmaking associated with 
the astronaut as icon. They also continue to marginalize the many thousands 
who also worked on the space program; in other words, fetishization of the 
astronaut has been a potent barrier against a social history of the space program 
since, in the popular consciousness, the history of the American space pro- 
gram remains inseparable from the biographies and heroism of astronauts.81 
78. Michael Collins, Carrying the Fire: A n  Astronaut’s journeys (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 1974). Soon after their selection in 1959, the original seven astronauts signed deals with 
Lrfe magazine for exclusive rights to bring their lives to the public. Apart from the many L$e stories, 
one major output of this agreement was the very clinical book by W. Scott Carpenter et al., We 
Seven, By the Astronauts Themselves (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1962). 
79. Walt Cunningham with Mickey Herskowitz, The All-American Boys (New York: Macmillan, 
1977); Eugene A. Cernan and Donald A. Davis, The Last Man on the Moon: Astronaut Eugene Cernan 
and America’s Race in Space (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). 
80. Donald K. “Deke” Slayton and Michael Cassutt, Deke! A n  Autobiography (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1995). See also Joseph D. Atkinson, Jr., and Jay M. Shafritz’s The Real St@: A 
History of N A S A ?  Astronaut Recruitment Program (New York: Praeger, 1985) for a more academic 
perspective on astronaut selection. 
81. Important exceptions to the bland astronaut-centered histories include two works by Henry 
S. F. Cooper: Before L$t& The Making of a Space Shuttle Crew (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1987) and 
A House in Space (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976). The former is an excellent study 
on the dynamics of forming and training crews for human spaceflight, while the latter explores the 
interactions of crew members on the long-duration Skylab missions. Jim Hansen’s biography of Neil 
Armstrong, First Man: The Liji ofNeil A. Armstrong (New York: Simon & Schuster, forthcoming) 
also promises to be an important contribution to the field 
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A new generation of space enthusiasts (affectionately called “space cadets” 
by some) has taken up the job of producing a slew of astronaut biographies. 
The first few published in the 1980s and 1990s provided unique viewpoints 
to the history of the American human space program, but by the early 2000s, 
their utility as history texts has diminished.82 Many astronauts continue to 
write their own memoirs, usually ghost-written with others. The memoirs of 
some would suggest that travel through space engendered profound spiritual 
transformations-or often crises of the spirit-that led them to unexpected 
pathways.83 The ones who achieved important management or advisory posi- 
tions in the space program-such as Gemini and Apollo astronaut Thomas 
P. Stafford-have more to say than others. But all ponder, explore, and fre- 
quently advocate specific policies to give direction to a space program evi- 
dently lacking one since the golden age of Apol10.~~ 
NEW HISTORY 
In an article in 2000, then-NASA Chief Historian Roger D. Launius 
identified a “New Aerospace History” that emerged in the 1980s that was 
82. See, for example, Colin Foale, Waystation to the Stars: The Story o f  Mir, Michael, and Me 
(London: Headline, 1999); Evelyn Husband with Donna Van Liere, High Calling: The Courageous 
L@ and Faith o f  Space Shuttle Commander Rick Husband (Nashville, TN:  Thomas Nelson, 2003); 
Colin Burgess et al., Fallen Astronauts: Heroes Who  Died Reaching the Moon (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2003); Ray E. Boomhower, Gus Grissom: The Lost Astronaut (Indianapolis: 
Indiana Historical Society Press, 2004); Neal Thompson, Light This Candle: The L@ G Times o f  
Alan Shepard-America’s First Spaceman (New York: Crown Publishers, 2004); Leon Wagener, One 
Giant Leap: Neil Armstrong’s Stellar American]ourney (New York: Forge, 2004); Nancy Conrad and 
Howie Klausner, Rocketman: Astronaut Pete Conrad’s Incredible Ride to the Moon and Beyond (New 
York: New American Library, 2005). 
83. Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., with Wayne Warga, Return to Earth (New York: Random House, 
1973); James Irwin and Williams Emerson Irwin, To Rule the Night (Philadelphia: A. J. Holman, 
1973); Kathleen Maughn Lind, Don Lind: Mormon Astronaut (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1985); 
Charlie Duke and Dotty Duke, Moonwalker (Nashville: Oliver-Nelson Books, 1990); Edgar D. 
Mitchell, The Way of the Explorer: A n  Apollo Astronaut’sjourney Through the Material and Mystical 
Worlds (New York G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1996); Gordon Cooper and Bruce Henderson, Leap of 
Faith: A n  Astronaut’sJourney into the Unknown (New York: Harper Collins, 2000). 
84. Armstrong et al., First on the Moon; Frank Borman with Robert J. Serling, Countdown: A n  
Autobiography (New York: W. Morrow, 1988); Wally Schirra and Richard N. Billings, Schirra’s 
Space (Boston: Quinlan Press, 1988); Jim Love11 and Kluger Jeffrey, Lost Moon: The Perilous Voyage 
of Apollo 23 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994); Mike R. Mullane, LiJtoff! A n  Astronaut’s Dream 
(Parsippany, NJ: Silver Burdett Press, 1995); Bill Nelson with Jamie Buckingham, Mission: A n  
American Congressman’s Voyage to Space (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988); Alan Bean 
with Andrew Chaikin, Apollo: A n  Eyewitness Account by an Astronaut (Shelton, C T  Greenwich 
Workshop Press, 1998); John Glenn and Nick Taylor,]ohn Glenn: A Memoir (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1999); Jerry Linenger, Offthe Planet: Surviving Five Perilous Months Aboard the Space Station Mir 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000); Scott Carpenter, For Spacious Skies: The UncommonJourney of a 
Mercury Astronaut (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2002); Thomas P. Stafford and Michael Cassutt, We Have 
Capture: Tom Stafford and the Space Race (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002). 
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“intrinsically committed to relating the subject to larger issues of society, 
politics, and culture and taking a more sophisticated view,” a history that 
“move [d] beyond a fetish for the artifact.”85 More generally, Launius char- 
acterized these works as being in the middle ground between critique and 
celebration of the space program. I would modify Launius’s typology by 
expanding the parameters to include a wider range of intellectual inquiry 
that often includes both critiques and celebration of the space program. They 
are, however, distinguished from the more traditional canon in two impor- 
tant ways: first, they do not rely on singular approaches to interpreting the 
history of space exploration, such as exploration, competition, technology, 
and astronauts. Instead, these works combine different elements of each and 
firmly locate their narratives in broader political, social, technological, and/or 
cultural contexts; i.e., they function as political, social, technological, and/or 
cultural histories. Second, they attempt to link to other historical subdisci- 
plines such as the history of the Cold War, diplomatic history, and the history 
of science and technology. 
In analyzing the new history, I describe important examples from each 
of four categories of new history-political, social, technological, and cultural 
history-and summarize opportunities for future research in each subgenre. 
Political History 
In the new history, political history has led the way in important reeval- 
uations of the American space program. Walter A. McDougall’s Pulitzer 
Prize-winning . . . T h e  Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space 
Age (1985) remains the most important and influential work in the genre. 
The book contributed to relocating the early years of the American space 
program in the broader context of postwar American politics. McDougall’s 
main argument was that after World War 11, and especially after Sputnik, the 
U.S. government marshaled resources on an unprecedented scale to promote 
advancements in science and technology, in effect, transforming the country 
into a new kind of 20th-century state, the technocracy. He noted: 
In those years [of the Sputnik challenge] the fundamental 
relationship between the government and new technology 
changed as never before in history. No longer did state and 
society react to new tools and methods, adjusting, regulating, 
or encouraging their spontaneous development. Rather, states 
took upon themselves the primary responsibility for generating 
new technology. This has meant that to the extent revolution- 
85. Launius, “The Historical Dimension of Space Exploration,” p. 23. 
460 CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
ary technologies have profound second-order consequences in 
the domestic life of societies, by forcing new technologies, all 
governments have become revolutionary, whatever their rea- 
sons or ideological pretensions.86 
In McDougall’s formulation, the rise of a postwar technocracy was insep- 
arable from the rise of the national security state, since federal policies on 
science and technology-especially after Sputnik-were closely related to 
countering the perceived intellectual and military power of the Soviet Union. 
McDougall’s overarching thesis substantively redefined the way in which his- 
torians viewed the space program. If they had previously resorted to invoking 
the “natural” human urge to explore, technological fetishization, or interna- 
tional competition, his work redirected attention to a magnitude of changes 
on the domestic political and institutional stage associated with the origins of 
the space program. 
McDougall also argued that the Eisenhower administration’s concerns 
over establishing a “freedom of space” rationale guided its initial formulations 
of American space policy. According to McDougall, neither the White House 
nor the Department of Defense emphasized a policy of being first to launch 
an artificial satellite of the Earth; instead, national security considerations- 
such as establishing the “freedom of space” precedent, developing a military 
space program under the cover of a civilian one, and not diverting resources 
from the concurrent ICBM program-trumped any drive to beat the Soviets. 
McDougall’s work challenged readers to reevaluate the ingrained notion of 
the Eisenhower administration’s space policy as confused and ineffectual.” 
Besides facilitating a shift in the tone of historical scholarship on American 
space exploration, . . . The Heavens and the Earth’s Pulitzer Prize validated his- 
torical scholarship on the space program as worthy of serious academic study. 
86. Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth. A Political History ofthe Space Age (New 
York: Basic Books, 1985), pp. 6-7, emphasis in original. 
87. Stephen E. Ambrose, in his multivolume biography of President Eisenhower, was the first 
to reframe the Eisenhower administration’s role in the origins of the U.S. space program, but 
McDougall fully developed the idea. See Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 2, The President 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983). The reevaluation of the Eisenhower administration’s role 
in early U.S. space policy was fleshed out further in Rip Bulkeley, The Sputniks Crisis and Early 
United States Policy. A Critique ofthe Historiography of Space (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1991). For pathbreaking research on the “freedom of space” issue, see also Dwayne A. Day, “New 
Revelations about the American Satellite Programme Before Sputnik,” SpaceJtght 36 (1994): 372- 
373; R. Cargill Hall, “Origins of U.S. Space Policy: Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of 
Space,” in Exploring The Unknown: Selected Documents in the History ofthe U.S. Civil Space Program, 
ed. John M. Logsdon et al., vol. 1, Ovganizingfor Exploration (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4407, 
1995), pp. 213-229; Dwayne A. Day, “Cover Stories and Hidden Agendas: Early American Space 
and National Security Policy,” in Reconsidering Sputnik: Forty Years Since the Soviet Satellite, ed. 
Roger D. Launius et al. (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000), pp. 161-195. 
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Following in the footsteps o f .  . . The Heavens and the Earth, innovative 
scholarship by space policy scholar Howard E. McCurdy and historian Roger 
D. Launius advanced a reinterpretation of the “golden age” of Apollo at a 1993 
symposium on presidential leadership and its influence on U.S. space policy. 
Instead of seeing Apollo as a “normal” stage in the evolution of American 
space policy, several historians argued that “the Apollo decision was . . . an 
anomaly in the history of the U.S. space program.”88 The implication was 
that policy-makers of the future could not use Apollo as a model of how to 
explore space since Apollo was intrinsically a unique product of its time that 
existed only because of exceptional circumstances, primarily national prestige 
and Cold War competition. Although this was not a new viewpoint, for the 
first time, space historians placed this notion as the key to understanding the 
early direction of American space exploration. In the conference proceedings, 
published as Spacejlight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership (1997), histori- 
ans also argued that the role of presidential leadership in general may have 
been overestimated by advocates of space exploration after the Kennedy era. 
Recent reexaminations of Kennedy’s historical 1961 decision to go to the 
Moon bolstered such a contrasting per~pective.~~ 
A 1997 conference on the 40th anniversary of Sputnik provided an 
opportunity for new and exciting scholarship on the origins and repercussions 
of the early American and Soviet space programs. Using recently declassified 
documents, historians amplified a number of important topics, including the 
“freedom of space” rationale for the beginning of the American space pro- 
gram, the selection of the Vanguard satellite project as the first civilian pro- 
gram, the formulation of the National Aeronautics and Space Act that led to 
the formation of NASA, and the effects of the National Defense Education 
Act that fundamentally altered the role of science and engineering in higher 
education in the United States. The collected papers from this conference, 
published as Reconsidering Sputnik: Forty Years Since the Soviet Satellite (2000), 
remain the most important set of intellectual inquiries into the origins of 
the American space program, complementing Robert Divine’s systematic 
study of the Eisenhower administration’s response to Sputnik, The Sputnik 
88. Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy, eds., Spacejight and the Myth .f Presidential 
Leadership (Urbana: University ofIllinois Press, 1997), p. 9. See also W. D. Kay, Can Democracies Fly 
in Space? The Challenge ofRevitalizing the U.S. Space Program (Westport, C T  Praeger, 1995). 
89. See also James L. Kauffman, Selling Outer Space: Kennedy, the Media, and Fundingfor Project Apollo, 
1961-1963 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1994); Michael R. Beschloss, “Kennedy and 
the Decision to Go to the Moon” in Spacefright and the Myth of Presidential Leadership, pp. 51-67; 
Stephen J. Garber, “Multiple Means to an End: A Reexamination of President Kennedy’s Decision 
to Go to the Moon,” Quest: The History .fSpacej?ight Quarterly 7, no. 2 (1999): 5-17; Andrew 
Chaikin, “White House Tapes Shed Light on JFK Space Race Legend,” Space.com, 22 August 
2001, http://www.space.com/news/kennedy~tapes~O10822.html; Roger D. Launms, “Kennedy’s Space 
Policy Reconsidered: A Post-Cold War Perspective,” Air Power History 50, no. 4 (2003): 16-29. 
462 CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
Chullenge (1993) ?O Similar reevaluations have been focused on other presi- 
dential administrations and their positions on initiatives within the civilian 
space program?’ 
The new political history suggests six broad areas ripe for future scholar- 
ship. These include the following: 
Revisiting the early American space program in light of the complex 
debates within the canon of Cold War history, including studies of the 
space program as an adjunct for the less savory dimensions ofAmerican 
foreign policy; additionally, historians could explore not only how 
the Cold War shaped the contours of the civilian and military space 
programs, but also how the latter shaped aspects of the former; Giles 
Alston’s dissertation on the influence of Apollo on international rela- 
tions points to further avenues of research?2 
2) Further study ofthe ways in which different administrations have used 
specific initiatives and programs as part of political agendas unrelated 
to the stated goals of the initiatives or programs;93 surprisingly, there 
exist no systematic studies of the Nixon or Reagan administration’s 
stance towards civilian and military space policy. 
90. Launius et al., Reconsidering Sputnik; Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower’s 
Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Lafayette P. Temple 111, 
“Organizing Space: The Political-Bureaucratic Dynamics Through 1961” (Ph.D. diss., George 
Washington University, 1999). See also Matt Bilk and Erika Lishock, The First Space Race: Launching 
the World’s First Satellites (College Station: Texas A&M University, 2004), which assembled all the 
new research into a single volume; Roger D. Launius, “Eisenhower, Sputnik, and the Creation 
of NASA: Technological Elites and Public Policy Agenda,” Prologue 28 (summer 1996): 127-143; 
Peter J. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap (Ithaca, NY: Cornel1 University Press, 1995). 
91. McCurdy, The Space Station Decision; Mark Damohn, Back Down to Earth; Krug, Presidential 
Perspectives on Space Exploration; Thor Nels Hogan, “Mars Wars: A Case History of Agenda Setting 
and Alternative Generation in the American Space Program” (Ph.D. diss., Public Policy and Public 
Administration Department, George Washington University, 2004). In addition, Launius and 
McCurdy’s Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership includes a number of important essays 
on Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush. 
92. Giles Alston, “International Prestige and the American Space Programme” (Ph.D. diss., 
Queen’s University of Belfast, 1989). 
93. For some examples, see Dwayne A. Day, “Space Policy-Making in the White House: The 
Early Years of the National Aeronautics and Space Council,” in Organizing for the Use of Space, ed. 
Launius, pp. 117-154; Joan Hoff, “The Presidency, Congress, and the Deceleration of the U.S. 
Space Program in the 1970s,” and Robert H. Ferrell, “Presidential Leadership and International 
Aspects ofthe Space Program,” both in Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership, ed. Launius 
and McCurdy, pp. 92-132 and 172-204, respectively. For a comparative study of NASA under 
two different administrations, see John D. Kelley, “An Organizational History of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration: A Critical Comparison of Administrative Decision Making 
in Two Pivotal Eras” (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 2002). 
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3) The relationship, exchanges, and competition between the civilian 
and militaryhntelligence space programs, in terms of intelligence, 
hardware, and managerial and engineering expertise;94 for example, 
how does the movement of high administrators (such as Dan Goldin 
and Michael Griffin) from one sector affect NASA policies? 
4) The connections between foreign policy and domestic space policy, a 
vast topic which has been studied piecemeal, but not in any systematic 
and long duvde approach. 
5) The relationship between domestic political transactions (congres- 
sional politics, redistricting, lobbying, policy papers, advisory boards, 
etc.) and the making of space policy. 
6) The role of institutions in the making of civilian and military space 
policy; the scholarship would encompass the study of why certain 
institutions are created, others are dissolved, what kind of inertia they 
carry through their history, and the ways in which particular institu- 
tions relate to others. 
History of Technology 
The second broad field of new history has emerged from within the 
bounds of the history of technology. Most artifactual histories of space pro- 
grams tend to accept implicitly notions of technological determinism, espe- 
cially that the space program exists as autonomous technology, affecting society 
around it but not being affected by it. There have been many works on the 
societal impacts of space e~plora t ion ;~~ the field of space exploration has, how- 
ever, largely been insulated from the paradigmatic revolution in the history of 
94. For general perspectives, see Dwayne A. Day, “Invitation to Struggle: The History of 
Civilian-Military Relations in Space,” in Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History 
ofthe U.S. Civil Space Program, ed. John M. Logsdon, vol. 2, External Relations (Washington, DC: 
NASA SP-4407, 1996), pp. 233-270; Mark A. Erickson, “The Evolution of the NASA-DoD 
Relationship from Sputnik to the Lunar Landing” (Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, 
1997). For exchanges of hardware between “black” and civilian space projects, see Dwayne A. 
Day’s “Not So Black and White: the Military and the Hubble Space Telescope,” Space Times 34 
(March-April 1995): 20-21, and “From Above the Iron Curtain to Around the Moon,” Spacefight 
47 (2005): 66-71. For an excellent work on the relationships between private industry, government- 
funded intelligence satellite programs, and technological innovation, see Jonathan E. Lewis, Spy 
Capitalism: Itek and the C I A  (New Haven, C T  Yale University Press, 2002). 
95. See, for example, Lillian A. Levy, ed., Space, Its Impact on Man and Society (New York: Norton, 
1965); Raymond A. Bauer et al., Second-Order Consequences: A Methodological Essay on the Impact o f  
Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969); Charles P. Boyle, Space Among Us: Some Effects o f  
Space Research on Society (Washington, DC: AIAA, 1974); Tim Greve et al., eds., The Impact of Space 
Science on Mankind (New York: Plenum Press, 1976). 
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technology in the 1980s that redirected focus from technological determin- 
ism to the social construction of technology (and technological systems)?6 A 
few notable exceptions include Pamela E. Mack’s Viewing the Earth: The Social 
Construction of the Landsat System (1990) and Donald A. Mackenzie’s Inventing 
Accuracy: A Historical Sociology OfiVuclear Missile Guidance (1990)?’ In the latter, 
Mackenzie argued that missile accuracy was not an inevitable consequence of 
technical change, but rather part of a process involving negotiation between a 
wide range of actors. His use of missile guidance as a window into exploring 
how accuracy was socially constructed suggests important future avenues of 
further research on the space program, including studies of the ways in which 
crew safety, mission success, or risk assessments in the human space program 
have been negotiated and socially constructed. 
The social constructivist approach is to some degree related to the influ- 
ential shift in the literature on technological systems. In moving the study 
of the history of technology from artifacts to systems, historian Thomas P. 
Hughes’s work fundamentally altered the ways in which historians conceived 
of the relationship between technology and society?’ Tentative steps towards 
a view of space projects as large-scale technological systems were taken in 
important works such as R. Cargill Hall’s Lunar Impact: A History OfProject 
Ranger (1977) and Roger E. Bilstein’s Stages to Saturn: A Technological History 
of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles (1980)?9 Similarly, Charles Murray and 
Catherine Bly Cox’s excellent Apollo: The Race to the Moon (1989) describes 
the Apollo project as a system whose primary actors were managers, engineers, 
politicians, and organizations rather than astronauts. Based on documentation 
and interviews with the remaining living actors of the endeavor, their recon- 
struction of the Apollo project as a milestone in the history of management 
makes it probably the single best historical overview of Apollo.”’ 
Beyond social constructivism, others have begun the work of looking at 
the space program as a case study in technological culture. In Goals in Space: 
96. For seminal early works on the social construction of technology, see Wiebe J. Bilker et 
al., eds., The Social Construction o f  Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History o f  
Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); Wiebe J. Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelrtes, and Bulbs: 
Toward a Theory ofsociotechnical Change (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); Merritt Roe Smith and 
Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma ofTechnologica1 Determinism (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1994). 
97. Mack, Viewing the Earth; Donald A. Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of 
Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, MA: NIT Press, 1990). 
98. Hughes, Networks of Power; Thomas P. Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1998). 
99. R. Cargill Hall, Lunar Impact: A History of Project Ranger (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4210, 
1977); Roger E. Bilstein, Stages to Saturn: A Technological History ofthe Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles 
(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4206, 1980). 
100. Charles Murray and Catherine Bly Cox, Apollo: Race to the Moon (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1989). 
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American Values and the Future of Technology (1991), William Sims Bainbridge 
used sociological methods to investigate how actors in American culture 
have used language in popular discussions on space exploration. On the insti- 
tutional and organizational side, Diane Vaughan, in The Challenger Launch 
Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA (1996), used inter- 
disciplinary approaches derived from sociology and communications theory 
to analyze the culture of NASA in the 1980~.~’~  Her research illustrates the 
ways in which organizations develop their own culture that, depending on 
the scarcity of resources, fosters an environment that finds high risk acceptable 
without breaking any major rules. Her conception of the “normalization of 
deviance” suggests important avenues of further research, especially for study- 
ing space projects that did not achieve any significant successes.1o2 
Others have explored more esoteric approaches to the technological his- 
tory ofthe space program. In The Religion ofTechnology (1997), David F. Noble 
investigates the role of scripture and definable Christian symbolism in the 
“dreaming” for space exploration in the pre-Sputnik days and the invocation 
of God as a transcendental element in the rhetoric of modern-day managers, 
activists, and a~tronauts.’’~ If not all of his ruminations are convincing, his 
findings on the prehistory of space travel suggest as-yet-unexplored opportu- 
nities for scholarship on the relationship between religion and spaceflight in 
the early 20th century, furthered recently by Roger D. Launius in a medita- 
tion on utopianism and space advo~acy.’’~ David E. Nye, in his essay “Don’t 
Fly Me to the Moon: The Public and the Apollo Space Program,” also con- 
tributes to the move away from technological determinism. He challenges the 
near-sacred notions among the “space cadet” community that the history of 
space exploration was of any significance in the history of humanity; he also 
questions the notion that “experiencing outer space transformed inner con- 
sciousness,” a claim which hinged on the images of a fragile Earth as seen from 
deep space by the Apollo astronauts. He concludes that retrospect has made 
Apollo a unifying memory when in reality, during its execution, the polity 
and populace remained fractured over its symbolic and material benefits. He 
concludes, “Just as all Americans revere their Revolution, even though less 
than half the population actively supported it in 1776, the Apollo Program 
appears to be gaining sanctity in retr~spect.”~’~ 
101. Diane Vaughan, Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA 
102. Vaughan’s analysis, of course, also influenced the work of the Columbia Accident 
103. David F. Noble, The Religion of’l’echnology: The Divinity ofMan and the Spirit oflnvention (New 
104. Launius, “Perfect Worlds, Perfect Societies.” 
105. David E. Nye, Narratives and Spaces: Technology and the Construction ofAmerican Culture (New 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
Investigation Board. 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), pp. 115-142. 
York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 160. 
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Robotic spaceflight has yielded significant new understandings about the solar 
system. This is the first contiguous, uniform, 360-degree color panorama taken by the 
Imager for Mars Pathfinder (IMP) over the course of sols 8, 9, and 10 (Martian days) 
in 1997. Different regions were imaged a t  different times over the three Martian days 
These new works underscore that, collectively, historians need to move 
beyond methodological approaches that embrace technological determinism, 
Whiggish history, and program-centered histories. They suggest six areas for 
further research: 
1) Despite nearly 40 years of writing space history, we still do not have a 
substantive history of space technology, work focused not on programs 
but on the technologies that constitute a complete system capable of 
spaceflight, including rocket engines, solar cells, fuel cells, communi- 
cations equipment, thermal protection, guidance systems, materials, 
etc.lo6 We need histories that are neither programmatic nor artifact- 
centered; for example, a history of satellite-based optical systems 
(cameras, lenses, mirrors, data recovery, etc.) could shed light on the 
relationship between a particular technology, commercial industry, or 
the military and the way in which consumers can shape technologies. 
2) An important but unexplored aspect of the space industry is the 
economic history of space manufacturing-in particular of rockets, 
engines, and satellites, which would illuminate issues of govern- 
ment-industry relations, quality control, and labor practices; it is also 
106. For works on discrete technologies, see Ldlian D. Kozloski, US.  Space Gear: Outfitting the 
Astronaut (Washington, DC. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993); Eldon C. Hall,Journey to the A4oon:The 
History of the Apollo Guidance Computer (Reston, VA AIAA, 1996); Gary L. Harris, The Origins and 
Technology oftheAdvanced Extravehicular Space Suit (San Diego, CA: Univelt, 2001); James A. Dewar, To the 
End ofthe Solar System:The Story ofthe Nuclear Rocket (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004). 
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to acquire consistent lighting and shadow conditions for all areas of the panorama. 
At left is a lander petal and a metallic mast that is a portion of the low-gain antenna. 
Deflated air bags are visible at the perimeters of all three lander petals. INASA image 
no. PIAOO752) 
necessary to locate this history within the broader history of mass 
production in America.lo7 
3 )  Journalists have devoted much attention to the various disasters of the 
Space Age, but besides one significant exception-David Shayler’s 
Disasters in Manned Spacejlight (2000)-they have been focused nar- 
rowly on particular incidents.”* Because the literature on space his- 
tory has had a triumphalist arc (introduction, plot thickens, crisis, 
triumph over adversity), it has ignored accounts of long-range tech- 
nological failures, which can also shed light on abandoned lineages 
of technologies and the contingencies that shaped our adoption of 
certain systems over  other^.'^' 
107. For mass production in general, see David A. Hounshell’s seminal From the American System 
to Mass Production (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1984). For a brief essay on the economics ofthe space 
program, see Henry R. Hertzfeld, “Space as an Investment in Economic Growth,” in Exploring the 
Unknown, ed. Logsdon, vol. 3, pp. 385-400. 
108. David Shayler, Disasters and Accidents in Manned Spacefight (New York: Springer, 2000). 
For various disaster-focused works, see Henry S. F. Cooper, Thirteen, the Flight That Failed (New 
York: Dial Press, 1972); Malcolm McConnell, Challenger: A Major Malfcrnction (Garden City, N Y  
Doubleday, 1987); Joseph Trento, Prescription for Disaster (New York: Crown, 1987); Richard S. 
Lewis, Challenger: The Final Voyage (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Claw Jensen 
and Barbara Haveland, N o  Downlink: A Dramatic Narrative about the Challenger Accident and Our Time 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996); Michael Cabbage and William Harwood, Comm 
Check: The  Final Flight ofShuttle Columbia (New York: Free Press, 2004). 
109. For technological failure, see Neil Schlager, ed., When Technology Fails: Signijcunt Technological 
Disasters, Accidents and Failures of the Twentieth Century (Detroit: Gale Research, 1994); Azriel Lorber, 
Misguided Weapons: Technological Failure and Surprise on the Battlefield (Washington, DC: Brasseys, 
2002). 
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4) The social constructivist approach remains a powerful methodological 
tool for in-depth studies of any number of rocket and spaceflight sys- 
tems, including, for example, the Space Shuttle, which is an excellent 
case for studying how different actors can shape the form and function 
of a technological system; such an approach would help to avoid the 
deterministic historical narratives that assume, for example, that the 
liquid-propellant rocket was the obvious method to reach space with- 
out questioning the social and cultural forces that led Tsiolkovskiy, 
Goddard, Oberth, and others to arrive at the rocket as the propulsive 
force for access to space. 
5) A relatively unexplored area is the social construction of risk in space 
technological systems; for example, we know little in a systematic 
way about the manner in which risk has been constructed, defined, 
and invoked in human versus robotic systems, in different human 
spaceflight programs, among engineers and flight directors, etc. An 
important unexplored question remains the historical evolution of 
what it means to “man-rate’’ a vehicle. 
6) We still do not have well-researched histories on the continuing 
tension between robotic and human spaceflight; specific areas of 
inquiry could include the interplay between technology, policy, 
and organizational culture in determining choices for robotic versus 
human spaceflight; what role economics plays in these choices; and 
the ways in which we measure “output” for given space projects 
(whether human or robotic) and how these evaluations may or may 
not be contingent upon premiums placed upon human or robotic 
spaceflight. Finally, a useful avenue of research may be to explore why 
and how, during the early space era (especially in the pre-Sputnik 
years), policy-makers overwhelmingly emphasized human spaceflight 
in their public advocacy. 
Social History 
Beyond political history, several historians and sociologists have taken up 
the job of moving beyond nose cone history into broader social themes. An 
early progenitor of this subgenre was William S. Bainbridge’s The Spaceflight 
Revolution: A Sociological Study (1976). Although his focus was primarily on 
spaceflight visionaries from the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Bainbridge 
argued that the advancement of technology was not necessarily deterministic. 
In fact, in cases of revolutionary technology such as the rocket, the principal 
actors (such as von Braun) maneuvered the government and military into 
facilitating resources to implement their goals of spaceflight. Thus, instead of 
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being co-opted by the state, scientists and engineers opportunistically took 
advantage of the state.”O 
Historians have also investigated a number of methodological issues 
related to the study of the early space program, including the problem of doing 
contemporary or near-contemporary history. Because of the recent nature of 
the history of space exploration, participants can play a large role in the way 
space history is chronicled. Participants provide evidence for historians, write 
history books, and sometimes dismiss nonparticipant history with a “you- 
weren’t-there” rationale; historians respond by condescending to the partici- 
pants by invoking “that noble dream” of objectivity and distance.”’ Space 
historians must explicitly address these methodological concerns if their goal 
is to produce history without baggage. 
Beyond methodological concerns, an important aspect of the social 
dimension of spaceflight has been the relationship between public opinion and 
the space program. Mark E. Byrnes, in his Politics and Space: Image Making by 
NASA (1994), traced the effects of NASA’s image-building policy on popu- 
lar perceptions of the organization as well as broader support for the cause of 
space travel. He argued that NASA primarily used three images-national- 
ism, romanticism, and pragmatism-to create and consolidate political support 
across the nation for its major endeavors in space.”’ Similar work by others has 
helped to challenge many accepted notions about public advocacy for the space 
program. Using quantitative data, for example, Herbert E. Krugman found 
that “given the extensive media coverage of the space events throughout [the 
Apollo program], favorable publicity did not seem to have generated equally 
favorable public support for the Apollo pr~gram.””~ Roger D. Launius found 
that popular support for the space program remained at the same relative level 
both during and after the Apollo program, undercutting the received notion 
110. William S. Bainbridge, The Spaceflight Revolution: A Sociological Study (New York: Wiley, 
1976). 
111. For a history of the search for objectivity in the discipline of history in American academia, 
see Peter Novick’s That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American Historical Profession 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For some of the methodological consider- 
ations in writing space history, see Joseph N. Tatarewicz, “Writing the History of Space Science 
and Technology: Multiple Audiences with Divergent Goals and Standards,” in The Historiography 
of Contemporary Science and Technology, ed. Thomas Soderqvist (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic 
Publishers, 1997), pp. 71-89. 
112. Mark E. Byrnes, Politics and Space: Image Making by N A S A  (Westport, C T  Praeger, 
1994). See also James L. Kauffman, Selling Outer Space: Kennedy, the Media, and Funding for Project 
Apollo, 2962-2963 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1994); Lynn Marie Disbrow, “A 
Metaphorical Analysis of the Evolution of NASA’s Public Image, 1962-1986” (Ph.D. diss., Wayne 
State University, 1989). 
113. Herbert E. Krugman, “Public Attitudes Toward the Apollo Space Program, 1965-1975,” 
Journal of Communication 27, no. 4 (1977): 87-93. 
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of a “golden age” of mass support for the space pr~gram.”~ Expanding the 
frontier on social histories of the Space Age, recent studies have also focused 
on hitherto unexplored but crucial elements of the history of spaceflight such 
as the pro-space movement, the impact of the space program on geographical 
locales, and engineers as a mass dem~graphic.”~ 
Beyond these important exceptions, social history, which revolutionized 
mainstream American history beginning in the 1960s, has not made many 
inroads into space history. I identify five areas for further study concerning the 
relationship between society and space: 
1) The history of the space program remains incomplete unless we 
explore the lived experiences and backgrounds of large demographic 
groups such as engineers, servicemen and -women, military and intel- 
ligence personnel involved in programs, launch personnel, staff work- 
ers, spouses and families of engineers in both the civilian and military 
space programs, etc. 
2) Further exploration is necessary on the relationship between public 
advocacy and political commitment in the context of the space pro- 
gram, extending the work already done; such approaches would require 
explorations of the efficacy of formal and informal lobby groups. 
3 )  In the past few years, a number of historians have taken steps into 
exploring the place of gender in the history of the space program; 
all of the work so far has focused on early women contenders for 
the astronaut corps, the so-called FLATs (First Lady Astronaut 
Trainees); most of these are narrow “surgical” histories that say little 
beyond recounting their life histories. The one exception, Margaret 
Weitekamp’s superb Right Stuff; Wrong Sex: Americu’s First Women in 
Spuce Program (2004), uses the FLATs story to revisit the social and 
cultural codes that guided broader American views on women, tech- 
nology, and exploration in late-20th-century America.l16 Yet these 
114. Roger D. Launius, “Public opinion polls and perceptions of US human spaceflight,” Space 
Policy 19 (2003): 163-175. 
115. Michael A. G. Michaud, Reaching for the High Frontier: The American Pro-Space Movement, 
1972-84 (New York: Praeger, 1986); William Barnaby Faherty, Florida’s Space Coast: The Impact of 
N A S A  on the Sunshine State (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002); Sylvia D. Fries, N A S A  
Engineers and the Age of Apollo (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4104, 1992). 
116. Margaret A. Weitekamp, Right Stu& Wrong Sex: America’s First Women in Space Program 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2004). See also Bernice Trimble Steadman with Jody M. Clark, 
Tethered Mercury: A Pilot’s Memoir: The Right StuJ-but the Wrong Sex (Traverse City, MI: Aviation 
continued on the next page 
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works still leave much to be done since we still do not have any sys- 
tematic studies of the role of women in much larger demographics 
who participated in the space program-in engineering, medicine, 
administration, and staff positions, as well as the thousands who were 
spouses in a predominantly male-dominated pr~ject;"~ we also need 
histories of women astronauts who actually flew in space, as opposed 
to those who never did. 
4) We need more studies of how the growth of the space industry has 
affected particular geographical locales, particularly Texas, Alabama, 
California, and Florida; space historians need to rise up to the chal- 
lenge to link subdisciplines such as urban history to space history by 
chronicling, for example, the transformation of urban sites through 
development and abandonment cycles or the motivations of many young 
scientists and engineers to pursue a career in the space program."' 
5) The American space program was most identified with a White male 
demographic which reflects the natural distribution of those who 
managed and participated in the endeavor, yet it is important that 
we have a good understanding of the role and place of the space pro- 
gram demographic through broader-and, in some ways, cataclys- 
mic-changes in the social fabric of American society from the 1960s 
to the 1990s in terms of racial relations and immigration."' 
continued from the previous page 
Press, 2001); Pamela Freni, Spacefor Women: A History $Women with the Right Stuff(Santa Ana, CA: 
Seven Locks Press, 2002); Stephanie Nolen, Promised the Moon: The Untold Story of the First Women 
in Space Race (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2003); Bettyann Kevles, Almost Heaven: The 
Story of Women in Space (New York: Basic Books, 2003); Martha Ackmann, The Mercury 13: The 
Untold Story of 13 American Women and the Dream ofspaceflight (New York: Random House, 2003). 
117. For recent autobiographical works that touch on broader issues of the role of women engi- 
neers in the American space program, see Shirley and Morton, Managing Martians; M. G. Lord, 
Astro Tuvf: The Private Li@ ofRocket Science (New York: Walker & Co., 2004). See also the piece 
on women who worked at Australia's Woomera Rocket Range: Kerrie Dougherty, ''Calculatlng 
Women: A Brief History of the LRWEIWRE Computing Team," Quest: The History ofSpacefriBht 
Quarterly 9, no. 4 (2002): 31-39. 
118. A recent pathbreaking article on the influence of postwar suburbanization on physicists' selec- 
tion of professional topics is exemplary of the kinds of new work in other fields. See David Kaiser,"The 
Postwar Suburbanization ofAmerican Physics," American Studies 56, no. 4 (2004): 851-888. 
119. Like the gender issue, the role of race in the American space program has been explored 
only through the focus of astronauts. See for example, J. Alfred Phelps, They Had A Dream: The 
Story ofAfn'can-American Astronauts (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994); Stanley P. Jones, African-American 
Astronauts (Mankato, MN: Capstone High/Low Books, 1998); Mae Jemison, Find Where the Wind 
Goes: Moments From M y  Lqe (New York: Scholastic, 2001); Betty Kaplan Gubert et al., Distinguished 
African Americans in Aviation and Space Science (Westport, C T  Oryx Press, 2002). There is also a 
large canon ofjuvenile literature on African American astronauts. 
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Cultural History 
The cultural history of spaceflight is the most recent subgenre in the field 
and also the most heterogeneous. A survey of the key works shows deep and 
broad work encompassing everything from relatively orthodox studies of the 
place of spaceflight in American culture to more postmodern meditations on 
modernity, masculinity, and machines. Perhaps the earliest work in the field 
was Norman Mailer’s Ofa Fire on the Moon (1969), which, coming as it did in 
the year ofApollo 11, contrasted sharply with other contemporary accounts of 
Apollo.lZ0 Using field research, Mailer constructed a narrative that illustrated 
the clash-and sometimes rapprochement-between the young countercul- 
ture of the late 1960s and the pseudomilitary culture of NASA. Mailer implic- 
itly critiqued what he believed was the militarized and regimented culture of 
NASA, with its middle-class values that cherished patriotism and encouraged 
unquestioned adherence to the dominant political culture. 
A few authors have explored how the space program has resonated in 
modern literature. In the insightful Seeing Earth: Literary Responses to Space 
Exploration (1985), Ronald Weber deconstructed many of the attendant meta- 
phors that cultural commentators-writers, poets, scholars, philosophers, 
theologians, astronauts, and others-have used to invoke, explain, extol, and 
critique the American space program, locating their meditations between the 
broad themes of “liberating leap into a mysterious future” and a new apprecia- 
tion of the Earth itself.lZ1 William D. Atwill, in Fire and Power: The American 
Space Program as Postmodern Narrative (1994), adopts a similar methodological 
approach but takes a more critical stance towards the American space pro- 
gram, specifically Apollo. His thought-provoking explorations, which touch 
on domestic shocks of the Vietnam War, try to unpack “the difficulty so many 
writers had telling [the] story of a technocratic enterprise simultaneously cen- 
tral and antithetical to the time and place that produced it.”lZ2 
Dale A. Carter also referenced American literature-in his case, Thomas 
Pynchon’s classic novel Gravity’s Rainbow (1973)-but had a more ambi- 
120. Norman Mailer, O f a  Fire on the Moon (New York: New American Library, 1969). See also 
W. David Lewis, “Buzz Aldrin’s Return to Earth: The Astronaut and Social Values in Apollo Era 
America,” Quest: The History ofSpacefight Quarterly 6, no. 1 (1998): 40-43. 
121. Ronald Weber, Seeing Earth: Literary Responses to Space Exploration (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 1985). For other, similar explorations, see Laurence Goldstein, The Flying Machine and Modern 
Literature (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); George Held, “Men on the Moon: 
American Novelists Explore Lunar Space,” Michigan Quarterly Review 18 (spring 1979): 318-342; 
Laurence Goldstein, ‘“The End of All Our Exploring’: The Moon Landing and Modern Poetry,” 
Michigan Quarterly Review 18 (spring 1979): 192-217. For a look at space and the visual medium, 
see Laura M. Andre, “Lunar Nation: The Moon and American Visual Culture, 1957-1972” (Ph.D. 
diss., University of North Carolina, 2002). 
122. William D. Atwill, Fire and Power: The American Space Program as Postmodern Narrative 
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1994), p. 11. 
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tious goal: to rewrite the postwar history of the American space program as 
a critique of American expansionist military and economic aims. In Carter’s 
worldview, the American space program represented a “Rocket State,” a con- 
fluence of civilian and military interests with little or no moral code. The 
book remains one of the most important synthetic cultural histories of the 
American space program.’23 Other, similar critiques of the American space 
program have emerged from the new cultural history and include David 
Lavery’s Latefor the Sky: The Mentality of the Space Age (1992), which rejects 
one of the most fundamental assumptions of space mythology, taken as gospel 
by other cultural commentators such as Wyn Wachhorst, that humans are 
propelled by unknown and innate forces to explore space.’24 
New work has also focused on popular culture. While not strictly a cul- 
tural history, Howard E. McCurdy’s Space and the American Imagination (1997) 
remains one of the most powerful studies on how popular conceptions of 
space exploration in American culture helped to shape national space policy.’25 
The iconography of space exploration in the 1950s, McCurdy argued, tapped 
deeply into some of America’s most entrenched cultural ideals such as the 
“limitless frontier,” the “heroic explorer,” the romance of aviation through 
Lindbergh and Earhart, and ultimately the utopian ideal of progress through 
technology.’26 Space enthusiasts and advocates such as Wernher von Braun 
used many of the same cultural representations in their lobbying but added 
the fear of the Soviet threat during the Cold Wzr. By invoking the specter of 
world domination in the late 1950s and early 1960s, they were able to influ- 
ence major policy decisions, including Kennedy’s historic decision to go to 
the Moon in 1961.12’ Marina Benjamin’s eloquent Rocket Dreams: How the 
Space Age Shaped Our View and the Future of Technology (2003) is the view from 
the other side, i.e., how the space program has affected popular culture. Her 
exploration of how popular culture has relegated the “space age” to a cultural 
123. Dale Carter, The Final Frontier: The Rise and Fall of the American Rocket State (London: Verso, 
1988). 
124. David Lavery, Late for the Sky: The Mentality of the Space Age (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1992); Wyn Wachhorst, The Dream of Spaceflight: Essays on the Near Edge of Infinity 
(New York: Basic Books, 2000). 
125. Howard E. McCurdy, Space and the American Imagination (Washington, DC: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1997). 
126. See also James A. Spiller, “Constructing America at the Peripheries: The Cultural Politics of 
United States Science and Exploration in Outer Space and Antarctica, 1950s-1990s” (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Wisconsin, 1999); Susan L. Mangus, “Conestoga Wagons to the Moon: The Frontier, 
the American Space Program, and National Identity” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1999). 
127. See also Mike Wright, “The Disney-Von Braun Collaboration and Its Influence on Space 
Exploration,” in Inner Space/Onter Space: Humanities, Technology and the Post-Modern World, ed. 
Daniel Schenker, Craig Hanks, and Susan Kray (Huntsville, AL: Southern Humanities Press, 
1993), pp. 151-160. 
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hinterland in the post-Apollo era is a powerful investigation into why the 
Along with the works of McCurdy and Benjamin, De Witt Douglas 
Kilgore’s Astvofutuvism (2003) represents one of the three most important 
books on the cultural history of spaceflight to appear thus far.Iz9 Marshaling 
an impressive array of source material, Kilgore investigates the conflicting 
ideals embedded in America’s vision of the future as represented in intel- 
lectual, scientific, artistic, and political discourse of the late 20th century. 
The power of Kilgore’s work lies not only in his explication of how and why 
a whole progress-oriented and futuristic space discourse resonated with so 
many in American culture, but also why Americans have found certain values 
in knowledge, politics, and art so desirable. The work depicts the history of 
futures propagated, struggled over, and, in some cases, lost.’30 
These recent works point to six different areas within the cultural history 
of spaceflight fertile for future scholarship: 
space age” resonated in the first place to so many.Iz8 ( 6  
1) The role of memory, myth, and nostalgia in shaping current under- 
standing of the history of spaceflight remains unexplored; decon- 
structing the Apollo myth in popular discourse-particularly its resale 
as cultural cachet via what Michael L. Smith has called “commodity 
scientism”-may deepen our understanding of why Apollo retains 
such a grip on the collective memory.I3l 
2) Going beyond hagiographical treatments of astronauts, cultural his- 
torians should devote attention to the complex role astronauts play 
as part of the iconography of heroism in American culture; further 
exploring the groundwork laid by Tom Wolfe in his seminal The Right 
Stufi(1979) as well as focusing on astronauts in the post-Apollo era 
128. Marina Benjamin, Rocket Dreams: How the Space Age Shaped Our Vision o fa  World Beyond 
(New York: Free Press, 2003). See also Paul Levinson, Realspace: The  Fate ofPhysical Presence in the 
Digital Age, O n  and Offthe Planet (London: Routledge, 2003), a similar meditation on the ways in 
which the digital age may have dampened humanity’s urge to explore space. 
129. Kilgore, Asfrofuturism. See also his “Engineers’ Dreams: Wernher von Braun, Willy Ley, and 
Astrofuturism in the 1950s,” Canadian Review ofAmerican Studies 27, no. 2 (1997): 103-131. 
130. See also Roger D. Launius, “Perceptions of Apollo: Myth, Nostalgia, Memory, or All of 
the Above?” Space Policy 21 (May 2005): 129-139; Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy, 
Imagining Space: Achievements, Predictions, Possibilities, 1950-2050 (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 
2001); Bruce Horrigan, “Popular Culture and Visions of the Future in Space, 1901-2001,” in 
New Perspectives on Technology and American Culture, ed. Bruce Sinclair (Philadelphia: American 
Philosophical Society, 1986), pp. 49-67. 
131. Michael L. Smith, “Selling the Moon: The U.S. Manned Space Program and the Triumph 
of Commodity Scientism,” in The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 2880- 
1980, ed. Richard Wrightman Fox and T. J. Jackson Lears (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 
pp. 175-209. ’ 
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would add significantly to understanding the shaping and evolution 
of the astronaut icon from hero and explorer in the 1960s to mechanic 
and experimenter in the 21st century.’32 Susan Faludi’s Stged: The 
Betrayal ofthe American Man (1999), where she argues that the emascu- 
lation of the astronaut in the post-Apollo era in part contributed the 
“betrayal” of the “American Man,” suggests that the fall of the astro- 
naut icon was as salient as its rise, but the extant scholarship remains 
woefully in~omp1ete.l~~ 
3)  A cultural history of the Space Age would be incomplete without 
fully researched scholarship on the rituals that have shaped the lives 
of not only participants in the space program but also those who wit- 
nessed it as viewers;’34 similarly, we need to revisit the history of space 
travel through the lens of popular scientific ~u1ture . l~~ An area ripe 
for investigation is the ways in which popular space culture shaped 
the lives of adolescents in the 1960s through science fiction, popular 
magazines, toys, models, and ~ 1 u b s . l ~ ~  
4) The recent graphic anthology 2001: Building For Space Travel (2001) 
was an important step in connecting space culture with the history of 
the built environment on Earth, particularly ar~hitecture;’~~ there still 
remains much to be done in terms of connecting the history of space 
exploration with the history of material culture-automobiles, toys, 
home appliances-to name only a few examples. 
5) Essential for studying the history of space exploration is the role of 
particular ideologies-whether utopian, spiritual, millenarian, excep- 
132. Wolfe, The Right S tu f i  
133. Susan Faludi, StiJied: The  Betrayal of the American Man (New York: William Morrow & Co., 
1999). See also Debra Benita Shaw, “Bodies Out  of this World: The Space Suit as Cultural Icon,” 
Science as Culture 13 (March 2004): 123-144. 
134. For early explorations on this field, see several articles by Colin Fries in Quest: The History of 
SpacefZight Quarterly: ”Space Age Legends: Urban Folk Tales Collected by the NASA Headquarters 
History Office” (vol. 8, no. 1 [2000]: 18-23), “Flying for Us: Space Age Milestones Celebrated in 
Music” (vol. 9, no. 3 [2002]: 30-36), “Sports Milestones in Space” (vol. 10, no. 2 [2003]: 37-40), 
and “Traditions of the Space Age” (vol. 11, no. 1 [2004]: 31-39). 
135. For a notable exception, which primarily covers the media of TV and film, see Robert A. 
Jones, “They Came in Peace for all Mankind: Popular Culture as a Reflection of Public Attitudes 
to Space,” Space Policy 20 (2004): 45-48. 
136. For a brieflook at the relationship between the proliferation ofscience fiction and the cause 
of spaceflight in the U.S., see the essay “Rockets to the Moon, 1919-1944: A Debate Between 
Reality and Fiction,” in Paul A. Carter, Politics, Religion, and Rockets: Essays in Twentieth Century 
American History (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1991), pp. 181-195. 
137. John Zukowsky, ed., 2001: Buildingfor Space Travel (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2001). 
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tionalist, modernist, humanist, atheistic, technological, environ- 
mental, or other-that motivated advocates, critics, and participants 
(direct and vicarious) of spaceflight in the 20th century.138 
6 )  A few have begun to revisit the history of space exploration through 
the theoretical framework of feminist studies, some through a reading 
of such sources as female-written “slasher” novels. Constance Penley’s 
N A S A / T R E K :  Popular Science and Sex in America (1997) critically 
tackles, among many topics, the role of sexuality in spaceflight cul- 
ture and also discusses NASA’s “inability to manage the meanings of 
women in additionally, Yaakov Jerome Garb’s ecofeminist 
approach to reevaluating the famous photograph of the whole Earth 
from lunar distance focused not on the epiphany of (re)discovering 
“one world” for all of humanity, but rather on how that iconic image 
of the Earth helped to entrench a more negative view, one of the 
dispassionate gaze of omniscient science as a masculine epistemol- 
ogy controlling all of nature, knowledge, and h~manity.’~’ Finally, 
in Cosmodolphins: Feminist Cultural Studies of Technology, Animals and 
the Sacred (2000), authors Mette Bryld and Nina Lykke used a critical 
feminist approach to unpack the relationships between the Space Age, 
the “New Age,” and the ecological symbolism of nature (represented 
through the icon of the dolphin). In taking a feminist approach to 
rewriting the master narratives of spaceflight, they identified what 
I believe is an important topic for future historians, the relationship 
between national identity and the making of history. They write: 
The early space race was, amongst other things, a discur- 
sive battle over entitlement to represent Universal Man in 
the biggest story told in modern times. Who was going 
to be the script writer and the protagonist of the master 
narrative of mankind’s cosmic exodus? This was and is a 
138. For an unusual look at space culture through “posthuman theory,” see Melanie A. R. 
Brown, “Posthumanity’s Manifest Destiny: NASA, Its Contradictory Image and Promises, and 
Popufar Culture” (Ph.D. diss., University of Central Florida, 2004). 
139. Constance Penley, N A S A / T R E K :  Popular Science and Sex in America (New York: Verso, 
1997), p. 3.  
140. Yaakov Jerome Garb, “The Use and Misuse ofthe Whole Earth Image,” Whole Earth Review 
no. 45 (March 1985): 18-25, and “Perspective or Escape? Ecofeminist Musings on Contemporary 
Earth Imagery,” in Reweaving the World: The Emergence o f  Ecofeminism, ed. Irene Diamond and 
Gloria Feman Orenstein (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1990), pp. 264-278. See also Jonathan 
Bordo, “Ecological Peril, Modern Technology and the (Post)Modern Sublime,” in Shadow ofSpirit: 
Postmodernism and Religion, eds. Phillipa Berry and Andrew Wernick (New York: Routledge, 1992), 
pp. 165-178. 
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question that matters a great deal when the official story of 
spaceflight is retold [separately in the U.S. and Russia] .I4* 
Their conclusions hint at further opportunities for research on national claims 
for the history of space travel: which was more “important” in the history of 
space exploration, the first time a human left the planet Earth (Yuri Gagarin) 
or the first time a human set foot on another celestial body (Neil Armstrong)? 
Ask a Russian and then an American, and one would get different responses. In 
both cases, historians use extraordinary metaphors to imbue them with grav- 
ity, comparisons that typically center on the movement of Earthly life from 
the oceans to land. The parallel narratives are contradictory but exist simul- 
taneously in multiple national discourses, buttressed by masculine notions of 
rationalism, exploration, and evolution. In some sense, space historians need 
to question how “thematic consensus” in space historiography was shaped by 
national identity. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The flavor of American space history has also been profoundly shaped 
by the location and sponsorship of its primary practitioners. In other words, 
American space history largely remains “court history.” For the past 40 years, 
it has been predominantly sponsored, written, and issued as a result of funding 
from sources who direct and operate the space program, i.e., the U.S. govern- 
ment (through NASA, the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum, 
and the Department of Defense) or major corporations. Because there has 
been no vibrant nongovernmental or noncorporate space history community 
(in academia, public history positions, or elsewhere), American space history 
has been much more conservative than other historical subdisciplines. The 
field has typically had a romance with the power and progress inherent in 
technology; it eulogizes and deifies a few important men; and it eschews any 
position that would criticize celebratory, jingoistic, or militaristic elements of 
the space program. The works of those who have broken this mold despite 
their connections to official organizations-Launius, Logsdon, McCurdy, and 
Neufeld, for example-collectively represent an important and positive, albeit 
minority, trend in the field of space h i~ t0 ry . l~~  
141. Mette Marle Bryld and Nina Lykke, Cosmodolphins: Feminist Cultural Studies of Technology, 
Animals and the Sacred (London: Zed Books, 2000). 
142. Michael J. Neufeld’s work, particularly his seminal The Rocket and the Rei& Peenemunde and 
the Coming ofthe Ballistic Missile Era (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), revolution- 
ized the history of the wartime German ballistic missile program by providing a balanced treatment 
of the development of the V-2 that did not gloss over the terrible human costs of its development. 
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The mainstream academic community has devoted very little attention 
to the space program, partly because academics tend to be narrowly focused 
on topics such as race, ethnicity, and gender. Typically, academics have had 
a condescending attitude towards fields such as the history of technology or 
space history, partly because they see in these fields little of interest to such 
contemporary conceptual lenses such as poststructuralism; postcolonial stud- 
ies; feminist studies; and issues revolving around gender, ethnicity, power, 
transnationalism, and sexuality. Academics have often refused to see the com- 
plexities of the space program, relying instead on unidimensional, weak, and 
often lazy interpretations of the space program as a bankrupt and militaristic 
element of American society. 
The publication of syntheses can say much about a particular discipline. 
On  the one hand, in a field that is very young, one might expect most works 
to be somewhat of a synthesis given the paucity of subject matter. On the 
other hand, maturity and longevity of a discipline and its attendant accumula- 
tion of source material might also engender the writing of syntheses. Since the 
beginnings of the field of space history, journalists and historians have tack- 
led the problem of the synthesis with various degrees of success. Von Braun 
and Ordway’s History ofRocketry and Space Travel (1966) was an early attempt 
that emphasized some of the key motifs of Cold War historiography such as 
exploration, competition, and the social welfare of all humankind. The work 
focused on great figures, civilian space exploration, and the potential ben- 
efits of the ~ r 0 j e c t . l ~ ~  More comprehensive works appeared in the 1980s and 
1990s that benefited from post-Cold War revelations. T. A. Heppenheimer’s 
Countdown: A History o f  Spaceflight (1997) traced the evolution of rocketry 
from pioneering theoreticians in the late 19th century to the mid-1990s. 
Heppenheimer’s marshaling of information is masterful, and his use of inspir- 
ing language complements his view that Apollo was “a drive toward a new 
human Tom Crouch’s Aimingfor the Stars: The Dreamers and Doers .f 
the Space Age (1999) is an eloquent exegesis on innovators in the 20th century 
who tried to translate their visions of space exploration-both successfully 
and unsuccessfully-into reality.’45 Although focused on great men and great 
technology, Heppenheimer’s and Crouch’s works remain the most successful 
syntheses in the traditional style of space h i~ t0 ry . l~~  
143. Von Braun and Ordway, History of Rocketry and Space Travel. The monograph was published 
in several updated versions up to 1985. 
144. T. A. Heppenheimer, Countdown: A History ofspacefight (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1997), p. 2. 
145. Tom D. Crouch, Aimingfor the Stars: The Dreamers and Doers ofthe Space Age (Washington, 
DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1999). 
146. For other syntheses, see Andrew Wilson, The Eagle Has Wings: The Story of American Space 
Exploration, 1945-1975 (London: British Interplanetary Society, 1982); David Baker, The History 
continued on the next page 
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Other recent syntheses remain flawed by their dated interpretations. 
William E. Burrows, in his This New Ocean: The Story of the First Space Age 
(1998), used an array of recently declassified material from both the United 
States and former Soviet Union to produce an otherwise eloquent narrative 
of the entire Space Age.14’ Burrows’s work, however, derives solidly from the 
Cold War framework of space exploration as a battle of noble proportions 
against a morally untrustable adversary. In demonizing communism as “more 
insidious” than Nazism, he describes the former as a “cancer, a disease that 
surreptitiously rode the bloodstream of the world, attacking and devouring 
every healthy organism in its path and growing bigger and more dangerous 
as it did By dismissing all of Soviet society as cancerous yet eulogizing 
such men as Sergei Korolev, such works inevitably end up in contradictions 
since we are left with no insight into how the former managed to produce the 
likes of the latter. Similarly, Mike Gruntman, in Blazing the Trail: The Early 
History .f SpaCecr.fr and Rocketry (2004), provides a well-researched and com- 
prehensive tale of the history of rocketry and spaceflight, with lucid explana- 
tions of technologies, but does Burrows one better by repeatedly denigrating 
not only the Russians but also American and Western liberals who questioned 
the American space program.’49 
With the rise of the new history, two threads of historiography now 
exist. One remains celebratory and internalist and the other questioning and 
externalist. Although there has been spillover from the former to the latter, 
the reverse, as evident in the works of Burrows and Gruntman, has been less 
common. It is clear, though, that both traditions have very important contri- 
butions to make. The old internalist history, focused on important men and 
singular artifacts, provided the backbone of our conception ofthe history ofthe 
space program. The new externalist history contributes the rationale, explica- 
tion-and the critiques-that make the old history meaningful. Despite the 
large canon of space history, those who have written syntheses have not man- 
continued from the previous page 
ofManued Spaceflight, 2nd ed. (New York: Crown Publishers, 1985); Michael Collins, Lijios The 
Story of America’s Adventure in Space (New York: Grove Press, 1988); H. P. Arnold, ed., Man in 
Space: A n  Illustrated History ofSpacefight (New York: Smithmark, 1993); Roger D. Launius, N A S A :  
A History of the U.S.  Civil Space Program (Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing Company, 1994); Helen 
Gavaghan, Something New Under the Sun: Satellites and the Beginning of the Space Age (New York: 
Copernicus, 1998). 
147. William E. Burrows, This New Ocean: The Story ofthe First Space Age (New York Random 
House, 1998). 
148. Ibid., p. 148. 
149. In describing the development of the Woomera missile test range in Australia in the 1960s, 
for example, Gruntman notes that “pacifists and communists tried to interfere with the construc- 
tion, as their counterparts invariably did with defense initiatives in other countries of the free 
world, thus serving willingly or unwittingly as a Soviet fifth column” (Mike Gruntman, Blazing the 
Trail: The  Early History of Spacecraft and Rocketry [Reston, VA: AIAA, 20041, p. 425). 
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aged to combine the two in any coherent fashion. One way to engender such 
a union would be for historians of spaceflight to engage much more actively 
with the mainstream American history c~mmuni ty . ’~~ Unlike the literature 
on American history, the writing on American space history is very young, 
but by engaging with a bigger audience-not only the broader public but 
also the academic history community-we might benefit from a rich vista of 
viewpoints that would move us forward from a fledgling subdiscipline to one 
that is vibrant, mature, and complex. And with maturity, we might yet see a 
powerful work that brings together the dictates of policy, the forces of society, 
and the nuances of culture into a grand narrative that chronicles the romance 
and the reality of this country’s efforts to explore space. 
150. It is of some importance that in the “list of upcoming meetings” section of the past four 
issues of News G Notes-the regular newsletter issued to the aerospace history community by the 
NASA History Office-one would find announcements for the many meetings of professional 
aerospace organizations but none for the annual meetings of the American Historical Association 
(AHA) or the Organization of American Historians (OAH). See the last four newsletters: NASA 
History Office, News 6 Notes 21, nos. 1-4 (2004). 
CHAPTER 15 
THE HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE’ 
Stephen B. Johnson 
e intent of this essay is to provide space historians with an overview of Th .  t e issues and sources of national security space so as to identify those 
areas that have been underserved. Frequently, ballistic missiles are left out of 
space history, as they only pass through space instead of remaining in space 
like satellites. I include ballistic missiles for several reasons, not the least of 
which is that they pass through space en route to their targets. 
Space programs originated in the national security (NS) arena, and except 
for a roughly 15-year period from the early 1960s through the mid-l970s, NS 
space expenditures in the United States (U.S.), let alone the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), have equaled or exceeded those of civilian pro- 
grams. Despite this reality, the public nature of government-dominated civil- 
ian programs and issues of security classifications have kept NS space out of 
the limelight. The recent declassification of the early history of the National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the demise of the Soviet Union have led 
to a recent spate of publications that have uncovered much of the “secret 
history” of the early Cold War. Nonetheless, much of NS space history has 
received little attention from historians. 
One feature of military organizations that is of great value for historians 
is their penchant to document their histories, and space organizations are 
no exception. Most military organizations have historians assigned to them, 
with professional historians at many of the positions documenting events as 
they occur. 
Unfortunately, this very positive feature is countered by the require- 
ments of secrecy and classification (and, in the case of the Naval Research 
Laboratory, the loss of its archives by fire). It is unfortunately true that much 
of this treasure trove of documentation created by historians within space 
organizations will remain classified for years to come. Some of the earlier 
1. Many thanks to David Arnold, Donald Baucom, Matt Bille, Dwayne Day, Steve Dick, R. 
Cargill Hall, and Rick Sturdevant, all of whom provided many useful comments and provided me 
with many more sources than I would ever have been able to find on my own. 
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material is being declassified now or could be declassified if someone would 
request it and if sufficient priority were assigned to the task. This is a field 
where outsiders can be of great service. 
To exploit the mass of documents that exist requires that historians have 
a basic grasp of the subject, what has been published to date, and what is yet to 
be done. This article aims to perform these functions by surveying the various 
military space programs and issues, giving a very brief sketch of their histories, 
and identifying the main sources that historians have created and used. 
OVERVIEW SOURCES 
While there is no single comprehensive overview history of NS space, 
several works cover a variety of areas. Walter McDougall’s Pulitzer Prize- 
winning . . . The Heavens and the Earth, written in 1985, thoroughly discussed 
the NS aspects of the space race; it is getting dated but remains useful for an 
introduction to the politics of the 1950s and 1 9 6 0 ~ . ~  William Burrows’s This 
New Ocean integrates NS space issues nicely into his acclaimed overview space 
h i~ tory .~  Mike Gruntman’s Blazing the Trail is an overview history of space 
technology, accounting for military  contribution^.^ So, too, does Asif Siddiqi’s 
authoritative Challenge to Apollo for the Soviet program up to the mid-l970s, 
which also has a fine essay on Soviet space history  source^.^ Peter Hays6 and 
Dwayne Day7 provide overviews of military and intelligence space, respec- 
tively, in Eligar Sadeh’s Space Politics and Policy. 
An earlier, short review of the state of national security space research 
is provided by Day’s 1997 article, which focuses on issues as opposed to a 
bibliographic treatment.* Day provided an overview of U.S. military space 
2. Walter McDougall, . . . The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History ofthe Space Age (New 
3. William E. Burrows, This New Ocean: The Story ofthe First Space Age (New York: The Modern 
4. Mike Gruntman, Blazing the Trail: The Early History of Spacecraft and Rocketry (Reston, VA: 
5. AsifA. Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974 (Washington, 
6. Peter L. Hays, “Space and the Military,” in Space Politics and Policy, an Evolutionary Perspective, 
ed. Eligar Sadeh (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), pp. 335-370. 
7. Dwayne A. Day, “Intelligence Space Program,” in Space Politics and Policy, an Evolutionary 
Perspective, ed. Sadeh, pp. 371-388. 
8. Dwayne A. Day, “The State of Historical Research on Military Space,”Journal ofthe British 
Interplanetary Society 50 (1997): 203-206. See also Roger D. Launius, “The Military in Space: 
Policy-Making and Operations in a New Environment,” in A Guide to the Sources of United States 
Military History: Supplement Ir/: ed. Robin Higham and Donald J. Mrozek (North Haven, C T  
Archon Books, 1998), pp. 488-522. 
York: Basic Books, 1985). 
Library, 1998). 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2004). 
DC: NASA SP-2000-4408,2000). 
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operations from 1987 to 1995 in Journal of the British Interplanetary Society in 
December 1993, as well as an updated and extended version of the article in 
Countdown? Cargill Hall and Jacob Neufeld wrote an early work that gives a 
flavor of USAF activities.1° David Spires’s overview history of the USAF in 
space is the best single place to start for the USAF portion of NS space his- 
tory.” Curtis Peebles’s High Frontier is a much shorter introduction to USAF 
space history.12 USAF Space Command recently published a two-volume set 
of basic documents that are of great value to military space hi~t0rians.l~ 
Steven Zaloga’s The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword is the best overview of Soviet 
control of and defense against nuclear forces.I4 Nicholas Daniloff‘s 1972 The 
Kremlin and the Cosmos is an early but important source on the Soviet pro- 
gram,” as is Christian Lardier’s LHstronautique Sovidtique,“ which is excellent 
for the technical aspects of Soviet space systems. Gerald Borrowman wrote a 
short overview of Soviet military space activities in 1982.17 Nicholas Johnson 
created yearly assessments of the Soviet space program, some of which are 
summarized in Soviet Space Programs, 1980-1985.18 His 1987 Soviet Military 
Strategy in Space was also a major work at the time.’’ Finally, Johnson’s books 
Europe and Asia in Space: 1993-1994 and Europe and Asia in Space: 1991-1992 
are outstanding sources for those two regions.” 
9. Dwayne A. Day, “A Review of Recent American Space Operations,” journal of the British 
lnterplanetary Society 46, no. 12 (1993): 459-470; Dwayne A. Day, “Capturing the High Ground: 
The U.S. Military in Space, 1987-1995, Part 1,” Countdown 13, no. 1 (1995): 30-45; Dwayne A. 
Day, “Capturing the High Ground: The U.S. Military in Space, 1987-1995, Part 2,” Countdown 
13, no. 3 (1995): 17-31. 
10. R. Cargill Hall and Jacob Neufeld, The U.S. Air Force in Space: 1945 to the 21st Century 
(Washington, DC: USAF History and Museums Program, 1998). 
11. David N. Spires, Beyond Horizons: A HalfCentury of Air Force Space Leadership (Peterson AFB, 
60: Air Force Space Command, 1997). 
12. Curtis Peebles, H k h  Frontier: The United States Air Force and the Military Space Program 
(Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997). 
13. David N. Spires, Orbital Futures: Selected Documents in Air Force Space History, vol. 1 (Peterson 
AFB, CO: Air Force Space Command, 2004); David N. Spires, Orbital Futures: Selected Documents 
in Air Force Space History, vol. 2 (Peterson AFB, CO: Air Force Space Command, 2004). 
14. Steven J. Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear 
Forces, 1945-2000 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002). 
15. Nicholas Daniloff, The Kremlin and the Cosmos (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972). 
16. Christian Lardier, L’Astronautique Soviktique (Paris: Armand Colin, 1992). 
17. Gerald L. Borrowman, “Soviet Military Activities in Space,”journal of the British Interplanetary 
18. Nicholas L. Johnson, Soviet Space Programs, 1980-1985 (San Diego: Univelt Press, 1987). 
19. Nicholas L. Johnson, Soviet Military Strategy in Space (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information 
Group, 1987). 
20. Nicholas L. Johnson, Europe and Asia in Space: 1993-1994 (Kirtland AFB, NM: USAF 
Phillips Laboratory, 1995; Colorado Springs, GO: Kaman Sciences Corporation, 1995); Nicholas 
L. Johnson, Europe and Asia in Space: 1991-1992 (Kirtland AFB, NM: USAF Phillips Laboratory, 
1993; Colorado Springs, CO:  Kaman Sciences Corporation, 1993). 
Society 35, no. 2 (1982): 86-92. 
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Some encyclopedic sources are useful. The latest Cambridge Encyclopedia of 
Space has significant information about military space, particularly in provid- 
ing summaries of all programs and launches up to 2000.21 Shirley Thomas’s 
eight-volume Men of Space from the 1960s remains a useful source.22 The 
forthcoming space history encyclopedia Space Exploration and Humanity will 
have a major section on NS space history.23 
Samuel Miller’s A n  Aerospace Bibliography is a good starting point to search 
for space history articles prior to 1978,24 as is John Looney’s 1979 bibliogra- 
phy for NASA.25 So, too, is the Smithsonian bibliography edited by Dominic 
Pisano and Cathleen Lewis, Air and Space History: A n  Annotated Bibliography, 
which takes researchers up to 1988.26 Jeffrey Richelson edited Military Uses of 
Space, 1946-1991, a useful bibliographic ~ource.~’ 
With the explosion of the World Wide Web in the 1990s, no discussion 
of sources can avoid online sources. An excellent online source for aerospace 
history, including defense space matters, is the government site for the U.S. 
Centennial of Flight Commission. This contains a plethora of short essays on 
a variety of aerospace history topics.28 The NASA History Division also has 
an excellent site with many online publications, including many that involve 
NASA-DOD relations. The Air War College Gateway is another excellent 
resource of past and current military space activitiesz9 Other credible sites 
include those for USAF Space Command, the National Security Archives of 
George Washington University, and the Federation of American Scientists. 
Several declassified USAF works are now online.30 Mark Wade’s online 
21. Fernand Verger, Isabelle Sourbks-Verger, and Raymond Ghirardi, with contributions by 
Xavier Pasco, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003). 
22. Shirley Thomas, Men of Space: Profiles of the Leaders in Space Research, Development, and 
Exploration, 8 vols. (Philadelphia: Chilton Company, 1960-68). 
23. Stephen B. Johnson et al., eds., Space Exploration and Humanity: A Historical Encyclopedia (Santa 
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, forthcoming, expected publication 2006-07). 
24. Samuel Duncan Miller, A n  Aerospace Bibliography (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force 
History, USAF, 1986). 
25. John J. Looney, Bibliography of Space Books and Articles from Non-AerospaceJournals, 1957-1977 
(Washington, DC: NASA History Office, 1979). 
26. Dominick A. Pisano and Cathleen S. Lewis, eds., Air and Space History: A n  Annotated 
Bibliography (New York: Garland Publishing, 1988). 
27. Jeffrey Richelson, ed., U.S. Military Uses of Space, 1945-1991: Index and Guide (Washington, 
DC: The National Security Archive; Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healey, Inc., 1991). 
28. United States government, Centennial of Flight Web site, http://www.centennialof$zght.gov. 
29. Air War College Gateway to Space Operations and Resources, http://www.au.af:mil/au/awc/ 
awcgate/awc-spc. htm. 
30. Mark C. Cleary, The 6555th: Missile and Space Launches through 1970 (Patrick AFB, FL: 45th 
Space Wing, 1991); Mark C. Cleary, The Cape: Military Space Operations, 1971-1992 (Patrick AFB, 
FL: 45th Space Wing, 1994); Harry Waldron, Historical Overview of the Space and Missile Systems 
Center, 1954-2003 (Los Angeles AFB, CA: Space and Missile Systems Center, 2003). 
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Encyclopedia Astronauticu has become a popular Internet source for space his- 
tory. Unfortunately, while it contains a great deal of information, not all of 
it is correct. Space historians have noticed a variety of factual problems, and 
unfortunately these problems have not been consistently repaired. Since this 
is not a peer-reviewed source and historical errors have not always been fixed, 
this cannot be considered a reliable source, despite its impressive appearance. 
Many other online sources have the same  problem^.^' 
Since reactions to the launch of Sputnik encompassed a variety of areas 
and actions, it is appropriate to mention a few key sources about that event 
and its ramifications here. The best recent overview is Roger Launius, John 
Logsdon, and Robert Smith’s Reconsidering Sputnik3’ Important earlier works 
on the topic include those by Robert Divine33 and Rip B ~ l k e l e y . ~ ~  
BALLISTIC MISSILES AND MILITARY SPACE LAUNCHERS 
Ballistic missiles originated from the rocketry experiments of amateurs in 
the 1920s and 1930s, which then gained the interest of military organizations, 
particularly in Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. These sto- 
ries have been described in a variety of books and articles through the years, 
as they account for the origins of space programs around the world. 
The story of the German V-2 project is perhaps the best known, both 
because it led to the world’s first operational ballistic missile and because of 
its leader, Wernher von Braun, who became famous in the United States after 
World War 11. American forces captured most of von Braun’s team at the end 
of World War 11, along with parts and plans to rebuild the Nazi program on 
American soil. Most of the team came to the United States, where they assisted 
American contractors and the U.S. military to develop their own ballistic missile 
capabilities. The United States already had its own rocketry programs, with the 
Navy working with physicist Robert Goddard and members of the American 
Rocket Society, and the Army funding the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Missile 
efforts proliferated after the war but did not gain priority until the early 1950s. 
Only then did the Air Force’s Atlas ICBM project, soon followed by the Thor, 
Titan, and other ballistic missile programs, push forward at a rapid pace. These 
liquid-propellant rockets were soon displaced as weapons by solid-propellant 
31. Encyclopedia Astronautica is available online at http://www.astronautix.com/. 
32. Roger D. Launius, John M. Logsdon, and Robert W. Smith, eds., Reconsidering Sputnik: Forty 
Years Since the Soviet Satellite (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000). 
33. Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower’s Response to the Soviet Satellite (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993). 
34. Rip Bulkeley, T h e  Sputniks Crisis and Early United States Space Policy (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1991). 
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ballistic missiles such as Minuteman and Polaris, which were much more use- 
ful militarily because they did not require a time-consuming and dangerous 
liquid fueling process. Once the Cold War ended, ballistic missile forces in the 
United States shrank rapidly along with the Soviet threat. Other nations each 
developed their own nuclear and ballistic missile programs. 
Ballistic missiles were the technical progenitors of the first-generation 
space launchers. The Atlas, Titan, and Thor missiles led to the Atlas, Titan, 
and Delta families of launchers, while the R7 became the Soyuz launcher. 
Similarly, early Chinese ballistic missile programs derived from the Nazi V-2 
through the Soviet R1 and R 2  programs evolved into the Long March series 
used for military and civilian launches. 
Finally, the military also developed hypersonic technologies from the 
1950s to the present, some of which evolved into craft capable of going into 
space. The X-series aircraft went faster and higher, culminating in the X- 
15 and X-20 Dyna-Soar programs of the early 1960s. Later efforts included 
the X-24, involvement with the Space Shuttle program, and the National 
Aerospace Plane, and they continue today with a variety of studies and tests. 
The early history of ballistic missile programs in Germany, the United 
States, and the Soviet Union is well documented. Nazi efforts on the V-2 pro- 
gram are the subject of many books with a variety of perspectives. The single 
best volume on the V-2 development program is Michael Neufeld’s The Rocket 
and the R e i ~ h , ~ ~  thoroughly researched from the German-language original 
documents. Overview space histories, such as Burrows’s This New Ocean and 
Heppenheimer’s Countdown, also provide good descriptions of the V-2 proj- 
ect, as well as both Soviet and American ballistic missile programs through 
the 1 9 5 0 ~ ~ ~  Older histories stemmed mainly from von Braun supporters, such 
as Frederick Ordway’s The Rocket Team and Walter Dornberger’s V-2: The 
Nazi  Rocket We~pon.~’ Less well known is the actual V-2 rocket campaign 
against Britain and British countermeasures, well documented in King and 
Kutta’s Impact: The History of Germany’s V- Weapons in World War IL3’ R. V. 
Jones’s The Wizard War gives an earlier description of British espionage efforts 
in World War 11, including against the V-2 offensive.39 Revisionist histories 
35. Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemunde and the Coming ofthe Ballistic Missile 
Era (New York: The Free Press, 1995). 
36. Burrows, This New Ocean; T. A. Heppenheimer, Countdown: A History of Space Flight (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997). 
37. Walter Dornberger, V-2: The Naz i  Rocket Weapon, trans. James Cleugh and Geoffrey Halliday 
(New York: Viking, 1954); Frederick I .  Ordway 111 and M. Sharpe, The Rocket Team: From the V-2 
to the Saturn Moon Rocket (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1979). 
38. Benjamin King and Timothy Kutta, Impact: The History oJGermany’s V- Weapons in World War  
I I  (Rockville Centre, N Y  Sarpedon, 1998). 
39. R. V. Jones, The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelligence, 1939-1945 (New York: Coward, 
McCann, and Geoghegan, 1978). 
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looking skeptically at von Braun and at the use of slave labor in World War 
I1 began to appear in the late 1990s. The two best of these sources are Andre 
Sellier’s A History of the Dora Camp and Jean Michel’s DoY~.~O Others include 
Yves Beon’s Planet Dora and Dennis Piszkiewicz’s Wevnher von Braun: The Man 
Who Sold the Moon.4’ The journey of von Braun’s team to the United States 
and other nations is the subject of a variety of literature, including works by 
Huzel, Lasby, Bower, Freeman, and Vilain.42 
Early overviews of rocketry, which unavoidably discuss military involve- 
ment, include Zim’s Rockets andjets; Vaeth’s 200 Miles Up; Caidin’s Rockets and 
Missiles; Emme’s edited History of Rocket Technology; Baker’s The Rocket; von 
Braun, Ordway, and Dooling’s History of Rocketry and Space Travel; Winter’s 
Rockets into Space; and Alway’s Rockets of the World. 43 
The origins of American rocket and ballistic missile programs are well 
documented. The best overview of the early USAF missile programs remains 
Jacob Neufeld’s internal Air Force history, Ballistic Missiles in the United States 
Air Force, 1945-1960. Older works also discuss the early ballistic missile pro- 
grams, such as Schwiebert’s A History of the U.S. Air Force Ballistic Missiles, 
Bergaust’s Rockets o f  the Armed Forces, Neal’s popular work on Minuteman, 
Chapman’s early history of Atlas, Rosen’s narrative of the Navy’s Viking, 
Green and Lomask’s history of Vanguard, and Hartt’s story of the Thor mis- 
sile. Thor and Atlas are described by Wambolt. Martin’s series on Atlas is 
informative. A more recent work is Stine’s 1991 ICBM. Greene’s early internal 
history of Titan is still valuable. The most detailed recent historical study of 
a single program is Stumpf‘s Titan II. Titan’s evolution is also described by 
40. Andre Sellier, A History ofthe Dora Camp (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003); Jean Michel, Dora 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1980). 
41. Yves BCon, Planet Dora: A Memoir of the Holocaust and the Birth of the Space Age (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1998); Dennis Piszkiewicz, Wernher von Braun: The Man Who  Sold the Moon 
(Westport, C T  Praeger Publishers, 1998). 
42. D. K. Huzel, Peenemunde to Canaveral (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962); Clarence 
G. Lasby, Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War  (New York: Atheneum, 1971); Tom 
Bower, The Paper Clip Conspiracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987); Marsha Freeman, 
How We Got to the Moon: The  Story of the German Space Pioneers (Washington, DC: 21st Century 
Associates, 1993); J. Vilain, “France and the Peenemunde Legacy,” in History of Rocketry and 
Astronautics, ed. P. Jung, American Astronautical Society History Series, vol. 21 (San Diego: 
Univelt Press, 1997), pp. 119-161. 
43. Herbert H. Zim, Rockets andjets (New York Harcourt Brace & Company, 1945); J. Gordon 
Vaeth, 200 Miles Up: The Conquest ofthe Upper Air (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1951); 
Martin Caidin, Rockets and Missiles: Past and Future (New York: The McBride Company, 1954); 
Eugene Emrne, ed., The History of Rocket Technology (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964); 
David Baker, The Rocket: The  History and Development of Rocket and Missile Technology (New York: 
Crown Books, 1978); Wernher von Braun, Frederick I. Ordway 111, and Dave Dooling, History 
ofRocketry and Space Travel (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1986); Frank H. Winter, Rockets into 
Space (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Peter Alway, Rockets ofthe World (Ann 
Arbor, MI: Saturn Press, 1992). 
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Falconer, as well as Richards and Powell. Reed’s dissertation is an outstand- 
ing study of Minuteman. The Navaho, although a cruise missile, was crucial 
for rocket engine technology and is analyzed by Gibson. Two early works 
focused on ballistic missile operations are by Hunter, and Baar and Howard. 
Powell describes Blue Scout, a military research vehicle, Project Farside, an 
early USAF balloon rocket program, and the obscure Draco launcher. The 
Association of Air Force Missileers publishes a newsletter and has a Web site 
that frequently contains missile stories and historical in f~rmat ion .~~ 
Older political studies started analytical assessments of ballistic missiles 
and remain useful, such as the works of Armacost, Beard, and Sapolsky4’ on 
the 1950s American intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), ICBM, and 
submarine-launched ballistic missile programs. Reed’s dissertation on the poli- 
tics of Minuteman is valuable.46 Lonnquest and Winkler coauthored To Defend 
44. Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missrles rn the United States Air Force, 1945-1960 (Washington, DC: 
Office of Air Force History, USAF, 1990); Ernest G. Schwiebert, A Htstory of the U.S. Au Force 
Balli~trc Missiles (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964); Erik Bergaust, Rockets of the Armed Forces 
(New York Putnam, 1966); Roy Neal, Ace in the Hole: The Story ofthe Minuteman Missile (Garden 
City, N Y  Doubleday, 1962); John L. Chapman, Atlas: The Story ofa Missile (New York: Harper 
81 Brothers, 1960); Milton Rosen, The Viking Rocket Story (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955); 
Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard: A History (Washington, DC: NASA 
SP-4202, 1970); Julian Hartt, The Mighty Thor (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1961); Joseph F. 
Wambolt, “Medium Launch Vehicles for Satellite Delivery,” Crosslrnk 4, no. 1 (winter 2002/2003): 
26-31; Richard E. Martin, “A Brief History of the Atlas Rocket Vehicle, Part 1,” Quest: The History 
of Spacefght Quarterly 8 ,  no. 2 (2000): 54-61; Richard E. Martin, “A Brief History of the Atlas 
Rocket Vehicle, Part 2,” Quest: The History ofSpacefight Quarterly 8 ,  no. 3 (2000): 40-45; Richard 
E. Martin, “A Brief History of the Atlas Rocket Vehicle, Part 3,” Quest: The History ojspacefght 
Quarterly 8 ,  no. 4 (2000): 46-51; G. Harry Stine, ICBM: The Making ofthe Weapon that Changed the 
World (New York: Orion Books, 1991); W. E. Greene, The Development ofthe SM-68 Titan, AFSC 
Historical Publications Series 62-23-1 (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Systems Command, 
1962); David K. Stump( Titan 11: A History of a Cold War Missile Program (Fayetteville: The University 
ofArkansas Press, 2000); Art Falconer, “Epic Proportions: The Titan Launch Vehicle,” Crosslrnk 4, no. 
1 (winter 2002/2003): 32-37; G. R. Richards and J. W. Powell, “Titan 3 and Titan 4 Space Launch 
Vehicles,”Journal ofthe British Interplanetary Society 46, no. 4 (1993): 123-144; George A. Reed, “U.S. 
Defense Policy, U.S. Air Force Doctrine and Strategic Nuclear Weapon Systems, 1958-1964: The 
Case of the Minuteman ICBM’ (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1986); James N. Gibson, The Navaho 
Missile Project: The Story ofthe “Know-How” Missile ofAmerican Rocketry (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military/ 
Aviation History, 1996); Me1 Hunter, The Mrssilemen (Garden City, N Y  Doubleday, 1960); James 
J. Baar and William E. Howard, Combat Missilemen (New York: Harcourt, 1961); Joel Powell, “Blue 
Scout-Military Research Rocket,”Journal ofthe British Interplanetary Society 35, no. 1 (1982): 22-30; 
Joel W. Powell, “Project Farside, America’s First Space Venture,” Journal of the British Interplanetary 
Society 35, no. 10 (1982): 462-466; Joel W. Powell, “The Curious Case of Draco and the ‘Secret’ 
Cape Canaveral Launches of 1959,” Quest: The History ofSpacefight Quarterly 6, no. 1 (1998): 44-46. 
45. Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thorgupiter Controversy (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Edmund Beard, Developing the ICBM: A Study in 
Bureaucratic Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris 
System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1972). 
46. Reed, “U.S. Defense Pohcy.” 
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and which provides technical details and overviews of all major U.S. 
programs. Lonnquest’s dissertation was a focused study on General Bernard 
Schriever’s role in Atlas.48 Koppes’s history of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
(JPL) remains a good introduction to its Army-funded rocketry and ballistic 
missile programs.49 Spinardi provides an overview of the U.S. Navy’s subma- 
rine-based ballistic missile  program^,^' as does Fuhrman.’l Friedman’s The 
Evolution of Nuclear Strategy remains a valuable work about nuclear warfare in 
general,52 as is Kaplan’s The Wizards ~ fArmageddon .~~  There are no major pub- 
lications on recent U.S. ballistic missile history beyond 1970, although there 
are many political science and politically motivated studies of arms control 
and disarmament. 
Soviet ballistic missile history has gotten a major boost since the end of 
the Cold War. The foremost work is currently Zaloga’s outstanding study, The 
Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword,54 which provides an overview of Soviet nuclear forces 
from 1945 to 2000. Zaloga’s earlier study Target America also remains useful.55 
Also useful is Podvig’s Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. 56 Siddiqi’s Challenge to 
Apollo, originally published by NASA and now published commercially, cov- 
ers in depth the early ballistic missile development of Korolev’s design bureau 
from the R1 to the R7.57 Siddiqi also covers the development and deploy- 
ment of a Soviet Fractional Orbiting Bombardment System (FOBS) .58 The 
Yangel design bureau was selected to build the R-36-0 FOBS over compet- 
ing proposals by the Korolev and Chelomey design bureaus. This system, 
which deployed 18 missiles from 1971 to 1983, placed a nuclear warhead in 
47. John C. Lonnquest and David F. Winkler, To Defend and Deter: The Legacy of the United 
States Cold War Missile Program, Special Report 97/01 (Champaign, IL: U.S. Army Construction 
Engineering Research Laboratories, 1996). 
48. John Lonnquest, “The Face ofAtlas: General Bernard Schriever and the Development ofthe 
Atlas Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, 1953-1960” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1996). 
49. Clayton R. Koppes,]PL and the American Space Program: A History oftheJet Propnlsion Laboratory 
(New Haven, C T  Yale University Press, 1982). 
50. Graham Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident: The Development of U.S.  Fleet Ballistic Missile 
Technology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
51. R. A. Fuhrman, “The Fleet Ballistic Missile System: Polaris to Trident,”]ournal of Spacecraft 
15, no. 5 (1978): 265-286. 
52. Lawrence Friedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983). 
53. Fred Kaplan, The Wizards ofArmageddon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983). 
54. Steven Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall ofRussia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, 
55. Steven J. Zaloga, Target America: The Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms Race, 1945-1994 
56. P. Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). 
57.AsifA. Siddiqi, Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge (Gainesdle: University of Florida Press, 2003); 
58. Asif A. Siddiqi, “The Soviet Fractional Orbiting Bombardment System (FOBS): A Short 
1945-2000 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 2002). 
(Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993). 
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temporary orbit, going over the South Pole to evade American early-warning 
radars and then deorbiting quickly to hit the United States. Harford’s Korolev 
also has a significant amount of information about the early ballistic mis- 
sile programs.59 Barry’s Ph.D. dissertation, “The Missile Design Bureaux and 
Soviet Piloted Space Policy,” describes some political aspects of early design 
bureaus.60 Zak wrote a short piece on the origins of the Cosmos launcher.61 
China’s early ballistic missile program is tied to the story of Tsien Hsue- 
Shen, which is chronicled in Chang’s Thread of the Silkworm.62 Harvey’s The 
Chinese Space Programme provides an overview of ballistic missile and launcher 
 development^.^^ Lewis also describes the Chinese ballistic missile programs.64 
Histories of other nations’ ballistic missile programs and their transfor- 
mation to launchers remain far less documented. The British program is the 
one major exception, with Morton’s Fire across the Desert, Twigge’s The Early 
Development o f  Guided Weapons in the United Kingdom, 1940-1960, Hill’s A 
Vertical Empire, and Martin’s De Havilland Blue Streak.65 A recent article on 
early French missile and launcher efforts is by Huwart.66 
The single best source for the history of U.S. space launchers is Launius and 
Jenkins’s e&ted work, To Reach the High Frontier, which has articles on all major 
American launch programs6’ This work also has an overview of the evolution 
of the Minuteman ICBM program by Hunley. Isakowitz is now up to the fourth 
edition of his International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems; tracing the 
evolution of these editions provides historians with a thorough grounding in the 
technical aspects of the subject.68 Hall provides an overview of the military ori- 
59. James Harford, Korolev: How One Man Masterminded the Soviet Drive to Beat America to the Moon 
60. William P. Barry, “The Missile Design Bureaux and Soviet Piloted Space Policy, 1953-1974” 
61. Anatoly Zak, “Cosmos Launcher: The Story of the Soviets’ Space Workhorse,” Spacefight 38, 
62. Iris Chang, Thread ofthe Silkworm (New York: Basic Books, 1995). 
63. Brian Harvey, The Chinese Space Programme: From Conception to Future Capab 
64. J. D. Lewis and H. Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs,” International Security 17, no. 2 
65. Peter Morton, Fire across the Desert: Woomera and the Anglo-Australian Joint Project, 1946-1980 
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Services, 1989); Stephen Robert Twigge, The Early 
Development of Guided Weapons in the United Kingdom, 1940-1960 (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood 
Academic Publishers, 1993); C. N. Hill, A Vertical Empire: The History ofthe UK Rocket and Space 
Programme, 1950-1971 (London: Imperial College, World Scientific, 2001); Charles H. Martin, De 
Havilland Blue Streak: A n  Illustrated Story (London: British Interplanetary Society, 2002). 
66. Olivier Huwart, “Du V-2 i Veronique: Les Premi6res Recherches Spatiales Militaires 
FranGaises,” Review Historiques des Armies 3 (1997): 113-126. 
67. Roger D. Launius and Dennis R. Jenkins, eds., To Reach the High Frontier: A History 4 U . S .  
Launch Vehicles (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2002). 
68. Steven J. Isakowitz, Joshua B. Hopkins, and Joseph P. Hopkins, Jr., International Reference 
Guide to Space Launch Systems, 4th ed. (Reston, VA: AIAA, 2004). 
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gins ofAgena in the CORONA program.69 Siddiqi chronicles some of the con- 
versions of Soviet ballistic missiles to launchers in Challenge to Apol10.~~ Harvey’s 
Russia in Space gives a good overview of Russian launch systems.71 Bille and 
Lishock describe early military launchers, including the obscure NOTSNIK, 
a designation combining the acronym for Naval Ordnance Test Station and 
Sputnik.72 NOTSNIK received attention earlier from Pesavento and Powell.” 
Military involvement with space transportation also includes the devel- 
opment of hypersonic and reusable systems. Overviews of hypersonics include 
Caidin’s early Wings into Space, the two volumes of The Hypersonic Revolution, 
and Miller’s The X - P l ~ n e s . ~ ~  The X-15 story dominates the early history of 
military reusable systems, and has garnered significant attention in the last two 
years. These include works by Jenkins, by Jenkins and Landis, Thompson, the 
reprint of Tregaskis, and G o d ~ i n . ~ ~  Quest issue 3, number 1, has a number of 
articles on the X-15. 
The Air Force’s abortive Dyna-Soar program, later renamed the X-20, is 
discussed in Spires’s Beyond Horizons and received historical attention in Quest 
issue 3,  number 4, with articles by Houchin and Smith.”j Houchin’s work is 
69. R. Cargill Hall, “The Air Force Agena: A Case Study in Early Spacecraft Technology,” in 
Technology and the Air Force: A Retrospective Assessment, ed. Jacob Neufeld, George M. Watson, Jr., and 
David Chenoweth (Washington, D C  Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), pp. 231-244. 
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Station: Texas A&M Press, 2004). 
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“Secrets Revealed About the Early US Navy Space Programme,” SpacefZight 38, no. 7 (1996): 243- 
245; J. Powell, “The N O T s  Air-Launched Satellite Programme,”Journal ofthe British Interplanetary 
Society 50, no. 11 (1997): 433-440. 
74. Martin Caidin, Wings into Space: The History and Future of Winged Space Flight (New York Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston, 1964); The Hypersonic Revolution: Case Studies in the History of Hypersonic 
Technology, vol. 1, From Max Valier to Project P R I M E  (1924-2967) (Bolling AFB, Washington, DC: 
USAF History and Museums Program, 1998); The Hypersonic Revolution: Eight Case Studies in the 
History ofHypersonic Technology, vol. 2, From Scramjet to the National Aero-Space Plane (Dayton, OH: 
Special Staff Office, Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright-Patterson AFB, 1987); Jay Miller, The 
X-Planes: X-1 to X-45  (Stillwater, MN: Voyageur Press, 2001). 
75. Dennis R .  Jenkins, Hypersonics Before the Shuttle: A Concise History ofthe X-15 Research Airplane 
(Washington, DC: NASA SP-2000-4518, 2000); Dennis R. Jenkins and Tony Landis, Hypersonic: 
The Story of the North American X-25 (North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 2003); Milton 0. 
Thompson, A t  the Edge ofspace: The X-15 Flight Program (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution 
Press, 2003); Richard Tregaskis, The X-25 Diary: The Story of America’s First Space Ship (New 
York: Dutton, 1961; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004); Robert Godwin, X- 
25-The N A S A  Mission Reports Incorporating Files from the U S A F  (Burlington, Ontario: Apogee 
Books, 2000). 
76. Roy F. Houchin 11, “Why the Air Force Proposed the Dyna-Soar X-20 Program,” Quest: The 
History of Spaceflight Magazine 3, no. 4 (winter 1994): 5-12; Roy F. Houchin 11, “Why the Dyna- 
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based on his dissertation, and he also has a more recent article on Dyna-Soar 
in the Journal of the British Interplanetary S0ciety.7~ Strom has a short introduc- 
tion to Dyna-Soar in Crosslink.’8 Apogee’s series of historic space document 
publications includes Godwin’s collection for Dyna-S0ar.7~ 
Russell Hannigan’s Spacejight in the Era $Aero-Space Planes was the first 
general work on the topic.80 Reed and Thompson both describe USAF involve- 
ment with lifting-body research.81 Schweikart describes the USAF’s efforts for 
an orbital reusable system in his Questfor the Orbital Jet.82 Butrica documents 
later military efforts to build reusable systems in his Single Stage to O~bit.’~ It 
is also important to note the military’s involvement with the Space Shuttle 
program, both in its design and in its operations. These are currently best 
documented in T. A. Heppenheimer’s two recent volumes and are also noted 
in David Spires’s overview of the U.S. Air Force in space, Beyond Horizons.84 
Tomei discusses the USAF Space Shuttle pr~gram.~’ The Inertial Upper Stage, 
developed to support the Space Shuttle program, is described by Dunn.86 
The military was also crucial in the development of the various technol- 
ogies of rocketry. Military funding of liquid-propellant and solid-propellant 
engines was the starting point for rocketry. The various stories of rocket pio- 
continuedfrom the previous page 
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neers (not repeated here), who were mostly funded by the military, invariably 
describe the early travails in the development of liquid and solid propellants. 
Volume 13 in the AAS History Series, edited by Doyle, provides a number of 
papers on the history of liquid-propellant rocketry.87 Heppenheimer describes 
the key role of the Navaho program in American liquid-propellant rocketry.88 
The best work on solid-propellant rocketry in the United States has been 
done by H~nley.’~ McKenzie’s sociological study of nuclear missile guidance, 
Inventing Accuracy, remains the best study of this aspect of ballistic missiles?’ 
Martin describes the development of the balloon tank structure of Atlas?’ The 
evolution of reentry systems is described by Hartunian?2 
Cleary provides two volumes on military operations at Cape Cana~era l .~~  
Guillemette describes the history of Space Launch Complex 6 at Vandenberg 
AFB.94 Day provides an unusual look at the archaeology ofvandenberg Air Force 
Base in a two-part series in S p a ~ g i g h t . ~ ~  Powell and Scala tell story of White Sands 
Missile Range, and Powell describes its Green River Annex.96 With the end of 
the Cold War, there have been a number of Historic American Engineering 
Record surveys of US. missile and space sites, such as Lauber and Hess’s survey 
of the Denver Titan site.97 Boxx describes the development of W~omera.~’ 
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EARLY WARNING AND SPACE SURVEILLANCE 
Response to an attack by ballistic missiles first requires warning that an 
attack is under way and the ability to discriminate between these and other 
natural or humanmade objects that reenter the atmosphere. Given that the 
flight time of intercontinental ballistic missiles from the U.S. to the USSR 
and vice versa is about 30 minutes and that defenses against missiles have 
remained extremely difficult, the main purpose of these systems was to send 
warning to the political and military leaders to command a retaliatory strike. 
In practice, this meant launching ballistic missiles, getting bombers into the 
air, and sending signals to submarine forces. Both the United States and Soviet 
Union developed ground-based and space-based systems for these purposes at 
the same time as ballistic missiles became viable as operational weapons. 
During World War 11, radar systems in the United States were developed 
mainly at Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Radiation Laboratory, 
which developed a variety of ground-, ship-, and aircraft-based radar systems to 
detect enemy aircraft and submarines and also to aid strategic bombing. After 
the war, the threat of Soviet nuclear-armed bombers spurred the creation of 
progressively more powerful radar systems, along with the need to connect the 
many radar systems together across increasingly larger regions, eventually to 
protect the entire North American continent. The problem of rapidly correlat- 
ing these data as aircraft speeds increased led researchers at the MIT Radiation 
Laboratory and at the University of Michigan to develop computer-based tech- 
nologies to integrate the variety of data for each air defense sector. The USAF 
ultimately selected MIT’s system, which became known as the Semi-Automatic 
Ground Environment (SAGE) system. SAGE became the most expensive com- 
puter and largest software programming effort of the 1950s. Unfortunately, the 
Soviet Union quickly made it obsolete by creating ballistic missiles. 
To detect ballistic missiles, the SAGE system was inadequate. What the 
United States needed was a large, over-the-horizon radar that could pick up 
ballistic missile launches as early as possible in their flight trajectories. The new 
system, called the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), whose 
first radar system in Thule, Greenland, began operation on 31 December 1960, 
could detect ballistic missiles launched from the Soviet Union 15 minutes prior 
to impact. This provided a bare minimum of time for the United States to 
retaliate by getting its bombers and ballistic missiles into the air before impact. 
Phased-array radar systems, including the PAVE PAWS and COBRA DANE 
systems of the 1970s and 1980s, were later implemented to improve capabilities 
to track multiple objects and to detect submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 
Such a short response time was problematic, and the USAF sought any 
means to extend it. By the late 1950s, satellites beckoned as a possibility. Building 
off of infrared sensor technologies developed in Nazi Germany, Lockheed 
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An Agena A spacecraft for an early MIDAS launch undergoes a weight test in 1960 
a t  Lockheed’s plant in Sunnyvale, California, before shipment to Cape Canaveral for 
launch. (Official USAFphoto. Air Force Space Command, Office of History) 
Corporation proposed a variant of its military satellite project, Weapon System 
117L (WS-l17L), that could detect the infrared signature of a ballistic missile’s 
rocket exhaust plume in the first few minutes of flight. This experimental proj- 
ect, called the Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS), placed infrared detec- 
tors on polar-orbiting satellites. Despite many failures, to the surprise of its 
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many skeptics, MIDAS proved that the technology was viable. Improvements 
in the detector technologies allowed the USAF to put out requests for an oper- 
ational geosynchronous system of three satellites that could monitor the entire 
globe. Eventually called the Defense Support Program (DSP), this program 
has gone through several upgrades since the early 1970s and remains functional 
today. DSP gained notoriety during the Gulf War of 1991 when it detected 
Iraqi short-range ballistic missile launches. Based on this experience, DSP has 
been tied more closely to tactical users, as shown in the Iraq War of 2003, when 
it relayed missile launch data to U.S. Central Command. It is currently to be 
replaced in the late 2000s by the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). 
The Soviet Union went through a similar evolution from local to conti- 
nental radars for air defense, and then ballistic missile detection, and finally to 
space-based systems. In the 1960s, the Soviets developed the Dnestr and Dnepr 
systems. The late 1970s and 1980s saw the deployment of the more powerful 
Daryal radars into operation, one of which was the Krasnoyarsk system that 
became a focus of controversy when the United States accused the Soviet Union 
of violating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by aiming this radar east across 
Siberia instead of across national borders as the treaty required. The Soviets 
also deployed three powerful over-the-horizon Duga-2 systems in the 1970s. 
Finally, the Lavotchkin design bureau developed early-warning satellites, first 
a constellation of Molniya orbit satellites called Oko, in the 1970s, and a geo- 
synchronous system called Prognoz, first deployed in the 1980s. Oko deployed 
a nine-satellite constellation with its apogee above North America and Europe 
to ensure satellites were deployed over these regions at all times. The fall of 
the Soviet Union has caused major problems with the early-warning system, as 
some of the ground-based radar sites were located in newly independent Baltic 
States that refused to operate them. In addition, the financial crises associated 
with the fall of the communist empire meant that the Oko and Prognoz con- 
stellations have not been fully maintained. The combination of these problems 
means that the now-Russian system has significant gaps in coverage. 
The American and Soviet navies both came to rely on space-based surveil- 
lance of the oceans to identify the location of each other’s fleets for both strate- 
gic and tactical purposes. Significantly outgunned by the U.S. Navy, the Soviet 
Union relied far more on submarines and ground-based aircraft for its naval 
goals and developed naval surveillance satellites to augment these capabilities. 
Its US-A (active radar-RORSAT, Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite) and 
US-I? (passive radar-EORSAT, Electronic Intelligence Ocean Reconnaissance 
Satellite) systems, designed by Vladimir Chelomey’s OKB-52, were deployed 
in the 1970s. The United States also saw the utility in a naval satellite system, 
also developing and deploying its White Cloud satellites in the 1970s. White 
Cloud, US-P, and their descendants remain active in the early 21st century, but 
US-A’s last launch was in 1988, and the program is now defunct. 
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Both the United States and the Soviet Union also had to distinguish 
between ballistic missiles and natural or artificial debris reentering the atmo- 
sphere. Neither side desired to launch a nuclear strike to retaliate against a 
meteor or old spacecraft burning up in the atmosphere. Starting in the late 
1950s, both sides began to develop space surveillance networks that used com- 
binations of active radar and passive optical and electronic sensors to monitor 
the trajectories of Earth-orbiting satellites and associated debris. 
Early-warning systems are most frequently encountered in books with 
larger goals. The best starting point to understand radar’s development from 
prior to World War I1 into the early Cold War is Buderi’s The Invention that 
Changed the W0rld.9~ The best source for an overview of the U.S. systems is 
Spires’s Beyond Horizons,loo which contains descriptions of the USAF ground- 
and space-based early-warning systems. Schaffel’s The Emerging Shield gives 
the prehistory of the air defense systems from the end of World War I1 to 
1960, including the various radar systems.I0’ Winkler gives an overview of 
both air defense and missile warning radar systems.lo2 Needell’s biography 
of Lloyd Berkner contains a chapter on his role in the development of the 
Distant Early Warning (DEW) line in the Klass was among the 
first to discuss MIDAS in his Secret Sentries in Space in 1971.1°4 Sprague’s 1985 
study of MIDAS at Air University is another early work.’OS The National 
Reconnaissance Office recently declassified Hall’s history of MIDAS, origi- 
nally written in 1989, but which was publicly published in 1999 both by the 
NRO and in Qzkest.lo6 N. W. Watkins published a short history of MIDAS after 
Hall’s work was written but before it was publicly released.’” Day published a 
three-part series on DSP in 1996.’” Richelson’s America’s Space Sentinels is one 
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of the few books devoted to the topic, in this case to the genesis and evolution 
of American early-warning systems, starting with MIDAS, but focusing on 
the DSP ~ystern.’’~ Since DSP had a ground control center in Australia, Ball’s 
Basefor Debate was an early monograph that described DSP, among other 
systems.”’ An obscure but useful source produced when the Woomera DSP 
facility was closed is Erickson’s The History of theJDFN (Joint Defence Facility 
Nurrungar).”’ Rosolanka created a short pictorial history of DSP.’12 
The best source for the Soviet and Russian program is Zaloga’s The 
Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword, which contains descriptions and development history 
of all Soviet and Russian ground- and space-based early-warning  system^."^ 
Another good overview is part 2 of Whitmare’s “Red Bear on the P r~wl . ””~  
Harvey’s Russia in Space provides a brief description of Oko and Prognoz.’l5 
Kagan also describes Soviet early-warning satellites, as does Forden.”‘ A 
description of the various post-Cold War gaps in the Russian system is given 
in Forden, Podvig, and Postol’s “False Alarm, Nuclear Danger””’ and in 
Clark’s “Decline of the Russian Early Warning System.”’1s 
United States and Soviet/Russian naval surveillance satellites are discussed, 
along with their implications for naval strategy and tactics, in Friedman’s dense 
and informative Seapower and Space.119 Siddiqi discusses the Soviet programs 
in a 1999 article in the Journal of the British Interplanetary Society.12’ Muse pro- 
vides another recent treatment of RORSAT.12’ Teal Ruby, the failed Defense 
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Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)-USAF effort to develop a 
satellite to monitor aircraft flight, is discussed by Day.’22 
There is no comprehensive published history of space surveillance, either 
American or Russian. Some early histories by Hayes, Thomas, and Engle and 
Drummond are now quite dated but describe passive satellite tracking in the 
early 1 9 6 0 ~ ’ ~ ~  They also include a substantial amount on satellite command 
and control as it existed at the time. More recent information can be found in 
Jane’s Space Directo~ry.’~~ An unpublished independent study project by Evans at 
the University of North Dakota used these sources and a few others to provide 
an overview history of the U.S. Space Surveillance N e t ~ 0 r k . l ~ ~  Spires’s Beyond 
Horizons provides some information on the history of the Space Surveillance 
Network as Powell describes the Ground-Based Electro-Optical Deep 
Space Surveillance (GEODSS) ~ystem.’~’ The evolution of space surveillance 
into asteroid detection after the collision of Shoemaker-Levy 9 with Jupiter 
in 1994 is narrated by Mesco.’28 The history of the Soviet/Russian system 
remains undocumented, with only a couple of brief papers in English describ- 
ing the system and even briefer mentions of its history.lZ9 An interesting case 
study of academic participation in space tracking is presented by Wikles and 
Gledit~ch.’~~ Another specific case study is the tracking of Cosmos 954, which 
fell on Canada in 1978.13’ 
122. Dwayne A. Day, “Jewel in the Sky: The US Military Satellite that Never Made It,” SpaceJllight 
47, no. 4 (2005): 147-154. 
123. Eugene Hayes, The Smithsonian’s Satellite Tracking Program: Its History and Ovganiration 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 1962); Shirley Thomas, Satellite Tracking Facilities: Their History 
and Operation (New York: Holt, 1963); Eloise Engle and Kenneth H. Drummond, S k y  Rangers: 
Satellite Tracking Around the World (New York: John Day Co., 1965). 
124.Jane’s Space Directory (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, annual). 
125. Brad M. Evans, “The History of the Space Surveillance Network and its Capabilities” 
(unpublished Independent Study Project, Department of Space Studies, University of North 
Dakota, summer 2003). 
126. Spires, Beyond Horizons. 
127. Joel Powell, “Satellite Tracking with GEODSS,” SpaceJlight 27, no. 3 (1985): 129-130. 
128. James C. Mesco, “Watch the Skies,” Quest: The  History of Spaceflight Quarterly 6 ,  no. 4 
129. G. Batyr, S. Veniaminov, V. Dicky, V. Yurasov, A. Menshicov, Z .  Khotorovsky, “The 
Current State of Russian Space Surveillance System and its Capability in Surveying Space Debris,” 
paper no. ESA SD-01 in Proceedings ofthe First European Confrence on Space Debris (held in Darmstadt, 
Germany, 5-7 April 1993, European Space Agency); Z. N. Khutorovsky, “Low-Perigee Satellite 
Catalog Maintenance: Issues of Methodology” (paper presented at the Second European Congress 
on Space Debris, Darmstadt, Germany, 17-19 March 1997). 
130. Owen Wilkes and Nlls Petter Gleditsch,“Optical Satellite Trackmg: A Case Study in University 
Participation in Preparation for Space Warfare,”Journal of Peace Research 15, no. 3 (1978): 205-225. 
131. Leo Heaps, Operation Morning Light: Terror in Our Skies, The Story of Cosmos 954 (London: 
Paddington Press, 1978). 
(1998): 35-40. 
500 CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Relaying data to and from space systems and ground centers in order to 
control these devices and to initiate and control military responses to strategic 
and tactical events is crucial to both nuclear and conventional warfare. With 
each generation and type of space vehicle, and in many cases with each spe- 
cific project, are built operations control centers and mechanisms to integrate 
and analyze the data and to distribute the data coming from the space systems 
to appropriate people and groups on the ground. Despite the unquestioned 
fact that all space systems require ground control, this topic has received, with 
a few notable exceptions, remarkably little attention from historians or other 
scholars. Most studies focus on the devices that go into space, to the detriment 
of what happens on the ground to control them. 
There are at least two types of ground control systems. The first type 
includes systems that directly control the operations of spacecraft. To do this, 
the engineering and sensor data are sent to the Earth (downlinked) from the 
spacecraft and distributed to a mission operations team, which then sends 
commands up (uplinked) to the spacecraft to control its operation. The second 
type includes systems that take the sensor data from spacecraft and then oper- 
ate on and distribute those data for other functions. The best U.S. example of 
the former is the satellite command and control complexes at Schriever AFB 
near Colorado Springs, Colorado, the Air Force Satellite Control Facility. The 
best example of the latter are the military command and control facilities of 
the Cheyenne Mountain Complex, also near Colorado Springs, which receive 
sensor data from all around the world, combine them into an integrated pic- 
ture of air and space threats to the North American continent, and then use 
and send those integrated data to decision-makers who must determine how 
to respond to any perceived threats. 
The stories of the two types of ground control systems appear in differ- 
ent kinds of histories. The histories of ground control systems that operate 
spacecraft are, to the extent they exist at all, usually tied to the history of the 
projects and spacecraft for which they were built. Thus, in most cases, one finds 
the ground control story in the general histories of the projects for which they 
were created. In some cases, these ground control systems are modified to also 
control other spacecraft, in which case they take on lives of their own, partially 
separated from the specific systems they control. Such is the story of the Air 
Force Satellite Control Facility, which began as the facility that controlled the 
CORONA sateIIites but later expanded to control other spacecraft as well. 
The histories of classical command and control systems such as those 
residing in Cheyenne Mountain are usually separate from the specific systems 
that contribute data because the point of these systems is to combine data from 
different systems and assemble it into formats usable to decision-makers. Thus 
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S p a c e  Defense  Cen te r  inside Cheyenne  Mountain,  J u n e  1984. (Official USAF photo. 
Air Force Space Command, Office of History) 
the histories depend on sensor systems and higher level political and opera- 
tional decisions as well as the specifics of the “combination” of the data. 
The origins of the North American command and control system start 
with the early-warning systems described in the previous section. As various 
radar systems were developed and deployed around the northern periphery 
of the continent, the United States developed the first real-time computer to 
automate the translation of radar data into a “user-friendly” graphical inter- 
face that would allow Air Force enlisted personnel to identify incoming Soviet 
bombers and direct U.S. fighters and missiles to intercept them. This system, 
called the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment, or SAGE, was a major mile- 
stone in the development of computing hardware and software. Developed by 
the Lincoln Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of technology, SAGE 
led to the creation of the Air Force-funded, nonprofit MITRE Corporation 
to complete its development, and also the System Development Corporation, 
which spun off from RAND Corporation to create SAGE’S software. 
In 1957, Canada and the United States formed North American Air 
Defense Command, or NORAD, to jointly protect the continent, given that 
the radar systems needed to detect Soviet bombers were located on both U.S. 
and Canadian soil. The central command center was established at Ent Air 
Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado, that same year. In 1959, the U.S. 
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Joint Chiefs of Staff selected Cheyenne Mountain, just southwest of Colorado 
Springs, to be the location of an underground, nuclear-hardened facility to 
house NORAD. Into the tunnels of Cheyenne Mountain, which was com- 
pleted in 1965, went the command facilities for the SAGE air defense network, 
the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), and what became the 
Space Surveillance Network. Tying these three separate systems together into 
a single command center was the 4251, Command Operations Center com- 
puting and display system, which used Philco 2000 computers. On 1 January 
1966, Air Force Systems Command handed over operations to NORAD, 
whose commander, by treaty, was always an American, and whose deputy 
commander was always a Canadian. The NORAD Combat Operations 
Center became operational in February 1967 when the Space Defense Center 
system, 496L, was completed. Data from NORAD were fed to the American 
and Canadian national authorities. 
Increases in Soviet threats and in corresponding American detection sys- 
tems such as phased-array radars led to the Cheyenne Mountain Improvement 
Program, called 427M. This new system would have to integrate with a global 
command and control system, known as the World-Wide Military Command 
and Control System (WWMCCS), which used Honeywell Information System 
6060 computers. Philco-Ford won a contract for system integration and test- 
ing, and the communications gear, while System Development Corporation 
won the contract for the Space Computation Center software and displays. 
The system also eventually included UNIVAC 1100/42 systems for satellite 
early warning. NORAD itself developed much of the system software. 427M 
was finally completed in 1979 but suffered some false nuclear attack warnings, 
which led quickly to studies and investigations as to the cause, which turned 
out to be faulty computer chips. 
The 427M program was a set of largely disjointed “stovepipe” projects, 
which were combined later into the next major upgrade, which became known 
as the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade Program.This program came to include a 
variety of backup systems, both electronic and physical. The USAF developed 
backup facilities at Offutt AFB near Omaha, Nebraska (the home of Strategic 
Air Command), and at Peterson AFB in Colorado Springs, along with an exist- 
ing NORAD backup facility at Malmstrom AFB near Great Falls, Montana.The 
various upgrades, like their predecessors, ran into cost overruns and schedule 
slips that accompanied their technical problems. Again came a variety of investi- 
gations, which again pointed to problems with systems integration of the many 
sensors, computers, and facilities. The Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade program 
finally reached full operational capability (FOC) in October 1998. 
In the 1991 Gulf War, Defense Support Program data on Iraqi bal- 
listic missile launches fed into NORAD and then to military units in the 
Gulf. From that time forward, the military has taken a variety of measures to 
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improve speed and accuracy of ballistic missile and other data from “strategic” 
sources such as NORAD to tactical units in wartime. By the early 21st cen- 
tury, another series of upgrades were under way, this time to take advantage 
of technical improvements in computer workstations and computer networks 
such as the Internet and World Wide Web. 
Information from NORAD feeds into the highest level political and mil- 
itary authorities so as to determine, in the worst case, whether a nuclear coun- 
terstrike should be launched or whether any other measures are required. With 
the advent of ballistic missiles, the time available for the nuclear “go code” 
decision from detection of the ballistic missiles from space and from ground- 
based radar shrank from hours down to 15 to 30 minutes. Furthermore, hydro- 
gen bombs in space or the upper atmosphere would disrupt the ionosphere, 
thereby disrupting most long-range radio communications, and destroy 
ground-based wire communication systems near nuclear impact points. One 
space-based solution to this problem in the 1960s and 1970s was the creation 
of the Emergency Rocket Communications System, which would launch Blue 
Scout (1963-1967) or Minuteman (after 1967) rockets from Wallops Island, 
Virginia, to high altitude, from where it would send an Emergency Action 
Message such as the nuclear go-code by radio, thus bypassing ionospheric 
disruptions. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration approved creation of the 
Milstar satellite communications system, which was nuclear-hardened so as to 
send the Emergency Action Message to American nuclear forces around the 
world during a nuclear war. The end of the Cold War reduced, but did not 
eliminate, threats to the U.S. command and control system. 
The Soviet Union faced similar problems, compounded by the political 
control of nuclear weapons by the Soviet secret police, the KGB. By the late 
1960s, the Soviets created the Signal system, which could detect an attempt 
by a crew to perform an unauthorized ballistic missile launch. In the 1970s, 
the Molniya satellite communications system enhanced Soviet command and 
control, although these satellites were vulnerable to nuclear attack in space. By 
the 1980s, the Soviets created an automatic nuclear response system known 
as Perimetr, much like the hypothetical “doomsday machine” satirized in the 
early 1960s film Dr. Stvungelove. This system, deployed in 1985, would automat- 
ically authorize nuclear retaliation even if the national authorities were dead. 
The Soviets also developed their own ballistic-missile-based communications 
system like the American Emergency Rocket Communications System. 
There are two recentworks onsatellite missioncontrolsystems. Mudgway’s 
Uplink-Downlink describes the evolution of Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s Deep 
Space N e t ~ 0 r k . l ~ ~  This is almost entirely a civilian story, but the military 
132. Douglas J. Mudgway, Uplink-Downlink: A History of the Deep Space Network, 1957-1997 
(Washington, DC: NASA SP-2001-4227,2001). 
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origins of the program are detailed in chapter 2. Arnold’s Spyingfvom Space is 
the first major published study of a military satellite control system, the Air 
Force Satellite Control Fa~i1ity.l~~ Spires’s Beyond Horizons also has discussions 
of satellite control in the USAF among its many other t 0 p i ~ s . l ~ ~  
The SAGE system has a s m a l l  but significant literature in the history of com- 
puting. The foremost reference is Redmond and Smith’s tome, From Whirlwind 
to MITRE.135 Jacobs’s T h e  SAGE Air Defense System gives an anecdotal account 
of SAGE? deve10pment.l~~ Edwards’s eclectic The Closed World put SAGE into a 
broader Cold War context through a postmodern discourse ana1y~is.l~’ In 1983, 
the Annals ofthe History o f  Computing published a SAGE special issue that included 
a collection of articles on various facets of the computer system.’38 Two institu- 
tional histories link SAGE to broader issues in command and control: MITRE 
Corporation’s corporate history and Baum’s history of System Development 
C~rporation.’~~ Hughes’s Rescuing Prometheus also has a chapter on SAGE.’40 
Dyer and Dennis produced a new history of MITRE in 1998.14’ 
Larger scale command and control systems and their ties to the national 
command authorities, such as NORAD and WWMCCS, have a surpris- 
ingly limited literature, given the importance of the subject for the survival 
of the United States in wartime. An early external description of NORAD 
is in DeVere and J0hns0n.l~~ Chapman provides a full history of NORAD’s 
Cheyenne Mountain Complex up to 1989 in Legacy ofPeea~e.’~~ The history of 
WWMCCS is told in Pearson, The World Wide Military Command and Control 
Control of British and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
nuclear forces to the mid-1960s is discussed in Twigge and Scott’s Planning 
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Control Systems (College Station: Texas A&M Press University, 2005). 
S A G E  Air Defense Computer (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). 
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Arm~geddon.’~~ Blair’s Strategic Command and Control from 1985 remains a valu- 
able source on the overall control of nuclear forces,’46 as is Bracken’s 1983 
Command and Control of Nuclear Forces.’47 For the Soviet Union and Russia, 
Zaloga’s The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword is the best introduction, with information 
on Signal, Perimetr,  et^.'^^ 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Separate from the issue of warfare are everyday military communica- 
tions for logistics, as well as tactical communications for conventional force 
operations. The United States has particular need for worldwide communi- 
cations due to the distribution of American military forces around the globe 
during and after the Cold War. The first communications satellite experi- 
ment was Project SCORE (Signal Communication by Orbiting Relay 
Equipment), which used a modified Atlas ICBM to broadcast a taped message 
from President Eisenhower in 1958. The Army Signal Corps launched the 
first repeater satellite, Courier, in 1960, while working on a more sophisti- 
cated satellite known as Advent. Advent was too ambitious and was canceled 
in 1962, but in 1964, the Department of Defense created the Initial Defense 
Communications Satellite Program (IDCSP), managed by the Defense 
Communications Agency. The Air Force built the satellites, while the Army 
Satellite Communications Agency handled the ground segment. IDCSP con- 
sisted of a constellation of simple Philco satellites in medium-Earth orbit, the 
first seven of which were launched in 1966. The military, from that time to 
the present, also leased transponders on commercial communications satellites 
for less sensitive logistical and other information. 
The second generation of military satellites was known as the Defense 
Satellite Communications System 11, or DSCS (pronounced “discus”) 11. Built 
by TRW, the first pair of these much more capable satellites were launched 
in 1971. Whereas IDCSP satellites could each handle 11 tactical-quality voice 
circuits, DSCS I1 satellites each had capacity for 1,300 voice channels and 
could communicate with much smaller antennas on the ground. DSCS I11 
satellites, built by General Electric and first launched in 1982, were even more 
capable, with antijamming capabilities and spot beams. DSCS I11 satellites 
continue to operate into the 21st century. 
145. Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States and the Command 
146. Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, 
147. Paul Bracken, The Command and Control ofNudear Forces (New Haven, C T  Yale University 
148. Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword. 
of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945-1964 (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000). 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1985). 
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In the meantime, the Navy wanted its own system for mobile fleet com- 
munications. The Lincoln Laboratory of MIT, with funding from all of the 
services, created a series of experimental satellites to test a variety of fre- 
quency ranges and capabilities. The first military satellites operated in Super 
High Frequency (SHF), which required very large ground antennas. Mobile 
communications required smaller ground antennas, often using Ultra-High 
Frequencies (UHF). Lincoln Experimental Satellites 3-6 tested these capabili- 
ties, leading to the Hughes-built Tacsat, which conclusively proved the utility 
of UHF communications for the U.S. Navy in particular. The Navy then 
funded development of the Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) 
system in the 1970s, but development delays led to purchase of the so-called 
“Gapfiller” satellites, also built by Hughes. Gapfiller and FLTSATCOM were 
both used in 1980s, with two FLTSATCOM satellites, controlled from Point 
Mugu, California, remaining in operation as of February 2005. 
The USAF originally developed the Milstar communications satellites 
in the 1980s for low-rate, nuclear-hardened communications capabilities to 
ensure the nuclear “go-code’’ could be sent in nuclear war. When the Cold 
War ended, the remaining Milstar satellites were modified for higher-rate 
communication capabilities for tactical purposes. Since the 1970s, the increas- 
ing use of imagery for strategic and tactical purposes has driven the devel- 
opment of satellite communication capabilities towards ever greater speeds. 
The KH-11 reconnaissance satellites, which were the first to use radio sig- 
nals to send imagery, required communications satellites such as the Satellite 
Data System to relay the data. Later systems, such as the Lacrosse radar-based 
reconnaissance satellite, used the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System 
also used by NASA. The Ultra-High Frequency Follow-On system, first 
launched in 1993, is the replacement for the aging FLTSATCOM design. 
With ever greater demand for communications bandwidth largely driven by 
sending digital imagery, the U.S. military began leasing significant amounts 
of time and transponders from commercial carriers, including its 2000 deal 
with Iridium Satellite LLC to lease the Iridium global satellite constellation 
that had gone bankrupt. 
The Soviet Union likewise developed military communications systems, 
starting with the well-known Molniya satellites in 1965. Because of the far 
northern latitudes of the Soviet Union, the Soviets have predominantly used 
medium-Earth-orbit systems to ensure coverage over the Poles. Later, the 
Soviets combined communications with navigational capabilities with the 
Tsiklon (first launched 1967) and later Tsiklon M system (first launched 1974). 
The Kristal and Strela satellite constellations were also developed, along with 
the geosynchronous Raduga communications system. 
Military satellite communications have also been crucial to other coun- 
tries, starting with the United Kingdom for the Royal Navy, which developed 
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and operated its Skynet system starting in 1969, and to NATO, which since the 
1970s has had its own series of satellites. China developed its Dong Fang Hong 
communications satellites starting in 1984. Many other countries have military 
satellite communication capabilities through their own domestic communica- 
tions satellites. These satellites are generally mixed military-civilian systems. 
No comprehensive history of satellite communications, or of military sat- 
ellite communications, exists. However, some historical research has begun. 
The origin of satellite communications is best told in Whalen’s The Origins 
of Satellite Communications, including the relationships between the military, 
NASA, and industry in its formative period in the 1950s and early 196Os.l4’ 
Butrica’s edited Beyond the Ionosphere contains a collection of historical papers 
on a variety of communications satellite topics, including military efforts of 
the USAF, Navy, and MIT’s Lincoln Laborat~ries.”~ Martin’s Communication 
Satellites, now in its fourth edition, is an essential reference, providing a brief 
overview of all communications satellites up to its publication date, includ- 
ing source information on where to get further data.’51 Spires and Sturdevant 
provide an overview of USAF military satellite communications, which is 
reproduced in Beyond the Iono~phere.’~~ Van Trees et al. provide an overview 
of satellite communications in a 2004 ar t i~1e. l~~ Lee’s History of the Defeense 
Satellite Communications System is one of the few works devoted exclusively 
to military space  communication^.^^^ Davis described Project SCORE in a 
1999 ar t i~1e. l~~ Richelson describes the Satellite Data System (SDS) in a 1982 
article in the Journal of the British Interplanetary S0~iety.I~~ Day’s 1999 Spacejlight 
article discusses SDS and its three launches from the Space Sh~tt1e.l~’ The U.S. 
and Soviet navies’ use of communications satellites is well told in Friedman’s 
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no. 5 (1984): 226-228. 
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(February 1999): 78-84. 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002). 
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Seapower and Space.158 Getting describes early military communications pro- 
grams in his a~tobiography.’~~ Recent issues and options for leasing commer- 
cial systems are discussed in a RAND study by Bonds et a1.16’ 
Harvey’s Russia in Space has an overview of Soviet and Russian com- 
munications systems.161 Hendrickx describes the early Molniya program.’62 
The Chinese program, including its communications satellites, is discussed in 
Clark’s overview in the Journal of the British Interplanetary S0~iety.I~~ Harvey also 
gives some attention to the Dong Fang Hong satellites in his The Chinese Space 
Prog~arnrne.’~~ Harris describes the British Skynet program.’65 
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
Unlike most other areas of military space, defense against intercontinen- 
tal ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is a subject that has spawned great public interest 
in the United States, with high-profile political debates highlighting the sub- 
ject from its inception in the 1960s, and particularly in the mid-1980s with the 
initiation of Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which critics 
called “Star Wars” after the 1977 film of that name. In turn, these political 
debates have led to a minor industry of polemical works both for and against 
ballistic missile defense and its alleged impact on international political and 
military stability. Amazingly, despite the thousands of pages and dozens of 
works on the subject, there is no comprehensive history of the actual ballistic 
missile defense systems and programs. In fact, there are no comprehensive 
public histories of any of the ballistic missile defense systems that have actually 
been deployed, the SDI program itself, or its Soviet counterparts. 
From the moment that Nazi Germany began firing V-2s at London, British 
and American soldiers, scientists, and engineers began searching for ways to 
counter these apparently unstoppable weapons. During World War 11, the only 
counter was to attack launch sites and logistics for the V-2. Once in flight, there 
was nothing that could stop them, due to their extremely high speed. After 
158. Norman Friedman, Seapower and Space: From the Dawn ofthe Missile Age to Net-Centric War$are 
159. Ivan A. Getting, All in a Lij2time: Science in the Defense ofDemocracy (NewYork:Vantage Press, 1989). 
160. Tim Bonds, Michale G. Mattock, Thomas Hamilton, Carl Rhodes, Michael Scheiern, Philip 
M. Feldman, David R. Frelinger, and Robert Uy, Employing Commercial Satellite Communications: 
Wideband Investment Optionsfor the Department ofDefense (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000). 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000). 
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162. Bart Hendrickx, “The Early Years of the Molniya Program,” Quest: The History ofspaceflight 
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the war, the U.S. Army developed its Nike-Ajax surface-to-air missiles, and 
the Army Air Forces contracted Project THUMPER with General Electric 
and the University of Michigan for Project WIZARD to investigate using 
missiles to destroy incoming ballistic missiles. In 1955, the Army contracted 
with Western Electric to create an antiballistic missile system, which led ulti- 
mately to the Nike-Zeus antiballistic missile. In 1958, the Air Force’s Project 
WIZARD was reduced to research on radar and command and control, and 
the Army gained control of the antiballistic missile program. The Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) developed an idea in July 1960 for a space- 
based system called Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept, or BAMBI. Nike-Zeus 
successfully intercepted an Atlas ICBM in 1962 but remained in research and 
development. Instead, the system’s capabilities were developed further to the 
Nike-X, which used an upgraded Nike-Zeus missile known as Spartan. 
In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson approved development and deployment 
of the SENTINEL system, which was to be a national ballistic missile defense 
system with 18 missile sites. However, with the growth of the antiwar move- 
ment resulting fi-om theVietnam War, support for SENTINEL shrank, and it was 
scaled back to the smaller SAFEGUARD system, which was barely approved in 
1969. Congress funded only 2 of the 12 proposed sites, which soon shrank to 
only 1 site north of Grand Forks, North Dakota, to protect a Minuteman ICBM 
field. President Richard Nixon used the antiballistic missile (ABM) system as a 
bargaining chip with the Soviet Union, leading to the signing of the ABM Treaty 
in 1972, which with a further protocol in 1974 allowed the United States and 
Soviet Union one missile site each.The system itself, which used new phased- 
array radars, deployed the long-range Spartan and the short-range Sprint missiles, 
each tipped with nuclear warheads. In September 1975, the system became fblly 
operational, but the next month, Congress terminated its funding.The next year, 
the Army began deactivation, and by 1977, the site was in “caretaker status,” with 
only its Perimeter Acquisition Radar remaining functional. 
The Soviet Union also began development of its own ABM systems in 
the late 1950s. Initial testing occurred at Sary Shagan in 1956 and led to 
the creation of the Anti-Missile Defense Forces in 1958. The first successful 
ballistic missile interception occurred in 1960, with the actual destruction 
of a test missile in 1961 using conventional explosives. Nuclear testing fol- 
lowed shortly thereafter. After an abortive attempt to deploy a system around 
Leningrad in the early 1960s, the Soviets deployed their first system, the A-35, 
around Moscow beginning in 1967. A series of upgrades followed both with 
the radar and missile systems. The upgraded system, the A-135, became fully 
operational only in the mid-l990s, with its new missiles, the SH-08 Gazelle 
and the SH-11 Gorgon, functioning like the American Sprint and Spartan for 
a layered defense. Thus the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, has kept 
an operational ABM system in place continuously since the late 1960s. 
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Even though the United States dismantled its ABM system in the mid- 
1970s, research and development continued on the relevant technologies. A 
revival came in March 1983 when President Ronald Reagan announced the 
Strategic Defense 1nitiative.Mter his landslide reelection in 1984, Reagan pushed 
major funding increases for strategic defense and created the Strategic Defense 
Initiative Organization (SDIO). SDIO investigated a variety of approaches to 
ballistic missile defense, including space-based lasers and kinetic kill vehicles, 
along with a variety of Earth-based approaches. With the end of the Reagan 
administration, SDI did not die, but it was scaled back, refocused on research, and 
renamed several times. The possibility of antiballistic missile systems got a boost 
during the GulfWar of 1991 when Patriot batteries intercepted some Iraqi Scud 
missiles over Israel and Saudi Arabia. When Pakistan and Iran tested medium- 
range ballistic missiles in 1998 and North Korea attempted to put a satelhte in 
orbit, the debate over ABM systems heated up again. Accelerated development 
followed but did not lead to a deployed system, partly due to technical issues. 
Through 2004, testing ofABM technologies continued with mixed success. 
Chun’s 2003 articles in Quest are a good starting point for the history of 
Nike-Zeus.’@ These articles rely on the Army’s Missiles Handbook, published 
annually in the late 1950s and early 1 9 6 0 ~ ’ ~ ~  Lonnquest andwinkler’s Defend and 
Deter provides an overview of Cold War missile systems, inclulng Nike-Zeus 
and SAFEGUARD.I6* Bowen’s 2005 Quest article provides a short overview 
of SAFEGUARD,’69 drawing significantly from three internal Army sources.17o 
Walker et al. provide a historical site asse~sment.’~~ Bruce-Briggs provides an 
overview of ABM systems through the early SDI ~ r 0 g r a m . l ~ ~  
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The history of the Soviet Union’s ABM systems are described in Zaloga’s 
The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword, and also in Whitmore’s Quest articles in 2002- 
2003.’73 Mathers discusses Soviet ballistic missile defense (BMD) during the 
Khrushchev era.174 The Federation of American Scientists also provides good 
material on Soviet ABM systems.’75 Siddiqi’s 1998 Spaceflight article describes 
the Soviet ground- and space-based laser programs FON and P01yus.’~~ 
Newhouse’s Cold Dawn is the classic introduction to the history ofSALT nego- 
t ia t ion~.’~~ Hays provides a good overview of the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaties (START I and START II).’78 
The best starting point to understand SDI’s beginnings is Baucom’s The 
Origins ~fSD1.l~~ Baucom also provides an overview of SDI’s organization, as 
does Mary FitzGerald.lS0 To date, there are no published overview technical 
histories of SDI and its descendants. However, Frances Fitzgerald provides 
an overview of SDI politics during the Reagan administration, and Graham 
does the same for the later Clinton and early G. W. Bush administrations.lS1 
Simmons and Bythrow describe Delta Star, an SDI Organization experi- 
ment to track launchers from space.ls2 Lagrasse and Farmin narrate the TSX-5 
experiment for the Ballistic Missile Defense 0rgani~at ion. l~~ 
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SPACE INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE 
Using space systems to divine the intentions and capabilities of other 
nations is a crucial aspect of military space, with a significant and growing 
historical literature. The use of satellites for reconnaissance was presented in 
RAND’S initial study of artificial satellites in 1946. The U.S. government 
was desperate for information about secretive Soviet efforts, particularly with 
respect to nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. In the 1950s, the United 
States, with cooperation from Great Britain and others, used a variety ofmeans 
to gather both photographic and electronic intelligence information, includ- 
ing balloon and aircraft overflights. These culminated with the U-2 program, 
which had its first mission over the Soviet Union in 1956. American officials 
realized that sooner or later, the Soviets would develop an antiaircraft missile 
that could shoot down U-2s, an event that transpired in 1960. In.the mean- 
time, the United States began development of a satellite that could replace 
the U-2. Reconnaissance satellites became a top priority of the military and 
intelligence communities at this time and have remained so to the present day. 
A major priority for the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations was the 
establishment of the principle of “freedom of space,” so as to allow American 
reconnaissance satellites to gather intelligence of the Communist bloc. 
The U.S. reconnaissance satellite effort began as the USAFS Project WS- 
117L in the mid-1950s. It led to the CORONA and Samos programs for 
reconnaissance and MIDAS for early warning. The USAF-funded Samos pro- 
gram intended to provide real-time intelligence data by sending images from 
on-board film readout to the ground by radio. Unfortunately, the technology 
to acquire high-resolution digital imagery was not yet mature, and after 11 
test flights with mixed results, the program was canceled. In the meantime, 
the CIA, with the Eisenhower administration’s encouragement, developed the 
CORONA film-return system. Under the public name of Discoverer, which 
was proclaimed to launch life science and engineering technology experi- 
ments, the CIA began test flights. After 12 consecutive failures, in August 
1960 the first CORONA capsule returned successfully from space. The next 
flight, Discoverer 14, put a camera in orbit and photographed more of the 
Soviet Union than all previous air overflights combined. 
The CORONA program operated until 1972, by which time it orbited 
a variety of cameras, improving ground resolution from about 40 feet to 6 
feet. Various CORONA missions also incorporated stereo cameras, two film 
buckets to increase mission length, and mapping cameras for military target- 
ing. Some also carried subsatellites that separated from the main satellite once 
in orbit, generally for electronics and signals intelligence gathering. Shortly 
after the first successful flight in 1960, the Eisenhower and Kennedy admin- 
istrations created, in secret, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to 
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manage CORONA and other space intelligence assets. To handle the mas- 
sive flow of imagery, the U.S. government created the National Photographic 
Interpretation Center. 
CORONA and its successors were crucial to maintaining peace during 
the Cold War, as first the U.S. and shortly thereafter the Soviet Union moni- 
tored each other’s nuclear capabilities. This mutual ability and its high value 
to each side made it possible to sign treaties banning weapons of mass destruc- 
tion from space, to limit ballistic missile defenses, and to allow the signing of 
verifiable arms control treaties starting in the 1970s. CORONA proved in the 
early 1960s that American fears that the Soviets were ahead in the develop- 
ment and deployment of ICBMs were unfounded. In fact, the “missile gap” 
was massively in favor of the United States. This information allowed the 
Kennedy and later administrations to scale back nuclear missile deployments 
and to stand firm against Soviet threats. 
A variety of successor systems for optical reconnaissance followed 
CORONA, starting with the KH-9 Hexagon in the early 1970s and the KH- 
11 Kennan real-time optical reconnaissance system. While the KH-9 pro- 
vided higher resolution using film-return methods, the KH-11 fulfilled the 
USAF’s dream of a real-time optical reconnaissance system, which allowed 
much faster return of data than the slow film-bucket capability. In parallel, 
the United States also developed a variety of signals and electronic intelli- 
gence systems, under a variety of code names such as Rhyolite, Canyon, and 
Magnum, and eventually an active radar-imaging satellite known as Lacrosse 
that allowed spy satellites to “see” through clouds and at night. The Advanced 
KH-11, Lacrosse, and a variety of signals and electronics intelligence satellites 
continue to operate today. 
The Soviet Union initially objected to U.S. reconnaissance systems, but 
only until it orbited its own systems, at which point Soviet leaders quietly 
dropped their objections to these highly useful devices. Korolev’s OKB-1 
developed the first Soviet reconnaissance system, known as Zenit, from the 
Vostok capsule used to orbit humans, by replacing the human gear with cam- 
era systems. Like the United States, the Soviets then developed a variety of 
improved optical systems, along with their own electronics and signals intel- 
ligence satellites. Improved optical satellites, under the name Yantar, first flew 
in 1974, with the real-time digital Yantar Terilen system first flying in 1982. 
New systems, known as Orlets and Arkon, are also currently flying. 
China, France, Israel, and Japan have also developed space photorecon- 
naissance capabilities. China’s Fanhui Shi Yao Gang Weixing satellites, first 
successfully launched in 1975, are recoverable optical imaging satellites, prob- 
ably at least in part for military purposes. France, Italy, and Spain collaborated 
to develop the Helios reconnaissance satellites, first launched in 1995. A sec- 
ond Helios was launched in 1999, and the second-generation Helios 2A was 
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placed in orbit in December 2004. Israel’s Ofeq series of military imaging 
satellites, first launched in 1988, are now up to Ofeq-5. Japan launched its first 
pair of Information Gathering Satellites in March 2003 in response to North 
Korea’s attempt to put a satellite in orbit with its Taepodong rocket launch in 
1998. A variety of other systems are in development in a number of nations. 
The 1990s saw a boom in histories of space intelligence, mainly due to 
the declassifications and the opening of some former Soviet archives. The 
NRO’s existence was revealed in 1992, in the first Bush admini~tration.”~ 
In May 1995, a public conference heralded the declassification of CORONA 
materials, while in August 2002, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency 
declassified imagery from the KH-7 and KH-9 Mapping Camera.18’ Prior to 
1992, Cold War-era attempts to tell the story of space reconnaissance and 
intelligence systems were necessarily based on many obscure clues with little 
direct hard evidence. Klass, Kenden, Borrowman, Richelson, Peebles, and 
Burrows each attempted this prodigious task, with varying degrees of suc- 
cess.lS6 Their efforts for CORONA are now outdated but remain valuable for 
electronics intelligence (ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) and for 
optical reconnaissance after CORONA. For signals intelligence, Bamford’s 
recent book on the National Security Agency is a good place to start, although 
it focuses mainly on nonsatellite programs.lS7 McDowell gives an overview 
of U.S. spy satellite programs, with each satellite’s launch date.la8 While sig- 
nificant progress has been made to untangle these programs, many issues and 
facts will no doubt remain unresolved for decades to come until the relevant 
sources are declassified. 
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In 1995, the rush of works on the CORONA project based on declas- 
sified sources started with a public conference whose proceedings resulted in 
an edited work by R ~ f f n e r . ’ ~ ~  That same conference led also to Day et al., 
Eye in the Sky, which provides a number of excellent articles by historians and 
participants on CORONA.19’ Day also wrote an early, concise overview of 
CORONA in two Quest  issue^.'^' Day also followed with articles on other arti- 
cles on various aspects of the CORONA program and its various camera sys- 
t e m ~ , ~ ~ ~  as well as avariety of other reconnaissance and intelligence ~r0grams. l~~ 
McDonald also wrote an early work on CORONA.194 Not surprisingly, those 
best able to take advantage of the now-opened archives included those who 
had written on the subjects before. Peebles soon published an overview his- 
tory of CORONA.’95 Richelson used these new sources, along with others, 
to publish a work on the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Science 
and Te~hnology.’~~ Burrows’s This New Oceun, which attempted a comprehen- 
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sive history of the “First Space Age,” used the new CORONA materials as 
~e1l . l~’  Taubman’s Secret Empire is a more recent take on Eisenhower’s support 
of CORONA and its predecessors.198 Arnold’s Spying from Space focuses on the 
command and control (C2) system set up for CORONA and deals with much 
of CORONA’S early history as a re~u1t.I~~ Temple’s 2004 book Shades of Grey is 
another solid contribution to space reconnaissance history.200 Day has a series 
of articles about the Samos prograrn.”l Hall describes the transfer of its camera 
technology to NASA’s Lunar Orbiter, as does Day.2o2 
RAND’s part in the development of satellite reconnaissance is described 
in Davies and Harris, RAND’s  Role in the Evolution of Balloon and Satellite 
Observations Systems and Related U. S.  Space Technology.203 Peebles wrote about 
the balloon projects in The Moby Dick Project.204 Hall sets the stage for satellite 
reconnaissance with a history of aerial overflights of the Soviet U.S. 
Air Force Project 117L, which gave rise to CORONA as well as MIDAS, is 
discussed in Coolbaugh’s 1998 article and in Perry’s, as well as in Bowen’s 
overviews of the genesis of military space efforts.206 Other CORONA-related 
works include McDonald’s edited CORONA: Between the Sun and the Earth, 
197. Burrows, This New Ocean. 
198. Philip Taubman, Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the C I A ,  and the Hidden Story ofAmerica’s Space 
Espionage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003). 
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(Reston, VA: AIAA, 2004). 
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Oder et al.’s The CORONA Story, and Lindgren’s Trust but Ver$y.’07 There 
have been concerns about errors in Lindgren’s work.’O* Institutional works on 
the NRO I discuss later in this essay. 
The politics of the freedom of space has been the focus of a number 
of historians. Stephen Ambrose, in his research on Dwight Eisenhower, was 
among the first to note the importance ofthe issue in 1981.209 Rostow analyzed 
the Open Skies policy one year later.’l0 McDougall’s . . . The Heavens und the 
Eurth provided the first full-length analysis of the issues involved.’” Hall, with 
deeper archival research and materials available, revisited the topic in 1995.’” 
Day followed with his assessment in 1998.’13 Neufeld revisited the issue in 
2000.’14 The most recent assessment is by Bille and Lishock in 2004.215 
Other relevant materials include McElheny’s biography of Eastman 
Kodak’s influential Edwin Land, as well as autobiographies of Richard Bissell 
and George Kistiakowsky.216 Ranelagh’s overview of the CIA, The Agency, 
contains some information on spy satellite programs.217 The GRAB SIGINT 
satellite is described by a 1997 Naval Research Laboratory publication and 
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in Day’s “Listening from Above.”’18 Ball’s Pine Gap provides information 
on U.S. signals intelligence, as do Pike’s “CANYON, RHYOLITE, and 
AQUACADE” and Day’s “Ferrets Above.”’19 Bamford’s 1982 The Puzzle 
Palace, 2002 Body of Secrets, and Lindsey’s popular book The Falcon and the 
Snowman also provide information on spy satellites, in particular from the 
Boyce and Lee spy case.’” An unusual and insightful look at a company’s role 
is found in Lewis’s Spy Capitalism, which discusses Itek Corporation.’” Day 
provided a recent overview of the intelligence space program in 2002.’” 
Non-U.S. reconnaissance systems have significantly less literature. What 
exists is mostly concerned with the Soviet Union and Russia. Harvey’s Russia 
in Space provides an ~verview.”~ Gorin describes Soviet and Russian optical 
reconnaissance systems articles in the Journal ofthe British Interplanetary Society, 
as does Clark.224 Clark also describes Chinese recoverable satellites, which are 
probably partly military in nature, in a 1998 Quest arti~le.”~ Zorn has a short 
article on the development of the Israeli satellite intelligence program.’’6 A 
flavor of the interactions between military and civilian systems can be seen in 
Baker et al., Steinberg, and Dehqanzada and Fl~r in i .”~  There are no histories 
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yet of European, Japanese, or other military space reconnaissance systems, 
but some information on these can be found at the Federation of American 
Scientists Web sitezz8 and Internet searches of newspapers and blogs. 
Finally, an area garnering recent attention is the use of satellite recon- 
naissance data for a variety of intelligence purposes. This is shown by a recent 
spate of work on American assessment (largely based on satellite imagery) of 
the Soviet manned lunar program in the 1960s. The best research on this so far 
is a two-part series, “The Moon in the Crosshairs,” by Day and Siddiqi in 2003 
and 2004.229 Day has followed this with several other articles.230 Pesavento and 
Vick have also ventured into this territory, although some of their claims have 
been challenged.231 
MILITARY HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 
The American and Soviet military services have been involved with 
human spaceflight programs from the late 1950s to the present, starting with 
supplying astronauts and cosmonauts to the fledgling human flight programs, 
moving on to studies and designs for piloted space reconnaissance and bomb- 
ing vehicles, and then designing and operating manned military space sta- 
tions. While most people realize that many astronauts and cosmonauts have 
been military pilots, few have pondered why the military lent many of its 
top personnel to civilian spaceflight programs. Even fewer people realize that 
the U.S. and USSR have had manned military space programs and that the 
Soviets even operated manned military space stations in the 1970s. 
Eugen Sanger developed the idea of a manned space bomber in the 1940s 
and studied the concept in World War I1 Nazi Germany. This “Silver Bird” 
vehicle would drop a bomb on New York, skip off the atmosphere, and return 
to Germany. Walter Dornberger, who headed the German Army’s ballistic mis- 
sile efforts in World War 11, brought the idea to the Bell Aircraft Corporation 
228. See http: //www.Jas. o y .  
229. Dwayne A. Day and Asif Siddiqi, “The Moon in the Crosshairs: CIA Intelligence on the 
Soviet Manned Lunar Programme, Part 1-Launch Complex J,” Spaceflight 45, no. 11 (2003): 
466-475; Dwayne A. Day and Asif Siddiqi, “The Moon in the Crosshairs: CIA Intelligence on 
the Soviet Manned Lunar Programme, Part 2-The J Vehicle,” SpaceJiight 46, no. 3 (2004): 10-11, 
230. Dwayne A. Day, “The Secret of Complex J,” Air Force 87, no. 7 (July 2004): 72-76; Dwayne 
A. Day, “In the Shadows of the Moon Race,” Spacefight 46, no. 11 (2004): 436-440; Dwayne A. 
Day, “From the Shadows to the Stars: James Webb’s Use of Intelligence Data in the Race to the 
Moon,” Air Power History 51, no. 4 (winter 2004). 
231. Peter Pesavento and Charles P. Vick, “The Moon Race ‘End Game’: A New Assessment 
of Soviet Crewed Lunar Aspirations-Part 1,” Quest: The History .f SpaceJiight Quarterly 11, no. 
1 (2004): 6-30; Peter Pesavento and Charles P. Vick, “The Moon Race ‘End Game’: A New 
Assessment of Soviet Crewed Lunar Aspirations-Part 2,” Quest: The History of Spaceflight Quarterly 
11, no. 2 (2004): 6-57. 
114-1 25. 
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in the United States, which in 1952 proposed to study the concept further with 
USAF funding. The Bell study, along with the USAF’s preference for manned 
bombers over missile systems, resulted in the USAF issuing requirements for 
a hypersonic strategic bombardment system in 1955. Several feasibility studies 
were consolidated in October 1957 into the Dyna-Soar program, which would 
initially design a hypersonic manned research vehicle. By late 1961, with the 
mass of Dyna-Soar growing and Soviet competition increasing with Gagarin’s 
flight, the USAF dropped suborbital tests and approved the development of the 
powerful Titan I11 launcher to put Dyna-Soar into space. However, the suc- 
cess of CORONA and the Soviet Zenit systems ensured that priority for both 
nations’ military space efforts went to reconnaissance satellites. By 1963, each 
side was willing to tolerate each other’s reconnaissance satellites, and threats 
to this toleration such as potential antisatellite systems like Dyna-Soar were 
unwelcome. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who was skeptical of its 
mission, canceled it in December 1963. 
However, McNamara agreed that piloted reconnaissance platforms 
had military potential, so at the same time that he canceled Dyna-Soar, he 
approved the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program to investigate. 
MOL‘S immediate lineage included ideas to modify the Gemini capsule- 
the so-called “Blue Gemini” program-as part of a military space station 
program called the “Manned Orbital Development System.” When the 
DOD began to consider taking over Gemini, NASA objected vociferously, 
and the DOD backed down. Ultimately, the USAF decided to modify the 
Gemini capsule to transport astronauts to the MOL, which would be car- 
ried behind the capsule on a Titan I11 launcher. As MOL’s schedule slipped 
and i ts  cost grew, NASA pushed its Apollo Applications Program (soon to 
become Skylab) and the Vietnam War intensified, increasing pressure to can- 
cel MOL. The success of CORONA and the need for funds to develop its 
successor robotic reconnaissance craft (the KH-9 Hexagon) led to MOL’s 
cancellation in June 1969. 
Human military spaceflight did not end with MOL, as the military con- 
sidered its participation in NASA’s Space Shuttle program. The military’s 
requirements significantly influenced the Shuttle’s design, and in the late 
1970s, the USAF prepared to fly Shuttle missions by building its own opera- 
tions center and launch facility, as well as training military astronauts for 
classified missions. In the 1980s, U.S. military men flew a number of clas- 
sified missions on the Space Shuttle, the details of which generally remain 
hidden from the public. One of the missions is known to have deployed two 
Defense Satellite Communications System I11 satellites. Others were most 
likely National Reconnaissance Office missions to deploy various reconnais- 
sance systems. However, the Challenger accident of 1986 and the resulting new 
priorities for the Shuttle soon ended military Shuttle missions. 
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Similar aspirations for human military missions also spurred the Soviets 
to develop programs. A “Raketoplan” explored concepts similar to Dyna- 
Soar. The Soviets also undertook a military space station program. Officially 
called Salyut, the second, third, and fifth were all Almaz military stations, 
launched in 1973, 1974, and 1976. Soyuz missions 14, 15, 21, 23, and 24 were 
all military missions to the Sulyut 3 and 5 stations, performing a variety of 
military tasks, mostly to determine the value of using cosmonauts for recon- 
naissance. After these missions, the Soviets concluded that automated satellites 
were more effective than humans in space, as the humans had limited amounts 
of time available for observations, as they had to eat, sleep, and maintain the 
station. This, combined with the much higher costs of human flights, ended 
human military missions. 
Both American and Soviet armed forces also lent military pilots to their 
respective civilian space programs. From World War I1 to the early 1960s, 
military test pilots aimed to go higher and faster, and their efforts, along with 
the medical experiments, observations, and flight suits made along the way, 
paved the way for civilian space missions. In the 1950s and 1960s, the rela- 
tively high prestige of spaceflight and the potential for human military mis- 
sions in space made this a reasonable proposition for the armed forces. Before 
NASA’s creation, the military controlled the space program by default. The 
Army and Air Force competed in early studies and proposals to put humans 
in space, including the Army’s Project Adam and Project Horizon and the 
Air Force’s “Man-In-Space-Soonest,’’ which had one of the worst acronyms 
possible, MISS. 
With NASA’s creation, the military’s role changed from one of leader- 
ship and control to one of support. Over time, as human-piloted missions and 
crewed space stations faded from military viability in the 1970s and 1980s, 
the number of military personnel becoming astronauts and cosmonauts has 
decreased somewhat. The military rationales for the continued movement 
of military pilots into civilian space programs have become less clear and, to 
date, have not been investigated by historians. Also, the military continues 
to support human flight programs with launch range support and a variety of 
other capabilities. These have declined over time as the civilian programs have 
frequently developed their own capabilities for astronaut testing, etc. 
Myhra describes Sanger’s early orbital bomber program in Nazi Germany.232 
Killebrew gives a history of the USAF’s efforts to find a role for military men 
in space.233 A short history of Dyna-Soar can be found in Quest issue 3, num- 
232. David Myhra, Sanger: Germany’s Orbital Rocket Bomber in World War  I I  (Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 
233. Major Timothy D. Killebrew, Military Man in Space: A History o fAir  Force Efforts to Find a 
Manned Space Mission, Air Command and Staff College Report No. 87-1425 (Maxwell AFB, AL: 
Air University Press, 1987). 
2002). 
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ber 4, which has a number of articles on the program, particularly those by 
Houchin and by Smith.234 Houchin’s 1997 Journal of the British Interplanetary 
Society article is also Godwin’s recent book on Dyna-Soar is a 
compilation of original documents.236 MOL’S history is also relatively obscure. 
Both P e e b l e ~ ~ ~ ~  and Pealei13* created three-part series on the project. Houchin’s 
1995 article investigates the question ofNASA’s relationship to MOL.239 Spires’s 
Beyond Horizons also describes these programs, along with earlier efforts, such 
as MISS.240 Strom provides a brief history of MOL.241 Jenkins’s Space Shuttle 
describes its first hundred missions, a number of which were classified military 
missions.242 Day provides an overview of NASA-DOD relations in an over- 
view article in Exploring the Unknown.243 Powell and Day describe military 
Shuttle missions.244 
Siddiqi covers the 1960s development of the Soviet Raketoplan and 
Spiral, along with the 1960s development of Almaz, in Chullenge to A p 0 l l 0 . ~ ~ ~  
He also describes the military Almaz program and consequent Soyuz flights 
to the military stations in two articles in the journal of the British Interplanetary 
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Historical Overview,” Quest: The History of Spacefight Magazine 3, no. 4 (1994): 13-18; Roy F. 
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Magaa’ne 3, no. 4 (1994): 35-37. 
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Lantratov describes the early Soyuz manned reconnaissance 
designs.247 Zimmerman’s recent history of space stations also briefly discusses 
the Soviet military missions.248 P e ~ a v e n t o ~ ~ ~  describes the Russian shuttle proj- 
ects, as does Garber.250 
The military’s ballooning experiments at extreme altitudes are described 
in Ryan’s The Pre-Astronauts, as well as DeVorkin’s Race to the Stratosphere.251 
Gantz provides a late-1950s view of USAF astronaut training, and Erickson’s 
dissertation looks at this as one aspect of a larger NASA-DOD relationship.252 
Military involvement with the development of spacesuits is described in 
Harris’s The Origins and Technology of the Advanced Extra- Vehicular Spacesuit.253 
Mallan, De Monchaux, and Kozloski also have monographs on the history of 
spacesuits, including their military origins.254 There are no published over- 
view histories of military test-pilot training, aerospace medicine, creation 
of launch facilities and range support, etc. On aerospace medicine, the best 
source so far is Mackowski’s 2002 dissertation.255 Important early sources 
include Armstrong’s Aerospace Medicine and Campbell’s Earthman/Spacernan/ 
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UNIVERSAL MAN.256 Early studies of USAF experiments related to human 
spaceflight can be found in Mallan and Meeter.257 Information on military 
astronauts and their training can be found indirectly through numerous astro- 
naut biographies and autobiographies, which I will not list here. Also, Swenson 
et al.’s early history of Mercury, This New Ocean, discusses some of the early 
military-based astronaut training and selection.258 Siddiqi’s Challenge to Apollo 
describes similar military origins for 
In 1959, Singer discussed the potential of military Moon bases.26” Springer 
describes the U.S. Army’s Project Adam in a 1994 Quest article and the Army’s 
Project Horizon Moon base study in his 1999 “Securing the High Ground.”261 
Burrows and Richelson also discuss military Moon base efforts.262 Stoff 
describes plans for a military version of the Apollo Lunar 
WEATHER AND SCIENCE 
The military has funded and developed a variety of experiments and 
systems to understand space and atmospheric environments and to support 
space operations. This intersects with literature in the history of science in the 
development of space science and meteorology. Prior to NASA’s existence, 
space science was almost exclusively funded by the military. The military has 
had scientific advisers ever since World War I1 to help guide its technology 
and scientific programs. The Office of Naval Research became a “proto- 
National Science Foundation” in the late 1940s and 1950s, funding a variety 
of research, while the USAF established a Scientific Advisory Board that peri- 
odically provided studies and advice, as well as a Chief Scientist’s Office to 
coordinate with academic advisers. The military as a whole used the Research 
256. Harry G. Armstrong, Aerospace Medicine (Baltimore, MD: Williams & Wilkins, 1961); Paul 
A. Campbell, Earthman/Spaceman/UNIVERSAL M A N ?  (New York: Pageant Press, 1965). 
257. Lloyd Mallan, Men, Rockets, and Space Rats (New York: Messner, 1961); George F. Meeter, 
The Holloman Story: Eyewitness Accounts of Space Age Research (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1967). 
258. Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A 
History ofproject Mercury (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4201, 1966). 
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260. Lieutenant Colonel S. E. Singer, “The Military Potential of the Moon,” Air University 
Quarterly Review 11 (summer 1959): 31-53. 
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High Ground: The Army’s Quest for the Moon,” Quest: The History of Spacejight Quarterly 7, no. 
262. William E. Burrows, “Securing the High Ground,” Air 6 Space Smithsonian 8 (December 
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Technicians check out DMSP Block 5D-3 satellite, late 1990s. (Official USAF photo. 
Air Force Space Command, Office of History) 
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and Development Board, which was to help coordinate academic efforts for 
science and technology development after World War I1 and into the 1950s. 
Science experiments aboard American V-2 rocket firings in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s were coordinated by the Naval Research Laboratory. These 
military-supported experiments, along with a variety of ground-based studies 
of the upper atmosphere, were the training ground for many of NASA's early 
space scientists. Similarly, all of the early space science experiments placed on 
board pre-NASA Explorer and Pioneer missions were military-funded. 
The U.S. Army developed the initial Television and Infrared Observation 
System (TIROS) weather satellite program, which it turned over to NASA 
in 1958. The military continued funding certain aspects of space science even 
after NASA's arrival on the scene in late 1958 and created its own opera- 
tional programs to monitor Earth and space weather due to their impact on a 
variety of military operations. The National Reconnaissance Office modified 
the TIROS design to create the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 
(DMSP), which was to ensure that CORONA photography over the Soviet 
Union took pictures of the ground instead of cloud tops. DMSP continued 
under USAF control until 1998, supporting a variety of tactical as well as stra- 
tegic uses. In May 1998, operational responsibility for DMSP transferred to the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) . Interestingly, 
the National Weather Service used the DMSP as the basis for its operational 
satellites in the 1960s instead of NASA's Nimbus. In the early 21st century, 
military and civilian needs are to be met with the National Polar-Orbiting 
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). 
As the impact of solar storms on radio communication became increas- 
ingly apparent, both civilian and military groups established groups to moni- 
tor space weather and issue warnings and advisories to satellite operators. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, the military's desire to test ABM technologies in space 
without violating the ABM Treaty led to the Clementine program, which 
found surprising evidence for water on the Moon. In the Soviet Union, the 
Meteor weather satellite program was a military-civilian system from the start, 
with military specifications provided by the Third Directorate of the Chief 
Directorate of Reactive Armaments (GURVO) and the design handled by the 
All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Electromechanics (VNIIEM) . 
Another major scientific and application initiative was the development of 
geodesy. This was crucial for military operations planning, both for airborne 
and ballistic missile strikes from the U.S. to the USSR and vice versa. In the 
1950s, knowledge of the exact size and shape of the Earth was insufficient 
for ballistic missile targeting, as the uncertainty in the distance from North 
American to Asia was in error between 20 to 30 miles. In addition, the Earth's 
shape influences the gravity field, which affects ballistic missile trajectories. 
Thorough mapping of the Earth's surface was essential and was advocated by 
THE HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY OF NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE 527 
Amrom Katz of RAND Corporation in the late 1950s. Development work 
began on mapping cameras for the USAF Samos program. However, mapping 
from space began in earnest with the U.S. Army in 1959, when it started the 
Argon program, which put the KH-5 mapping camera on board CORONA 
spacecraft. Other mapping cameras were also developed and integrated with 
the CORONA program. 
The other aspect to geodesy was the study of the Earth’s gravitational 
field through experimental satellites. Scientists developed several techniques. 
One was to measure a satellite’s position in orbit through visual sightings at 
different points on the Earth, such as occurred with the 1960s American Echo 
1 and PAGEOS (Passive Geodetic Earth Orbiting Satellite) satellites. Another 
method was to have a satellite send two radio signals at differing wavelengths 
and then observe the Doppler-effect frequency shifts from the ground. The 
U.S. Transit system, as well as the French Diapason and Diademe satellites of 
the 1960s, operated with this principle. Passive satellites with mirrors that can 
reflect laser beams from Earth have also been launched, such as the French 
Starlette. Military geodetic satellites have generally predated civilian sys- 
tems, and civilian geodetic experiments have been among the first satellites 
of nations with ballistic missiles, such as France and China. The U.S. military 
began its Anna 1A and 1B optical ranging satellites in 1962, followed quickly 
by the Gravity Gradient Stabilization Experiment satellites, the Sequential 
Collation of Range satellites, and the Geodetic Earth Orbiting Satellite. The 
Soviets started their geodesy experiments with the Sfera series in 1968, fol- 
lowed by the Musson series beginning in 1980. The U.S. Global Positioning 
System is also used for geodetic purposes. 
Sapolsky’s history of the Office of Naval Research is a good introduction 
to the role of ONR.264Van Keuren narrates the scientific cover for intelligence 
gathering by the Naval Research Laboratory, while McDowell provides an 
overview of its satellites.265 Leslie’s The Cold War and American Science describes 
military interactions with MIT and Stanford, including some related to space.266 
The role of Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory is told 
by Klingaman.267 Sturm describes the creation and evolution of the USAFS 
264. Harvey M. Sapolsky, Science and the Navy: The Hi5tory of the Ofice ofNaval Research (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990). 
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Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) up to 1964.268 Gorn’s Harnessing the Genie also 
discusses the SAB in its relation to technology f~recasting.’~~ Komons describes 
the history of the USAF Office of Scientific Research up to the early 1 9 6 0 ~ . ’ ~ ~  
Day’s Lightning Rod narrates the history of the USAF Office of Chief Scientist.’” 
Liebowitz’s chronology provides information on the Cambridge Field Station 
and its evolution to the Air Force Geophysics Laboratory.’” 
Dick describes the long history of the U.S. Naval Observatory and 
its relationship to astronomy and space science.273 Doel’s general history of 
pre-Space Age planetary science contains important information about the 
military’s role in its creation.274 The history of the American V-2 experiments 
is told in DeVorkin’s Science with a Vengean~e.’~~ Bille and Lishock’s The First 
Space Race describes the military’s role in launching the first satellites, includ- 
ing scientific aspects.276 Needell’s Science, Cold W a r  and the American State 
portrays military-science relationships through the life of Lloyd Berkner, a 
leader of early Cold War atmospheric and space ~cience.”~ Newell’s Beyond 
the Atmosphere and Butrica’s To See the Unseen both begin with descriptions of 
military-funded or -approved space science prior to the founding of NASA.2i8 
Vanguard, along with its Navy origins and science, is described in Green’s early 
NASA history.279 Paulikas and Strom describe The Aerospace Corporation’s 
early efforts in understanding the space environment.280 Hendrickx narrates 
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(Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1986). 
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Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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Research, 1920-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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after World War I I  (New York: Springer-VerIag, 1992). 
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the story of the Soviet Elektron program, which was a scientific response to 
U.S. discoveries with Explorer.281 
Day describes the Argon system and other mapping programs linked to 
CORONA.2s2 Geodesy and its links to military space have become topics for 
recent research, particularly a series of articles by Warnerzs3 and another series 
by C l o ~ d . ” ~  T h e  Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space has a good introduction to 
geodesy that describes the various geodesy missions.2s5 Doel has recently ven- 
tured into the military’s influence on Earth science as Cloud looks at 
the links between the intelligence and civilian remote sensing prograrn~.’~~ 
The best overview of the origins of the Defense Meteorological Satellite 
Program is Hall’s recently declassified article.’” This same 2002 Quest issue 
also contains an informative interview with the program’s first manager, 
Thomas Haig.289 Abel gives a history of DMSP up to 1982; Brandli shows how 
DMSP was used in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s; and Day provides 
a short history on the origins of the pr~grarn.’~’ Bates and Fuller give a gen- 
281. Bart Hendrickx, “Elektron: The Soviet Response to Explorer,” Quest: The Histouy of 
Spacefght Quarterly 8, no. 1 (2000): 37-45. 
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285. Fernand Verger, Isabelle S0urbt.s-Verger, and Reymond Ghirardi, with contributions by 
Xavier Pasco, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Space: Missions, Applications, and Exploration (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
286. Ronald E. Doel, “Constltuting the Postwar Earth Sciences: The Mhtary’s Influence on the 
Environmental Sciences in the USA after 1945,” Social Studies of Science 33, no. 5 (2003): 635-666. 
287. Cloud, “Reviewing the Earth.” 
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era1 history of military weather forecasting, while Nebeker provides a general 
history of which the military is a part.291 Gavaghan discusses the military ori- 
gins of TIROS and early weather satellites in Something New Under the Sun, 
based largely on interviews with Verner S ~ o m i . ~ ~ ~  Hendrickx’s 2004 history of 
Meteor is the best source for the Soviet and Russian weather satellites.293 
Space weather and its relationship to the Sun have received little hstorical 
attention. Hufbauer’s Exploring the Sun describes some USAF efforts in solar and 
space weather observations. Myers wrote a study of space weather operations.294 
NAVIGATION 
Developed initially for nuclear warfare, space-based navigation has 
become a worldwide commercial and civilian utility, as well as a major con- 
tributor to conventional warfare. Space-based navigation developed from ideas 
generated from tracking the first satellites from Earth. Scientists worked out 
the nuances of determining precise satellite positions and orbital trajectories. 
Once they determined the orbital positions and parameters with precision, 
scientists at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory realized 
that it was possible to reverse the procedure. Knowing precise positions in 
orbit, one can use satellites to determine precise positions on Earth. This 
would be extremely useful for ships, which had to calculate their positions 
on featureless oceans. Thus was born the Transit program, which used the 
Doppler effect from satellite radio signals to determine ship and submarine 
positions. The U.S. Navy was particularly interested, because it needed pre- 
cise position measurements for its Polaris submarines to determine the initial 
firing positions of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 
Transit worked well for ships but was inadequate for aircraft, because its 
signals were useful in only two dimensions and there were not enough Transit 
satellites to ensure that there were enough signals to triangulate positions at 
all times. The U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force all experimented in the 1960s 
with technologies to improve upon Transit, but each had different capabili- 
ties. In 1973, the Secretary of Defense ordered the combination of the various 
programs and technologies into the Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) 
291. Charles C. Bates and John F. Fuller, America’s Weather Warriors: 1814-1985 (College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 1986); Frederik Nebeker, Calculating the Weather: Meteorology in the 
20th Century (New York: Academic Press, 1995). 
292. Helen Gavaghan, Something New Under the Sun: Satellites and the Beginning ofthe Space Age 
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program. The first test satellites were put in orbit in 1978, but not until 1993 
was a full constellation of 24 satellites in place. GPS proved its worth in the 
1991 Gulf War as it helped guide Army units over the faceless desert, Navy 
ships around Iraqi minefields, Air Force aircraft to precise target points, and 
precision weaponry fired from Navy and Air Force units. Since that time, the 
U.S. military has converted more and more of its munitions to GPS-based 
precision munitions, since these proved vastly more effective than conven- 
tional ordnance. The use of GPS is now tightly woven with virtually all U.S. 
military operations. In addition, GPS has spawned a vast commercial market, 
which greatly exceeds the military’s use in terms of receivers sold. GPS has 
become a global utility, which complicates U.S. military plans. Politically, it 
can no longer simply shut down civilian access to high-precision signals, even 
though it had originally intended to do so in wartime. 
The Soviet Union was not far behind in the development of its own 
navigational systems. The Soviets first tested the Tsiklon communications 
and navigation satellite in 1967, and it became formally operational in 1971. 
Like Transit, it was used primarily for naval navigation. An improved version, 
Parus, was first tested in 1974 and operational in 1977. The Soviets next fielded 
an all-service geodetic and navigational system known as Kristal, which was 
tested for the Soviet Navy in 1971, and the all-service version in 1984. The 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), the equivalent to GPS, first 
flew in 1982, but since the fall of the USSR, Russia has been unable to main- 
tain the full constellation. 
After 2000, China and Japan flew their first navigational satellites, and 
Europe, in partnership with China, India, and other nations, is beginning its 
Galileo program, which will sell its services to d i t a r y  as well as civilian users. 
Historical information on navigational satellites remains surprisingly 
limited. For a longer view of U.S. navigation since the 19th century up to 
GPS, and also because the U.S. Naval Observatory provides the time for GPS, 
see Dick’s Sky and Ocean Joined.295 Gavaghan discusses the early work of John 
Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory in the creation of Transit,296 
as do D a n ~ h i k ’ ~ ~  and Guier and Weiffenba~h.’~~ Qualkinbush gives an over- 
view of Transit.299 Friedman provides details of the U.S. and Soviet naviga- 
tional systems in terms of their utility for naval operations, including Transit, 
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296. Gavaghan, Something New Under the Sun. 
297. Robert J. Danchik, “An Overview of Transit Development,”Johns Hopkins APL Technical 
298. William H. Guier and George C. Weiffenbach, “Genesis of Satellite Navigation,” Johns 
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Digest 19, no. 1 (1998): 18-26. 
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GPS, Tsiklon, Parus, and Kri~tal.~OO The GPS story is extremely important but 
as yet has no full history. Alford provides a history up to 1985.301 Bradley has a 
few papers on the subject.302 Two articles in Quest 11, number 3, provide good 
overviews of the development of GPS: a historical overview by Banther and an 
interview of Bradford Parkinson, one of the program’s founders.303 Parkinson 
has written three historical articles on GPS.304 Chapter 28 in Getting’s All in 
a Lijztime discusses his role in early navigation at The Aerospace Corporation, 
as does his short paper in IEEE Spectrum.305 Rip and Hasik’s recent book, The 
Precision Revolution, is an outstanding look at the impact of space-based naviga- 
tion on ~ar-fighting.~’~ Harvey provides a brief overview of Russian naviga- 
tional satellites.307 Forden analyzes the functions of China’s Beidou regional 
navigational satellite system.308 
ANTISATELLITES AND SPACE WARFARE 
Both the United States and Russia have had the capability to destroy each 
other’s satellites from the 1960s, with both sides deploying systems. In the 
United States, antisatellite weapons have been politically sensitive. Because 
the United States placed such high value on its space reconnaissance capabili- 
ties, political leaders have been wary about creating provocative antisatellite 
300. Friedman, Seapower and Space. 
301. Major Dennis L. Alford, History ofthe N A V S T A R  Global Positioning System (1963-1985), Air 
Command and Staff College Report No. 86-0050 (Maxwell AFB,AL:Air University Press, 1986). 
302. George W. Bradley 111, “Historical Origins of the Global Positioning System” (prepared 
for the History of Technology Conference, Andrews AFB, MD, 24 October 1995); George W. 
Bradley 111, “NAVSTAR Global Positioning System Decision” (prepared for the CAMP Military 
History Symposium, Rapid City, SD, 11 May 2001); George W. Bradley 111, “Origins ofthe Global 
Positioning System,” in Technology and the Air Force: A Retrospective Assessment, ed. Jacob Neufeld, 
George M. Watson, Jr., and David Chenoweth (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums 
Program, 1997), pp. 245-254. 
303. Chris Banther, “A Look into the History of American Satellite Navigation,” Quest: The 
History ofSpacefllght Quarterly 11, no. 3 (2004): 40-48; Steven R .  Strom, “An Interview with Dr. 
Bradford Parkinson,” Quest: The History of Spacefight Quarterly 11, no. 3 (2004): 49-59. 
304. Bradford W. Parkinson et al., “A History of Satellite Navigation,” Naugatron:journal of the 
Institute ofNauigation 42, no. 1, special issue (1995): 109-164; Bradford W. Parkinson and Stephen W. 
Gilbert, “NAVSTAR Global Positioning System-Ten Years Later,” Proceedings ofthe I E E E  71, no. 
1 (October 1983): 1177-1186; Bradford W. Parkinson, “Introduction and Heritage of NAVSTAR, 
the Global Positioning System,” in Global Posittoning System: Theory and Applicattons, ed. Bradford 
W. Parkinson and James J. Spiker, Jr., vol. 1 (Washington, DC: AIAA, 1996). 
305. Ivan A. Getting, All in a Llfetime: Science in the Defense ofDemocracy (New York: Vantage 
Press, 1989); Ivan A. Getting, “The Global Positioning System,” I E E E  Spectrum (December 1993): 
36-38,43-47. 
306. Michael Russell Rip and James M. Hasik, The Precision Revolution: GPS and the Future o f  
307. Harvey, Russia tu Space: The Failed Frontier? 
308. Geoffrey Forden, “China’s Satellite-Based Navigation System: Implications for Conventional 
Aerial War$& (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002). 
and Strategic Forces,” Breakthroughs 13, no. 1 (spring 2004): 19-28. 
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(ASAT) weapons, for fear of provoking the Soviet Union into developing 
the capability. Despite (or regardless of) American fears or sensitivities, the 
Soviets developed their own ASAT systems. 
American antisatellite capabilities were generally direct spinoffs from 
other technologies and systems. Dyna-Soar, discussed earlier, was to have a 
satellite inspection and destruction capability. Ballistic missile defense systems, 
whether Earth- or space-based, were easily modified to attack satellites as well 
as missiles, at least in low-Earth orbit. Finally, ballistic missiles provided the 
orbital boost capabilities to launch antisatellite weapons. All that was really 
needed was to wait for the satellite to get within range of the booster and then 
fire it with precise timing. 
Early ASAT weapons depended on whether nuclear detonations in space 
could disable satellites. The first American in-space nuclear test occurred with 
Project Argus, which was launched in August 1958 and detonated a 2-kiloton 
weapon, while the Explorer IV satellite measured the resulting change in 
radiation. Further tests, culminating in the much larger 1962 Starfish Prime 
nuclear tests in space over Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean, confirmed 
that in-space nuclear explosions created radiation intensities that were deadly 
to both friendly and enemy satellites, as well as knocking out electrical power 
in the Hawaiian Islands hundreds of miles distant. The data from these tests 
confirmed that nuclear weapons could destroy satellites, but also that they 
were indiscriminate in their effects, which led shortly thereafter to the U.S. 
and USSR agreeing to ban nuclear tests in space. 
American ASAT testing began seriously in October 1959, when the 
USAF’s project Bold Orion used a B-47 bomber to air-launch a Martin 
Corporation missile, which came within 4 miles of the Explorer VI satellite. 
The Navy explored ship- and air-launched ASAT systems, culminating in two 
air-launched tests in 1962. In the meantime, the USAF was developing the larger 
scale SAINT, or Satellite Inspector for Space Defense, which started with a 
General Operational Requirement to develop a satellite defense system in June 
1958. The USAF-managed program was contracted to Radio Corporation of 
America, which designed a rendezvous-capable vehicle with on-board radar to 
be launched with an Atlas-Agena. As it became clear that SAINT could not 
intercept some targets of interest, such as Fractional Orbit Bombardment sys- 
tems, the USAF canceled it, and its mission migrated to Dyna-Soar. 
In parallel, the U.S. Army was extending the capability of its Nike-Zeus 
ballistic missile defense system to have low-Earth-orbit ASAT functions. This 
became Program 505 Mudflap, which was the first U.S. operational ASAT sys- 
tem, deployed at Kwajalein Atoll fiom 1963 to 1967. Replacing it was the USAFS 
Program 437, which used Thor launchers with nuclear warheads launched from 
Johnston Island to intercept Soviet satellites. It was operational from 1964 to 
1970, when it went on standby status before being terminated in 1975. 
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The Chelomey design bureau, OKB-52, designed the Soviet Istrebitel 
Sputnikov (IS) co-orbital ASAT satellite, which first flew in November 1963. 
A series of tests of the system continued through 1971, including operational 
tests in 1968 in which the IS satellite successfully exploded near its target sat- 
ellite. After halting for a few years, the Soviets restarted ASAT tests in 1976, 
which spurred the Ford administration to restart an American ASAT program, 
the Miniature Homing Vehicle, an air-launched system that used the fourth 
stage from a Scout launch vehicle to boost it to space. The United States also 
funded particle beam and laser beam research programs for potential ASAT 
and BMD applications, as did the Soviet Union. Since the mid-l980s, U.S. 
ASAT research, if it continues, appears to have been folded into the Strategic 
Defense Initiative, and later the Ballistic Missile Defense and National Missile 
Defense programs. Russian ASAT research remains cloaked, but no space tests 
appear to have occurred since the demise of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, 
both nations, as well as China, have the capability to build ASATs. 
Although published in 1985, Stares’s The Militarization of Space remains 
a good starting reference for antisatellite systems, describing the politics and 
basic programs of both U.S. and Soviet systems.309 Manno provides simi- 
lar inf~rrnation.~~’ Kilgo’s 2004 Quest article provides an overview of U.S. 
ASAT programs.311 Chun has written a number of recent articles on the his- 
tory of U.S. ASAT systems. He describes SAINT in his “A Falling Star.”312 In 
a later article, “Nike-Zeus’ Thunder and Lightning,” he narrates the genesis 
of the Army’s Program 505.313 The story of the USAF’s Program 437 is told in 
Shooting Down a “Star. This work draws from Austerman’s Program 437.315 
The Miniature Homing Vehicle program is described in Stares’s book, in 
Day’s “Arming the High Frontier,” and in Spires’s Beyond H o ~ i z o n s . ~ ~ ~  Siddiqi 
309. Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984 (Ithaca, NY. Cornel1 
University Press, 1985). 
310. Jack Manno, Arming the Heavens: The Hidden Military Agenda for Space, 1945-1995 (New 
York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1984). 
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Quarterly 11, no. 3 (2004): 30-39. 
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narrates the history of the Chelomey ASAT system in an article in journal of 
the British Interplanetary Society.317 Onkst describes CIA and NRO responses to 
Soviet antisatellite systems between 1962 and 1971.318 
ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND ACQUISITION 
The history of human activities in space is intimately tied to the develop- 
ment of sophisticated technologies. In military terms, the research and devel- 
opment leading to the creation of these technologies is called “acquisition.” 
The unique characteristics of the space environment drove the creation of 
new managerial methods for military technology acquisition called “systems 
management.” Space systems are also operated differently from most Earth- 
based systems, leading to unique operational processes as well. These devel- 
opmental and operational differences have also led to the creation of new 
organizations within the services that handle these unique acquisition and 
operations processes. 
In the late 1940s through the early 1960s, the military services com- 
peted for “roles and missions” related to nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, 
and finally space systems. The novelty of nuclear weapons and of the space 
environment meant that none of the services had a clear-cut, unchallengeable 
claim to these technologies or to space. The Army saw ballistic missiles as 
extensions to its classical artillery. The USAF saw space as a natural exten- 
sion of flying. The Navy believed space had unique characteristics crucial for 
its mission on and in the oceans and did not want either the Army or the Air 
Force to monopolize space. 
Army Ordnance handled the bulk of the Army’s missile efforts, control- 
ling von Braun’s Army Ballistic Missile Agency and funding Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (JPL) to develop the Corporal ballistic missile. Early Air Force 
missile efforts were managed by Air Research and Development Command 
and Air Materiel Command, which themselves battled over who controlled 
what portions of the development process. The Navy’s efforts were concen- 
trated in the Naval Research Laboratory, with some programs in the Office 
of Naval Research. 
Sputnik highlighted American space deficiencies, leading to a variety of 
changes. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was formed to 
coordinate military space activities. However, it was unsuccessful in this role, 
317. Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo; Asif A. Siddiqi, “The Soviet Co-Orbital Antisatellite System: A 
Synopsis,”Journal ofthe British Interplanetary Society 50, no. 6 (1997): 225-240. 
318. D. H. Onkst, “Check and Counter-Check: The CIA’S and NRO’s Response to Soviet Anti- 
Satellite Systems, 1962-1971,” Journal OJ the British Interplanetary Society 51, no. 8 (August 1998): 
301-308. 
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and the services pushed ARPA aside to instead focus on advanced research in 
which the services were not immediately interested. Space was too important 
to be left to a separate agency. The DOD also created the Deputy Secretary 
of Defense for Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to coordinate and con- 
trol military research, while the Secretary of Defense was given more budget 
authority, which Robert McNamara in the 1960s used to exert control over 
the services. By the end of the 1950s, the Army had mostly lost the battle for 
space, relinquishing JPL and ABMA to NASA. However, it retained pro- 
grams in ballistic missile defense, playing the leading role for BMD and for the 
Program 505 Mudflap antisatellite system. The Navy successfully prevented 
an Air Force monopoly, retaining operational control of satellites intended for 
naval support such as Transit. 
The Air Force won the majority of the turf battles, partially assisted by 
its concept of “aerospace,” the “indivisible medium” of air and space that the 
Air Force claimed could not be separated and was the natural single medium 
for operations above the Earth’s surface. In 1961, the USAF reorganized its 
research and development activities, creating Air Force Systems Command for 
the acquisition of all major programs. Since all space programs were, in the 
early days, development programs, this centralized the management of many 
NS space systems. McNamara rewarded the USAF by officially awarding it 
the bulk of the “space mission.” 
However, this was only a partial bureaucratic victory, because other 
organizations gained or retained influence over certain aspects of NS space. 
This included the National Reconnaissance Office, which forced the USAF to 
share responsibility for reconnaissance satellites with the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and the Defense Communications Agency, which exerted control 
over various aspects of communications satellites and ground systems. Other 
organizations that remained involved with military space included Lincoln 
Laboratory, which was funded by all three services, and the National Security 
Agency, which operated ground stations that received and interpreted signals 
intelligence data. 
The next major changes to the organization of American NS space 
occurred in the early 1980s, due to two major spurs: the Space Shuttle and 
Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. By the late 1970s, the USAF was build- 
ing new facilities to handle Space Shuttle military operations, including a 
launch pad at Vandenberg AFB, a new control facility in Colorado Springs, 
as well as classified facilities at NASA’s Johnson Space Center near Houston. 
The question of what organization would handle Shuttle operations, as well 
as Reagan administration concerns about the USAF’s fractured space opera- 
tions, led the USAF to centralize its satellite operations into a new major 
command, USAF Space Command, based in Colorado Springs. The Army 
and Navy followed suit, creating Army Space Command and Naval Space 
THE HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY OF NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE 537 
Command, respectively. The next step was to create a single unified com- 
mand, called United States Space Command, to centralize operational control 
of all military space assets. Space Command eventually wrested control of 
launch operations from Systems Command, and Systems Command itself was 
soon deactivated, with its functions handed to a newly created Air Materiel 
Command, which brought USAF organizational changes full circle, almost 
identical to its late-1940s form. In the early 2000s, after the 11 September 
2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, U.S. 
Space Command was deactivated and its functions split between Strategic 
Command and a new Northern Command that concentrated on defense of 
the North American continent. 
In the Soviet Union, ballistic missile and space forces evolved differently. 
Initially, ballistic missiles and the early space programs were coordinated 
among several research institutes and design bureaus but organized by Sergei 
Korolev’s Special Design Bureau-1 (OKB-1) in Kaliningrad near Moscow. 
The Soviet leadership soon fomented internal competition for ballistic missiles 
by giving responsibility for some of these systems to Mikhail Yangel’s OKB- 
586 in Dnepropetrovsk, which soon moved into spacecraft design as well. A 
third design bureau, Vladimir Chelomey’s OKB-52 in Reutov, gained strength 
during Nikita Khrushchev’s reign, influenced by the fact that Chelomey hired 
Khrushchev’s son, Sergei. Chelomey developed ballistic missiles, as well as 
antisatellite systems and the Almaz manned reconnaissance orbital station. 
While these “big three” design bureaus were the most prominent, many oth- 
ers were involved with specialized aspects of Soviet military space programs, 
from subsystems to specific satellite types, such as Mikoyan’s OKB-155 that 
worked on Spiral, Kozlov’s OKB-1 Branch 3 that focused on reconnaissance, 
Savin’s OKB-41 that worked on EORSAT and RORSAT, etc. 
Most design bureaus reported to the Ministry of Armaments (MV) 
until 1965, when they were transferred to the Ministry of Machine Building 
(MOM) under Dmitry Ustinov. Some design bureaus, such as Mikoyan’s, 
reported to the Ministry of Aviation Industry. In the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Soviets kept design, accomplished in the design bureaus, separate from pro- 
duction, handled in a variety of factories and plants. In the mid-l970s, the 
Soviets combined design bureaus and associated factories into Scientific- 
Production Associations, or NPOs. Thus OKB-1 and various bureaus com- 
bined into NPO Energia, while OKB-52 became NPO Mashinostroyenia 
and OKB-586 became NPO Yuzhnoye. 
System operations were handled through the Ministry of Defense, which 
controlled the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Nikita Khrushchev, wanting to 
emphasize the importance of ballistic missiles, created the Strategic Missile 
Forces (or Missile Forces of Strategic Designation-RVSN), which from 
1959 to 1981 operated ballistic missile and space systems. Air defense sys- 
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tems, which evolved into the ballistic missile defense and warning systems, 
were operated by the Forces of Anti-Missile Defense (V-PRO), formed in 
1958. Soviet military space programs were centralized in 1964 in the Central 
Directorate of Space Systems (TsUKOS) of the RVSN and, in 1970, called the 
Chief Directorate of the Space Systems (GUKOS). In 1981, GUKOS was 
separated from the RVSN and placed directly under the Ministry of Defense. 
Renamed the Directorate of the Space Systems Commander (UNKS) in 
1986, space systems were formed into a separate military service in 1992, the 
Military Space Forces (VKS). Between 1997 and 2001, the military space 
forces were once again subordinated to the RVSN but, in 2001, were once 
again made an independent force, the Space Forces (KVR). In 2000, when 
the National Air Defense service was disbanded, its strategic defense functions 
were transferred to the Space Forces. 
China’s military space program began when Tsien Hsue-Shen, a brilliant 
rocket theorist working for the California Institute of Technology and a found- 
ing member of JPL, returned to Communist China from the United States 
in 1955. In January 1956, the government founded the Institute of Mechanics 
in Beijing with Tsien in charge. By October, the government heeded Tsien’s 
proposal to develop rockets, creating the Fifth Academy of the Ministry 
of National Defense, with Tsien at its head. The Fifth Academy acquired 
Soviet R1 and R2 missiles, along with Soviet technicians and blueprints. The 
Chinese satellite program began on a small scale when engineers from the 
Shanghai Institute of Machine and Electrical Design went to Beijing to work 
with Tsien. They returned to Shanghai and started to work, but not until 
1965 did the Shanghai institute, under the authority of the Seventh Ministry 
of Machine Building (the Fifth Academy’s new designation) and with assis- 
tance from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, get authorization to work with 
local factories to build satellites. The Shanghai group eventually became the 
Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology. In 1982, the Seventh Ministry 
became the Ministry of Space Industry (MASI), which had several academies 
under it developing various systems and subsystems. Information on other 
military space organizations exists through primary sources, but there has 
been little historical work published in open literature. 
The evolving organizational structures reflect a deeper set of evolving 
managerial and engineering processes that were also created along with space 
systems. Ballistic missile and space systems both require levels of reliability 
significantly higher than most typical Earth-bound technologies. Neither bal- 
listic missiles nor space systems (with a few exceptions like the Shuttle orbiter) 
return once placed in space; therefore, components, except for software, can- 
not be replaced. Rocket engines are extremely dangerous and have extreme 
temperatures and pressures. The space environment also has extremes of tem- 
perature along with radiation, while the lack of air confounds conventional 
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heating and cooling methods. Finally, ballistic missiles and space systems are 
composed of a multiplicity of individually complex technologies, connected 
in complex ways. . 
The combination of these factors led designers to create systems engi- 
neering, which is the set of methods to coordinate the organizational com- 
munication and complexity of space systems. These methods, which include 
environmental and systems testing, quality control, change control, design 
reviews, and configuration control, came to symbolize the extremes of pre- 
planning, controlled manufacturing, and rigorous testing that characterized 
the space industry. They went hand in hand with managerial innovations 
such as project management, configuration boards, matrix management, 
network scheduling tools, and program control rooms. Starting with ballis- 
tic missile programs of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force, these methods 
formed through the mutual interactions of government, industry, and aca- 
demia and led also to the creation of nonprofit organizations such as RAND 
Corporation, The Aerospace Corporation, and MITRE Corporation to help 
the government analyze and coordinate complex technological systems. By 
the mid-l960s, the bulk of these processes and institutions were in place, as 
the DOD instituted systems management across all of the services. Since that 
time, a variety of managerial reforms have been attempted, which somewhat 
modify these techniques or allow flexibility for program managers to select 
from a menu of the systems management tools. However, at the start of the 
21st century, the core of these methods remained in place for space systems 
and ballistic missiles. 
Virtually all military organizations have institutional histories, and thus 
there are a host of internal studies that either have been or someday will be 
declassified. These generally provide a solid base for institutional and manage- 
rial histories. I will not attempt to describe them all here. The best procedure 
for historians is to consult the military organization (or its successor) in which 
they are interested and request access to the appropriate institutional histories, 
as well as starting with the regular publications described below. 
Spires’s Beyond Horizons is the best starting point for the USAF’s space 
organization and executive management. Neufeld’s Ballistic Missiles in the 
USAF provides a similar basis for ballistic missiles,319 as does Schaffel’s The 
Emevging Shield for continental defense. Waldron provides an overview of 
the Space and Missile Systems Center.320 No such overview works exist for 
the U.S. Army’s space efforts, or for the U.S. Navy, ARPA, or the Strategic 
Defense Initiative Organization and its successors. A few lower-level mono- 
graphs and articles exist. Neufeld’s Research and Development in the United States 
319. Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air  Force. 
320. Waldron, Historical Overview ofthe Space and Missile Systems Center. 
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Air Force is an interview with key actors: Bernard Schriever, James Doolittle, 
Samuel Phillips, Robert Marsh, and Ivan Getting.321 Tunyavongs describes 
the politics of the foundation of Air Force Space Command.322 Sapolsky’s 
Science and the Navy narrates the history of ONR,  while McDowell describes 
a variety of Naval Research Laboratory satellite projects.323 Sigethy’s 1980 dis- 
sertation on the organization of USAF basic research is a good stating point for 
that area.324 Lambeth’s short 2004 article in Air Force Magazine describes some 
of the politics of military space.325 
Institutional histories of the intelligence space organizations exist, but 
most remain classified. However, some of these histories have become avail- 
able over time. The National Security Archive at George Washington 
University has a variety of original documents, many of which are posted 
online, regarding the intelligence space programs, in particular those of the 
CIA, NRO, and NSA.326 Richelson’s “Undercover in Outer Space” provides 
an overview of the NR0.327 Perry’s declassified history, Management of the 
National Reconnaissance Program, 1960-1965, is an outstanding early work on 
the organizational problems of reconnai~sance.~~~ Laurie reviews the relation- 
ship of the NRO and Congress.329 Other points of view of the NRO include 
the CIA’S Ofice ofspecial Projects, 1965-1970 and CORONA Program History.330 
Day describes the relationships between some of these various histories in his 
2000 “Rashomon in Space.”331 
U.S. military-funded nonprofits and academically managed organiza- 
tions have received their share of historical work, both from the nonprofits 
321. Jacob Neufeld, ed., Research and Development in the United States Air Force (Washington, DC: 
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index. html. 
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NRO,” International]ournal of Intelligence and CounterIntelltgence 13, no. 3 (fall 2000): 301-344. 
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Reconnaissance Program, 1960-2965 (Washington, DC: NRO,  1969). 
329. Clayton D. Laurie, Congress and the National Reconnaissance Ofjce (Washington, DC: Office 
of the Historian, NRO, June 2001). 
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Activities” (internal document, 19 May 1976). 
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Quest: The History of Spaceftght Quarterly 8 ,  no. 2 (2000): 45-53. 
Center for Air Force History, 1993). 
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Change” (Ph.D. diss., The American University, 1980). 
(2004): 60-64. 
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themselves and from scholars. Mark and Levine provide an overview of these 
institutions.332 RAND Corporation is the most famous of these organizations, 
whose history is described in an early book by Smith, in Jardini’s dissertation, 
and, most recently, by Collins.333 Baum describes the RAND spinoff for air 
defense, System Development Corporation.334 Freeman describes MIT’s 
Lincoln Laboratory, also initially established for air defense, as was the MITRE 
Corporation, which wrote its own internal history, with a more recent history 
by Dyer and Dennis.335 The Aerospace Corporation did its own internal his- 
tories up to 1980 and had a couple of other student thesis histories written 
about it in the early 1 9 7 0 ~ . ~ ~ ~  Koppes provides an excellent history of JPL 
through 1980, including its military roots.337 
The history of the U.S. aerospace industry from the standpoint of busi- 
nesses, which are contracted by the military, is best overviewed in Bilstein’s 
T h e  American Aerospace Markusen et al. perform a series of local 
economic impact studies of military contracting and influences, which include 
the space sector, in The Rise  Of the  G ~ n b e l t . ~ ~ ~  Similar studies for Colorado 
are Sturdevant and Spires’s “Mile-High Ventures” and Spires’s “Walter Orr 
Roberts.”340 Baker and Baker provide a similar story for the foundation of the 
332. Hans Mark and Arnold Levine, The Management $Research Institutions: A Look at Government 
Laboratories (Washington, DC: NASA SP-481, 1984). 
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336. The Aerospace Corporation: Its Work, 1960-1980 (El Segundo, CA: The Aerospace 
Corporation, 1980); The Aerospace Corporation: Its People, 1980 (El Segundo, CA: The Aerospace 
Corporation, 1980); The Aerospace Corporation, 1960-1970, Serving America (El Segundo, CA: 
The Aerospace Corporation, 1970); James Franklin Wheeler, “The Aerospace Corporation, Past, 
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space community in Utah.341 Commercial space systems have had an increas- 
ing impact on military space. An overview of these issues is found in Klotz 
and in Logsdon and A ~ k e r . ~ ~ ’  
There are a number of works about various aerospace companies, includ- 
ing their contracts and relations with the military. These include A e r ~ j e t , ~ ~ ~  
B ~ e i n g , ~ ~ ~  C ~ n v a i r , ~ ~ ~  General Dynamics,346 General Electric’s Aerospace 
Group,347 Itek,348 L ~ c k h e e d , ~ ~ ~  McDonnell Douglas,350 Martin Marietta,351 
Reaction Motors,352 R ~ c k e t d y n e , ~ ~ ~  Thiok01,~~~ and TRW.355 
Siddiqi’s Challenge to Apollo is the best starting point for the institutional 
history of the Soviet ballistic missile and space programs,356 along with his 
1997 SpacefEight article that he later put into an appendix in Challenge to Apollo. 
The other essential reference is Zaloga’s The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword.357 A sim- 
ple introduction to the organizational evolution of the Soviet and Russian 
341. Doran J. Baker and Kay D. Baker, “Outer Space Exploration from Utah: Leon Linford and 
Rocket Science,” Quest: The  History of Spacejight Quarterly 12, no. 3 (2005): 6-15. 
342. Frank G. Klotz, Space, Commerce, and National Security (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations Press, 1998); John M. Logsdon and Russell J. Acker, eds., Merchants and Guardians: 
Balancing U.S. Interests in Global Space Commerce (Washington, DC: Space Policy Institute, George 
Washington University, May 1999). 
343. The Aerojet: The Creative Company (Los Angeles: Stewart F. Cooper Company, 1995). 
344. Eugene E. Bauer, Boeing in Peace and War (Enumclaw,WATaba Pubhcations, 1991); Guy Norris 
and Mark Wagner, Boeing (Osceola, WI: MBI Publishing, 1998); T. M. Sell, Wings of Power: Boeing and 
the Politics o f  Growth in the Northwest (Seattle: University ofWashmgton Press, 2001); Robert J. Serhng, 
Legend and Legacy:The Story ofBoeing and Its People (NewYork: St. Marhn’s Press, 1992). 
345. Bill Yenne, Into the Sunset: The Convair Story (Lyme, C T  Greenwich Pub. Group, 1995). 
346. Roger Franklin, The Defender: The Story of General Dynamics (New York: Harper & Row, 
1986); Jacob Goodwin, Brotherhood of Arms: General Dynamics and the Business of Defending America 
(New York: Times Books, 1985). 
347. Major A. Johnson, Progress in Defense and Space: A History of the Aerospace Group of the General 
Electric Company (Major A. Johnson, 1993). 
348. Jonathan Lewis, Spy Capitalism: I T E K  and the C I A  (New Haven, C T  Yale University Press, 
349.Walter Boyne, Beyond the Horizons, The Lockheed Story (NewYork: St. Martin’s Press, 1998). 
350. Douglas J. Ingells, The McDonnell Douglas Story (Fallbrook, CA: Aero Publishers, 1979); Bill 
Yenne, McDonnell Douglas: A Tale of Two Giants (London: Arms and Armour, 1985). 
351. William B. Harwood, Raise Heaven and Earth: The Story of Martin Marietta People and Their 
Pioneering Accomplishments (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993). 
352. Frederick I. Ordway 111 and Frank H. Winter, “Reaction Motors Inc.: A Corporate 
History,” AIAA Paper 82-277, 1982. 
353. Thirty Years of Rocketdyne (Canoga Park, CA: Rocketdyne Division, Rockwell International 
Corporation, 1985). 
354. E. S. Sutton, “From Polymers to Propellants to Rockets-A History of Thiokol,” AIAA 
Paper 99-2929 (35th AIAA/American Society of Mechanical EngineedSociety of Automotive 
Engineers/American Society for Engineering Education Joint Propulsion Conference and Exhibit, 
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School Press, 1998). 
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military space forces is provided in Gorin’s “Russian Space Forces” article 
in the forthcoming ABC-CLIO space history encyclopedia, Space Exploration 
and Humanity.358 Berkowitz provided an early look at the organization of the 
USSR‘s space units.359 For a first-person view of the early organization of 
Soviet rocketry, see Chertok’s recently translated memoir.360 Clark provides 
an overview history of Yangel’s design bureau, now Y ~ z h n o y e . ~ ~ ~  
For China, Chang’s biography of Tsien Hsue-Shen, Thread ofthe Silkworm, 
is the best starting point.362 Chapter 4 of Johnson-Freese’s The Chinese Space 
Program provides a basic organizational overview and history, as does Harvey’s 
China’s Space Program.363 
On acquisition and management, Lonnquest’s 1996 dissertation, “The 
Face of Atlas,” is an outstanding study of Bernard Schriever’s role in the cre- 
ation of the Atlas ballistic missile. Johnson’s The United States Air Force and the 
Culture o f  Innovation investigates the development of management and systems 
engineering of USAF ballistic missile and air defense programs in the 1950s, 
while The Secret of Apollo contains a shorter version of the ballistic missile 
story but adds JPL, the NASA manned space program, and the early European 
space programs.364 Hughes also tackles these topics in Rescuing P r o m e t h e u ~ . ~ ~ ~  
A short overview of USAF acquisition is provided by B e n ~ o n . ~ ~ ~  All of these 
works draw from Gorn’s outstanding study, Vulcan’s York’s 1970 book 
explains his role in the organization of NS space in Race to Oblivion.368 A criti- 
cal but historical assessment of USAF acquisition by a key early participant 
358. Peter A. Gorin, “Russian Space Forces,” in Space Exploration and Humanity: A Historical 
Encyclopedia, ed. Stephen B. Johnson et al. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, forthcoming, expected 
publication 2007). 
359. M. J. Berkowitz, “To Lift the Veil of Secrecy: USSR Ministry of Defence Space Units,” 
Journal ofthe British Interplanetary Society 46, no. 5 (1993): 191-198. 
360. Boris Chertok, Rockets and People, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: NASA SP-2005-4110, 2005). 
361. Phillip S. Clark, “The History and Projects of the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau,”Journal ofthe 
362. Chang, Thread of the Silkworm. 
363. John Johnson-Freese, The Chinese Space Program: A Mystery Within a Maze (Malabar, FL: 
Krieger Publishing Company, 1998); Brian Harvey, China’s Space Program: From Conception to 
Manned Spaceflight (Chichester, U.K.: Springer-Praxis, 2004). 
364. Stephen B. Johnson, The United States Air Force and the Culture of Innovation, 1945-1965 
(Washington, DC: USAF History and Museums Program, 2002); Stephen B. Johnson, The Secret 
of Apollo: Systems Management in American and European Space Programs (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins, 2002). 
British Interplanetary Society 49, no. 7 (1996): 267-276. 
365. Thomas P. Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus (New York: Pantheon, 1998). 
366. Lawrence R. Benson, Acquisition Management in the United States Air Force and Its Predecessors 
(Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997). 
367. Michael H. Gorn, Vulcan’s Forge: The Making of an Air  Force Command for Weapon Acquisition 
(1950-1985), vol. 1, Narrative (Andrews AFB, MD: History Office, H Q  Air Force Systems 
Command, 1985). 
368. Herbert F. York, Race to Oblivion: A Participant’s View ofthe Arms Race (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1970). 
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can be found in Hall’s The Art of Destructive Management.369 Finally, there is 
currently ongoing a project by the Department of Defense called the Defense 
Acquisition History Project, which is to produce a six-volume series on the 
subject in 2007 and 2008. 
SPACE POWER THEORY 
To date, there is no dedicated monograph on the history of military space 
doctrine and space power theory, perhaps because there is no single work that 
commands doctrinal allegiance. Over the centuries, but particularly since the 
Napoleonic era, military commanders and thinkers have developed a variety 
of theories and doctrines on the nature of war. As warfare expanded from the 
land to the sea and to the air, major thinkers for each, which include Sun Tzu, 
Jomini, and Clausewitz for land warfare; Mahan and Corbett for naval war- 
fare; and Douhet, Mitchell, and Warden for air warfare, developed theories 
and doctrines that have become the basis for understanding conflict in these 
domains ever since. To date, no such comprehensive, fundamental theory has 
been developed for space. 
The first attempts to understand the implications of space were reactions 
to the Nazi V-2 project, such as the 1946 RAND study, which discussed the 
potential for space assets to enhance certain military activities, such as recon- 
naissance and weather prediction. RAND also noted the potential political 
prestige effects of launching the first artificial satellite. In the 1950s, Strategic 
Air Command’s ability to deliver nuclear weapons in a devastating strategic 
bombing campaign was at the forefront of doctrine, and ballistic missiles were 
seen as an alternative means to deliver nuclear weapons. Defense-oriented 
activities, such as early-warning systems, were of distinctly lesser importance. 
With the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the consequent reaction in the 
United States to launch satellites and to organizationally control space activi- 
ties, the USAF ultimately won the lion’s share of military space programs. 
General Thomas White defined and propagated the term “aerospace” in 1959 
to press the USAF’s claim that air and space were a continuous medium with 
no definite boundary, and hence that it was natural for the Air Force to con- 
trol operations in this single environment. This claim is debatable at best, but 
it aided the USAF’s bureaucratic cause, as the Kennedy administration in 1961 
awarded the USAF the largest share of military space projects and functions. 
The next major spur to space power theorizing came in the 1980s, as 
a theoretical counterpart to the formation of USAF, Army, Navy, and U.S. 
Space Commands and Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. By the late 1980s, 
369. Edward N. Hall, The Art of Destructive Management: What  Hath Man Wrought? (New York: 
Vantage Press, 1984). 
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Lupton formulated his four-part conceptual division of space doctrines: sanc- 
tuary, survivability, control, and high ground. At the same time, the USAF 
created a four-part division of its activities, which remain its major means of 
categorizing its activities: space support, force enhancement, space control, and 
force application. These two conceptualizations remain the basic frameworks 
for discussion in the early 21st century, although others have been postulated, 
the most significant of which is probably the extrapolation from Warden’s 
theory of airpower to postulate space as an economic center of gravity. 
Serious theorizing continued into the 1990s and into the first decade of 
the 21st century, but as yet, no comprehensive theory of space warfare has 
emerged. A number of recent authors, including Dolman, Hays, Lambakis, 
Preston, Watts, Gray, Sheldon, and others, have continued the debate. 
Specific histories of space power and doctrine are few. Futrell’s authorita- 
tive Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine volumes are the starting point for understanding 
the history of USAF theories and doctrine, including the intrusion of space 
into the service.370 Equally authoritative on the political aspects of the military 
and some of the debates is McDougall’s . . . The Heavens and the Earth.371 Hays’s 
dissertation investigates the relationship between space programs and attempts 
to create a military space doctrine.372 
The term “aerospace,” along with its evolution and influence, has caught 
some attention. In two articles, Terry narrates the formulation of the aero- 
space doctrine in the late 1950s, during the formative years of the space pro- 
gram.373 Jennings focuses on the conflict over the term “aerospace” itself and 
its use in doctrine.374 Rothstein investigates the evolution of the concept from 
airpower theory.375 Houchin reviews the impact of hypersonic technologies 
on aerospace doctrine.376 
Given the relative paucity of historical work, historians will need to 
read the major proponents directly. Lupton’s O n  Space Warfre is often consid- 
370. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 
1907-1960, vol. 1 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1989); Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, 
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AL: Air University Press, 1989). 
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1944-1958” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 
University Press, 2001). 
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ered the starting point for space power theory.377 Mantz developed his own 
theory of space combat in The New Dolman’s Astropolitik provides 
another important view on the political aspects of space power.379 Lambakis’s 
On the Edge o f  Earth is a good overview of current ideas.380 Preston et al.’s 
Space Weapons, Earth Wars focuses on the political and technical issues of space 
weapons.381 Oberg provides an overview of the USAF’s official doctrine at 
the end of the 20th ~entury .~”  Watts provides an informed analysis of trends 
relevant for military space.383 Shaw attempts to mirror Alfred Thayer Mahan’s 
influence on history.384 Two other important recent works on space power 
theory are by Smith385 and Lambeth.386 
Hays et al.5 Spacepowerfora New Millennium is a compilation ofrecent papers on 
U.S. military space,a number ofwhich relate to theoretical aspects.387 DeBlois’s 1999 
Beyond the Paths ofHeaven is a compendium of papers on space power tho~ght.~” 
Lambright’s collection on space policy contains some theoretical papers.389 Air G 
Space Power Journal (and its predecessor, Aerospace Power Journal, which went by 
other names earlier) often has papers on d t a r y  space doctrinal issues. 
Although typical for other military functions, there are few works that 
focus on space systems in combat, for the simple reason that only recently 
have they been in combat. The First Persian Gulf War of 1991 was the first 
war in which space systems played an important role, which is documented by 
Kutyna, Campen, and Berkowit~.~~’ 
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CONCLUSION-HOLES IN THE LITERATURE 
What can we observe from the rather lengthy treatise on sources pro- 
vided above? First and foremost, there is no area of military space that has a 
comprehensive treatment with both in-depth analysis and crosscutting syn- 
thesis. Some sectors, such as launcher and ballistic missiles, as well as robotic 
intelligence and reconnaissance, have an extensive literature. Others, such as 
command and control, communications, navigation, and space power theory, 
have received very little historical attention. The remainder have had some 
historical research done but remain significantly underdeveloped early-warning 
and space surveillance; ballistic missile defense; human flight; weather and 
science; antisatellite systems; and organization, management, and acquisition. 
Needless to say, this leaves the overall state of military space history as signifi- 
cantly underdeveloped, with a few pockets of significant work and a few areas 
almost completely blank. 
Even in areas that have extensive literature, there remain gaping holes. 
In those sectors with virtually no historical research, almost the entire sector 
is a historical blank slate. I give my thumbnail assessment of missing research 
for each sector below. 
Holes in the Research 
* Ballistic missiles and launch vehicles: synthetic overview, U.S. ballis- 
tic missiles after 1965, ballistic missiles outside the United States and 
Russia/USSR, nuclear warfare strategies after 1960s, effect of the end 
of the Cold War. 
0 Early warning and space surveillance: synthetic overview, U.S. over- 
view, space surveillance, Cold War radar systems history. 
* Command and control: synthetic overview, U.S. /Canada relationship 
with NORAD, system-of-systems history, conventional versus nuclear 
command and control, C2 computing after SAGE, C2 and human fac- 
tors research. 
* Ballistic missile defense: synthetic overview, U.S. overview, project histo- 
ries, SDI and later programs, unbiased political and arms control studies, 
strategic versus theater missile defense, technical history of BMD. 
continued from the previous page 
Computers, and Intelligence Systems in the Persian G u g W u r  (Fairfax, VA. Armed Forces Communications 
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Robotic intelligence and reconnaissance: synthetic overview, non-U.S. 
reconnaissance, post-CORONA reconnaissance, politics of commer- 
cial remote sensing, uses of satellite intelligence, economics of sector. 
* Military human flight: synthetic overview, military-civilian relation- 
ships with astronauts, aerospace medicine, hypersonic technologies 
overview, Space Shuttle and Buran military aspects, Raketoplad 
Spiral, technical program histories, MOL versus Almaz. 
Weather and science: synthetic overview, Clementine, military-civilian 
weather political interactions, project histories, institutions and institu- 
tional relationships. 
Navigation: synthetic overview, full project histories, non-U. S. navi- 
gation systems, strategic to tactical and commercial applications, poli- 
tics and economics of navigation. 
Antisatellite systems and space warfare: synthetic overview, full-length 
project studies (both U.S. and USSR), relationship to BMD and space 
warfare, new political history (beyond Stares). 
Organization, management, and acquisition: synthetic overview; Army, 
Navy, DOD, Missile Defense Agency space institutional histories; 
1970s-present acquisition; comparative studies to other types of sys- 
tems (aircraft, C2, naval, etc.). 
0 Space power theory: synthetic overview; relationships of theory to 
doctrine and practice; studies of theorists and their theories; relation to 
other military theories; connections to political, technical, and insti- 
tutional changes. 
There would be great value to the militaries of spacefaring nations, gov- 
ernmental leaders and managers, and the general public to have histories of the 
many areas that remain underdeveloped. Given that the existence of military 
space activities is no longer classified, and given the changing world since 
the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of global terrorism, broader and 
deeper knowledge of the actual uses of space will be of great benefit. More 
research, both from the military itself and from external scholars, will be nec- 
essary to make the history of national security space as informed and thorough 
as the great and growing importance of these activities deserves. 
CHAPTER 16 
CRITICAL THEORY AS A TOOLBOX: 
SUGGESTIONS FOR SPACE HISTORY’S RELATIONSHIP 
TO THE HISTORY SUBDISCIPLINES 
Margaret A. Weitekamp 
fter the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia in February 2003, I spoke on A a number of radio programs. In the days after the accident, I had writ- 
ten a newspaper editorial reflecting on my fellowship year at the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Headquarters History Office 
in 1997-1998. As a result, the small upstate New York college where I was 
teaching put my name on its Web site as a local space expert. Busy with 
classes, I accepted the invitations that fit most easily into my schedule. All 
but one went smoothly. Too late to cancel, I realized that I had agreed to be 
the guest for a Las Vegas radio personality whose regional following loved 
him for his right-wing political opinions and his penchant for controversy. 
Halfway through the hour-long program, a loyal listener began his question 
with an apology. He had missed my introduction at the beginning of the 
hour: “I’m sorry,” he asked me, “I didn’t hear . . . . Are you a NASA critic or 
a NASA apologist?” 
His question took me aback. I did not consider myself to be either. As an 
historian of 20th-century America, I studied space history because it allowed 
me to investigate the intersections of many different themes-politics, society, 
culture, science, technology, gender, and race-all in one subject. Although 
historians’ conclusions certainly support or criticize particular policy deci- 
sions, I saw doing space history as investigating what spaceflight efforts could 
reveal about a particular time and place: how specific historical contexts shaped 
which projects were pursued, why historical actors made particular decisions, 
and how spaceflight technologies have been embedded in their cultural con- 
texts. Regrouping, I tried to explain the role of the professional historian to 
the listener. 
For many years, the caller’s assessment of space experts as entrenched 
in one camp or the other-as either boosters/apologists or critics/expos- 
ers-would not have been wrong. In a 2000 Space Policy article, Roger D. 
Launius, then the NASA Chief Historian, argued that space history could be 
categorized into three parts, including two categories that were more sophis- 
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ticated but not altogether different than the caller’s binary options. The first, 
the “historiography of expectation” (my caller’s ‘‘apologists”), is, according 
to Launius, “unabashedly celebratory and includes not only the so-called 
‘Huntsville School’ of writing but also those fascinated with the machinery 
and those who use space history to promulgate the space exploration agenda 
for the future.” The second group, the expos&, used space history to question 
the validity of space exploration efforts at all. Finally, Launius outlined a third 
category of scholarship that he called the New Aerospace History: “profes- 
sionally-trained scholars of differing ideologies and prerogatives who concen- 
trate on questions other than whether or not space exploration is justifiable.”’ 
Launius’s choice of name for this school of historiography, the “New 
Aerospace History,” self-consciously positioned the newest space history schol- 
arship as descended from the New Social History advanced beginning in the 
1960s and 1970s. By doing so, he emphasized the active engagement of the 
New Aerospace History with recent scholarship in the broader field of his- 
tory. At the same time, he marked the place of space history as a growing 
subdiscipline within a field still shaped by the New Social History. Indeed, 
the very subject of this paper-a study of the relationship of space history to 
the history subdisciplines-reflects the proliferation of subject areas created 
when historians wrestling with questions of race, class, ethnicity, and gender 
challenged the artificial nature of the consensus school’s master narrative. As 
a result, mapping the 50 years of space history’s expansion means surveying it 
against the shifting background of a complex and changing discipline. 
Such a survey requires two different approaches. First, this analysis reviews 
and outlines space history’s evolution since the beginning of the Space Age. 
Because the aim of this piece is to survey the field, the bibliography included 
in the notes offers a sample of relevant works but not a complete accounting 
of any subdivision of the field.2 Second, the paper offers some perspective on 
space history’s current relationship to the rest of the discipline of history as 
practiced in the United States. When examined in these two ways, space his- 
tory exists both in “relation to” other history subdisciplines (a terminology 
which implies separation from the other subfields and an internal cohesion 
within space history, two points that deserve questioning in their own right) 
and in a continually evolving “relationship with” the rest of the discipline. As 
this essay maps those dynamics, it also offers some suggestions. 
Although the New Aerospace History developed in dialogue with cur- 
rent historical scholarship, the insights of the New Social History have still 
been only incompletely incorporated into space history. This deficit is not 
1. Roger D. Launius, “The Historical Dimension of Space Exploration: Reflections and 
2. Asif Siddiqi’s chapter in this volume offers a more complete current historiography. 
Possibilities,” Space Policy 16 (2000): 23-38. 
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attributable to a lack of source material, but rather to a limited perspec- 
tive on what it would mean to integrate the study of race, class, ethnicity, 
and gender into space history more fully. Bringing the insights of the New 
Social History to space history is not a call for more compensatory histories 
of the still-understudied women in the space field or for separate histories 
of each minority group or ethnicity working in any particular segments of 
space exploration. (Although compensating for past omissions remains a use- 
ful contribution to the field, it is just the first step in historical analysis.) If 
the New Social History has taught historians anything, it is that gender, race, 
ethnicity, and class exist in every history-for both privileged and marginal- 
ized groups. Gender identity shapes the historical experience of both women 
and men. Racial identity affects the lives of White people just as much as it 
does for people of color. Bringing this perspective into analyses of technolo- 
gies or politics requires a new set of tools. 
New developments in the humanities-specifically critical theory-offer 
a toolbox of concepts and methods that will allow space history to delve fur- 
ther into questions of identity, power, and point of view. If the tools of critical 
theory can be adapted without straying too far from the narrative tradition of 
historical scholarship (that is, by adopting its principles and insights without 
overreliance on theoretical terminology, which can become opaque jargon), 
the result will bring space history into more fruitful dialogue with the rest 
of the scholarly community while bringing the insights of recent scholarship 
to a wider readership. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SPACE HISTORY 
The active study of space history began with the very first successful 
orbital flights in the late 1950s. After the flights of Soviet artificial sateIlites 
Sputniks I and I1 in 1957, spaceflight efforts in the United States generated 
awareness by both participants and observers that these events were historic; 
the participants were “making history.” Because American lawmakers were 
also cognizant of the history-making potential of U.S. space efforts-and of the 
need to publicize American achievements to the rest of the world-the 1958 
National Aeronautics and Space Act included, alongside the directives for the 
creation of a civilian space agency, the mandate that NASA “provide for the 
widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information concerning 
its activities and the results there~f.”~ In practical terms, this directive provided 
the basis for the creation and maintenance of NASA’s history offices, archives, 
3. “National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,” Public Law 85-568, in Exploring the Unknown: 
Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, vol. 1, Organizing for Exploration, ed. 
John M. Logsdon (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4407, 1995), p. 337. 
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The 1959 NASA Seal. (NASA photo no. GPN-2002-000195/ 
and libraries. The space agency even began a fine arts program, sponsoring 
a still-ongoing effort to commission artists to record NASA’s achievements 
through sketches, paintings, and other art forms.4 
The story of how NASA came to interpret its mandate to include a his- 
tory program began, at least in part, with Melvin Kranzberg, one of the fathers 
of the history of technology and a key figure in the creation of the NASA 
History Office. Kranzberg was a faculty member at the Case University of 
Technology in Cleveland, Ohio, when Case’s president, T. Keith Glennan, 
was asked by President Dwight D. Eisenhower to become the founding 
Administrator of NASA. In 1958, Kranzberg persuaded Glennan to create a 
history office at the new civilian space agency in the tradition of the successful 
history offices working in the armed forces and in other federal agencies. The 
4. For history and individual artists in the NASA Art Program, see Anne Collins Goodyear, 
“The Relationship of Art to Science and Technology in the United States: Five Case Studies, 
continued on the next page 
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founding of the NASA History Office and the beginning of space history as a 
field occurred at the same time that the broader discipline of history began to 
see the development of distinct subfields organized by topic and appr~ach.~ 
Around the same time that his discussions with Glennan were inspiring 
the new NASA History Office, Kranzberg also helped to found the Society 
for the History of Technology (SHOT). Kranzberg saw the history of tech- 
nology as the latest development in the study of the past: the newest link in 
a chain of histories that offered fresh topics of study and modes of analysis to 
the expanding field. In May 1962, he published an article in Science magazine 
titled “The Newest History: Science and Technology.” In it, he compared the 
history of technology to James Harvey Robinson’s The New History (1912), 
published exactly 50 years earlier. As Kranzberg noted, at the same time that 
Robinson was developing his New History, another historian, George Sarton, 
was also offering the field a groundbreaking new subject for consideration: a 
new history of science. In all three cases, changing world events, social move- 
ments, and academic developments inspired historians to rethink their con- 
ceptions and interpretations of the past.6 
The development of innovative historical approaches-and thus of new 
historical subfields-drove the central argument of Kranzberg’s Science article. 
For the history of technology, Kranzberg argued, the launch of Sputnik I on 
4 October 1957 marked the beginning of a new era. In response, the United 
States needed not only a technological response in the form of a space program, 
but also a study of “technology and science as essential components of our cul- 
ture, affected by and affecting every other aspect of society.” Building on the 
tradition of change and growth in the historical field, Kranzberg saw new his- 
tories as extending and expanding a vital and changing discipline. In his words, 
“Just as the ‘new’ history triumphed over the ‘old’ but never succeeded in dis- 
lodging it completely, so today the ‘new’ history is itself being supplemented 
continued from the previou3 page 
1957-1971” (Ph.D. diss., The University of Texas at Austin, 2002); Anne Collins Goodyear, 
“NASA and the Political Economy of Art, 1962-1974,” in The Political Economy ofArt: Creating the 
Modern Nation of Culture, ed. Julie Codell (Newark University of Delaware Press, forthcoming); 
Anne Collins, “Art, Technology, and the American Space Program, 1962-1972,” Intertexts 3, no. 2 
(fall 1999): 124-146; Anne Collins Goodyear, “On the Threshold of Space: Norman Rockwell’s 
Longest Step,” Architecture and Design for Space: Vision and Reality exhibit catalog (New York: Harry 
N. Abrams, Inc., 2001), pp. 102-107 (exhibit shown at the Art Institute of Chicago, 24 March- 
21 October 2001); “Robert Rauschenberg’s Space-Age Allegory, 1959-1970,” in 1998 National 
Aerospace Conference Proceedings (Dayton, OH: Wright State University, 1999): 82-91. 
5. For Kranzberg’s influence on the creation of NASA’s History Office, see Roger D. Launius, 
“NASA History and the Challenge of Keeping the Contemporary Past,” Public Historian 21 (sum- 
mer 1999): 63-81. 
6. Margaret Rossiter, ed., Catching Up With the Visions: Essays on the Occasion ofthe 75th Anniversary 
of the Founding of the History of Science Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Book for the History 
of Science Society, 1999), a supplement to Isis 90. 
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by the ‘newest’ history.”’ Kranzberg’s Science article is particularly instructive 
for a discussion of how today’s space history has evolved because his analysis of 
American historiography up to 1962 offers a useful model for thinking about 
how new histories expand the discipline of history. In addition, it points out 
the close link between space history and the history of technology, which con- 
tinues to be a vital and important subfield for space history. 
If the NASA History Office’s existence can be traced to Glennan and 
Kranzberg, its reputation for scholarly rigor began with the first NASA 
Historian, Eugene “Gene” M. Emme. From the beginning of its life, the 
NASA History Office worked to balance two major charges: collecting and 
archiving the history of U.S. civil space exploration efforts for use by histori- 
ans, scholars, and the press, and interpreting that material to advise the space 
agency on ongoing decisions. In addition to managing these tasks, Emme 
put the program on the path to real scholarly publishing. He instituted the 
practice of peer review for historical manuscripts published by the NASA 
History Office, a process that parallels the one used by academic presses and 
one which has allowed NASA’s history program to develop into a respected 
site for both research and publishing. As the first in a series of interpretive vol- 
umes recording the details of historic space achievements within a narrative 
structure, Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander’s This New Ocean: A History of 
Project Mercury set the tone for NASA’s authoritative recording of space history. 
Within its first two decades, NASA’s project histories also included books 
on Gemini, Vanguard, and Apollo.8 Within the structures of the U.S. space 
agency, the NASA History Office focused on American space efforts, empha- 
ses that also characterized the field of space history generally. 
The NASA History Office also began the ongoing relationship between 
space history and oral history. As a research technique, the tape-recorded 
interview came into its own in the 1940s and became a useful tool for record- 
ing histories both “from the bottom up” and “from the top down.”9 By 1966, 
the Oral History Association provided a professional organization for oral his- 
torians to share their work while developing and refining the ethical and prac- 
tical guidelines for productive oral histories. For an endeavor like spaceflight, 
7. Melvin Kranzberg, “The Newest History: Science and Technology,” Science 136, no. 3515 (11 
May 1962): 463-468. 
8. Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander, This New Ocean: A 
History ofProject Mercury (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4201, 1966); Constance McLaughlin Green 
and Milton Lomask, Vanguard: A History (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4202, 1970); Barton C. 
Hacker and James M. Grimwood, On the Shoulders ofTitans: A History ofProject Gemini (Washington, 
DC: NASA SP-4203, 1977). See also Launius, “NASA History,” pp. 63-81. 
9. Paul Thompson, The Voice ofthe Past: Oral History, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000); Edward D. Ives, The Tape-Recorded Interview: A Manual for Fieldworkers in Folklore and Oral 
History (Knoxville: University ofTennessee Press, 1995). The best practical handbook is Donald A. 
Ritchie, Doing Oral History: A Practical Guide, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
CRITICAL THEORY AS A TOOLBOX.. . 555 
which required the work of so many different managers, engineers, scientists, 
and pilots, oral history became a key means of recording the full history of 
various space programs, NASA Centers, and historical actors. NASA contin- 
ues to use oral history as a major tool for collecting, preserving, and dissemi- 
nating space history.” 
If the early years of space history (and its relationships with the history 
subdisciplines) can largely be traced through a history of the NASA History 
Office, once the field developed into some maturity in the 1980s, the story 
got much more complex. From where it began in the early 1980s, space his- 
tory underwent dramatic growth and transformation. Because a full analysis 
of that historiography would be too long and involved for this piece (and has 
already been done extraordinarily well elsewhere, as noted above),” an outline 
serves better as a way of noting the relationships between the growing sub- 
field and the changes happening in the discipline of history as a whole. Three 
events mark key points in the evolution of space history: a 1981 Smithsonian 
proseminar, Walter McDougall’s Pulitzer Prize-winning 1985 book, and Asif 
Siddiqi’s 2000 history of the Soviet space program, Challenge to Apollo. 
In 1981, a Smithsonian Institution proseminar in space history hosted 
at the National Air and Space Museum marked the emergence of space his- 
tory as a recognized field. David DeVorkin and Pamela Mack of the then- 
Department of Space Science and Exploration called the meeting to bring 
together scholars working on space history in order to assess the progress 
made over the previous 15 years. The report of the meeting in Isis recorded a 
successful and growing subdiscipline, noting that “the field is already marked 
with a respectable number of books, monographs, dissertations, and works- 
in-progress.” The questions being asked at this meeting offer a sense of the 
state of development of the field. Three issues dominated discussion: first, “Is 
space history best considered part of the history of science or of the history 
of technology?”; second, “Can space science be considered a coherent disci- 
pline?”; and finally, “How should space historians confront the peculiar state 
of sources in this field? ”’’ 
In debating the first question, historians of science and historians of tech- 
nology who worked on space topics found themselves in active discussion 
about the commonalities and differences between their home subfields. The 
discussion of space history’s place quickly made it clear just how much space 
history required the insights of both subdisciplines. Requiring space history to 
be either one or the other would be insufficient. (The divisions between these 
10. See Roger D. Launius, “We Can Lick Gravity But Sometimes the Paperwork Is Overwhelming: 
NASA, Oral History, and the Contemporary Past,” Oral History Review 30, no. 2 (summer/fall 
2003): 111-128. 
11 .  Launius, “Historical Dimension,” Space Policy, pp. 23-38. 
12. Richard E Hirsh,“Proseminar on Space History, 22 May 1981,” his 73, no. 266 (1982): 96-97. 
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two subdisciplines and the professional organizations that represent them are 
only just beginning to be healed. The November 2005 joint meeting between 
the Society for the History of Technology and the History of Science Society 
in Minneapolis, Minnesota, marked a renewed attempt to bridge this gap).I3 
As a subject centered on the relationships among science, technology, and the 
state, the history of spaceflight pushed historians to address science and tech- 
nology as social and political activities. 
Space historians at the 1981 Smithsonian proseminar also shared a com- 
mon set of anxieties about sources. Many faced significant problems getting 
full access to documentation that was still considered sensitive during the 
renewed Cold War tensions of the early Reagan administration. At the same 
time, massive space projects generated so much paperwork that they became 
difficult to interpret. In the opinions ofthose attending the Smithsonian event, 
government records from active or recently active programs were “abun- 
dant but poorly organized.” Again, this recorded discussion provides a useful 
benchmark for assessing space history. Given how much space history would 
expand by the early 1990s, when the end of the Cold War led to an explosion 
of newly available materials, the question of sources provides a striking point 
of compari~on.’~ 
One of the solutions offered for dealing with incomplete or sensitive 
records was oral history. The proseminar’s organizers quickly took up that 
charge. Between 1981 and 1990, the Department of Space History at the 
Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum organized sev- 
eral oral history projects. These included the Space Astronomy Oral History 
Project, the Space Telescope History Project, the Glennan-Webb-Seamans 
Project for Research in Space History, and the RAND History Project. In 
all, the interviews conducted reflected the principal investigators’ interests in 
space science, as well as in management and political themes in space history. 
In the final catalog of these oral histories, the organizers acknowledge that 
their understanding of the interactions between science, technology, and the 
state changed considerably over the course of the oral history projects. This 
insight reflects the scholars’ own intellectual growth during the course of the 
project through the 1980s, but it also reflects the state of the field. In the midst 
of their work, space history underwent an evolutionary leap.” 
13. The organizations had unsuccessful p i n t  meetings in Pittsburgh in 1986 and in Madison, 
WI, in 1991. See Terry S. Reynolds, “From the President’s Desk: ‘Time to Try Again?”’ SHOT 
Newsletter (April 2000), available online at http ~//shot.press~hu.edu/Newsletters/archive/2OOO~Apr1l/ 
presdeskhtm (accessed 21 April 2005). 
14. Hirsh, “Proseminar,” pp. 96-97. 
15. Martin J. Collins withlo Ann Bailey and Patricia Fredericks, “Oral History on Space, Science, 
and Technology: A Catalogue of the Collection of the Department of Space History, National Air 
and Space Museum” (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1993), pp. I-v. 
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Walter McDougall began his Pulitzer Prize-winning analysis of space his- 
tory with a metaphor of evolution: the image of the first fish-turned-amphib- 
ian. In that moment, he suggested, biological adaptation jumped forward, not 
in a slow, incremental progression, but in a saltation, an evolutionary leap. 
According to McDougall, this metaphor also described the transformed rela- 
tionship between the state and research and development (R&D) in the years 
after the Second World War. In many ways, . . . The Heavens and the Earth was 
also a saltation for space history. McDougall’s work was a watershed book for 
its comprehensive consideration of space history as a part of political history.16 
Twenty years later, McDougall’s work remains a required first reference 
on many topics for most space historians (both popular and academic). At a 
1997 40th-anniversary conference commemorating the launch of Sputnik, 
many historians began their analyses with a reference to McDougall’s work.17 
In considering how space history exists both in relation to (that is, standing 
separately) and in active relationship with particular historical subdisciplines, 
however, McDougall’s work solidified a link between space history and politi- 
cal history that remains strong. Few would consider writing a space history 
without some serious consideration of party politics, national legislators, or 
foreign and domestic policy. More so, political historians welcome discussion 
of space history as an avenue into broader topics. 
Just as McDougall’s example required space historians to place space 
history in its political context, so also by the mid-l980s, new developments 
in the history of technology required historians to reconsider how technolo- 
gies existed as embedded in their social contexts. As a result of the ongo- 
ing relationship between space historians and historians of technology (who 
are often one and the same), space history and the history of technology 
grew and broadened in similar ways over the years. In a 1986 Technology 
and Culture article, Kranzberg published his famous “six laws of technology,” 
guiding principles that emphasized the role of technology as an inherently 
human endeavor, embedded in culture. Likewise, space history has deepened 
its understanding of space technologies-and indeed, of space programs-as 
embedded in particular social, political, and cultural contexts. Within the 
Cold War context of the early space race, however, for the first 20 years of 
space history, most U.S. authors focused on American space efforts, in part 
because these stories resonated with the public and in part because the ongo- 
16. Walter McDougall, . . . The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New 
York: Basic Books, 1985), p. 3. Because of its length, . . . The Heavens and the Earth is not easily 
assigned in a classroom setting. A digestible history of space exploration that encompasses the 
political and social contexts is still needed. 
17. “Reconsidering Sputnik: 40 Years Since the Soviet Satellite Symposium” (held in Washington, 
DC, 30 September-1 October 1997). 
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ing diplomatic stalemate with the Soviet Union made information about the 
Soviet side of the story all but impossible to access.18 
Another saltation for space history happened at the end of the Cold War, 
when the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 presaged the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. Not only did these geopolitical changes have major 
impacts on the way that spaceflight would be conducted from that point 
onward (thus requiring historians to rethink how space history would be 
written from then on), but these changes also created a boom in possibilities 
for space history. New sources emerged, both through the declassification of 
military or other classified space projects in the United States and through the 
release of previously secret sources from the former Soviet Union. 
New sources yielded new histories. One that compares to Walter 
McDougall’s in scope and impact is Asif Siddiqi’s Challenge to Apollo: The 
Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974. Working in the Russian-language 
documents made newly available by the release of uncensored records after 
1988, Siddiqi reconstructed the history of the Soviet space program from the 
early 1930s Group for the Investigation of Reactive Engines and Reactive 
Flight (GIRD) to the end of the N1L3 program in 1974. Comprehensive, 
detailed, and yet still very readable, his narrative offers new dimensions and 
backstories to known events, revealing details about the people and the deci- 
sion-making processes that created the Soviet space program. In doing so, the 
book presents a clear look at the history of Soviet space efforts, the outlines of 
which had previously only been gleaned from censored records or American 
intelligence. The result, Siddiqi suggests, sheds new light on human space 
exploration as a whole: “What may be possible now is to take a second look 
not only at the Soviet space program, but also the U.S. space program-that 
is, to reconsider again humanity’s first attempts to take leave of this planet.”” 
In the United States, the end of the Cold War also opened new topics for 
space researchers, permitting histories of previously classified programs (for 
example, the CORONA spy satellites) .20 
Indeed, the number of topics that constitute space history has multiplied 
in recent years. As it now stands, space history encompasses the history of 
human spaceflight, including reevaluations of programs, centers, technologies, 
18. Melvin Kranzberg, “Technology and History: ‘Kranzberg’s Laws,”’ Technology and Culture 
19. AsifA. Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974 (Washington, 
DC: NASA SP-2000-4408,2000), p. x. Also republished as a two-volume set: AsifA. Siddiqi, The 
Soviet Space Race with Apollo (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003), and Asif A. Siddiqi, 
Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003). 
20. Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell, eds., Eye in the Sky: T h e  Story Offhe 
Corona Spy Satellites, Smithsonian History of Aviation Series (Washington, DC: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1998). 
27 (1986): 544-560. 
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events, and people, including both military and civilian spaceflight projects and 
technologies.’l The recent addition of commercial space ventures and a nascent 
space tourism industry should soon join these topics. Human spaceflight makes 
up only a part of the picture, however. Space history must also include satel- 
lite programs, launch vehicles, and planetary exploration. The history of space 
science and of astronomy is also a part of space history.” Although most of 
what is written focuses on stories of success, accounts of incomplete, failed, 
or abandoned projects also illuminate the forces that shape space exploration. 
And space history is most decidedly international. As the number of countries 
participating in space efforts has increased, space history reflects an expansion 
beyond the previous U.S.-Soviet/Russian focus. In part, this breadth of topic 
and diversity of approach define the New Aerospace History.23 
T H E  NEW AEROSPACE HISTORY 
More so, however, the New Aerospace History developed in the 1990s as 
a result of the increasing professionalization of space history. Like other related 
subdisciplines, space history evolved from histories written by participants 
and practitioners into a field being advanced by professionally trained histo- 
r i a n ~ . ~ ~  Roger D. Launius, the NASA Chief Historian in the 1990s, also led 
the push for space history to engage the cutting-edge scholarship in the wider 
discipline. During his tenure leading the NASA Headquarters History Office 
from 1990 through 2002, Launius worked to develop the Agency’s publishing 
efforts as a way of creating opportunities for a rigorous practice of space his- 
tory. For instance, in addition to commissioning new volumes for the exist- 
21. See, for example, Andrew Chaiken, A Man on the Moon: The Voyages of the Apollo Astronauts 
(New York: Viking Press, 1994); Roger D. Launius, “NASA and the Decision to Build the Space 
Shuttle, 1969-72,” The Historian 57 (autumn 1994): 17-34; Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: 
Eisenhower’s Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Roger D. 
Launius and Howard E. McCurdy, eds., Spacejlight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1997); W. Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo:james E. Webb o f N A S A  
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1995); James J. Harford, Korolev: How One Man Masterminded the Soviet 
Drive to Beat America to the Moon (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997). 
22. See, for instance, Pamela Mack, ViewingtheEarth: The Social Construction ofLandsat (Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 1990); “Developing U.S. Launch Capability: The Role of Civil-Military 
Cooperation” (paper presented at the American Association for the Advancement of Science con- 
ference, Washington, DC, 5 November 1999); David DeVorkin, Science with a Vengeance: How the 
Military Created the US Space Sciences After World War I1 (New York: Springer, 1993). 
23. See, for instance, Margaret A. Weitekamp, Right StuJ Wrong Sex: American’s First Women in Space 
Program (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2004); John Krige and Arturo Russo,“Europe in Space, 1960-1973,” 
European Space Agency SP-1172 (Noordwijk, Netherlands: ESA Publications Division, 1994). 
24. Similar trends exist in the history of technology. At the 13 January 2005 meeting of the 
Historical Seminar in Contemporary Science and Technology at the Smithsonian Institution’s 
National Air and Space Museum, a spirited debate arose between those celebrating the prevalence 
of professional historians in the field and those lamenting the absence of trained engineers. 
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ing Special Publications series, Launius also began the NASA Monographs 
in Aerospace History, a series of slim paperback volumes focused on specific 
topics. Throughout his efforts, Launius aimed to bring NASA’s publishing to 
a new level of scholarly excellence, an effort that was recognized by the larger 
history community when the Agency’s history books began to win prizes 
from professional organizations. Through the development of a professional- 
ized history, space history forged new connections with other subdisciplines at 
the same time that it also became a somewhat more coherent ~ubfield.’~ 
As with so many things, the status and standing of space history as a 
subdiscipline can be measured through its funding and visibility. Several sig- 
nificant fellowships exist for emerging and established scholars. The American 
Historical Association (AHA) and NASA have offered a joint full-year pre- 
doctoral or postdoctoral aerospace history fellowship each year since 1986. 
And several different fellowships for graduate students (at the master’s, pre- 
doctoral, and postdoctoral levels) and senior scholars exist at the Smithsonian 
Institution’s National Air and Space Museum. Space history is also a consistent 
presence at major scholarly conferences including the AHA, the Society for 
the History of Technology (SHOT), the Organization ofAmerican Historians 
(OAH), and the American Studies Association (ASA). 
Space history also has a tradition of gathering scholars and participants 
to celebrate and commemorate major anniversaries in the history of the field. 
Beginning with events and symposia held to mark the first 25 years of the 
Space Age, such conferences have recorded the state of the field at various 
points in its existence. This very volume follows in that tradition. As the 
proceedings of the NASA History Division’s “Critical Issues in the History of 
Spaceflight” symposium, the articles contained here offer a current indicator 
of the subject’s breadth and diversity-and of participants’ sense of the field as 
a coherent enough one to warrant such a meetingz6 
As much as space history has become a more internally coherent field, 
however, its employment opportunities, graduate study, and publishing trends 
reflect its roots in many different subdisciplines. Although dedicated space 
history jobs can be found at NASA (at Headquarters or the Centers), the 
Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum, or the Space Policy Institute 
25. For instance, the Organization of American Historians (OAH) awarded its 1998 Richard 
W. Leopold Prize to Andrew Butrica’s To See the Unseen: A History of Planetary Radar Astronomy 
(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4218, 1996). 
26. Allan Needell, ed., The First 25 Years in Space: A Symposium (Washington, DC: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1983); Alex Roland, ed., A Spacefaaring People: Perspectives on Early Spacefright 
(Washington, DC: NASA SP-4405, 1985); Martin J. Collins and Sylvia D. Fries, eds., A Spacefaring 
Nation: Perspectives on American Space History and Policy (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution 
Press, 1991); Stephen J. Garber, ed., Looking Forward, Looking Backward: Forty Years of U.S. Human 
Spacefright Symposium (Washington, DC: NASA SP-2002-4107,2002). 
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at George Washington University, most space history experts continue to find 
homes in non-space-specific academic jobs in history or political science. (In 
a rare occurrence, the University of Central Florida offered and filled a full- 
time, tenure-track space history position in 2005.) The many intersections of 
space history with the other history subdisciplines offer employment oppor- 
tunities that are at least as ample as any academic field’s opportunities are. 
Likewise, junior scholars engaged in graduate work have focused on space 
topics while earning degrees in history and political science as well as fields 
as diverse as geography and  communication^.^^ Opportunities for publishing 
peer-reviewed articles also reflect the roots of space history as a topic studied 
by many different types of historians. Except for Space Policy, few professional 
journals have space topics as a central focus. 
The inherently interdisciplinary nature of space history can be seen in 
some of its best new works. For instance, Howard McCurdy’s Space and the 
American Imagination combines social and cultural history with public policy 
analysis to show how popular culture influenced policy-making. McCurdy 
analyzes how “space boosters” in the 1950s and 1960s used magazines, televi- 
sion shows, and movies to create the groundswell of support needed to loose 
the massive amounts of public funding required to carry out space explo- 
ration initiatives. McCurdy’s detailed analysis persuasively links comics and 
27. Kathy Keltner, for example, is writing a communications Ph.D. dissertation at Ohio University. 
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Congress. What might have seemed like an unlikely junction between unre- 
lated fields is now a connection being followed by other scholars.28 
Some likely connections are only just being explored. Despite what might 
seem like natural areas of overlap, very few scholars have actively pursued work 
at the juncture between environmental history and space history. As areas of 
history that both study the intersections of science, technology, and culture, 
space history and environmental history have much to say to each other. In a 
field that is building on its histories of national parks and natural spaces, envi- 
ronmental history investigates the intersections between nature, technology, 
and public policy. Environmental historians have taken on roads, cars, and 
urban/suburban sprawl as topics but have stopped short of dealing with outer 
space. As much as many environmental historians have not considered outer 
space as “nature” or even as a natural place, neither have space historians looked 
to environmental history for ways to think about space as an environment. 
Environmental history might also offer models for thinking about the Earth 
and low-Earth orbit as “natural.” New work by scholars such as Neil Maher 
demonstrates the extent to which exploring space is less about finding nature in 
outer space than it is about obtaining new perspectives on nature on Earth. In 
the environmental historian’s triad of investigating the intersections between 
nature, technology, and culture, space historians often ignore nature. The need 
for intersection between these subfields is a development being echoed by his- 
torians of science and technology. Both the History of Science Society (HSS) 
and SHOT now have environmental history special interest groups (called 
the “Earth and Environment Forum” and “Envirotech,” respectively). Despite 
these forays into interdiscip arity, space history has often lagged behind the 
evolution of the discipline as practiced in the United States.29 
By the 1980s, the New Social History had fundamentally transformed 
the discipline’s practice, becoming formalized through established journals, 
academic appointments, and professional organizations. The rejection of the 
consensus school led to renewed attention to the lives of ordinary people and 
a new set of narratives that challenged the accepted periodization of U.S. and 
world history. Although critics complained that the field ofhistory was becom- 
ing fractured or that a common American identity was being lost,30 advocates 
28. Howard McCurdy, Space and the American Imagination (Washington, DC: Smithsonlan 
Institution Press, 1997). 
29. Two examples are Neil Maher, “On Shooting the Moon,” Gallery in Environmental History 
9 (July 2004): 526-531, and Erik M. Conway, “The World According to GARP: Scientific 
Internationalism and the Construction of Global Meteorology, 1961-1980” (paper presented at 
the International Commission on History of Meteorology, Polling, Germany, 5-9 July 2004). 
“Envirotech” was founded at the August 2000 SHOT meeting in Munich, Germany. 
30. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting ofAmerica: Rejections on a Multicultural Society (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998). 
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for the New Social History argued that particular attention to women, labor- 
ers, people of color, the poor, or people with disabilities revealed aspects of 
the past that had been systematically ignored by the previous, more unified 
narrative. Growing scholarship demonstrated how exclusionary and limited 
the master narrative had needed to be in order to maintain its cohesiveness. 
Through the 1970s and the 1980s, scholars developed subfields with new 
modes of analysis that focused on questions of difference and power. In 1990, 
when Eric Foner edited a new collection of essays for the AHA called The New 
American History, in addition to essays on various periods of U.S. history, the 
volume included attention to six “major themes in the American experience.” 
These included “Social History,” “U.S. Women’s History,” “African-American 
History,” “American Labor History,” “Ethnicity and Immigration,” and dip- 
lomatic history. If these topics can be considered a rudimentary breakdown of 
the established subfields in American history and of the concerns of the New 
Social History, then an examination of these areas offers insight into how well 
space history has engaged each of them. In the parlance of many historians, this 
longer list is often simplified to class, race, ethnicity, and gender.31 
Political scientists working on space topics have addressed questions of 
class or labor history in space history through their analyses of NASA as a 
complex organization and NASA’s management culture. Sadly, these subjects 
became all too relevant after the losses of two Space Shuttles, Challenger in 
1986 and Columbia in 2003. Both the Rogers Commission and the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board diagnosed organizational cultures that had 
become inured to risk. In addition, they found communication and project 
management problems that contributed directly to the loss of the two Shuttle 
crews. As a result, scholars have paid particular attention to NASA’s deci- 
sion-making culture. Many other aspects of NASA as a labor force remain 
unexamined, however. Although the individual stories of astronauts, flight 
controllers, and rocket scientists have been recorded, the collective stories of 
the thousands of people who made particular space projects work offer many 
opportunities for thinking about the space agency as a ~orkplace.~’ 
Labor practices and environments, including the relationship of the space 
agency with contract work, a key characteristic of NASA’s labor structure- 
and of the larger aerospace industry-remain an underdeveloped topic. For 
instance, the Grumman Corporation, the engineering company that won the 
31. Eric Foner, ed., The NewAmerican History (Phdade1phia:Temple University Press, 1990), p. vi. 
32. Howard McCurdy, Inside N A S A :  High Technology and Organizational Change in the U.S. Space 
Program (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1993). See also Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: 
Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at N A S A  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); 
Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster: From the Glory of Apollo to the Betrayal of the Shuttle (New 
York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1987); Greg Klerkk, Lost in Space: The Fall of N A S A  and the Dream of 
a New Space Age (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004). 
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NASA contract to design and manufacture the Lunar Modules for the Apollo 
Program, never unionized because Grumman self-consciously promoted a 
sense of community at its facilities while discouraging labor organizing. In 
a very different example, engineers working at space work sites like the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory came to understand that layoffs were a part of the busi- 
ness plan. Aerospace companies hired highly skilled workers when contracts 
began, only to dismiss them when contracts ended. These two stories are 
small pieces of a larger story about how shifting relationships between NASA, 
aerospace contractors, and the larger aerospace industry shaped and reshaped 
what it meant to do space work from the beginning of the Space Age through 
the end of the Cold War.33 Finally, the labor history of the U.S. space pro- 
gram should also include the entire communities that grew up around NASA 
Centers, when long-term projects like Mercury, Gemini, or Apollo required 
entire families to relocate. The transformations of places like Huntsville, 
Alabama, or Cape Canaveral, Florida, or Tysons Corner, Virginia, illustrate 
how the work of science and technology industries transformed landscapes, 
creating new communities and cultures.34 
If the labor history of space has only just begun to be explored, questions 
of race and ethnicity have been almost entirely ignored. Only one book has 
dealt with race or ethnicity as a primary topic. J. Alfred Phelps’s collective 
biography, They Had a Dream: The Story o f  African-American Astronauts, offers 
chapter-length biographies of African American astronauts as basic compensa- 
tory history (adding omitted names and events to the historical record with- 
out a broader analysis of their social, political, or cultural  context^).^' Such 
work is a necessary beginning, but much more remains to be done. Given the 
sophistication of the analysis in African American history, Asian American 
history, and Native American history, and the emergence of interest in white- 
ness as a constructed racial category, space history’s lack of analysis of race 
betrays an unspoken but distinct discomfort. The aspect of the New Social 
History that has received the most attention in space history has been women’s 
contributions. In recent years, there has been a sudden flurry of attention to 
women in space. In 1996, when I began my dissertation research on Randy 
Lovelace’s Woman in Space Program, a short-lived and privately funded proj- 
33. M. G. Lord, Astro Tu$ The Private Lqe of Rocket Science (New York: Walker & Company, 
2005). See also Joan Lisa Bromberg, N A S A  and the Space Industry (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 
1999). Lord’s memoir of her father’s work at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) offers use- 
ful insights into JPL as a workplace. Bromberg addresses NASA’s relationship with contracting 
companies as a business history while calling for future scholars to return to this subject through 
primary research. 
34. Paul Ceruzzi, From Tysons Corner to Internet Alley: Hgh Technology in Northern Virginia, 1945- 
2001 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, forthcoming in 2006). 
35. J. Alfred Phelps, They Had a Dream: The Story OfAfrican-American Astronauts (Novato, CA: 
Presidio, 1994). 
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ect that tested women pilots for astronaut fitness in the early 1960s, only two 
short pieces and a book chapter had been written about the subject.36 By the 
time my book was published in 2004, however, it counted as the fourth major 
treatment of that specific program in six years.37 In addition, three new books 
have recently been published documenting women’s successes as astronauts 
and cosmona~ts .~~ In all, there are seven new books published since 2002 
about women and space.39 Another dissertation about NASA’s first women 
astronauts connects the question of women astronauts to the literature in the 
history of science and technology.“’ 
This attention reflects the increased visibility of women in the astronaut 
corps, the most visible face of NASA’s programs. Yet, despite the attention 
to the subject, space history can still only be considered as working in rela- 
tion to women’s history but not in any real dialogue with women’s history or 
women’s studies. Most of the new accounts amount to compensatory history, 
adding women to the historical account with little attempt to contextualize 
the histories by using them to make a broader critique or reassessment of the 
time in which they are set. And little to no work has offered a critical analysis 
of the role of gender (both femininity and masculinity) in a particular time 
or place. Investigating the treatment of women can expand what is known 
about the complex, intersecting, social, cultural, and political contexts of the 
U.S. space program. 
A partial solution for development in the neglected areas may lie in a sub- 
field that has a long relationship with space history: oral history. Oral history 
continues to be a useful tool, technique, and intersecting subfield for space 
36. Joseph D. Atkinson and Jay M. Shafritz, “The First Efforts of Women and Minorities to 
Become Astronauts,” chap. 5 in The Real Stuff: A History ofNASA’s Artronatrt Recruitment Program 
(New York: Praeger, 1985); Sheryll Goecke Powers, Women in Flight Research at N A S A  Dryden 
Flight Research Centerfvom 2946 to 1995, Monographs in Aerospace History, no. 6 (Washington, 
DC: NASA, 1997); Sylvia D. Fries, “The History of Women in NASA,” NASA TM-108100, 
Women’s Equality Day talk, Marshall Space Flight Center, 23 August 1991. 
37. Leslie Haynesworth and David Toomey, Amelia Earhart’s Daughters: The  Wild and Glorious 
Story ofAmerican Women Aviatorsfvom World War II to the Dawn ofthe Space Age (New York: William 
Morrow & Co., 1998); Stephanie Nolen, Promised the Moon: The Untold Story ofthe First Women 
in the Space Race (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2002); Martha Ackmann, The Mercury 
13: The Untold Story of Thirteen American Women and the Dream ofspace Flight (New York: Random 
House, 2003); Weitekamp, Right Stuff; Wrong Sex. 
38. Pamela Freni, Space for Women: A History .f Women with the Right Stuff (Santa Ana, CA: 
Seven Locks Press, 2002); Laura S. Woodmansee, Women Astronauts (Burlington, Ontario: Apogee 
Books, 2002); Bettyann Holtzmann Kevles, Almost Heaven: The Story of Women in Space (New York: 
Basic Books, 2003). 
39, In addition to those listed above, see also Laura S. Woodmansee, Women of Space: Cool 
Careers on the Final Frontier, Apogee Books Space Series 38 (Burlington, Ontario: Collector’s Guide 
Publishing Inc., 2003). 
40. Amy Foster, “Sex in Space: The Politics and Logistics of Sexually Integratmg NASA’s 
Astronaut Corps” (Ph.D. diss., Auburn University, 2005). 
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historians. In 1996, NASA’s Johnson Space Center History Office initiated an 
oral history project to interview NASA employees and contractors from the 
Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Skylab programs, as well as to convert decay- 
ing oral history reel-to-reel tapes to more stable media. An analysis and reflec- 
tion on NASA’s history and continuing work with oral history can be found 
in Roger Launius’s 2003 article in a special issue of the Oral History Review 
about oral history in the federal g~vernment.~’ As we continue to lose the 
original participants in early space efforts, the need to preserve space history 
in comprehensive, well-researched, -documented, and -preserved interviews 
is becoming all the more important. Furthermore, the current scholarship in 
oral history demands consideration of what recorded interviews reveal about 
race, class, gender, status, and power. Perhaps a closer relationship between 
oral history and space history, two subdisciplines that have been closely linked 
for some time, could provide one avenue for the New Aerospace History to 
develop in its integration of the insights of the New Social History. 
In 2000, Roger Launius identified a New Aerospace History that seeks 
to engage with the scholarship and insights of the New Social History. And, 
as just outlined, much remains to be done. But in many ways, the scholarly 
world has already moved beyond the ideas of the New Social History. If space 
history is going to engage with the insights provided by the explosion of his- 
torical scholarship in the last 20 years, space historians must begin to grapple 
with the influences of critical theory. 
C R I T I C A L  T H E O R Y  AS A TOOLBOX 
Critical theory is an umbrella term that encompasses the diverse and 
often divergent theoretical schools of structuralist, poststructuralist, femi- 
nist, Marxist, postmodern, and psychoanalytic theory that emerged since the 
1970s in literary and anthropological analysis. Critical theory concerns itself 
with the differences between representations and reality and, in particular, 
the ways in which language constructs what is perceived. One part of this 
analysis is the complex social construction of various identities (race, class, 
gender, sexuality, etc.). Critical theory looks at how cultures and institutions 
construct some identities as privileged while marginalizing or denying others. 
(A similar dynamic also occurs on a national or international level, underly- 
ing colonialism and postcolonial relationships between states and peoples.) 
Critical theory questions the seeming obviousness of these categories, point- 
ing out how assumptions about naturalness are part of the construction of 
privilege (and thus also of marginalization). The postmodern component of 
critical theory addresses globalization, consumerism, and the fragmentation 
41. Launius, “We Can Lick Gravity.” 
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of authority. Such scholarship often pursues discourse analysis, a study of how 
the way that a topic is discussed shapes its reality. Epistemological questions 
of how meaning is made and how we know what we know also drive this 
analysis. Critical theory thrives on juxtaposing texts (which include not only 
literal, written texts, but also any cultural form that can be read for meaning, 
including images, music, movies, or television). It embraces contradictions, 
often frustrating those who want definitive characterizations. In recent years, 
the exploration of these questions using critical theory has proven to be so 
fruitful that entire new research fields now exist, including cultural studies, 
queer theory, and critical race theory. 
Historians began to engage literary theory in the late 1970s. In fact, by 
the time I entered graduate school in the early 1990s, there was a perceptible 
divide in the history department where I studied at Cornel1 University. On 
the one side, Dominic LaCapra led the School of Criticism and Theory, a 
summer institute begun in 1976 that brought together faculty and graduate 
students for an intensive six-week theory “boot camp” premised on the idea 
that an understanding of theory is fundamental to humanistic studies. On  the 
other side, empiricists, including my adviser, taught the intensive study of 
primary documents-not as texts to be juxtaposed at will, but as evidence of 
the reality of the past. 
The theorists argued that overarching concepts of hegemony, power, and 
privilege unlocked the central debates raised by the histories they analyzed. 
They embraced Foucault’s suggestion that all history is really about the pres- 
ent, not the past, and that the “real” or “true” past was unknowable. They 
wrote comfortably for a scholarly audience, preferring analysis to narrative 
(which is all constructed anyway). The empiricists lamented the impenetra- 
bility of theoretical jargon and the ahistorical problems of bringing the post- 
modern European theory of Foucault to bear on czarist Russia, colonial Latin 
America, or premodern China. They believed that sufficient research could 
reveal a past that might not be objectively perceived but that was nonetheless 
real. They believed in the power of history as a tale well told, in the tradition 
ofthe scholar-writer. As I did with the radio caller mentioned at the beginning 
of this piece, I find that I resist fitting neatly into one category or the other. 
Although I completed my Ph.D. as a broadly trained Americanist rooted in 
empirical research, my first job-teaching women’s studies, a very theory- 
centered field-became an informal three-year postdoc in critical theory. 
Space history, of course, fits both camps. On the one hand, the history 
of spaceflight can easily be told as a modernist narrative of progress achieved 
through rationality and hierarchy. For that matter, space history also fits well 
into American exceptionalism, the model of U.S. history as an example for 
the world. On  the other hand, critical theory also applies. National and inter- 
national space efforts cannot be understood without consideration of the mass 
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media, mass consumption, and the mass production that feeds it. Globalization 
is also a crucial context for space history. 
Indeed, the very topic of this essay, an analysis of the historiography of 
space history and its relationship with the other history subdisciplines, follows 
an epistemological line of inquiry. It seeks to illuminate critical issues in the 
history of spaceflight through an analysis of how the field of space history has 
been constructed and what other fields have been influencing the questions 
asked-at base, investigating how we do what we do, to the end of under- 
standing how we know what we know. Over the last 10 years, critical theory 
has become an entrenched part of scholarly discourse, enabling useful critiques 
of power and difference that bridge national and international studies and bring 
race, gender, and class into the center of political and social analyses. 
For those interested in space history, analyzing the broader cultural set- 
tings provides a new way to understand how space efforts resonated. Two 
examples help make the point. In her 1998 book Aliens in America, Jodi Dean 
analyzed the pre-Y2K fascination with aliens and UFOs as a part of the 1990s 
trend of interest in space-themed things. Dean suggests that Ron Howard’s 
1995 film Apollo 13 transformed the story of a 1970 space accident into a 
tale that reflected 1990s American preoccupations with a safe return to home 
that is witnessed through television. Likewise, British scholar Debra Shaw 
analyzed the spacesuit as cultural icon in the context of broader American 
popular culture. In both cases, the authors used space as part of their analyses, 
but neither author is particularly interested in actual spaceflight. A wonder- 
ful opportunity exists here for a scholar to work on the cultural imagery of 
space while also taking spaceflight seriously as something real, not merely as 
a convenient text.42 
One of the best examples of a scholar executing sophisticated theoreti- 
cal analyses in plain language while taking spaceflight seriously is Constance 
Penley’s analysis of NASA in the first half of her book NASA/TREK. Written 
in the wake of the Space Shuttle Challenger’s January 1986 explosion, media 
studies scholar and cultural critic Penley addressed the public’s fixation on 
Christa McAuliffe, the “ordinary citizen”/teacher whose inclusion on the 
flight accounted for the intense media coverage of the much-postponed launch. 
Her analysis revealed how widely circulated sick jokes about the public deaths 
of the Shuttle astronauts betrayed cultural discomfort with women’s pres- 
ence in the highly technological Space Shuttle. Penley’s arguments are care- 
fully made and easy to read even as they draw on a vast literature in feminist 
theory. Penley moves beyond a simple accounting of women’s or men’s roles 
42. Jodi Dean, Aliens in America: Conspiracy Cultures From Outerspace to Cyberspace (Ithaca, N Y  
Cornel1 University Press, 1998); Debra Benita Shaw, “Bodies Out of This World: The Space Suit 
as Cultural Icon,” Science as Culture 13, no. 1 (March 2004): 123-144. 
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to consider how ideas about gender are embedded in customs, organizational 
structures, and social practices.43 
The construction of masculinity is just as important as the construction 
of femininity. In Astm  tu^ her memoir of her father, a 1960s Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory engineer, M. G. Lord’s deeply personal story also offers a model 
for a nuanced analysis of the constructions of gender at NASA Centers. Lord 
explores the rocket engineer as an archetype of 1960s masculinity, a stereotype 
which she acknowledges “no human person can ever fully embody. The buzz- 
cut cowboys of Mission Control, homogenous as a Rockette kick-line, were 
a cold-war fiction, along the lines of other cold-war fictions-the notion, for 
instance, that hard-drinking, womanizing test pilots, when selected to be astro- 
nauts, metamorphosed into temperate family men.” Lord’s reflections demon- 
strate that a monolithic masculinity did not exist. Rather, different archetypes 
of masculinity existed in flight control, or planetary probe engineering, or the 
astronaut corps: constructions of masculinity that were specific not only to a 
particular time and place, but also to different jobs. More so, she illustrates in 
easily comprehensible prose how abstract constructions of masculinity had real 
effects even though individual men did not conform to the ~tereotypes.4~ 
Analyses of masculinity are also being developed in histories of the 
images of astronauts. Roger Launius’s ongoing reevaluation of the Apollo 
astronauts in myth and memory offers an insightful analysis of the men’s per- 
sonal backgrounds. With only one exception, NASA’s Apollo astronauts were 
working-class or middle-class men who benefited from military service and 
the GI Bill-a story that mirrored the postwar American dream, the ideal of 
the best that America had to offer. The cultural story told by Apollo’s models 
of masculinity provides a marked contrast with the characterizations observed 
when the nation mourned the Columbia astronauts. In that case, the reaction 
to the Columbia tragedy represented a little-noticed but significant shift in 
the way that astronauts have been depicted. More than just the absence of the 
previously disproportionate attention to the female members of the crew (as 
Penley noted after the Challenger disaster), the aftermath of the Columbia loss 
included a noticeable focus on the male astronauts as husbands and fathers. 
The Columbia coverage revealed a new conceptualization of men as active, 
nurturing parents, not just as “family men” (a term that describes a kind of 
dependability that serves as a workplace asset but which said little about a 
man’s real role as an integral part of his family’s life). In both examples, the 
images of the astronauts reflect the cultural context in which they lived.45 
43. Constance Penley, NASA/TREK: Popular Science and Sex in America (NewYork: Verso, 1997). 
44. M. G. Lord, Astro Turf, p .  16. 
45. Roger D. Launius, “Heroes in a Vacuum: The Apollo Astronaut as Cultural Icon” (presented 
at the Organization of American Historians 2005 Annual Meeting, San Jose, CA, 3 April 2005); 
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A practical model for this kind of wide-ranging gender analysis can 
also be found in some recent work in diplomatic history. Frank Costigliola’s 
close reading of George Kennan’s famous long telegram advocating con- 
tainment noticed that Kennan cast the Soviet Union and the United States 
in gender-laden metaphors. Costigliola argues that Kennan’s appeal to cul- 
tural ideas about proper gender roles reinforced his arguments about neces- 
sary U.S. action. Likewise, Robert Dean offers a very useful analysis of the 
particular brand of upper-class, White masculinity that defined and drove 
John F. Kennedy and his New Frontiersmen. Examining White House deci- 
sion-makers throughout the 1960s, Dean points out how gendered metaphors 
of strength and weakness underlay foreign policy-makers’ understanding of 
international situations, specifically the Cold War. Dean shows how the gen- 
dered metaphors used to understand foreign policy led to real Cold War deci- 
sions, bringing ideas about gender into crucial national actions. In both cases, 
gender does not mean “women” but rather the social construction of both 
masculinity and fern in in it^.^^ 
In much the same way, critical race theory has demonstrated that race also 
requires a more complex treatment than the oversimplified American preoc- 
cupation with rigid Black/White racial categories. Critical race theory dem- 
onstrates that race is mutable, not biologically determined, and yet nonetheless 
real. Because race categories have been historically constructed and carried 
(and still carry) real consequences for people of all colors, the construction of 
those categories and what they meant at a particular place and time provide 
the best way to analyze their historical influence and multiple meanings. 
The best examples of this kind of work are being carried out in cultural 
studies. In Astrofuturism: Science, Race, and Visions of Utopia in Space, De Witt 
Douglas Kilgore employs well-grounded race analysis as a part of his examina- 
tion of the connections between space science fiction and utopian visions of 
the future set in space. Another author analyzing race in space-themed pop- 
ular culture is Daniel Bernardi, whose work on Star Trek investigates how 
America’s obsession with race played out in the multiple incarnations of Gene 
Roddenberry’s cult hit television show and its many spin-offs. For Bernardi, 
“ ‘race’ refers to a multifaceted, omnipresent but utterly historical category of 
meanings.” How these meanings are constructed in particular times and places 
continued from the previous page 
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informs his work, allowing his analysis to account for changes in race relations 
over time. As a result, Bernardi’s work avoids reinforcing racial categ0ries.4~ 
Having more complex, theoretically grounded conceptions of race also 
allows scholars to examine the social and historical construction of white- 
ness. In addition to the historians documenting the contested construction of 
White racial identity in the United States, other scholars have been exploring 
the impact of White privilege: the unearned and usually unnoticed advantages 
that accompany being White in America. For space history, an awareness 
of whiteness as a contested identity, which carried real meaning for people’s 
day-to-day lives, opens new topics for investigation. For instance, it would be 
very interesting to examine a place like Huntsville, Alabama, where white- 
ness took on several different historical meanings. By the 1950s, the Army 
Ballistic Missile Agency in Huntsville welcomed German rocket scientists, 
who had been brought into the U.S. through Project Paperclip. These men 
found themselves living and working in a state just beginning to wrestle with 
the fundamental questions raised by the Civil Rights movement. Little race 
history presents itself to be written when the focus remains narrowed to doc- 
umenting the historical presence of African American workers. But if one 
considers the multiple and varied meanings of whiteness, this history offers 
intriguing possibilities for reinvestigating a formative site for space history.48 
One of the reasons that space history has not always embraced all of the 
aspects of the New Social History is that many scholars dismiss the focus on 
race, class, ethnicity, and gender as forced or unnecessary due to the lack of 
women or minorities in a field. The previously ignored women’s stories have 
been largely uncovered and already told, the argument goes. Having few people 
of color working in various space programs means that little race history pres- 
ents itself to be written. Few labor problems beg for a class history analysis. But 
when considering critical theory, the question becomes, not how does one write 
an appropriately attentive history of each race or ethnicity, but rather, how did 
the space program deal with race or ethnicity? Not where are the women, but 
how did the space program deal with gender for both men and women? Not 
where are the gays, but why is the space program so relentlessly straight (and, 
for that matter, so reluctant to broach the topic of sexuality at all)? 
Such questions are relevant even if the identities being analyzed were 
not noticed or commented upon at the time. Indeed, one of the defining 
47. De Witt DouglasKilgore, Astrofuturism: Science, Race, and Visions ofUtopia in Space (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003); Daniel Leonard Bernardi, Star Trek and History: Race-iilg 
Toward a White Future (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998), p. 15. 
48. Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness o f a  D@erent Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy $Race 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Umversity Press, 1999); Peggy McIntosh, “White Privilege: Unpacking the 
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Dr. Wernher von Braun greeting a crowd at  the Gulf South State Fair in Picayune, 
Mississippi, in October 1963. [NASA photo no. GPN-2000-000538) 
characteristics of privilege is obliviousness. White privilege, for instance, 
includes the assumption of whiteness as the norm, a condition that does not 
need to be named (in contrast to the way that Blackness, for instance, does not 
go unnamed). Even though participants did not comment on the impact of 
whiteness or masculinity in the historical moment, the contemporary social 
construction of those identities continued to shape historical actors’ experi- 
ences. The insight that all history contains gender, race, ethnicity, and class 
opens up new possibilities for integrating these elements into the ongoing 
discussions of technologies and politics in any space history. 
One of the admitted drawbacks of critical theory is the jargon that accom- 
panies it. As one teaching Web site suggests, “The hardest part of understand- 
ing and working with critical theory is grasping and using the new vocabulary, 
but, as with all languages, the new vocabulary will empower you and enhance 
your exposition of already existing thoughts and ideas.”49 I disagree. The con- 
cepts and insights of critical theory empower scholars. The vocabulary can be 
cumbersome and obfuscating. The examples offered above, however, dem- 
onstrate that critical theory can be employed in the service of an historical 
analysis while still using plain language. Keeping in mind the importance 
of narrative and craft in the writing of history will allow space historians to 
integrate these insights into readable histories. Critical theory does not offer 
all of the answers for the development of space history, but sampling from this 
toolbox can move the field forward. 
49. Din0 Felluga, “General Introduction to the Site,” Introductory Guide to Critical Theory, updated 
28 November 2003, http://www.purdue.edu/guidetotheory/introduction/ (accessed 16 February 2005). 
CHAPTER 17 
SPACE ARTIFACTS: ARE THEY HISTORICAL EVIDENCE? 
David A. DeVorkin 
Museum collections . . . show you not what there was 
but what was collected. 
-JimBennett, “Scientific Instruments,” 
in Research Methods Guide, Department 
of History and Philosophy of Science, 
University of Cambridge 
nyone sensitive to the immense costs involved in collecting and preserv- A ing the material legacy of modern culture must question such expendi- 
tures at one time or another. Can the needs of history, for instance, justify the 
effort and expense it takes to identify, acquire, transport, preserve, inventory, 
evaluate, and possibly even to exhibit some object of note? An 11th-century 
astrolabe, a Galilean telescope, or the fabulously mysterious and insightful 
Antikythera mechanism all, no doubt, have provided valuable insight into his- 
toric events, capabilities, unwritten norms of practice, and cultural imperatives. 
But what of the modern stuff, essentially the past 50 years of the Space Age? 
What does the Freedom 7 capsule tell us? Or what can Apollo 1 1, or Armstrong’s 
chronograph, or the backup mirror to the Hubble Space Telescope tell us that 
other forms of documentation cannot reveal? Why collect and preserve mate- 
rial artifacts of the Space Age when there is, indeed, a mountain of documen- 
tation readily accessible that can tell us everything we might possibly want to 
know or can answer every question we can imagine to ask? 
The act of collecting and properly preserving objects that somehow rep- 
resent or inform the history of the exploration of outer space is one of the 
most expensive and labor-intensive ways of preserving the record of space 
history. As an historical activity, it is far more expensive, requiring a broad 
range of talents and expertise and an infrastructure at least an order of magni- 
tude greater than that required for any library or archival facility devoted to 
space history, and it is many orders of magnitude greater than what is required 
by an individual scholar to pursue publishable space history. Why, then, do 
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institutions and historians engage in such activity? Are the payoffs and returns 
proportionally worth the effort and expense? Can the payoffs be measured on 
scales that compare to the professional payoffs resulting from other forms of 
historical inquiry and outreach, or are the payoffs of a wholly different char- 
acter, so removed or distinct from familiar intellectual processes and modes of 
communication that they demand a distinct scale for evaluation separate from, 
or complementary to, those in place within academe? This essay will raise 
these questions and explore them. 
WHY ARTIFACTS ARE MARGINALIZED 
AS HISTORICAL EVIDENCE 
In a 1962 essay in Science, filled with the exuberance of establishing a 
new discipline, Me1 Kranzberg argued that there were ample reasons to sup- 
port the history of science and technology disciplines as the “ ‘newest’ his- 
tory.”’ Speaking more about technology than science, the newest history, he 
argued, offered promise of reconnecting the two cultures, as if to counter C. P. 
Snow’s allegations. As Kranzberg wished to describe it, “It is about human 
work [in science and technology] . . . . Indeed, the search for truth and order 
and beauty in science is comparable to the same striving in literature, art, 
poetry.” It is a very human activity to search for truth, order, and beauty, and 
the nature of the search reflects changing intellectual climates, human inven- 
tiveness and imagination, and human values and social systems. Technology 
plays an intimate part in all of this because its significance “lies in what it 
does.” Again, following Kranzberg, “the significance of technology is in its 
use by human beings.”2 
In his 1962 essay, he explored the significance of the study of the his- 
tory of science and technology, and its possible applications, and identified 
typical questions modern practitioners of the “newest history” ask and how 
the exploration of their answers might benefit society. Above all, Kranzberg 
placed humans at the center of attention as well as the institutions they build 
and the nations they defend. He used the telephone to describe what is impor- 
tant about technology: At one level, the telephone is merely a system of wires, 
circuits, and switches, transmitters and receivers of electrical signals. Issues 
historians have addressed have included who invented it and why they did it, 
motivations, resources available, assumptions, “but the human meaning of the 
telephone lies in its transmission of sound for long distances between persons.” 
The telephone has changed the way people live their lives and communicate 
1. Melvin Kranzberg, “The Newest History: Science and Technology,” Science 136, no. 3515 (11 
2. Ibid., p. 466. 
May 1962): 465. 
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with others. Using the telephone and other examples, Kranzberg’s message is 
Kranzberg’s article, at one level, reflects modern practice. It leaves the 
strong impression that the “things” of technology do not constitute the knowl- 
edge base, but that they do represent history in some amorphous way. Indeed, 
in his campaign to increase attention by historians and scientists to the value 
of the history of science and technology, he emphasized its social application 
and minimized issues relating to what one might call a “material culture” 
focus. “Things” do appear prominently, and Kranzberg is clearly sensitive to 
the ills of Neoplatonic aristocratic dualism, the emphasis of brain over hand. 
But for the sake of his argument in 1962, things merely symbolize human 
goals and aspirations and adorn the titles, texts, and images of the literature of 
the history of science and technology. 
Thus, in the 40-odd years since Kranzberg’s essay in Science, an unin- 
tended consequence of his campaign, and of those of his generation, was a 
certain neglect of the things of science and technology, the material artifacts, 
as sources of information themselves. They could be sacralized and celebrated 
and even revered, but they did not, in and of themselves, provide a knowledge 
base. And as a new literature emerged in the history and technology of space 
exploration, a consequence of the increased interest in the field overall since 
Sputnik, it also reflected the same priorities of the newest history and did not 
include things in its formal knowledge base. 
Things do matter in the geological and biological sciences, as well as in 
the broader ranges of natural history including anthropology, archaeology, 
and paleontology. Collections do constitute primary knowledge. After all, 
these disciplines largely grew up around collections that had to be organized 
and preserved somehow, and the present structure of these museums and their 
collections still represents the organized data the scientist needs.“ But for the 
disciplines engaged in space history, where we might find historians of tech- 
nology and science, or social and cultural history, military history, business 
history, American history, American studies, along with a smattering of soci- 
ologists, economists, policy specialists, and psychologists, to say nothing of 
those who came from backgrounds in aerospace itself, none of these areas of 
inquiry grew up around a practice of collecting artifacts, organizing and clas- 
sifying them, and searching for new knowledge in the effort, through empiri- 
cal analysis or some form of rational argument. As a result, although those 
engaged in curatorial functions most definitely think about their collections 
and treat them to all the standards required of their codes of ethics and insti- 
tutional capabilities, few of them actually have utilized these collections as 
that science and technology have social  consequence^."^ L‘ 
3. Ibid., p. 466. 
4. Bernard S. Finn,“The Science MuseumToday,” Technology and Culture 6, no. 1 (1965): 78-79. 
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primary evidence in their historical research and writings. Many have written 
about their collections and the objects in them, of course, ordering them by 
age, manufacturer, speed, function, and capability, because they are fascinated 
by or are somehow attracted to objects, but the data they employ are of the 
more traditional kind: the written and spoken word, images, pictorial repre- 
sentations, and the like.5 
To make this last observation, Joseph Corn surveyed a decade’s worth of 
articles in Technology and Culture, the quarterly publication of the Society for 
the History of Technology. He found that less than 15 percent of the authors 
“employed any material evidence” and, of these, most wrote on ancient or 
early modern technologies. “Rhetoric to the contrary, then, the history of 
technology as a field is not deeply committed to learning from  thing^."^ Corn 
takes this farther to identify factors that detract from the use of things as evi- 
dence and also argues that because of these social factors limiting how histori- 
ans communicate processes and the influences upon them, in fact, the survival 
of the real thing (the true artifact and even the facsimile) is more important 
than one might appreciate from the published record alone. 
THINGS AS “CONGEALED CULTURE” 
After all, things do exist, have existed, and are constantly on the minds 
of at least some historians, especially those who find themselves working in 
museums or training those who might see museums as a career goal. Things 
constitute the “corpse” of much of what we call science and technology, and 
so they have been regarded by some as holding out potential as a source of 
diagnostic or even forensic knowledge offering insights unavailable other- 
wise. Given the emphasis on people and institutions fostered by Kranzberg 
and almost all subsequent workers, this potential has remained largely locked 
up in the things themselves, which has led at least one prominent historian of 
technology, Thomas Parke Hughes, to refer to them as “congealed ~ul ture .”~  
Hughes’s rhetorical concept has been applied by scholars to various and 
sundry objects, institutions, and individuals, mainly to describe a static relic 
or an art object, “a kind of tomb for the creative spirit” that has somehow 
been transported into a context wholly unlike that of its creation: the art gal- 
lery, living room, museum, or historic site. The term has also been used to 
5. Joseph J. Corn, “Object Lessons/Object Myths? What Historians of Technology Learn from 
Things,” in Learning from Things, Method and Theory oJMaterial Culture Studies, ed. W. David Kingery 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), pp. 35-54. 
6. Ibid., p. 37. 
7. Thomas Hughes, commentary in Pamela Mack and David DeVorkin, “Proseminar in Space 
History,” Technology and Culture 23 (1982): 202-206. 
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encapsulate entrenched personalities, hopelessly outdated or resistive bureau- 
cracies, and static libraries and the books they contain.* Hughes, however, 
had no such negative thoughts in mind when he used the term at a May 
1981 “Proseminar in Space History” at the National Air and Space Museum. 
There, he was expressing his feeling that it was the best we could hope for in 
material culture, but to utilize it we had to learn how to obtain the proper 
tools to capture the essence of an artifact and to understand how it represents 
an amalgam of interests, motivations, ideas, questions, and techniques that are 
representative of the culture that conceived of it, paid for it, built it, and used 
it. At least, that is what some participants took away from his commentary? 
Hughes’s remark embodied the perennial challenge facing curators of objects, 
or things, to find ways to unpack all the forces and drives that brought that 
artifact into existence and played a part in its lifetime of use. Curators trained 
as historians have certainly done much of this. The literature of space his- 
tory is rich in the study of the technologies and the objects representing them 
that made space travel possible. But the question in my mind then and now 
is, where is the survival of the artifact itself in all this effort? And what is 
its role in history: as historical evidence leading to new knowledge, or as a 
commodity, an ornament that somehow illustrates or celebrates, but does not 
necessarily inform the past? 
Kranzberg’s assertion that the history of technology focuses on human 
actions did not prevent almost half of the articles in Technology and Culture 
scanned by Corn from dealing somehow with devices: tools, weapons, instru- 
ments, objects with a function. But historical studies of things are subject 
to a wide variety of perspective: “What’s nuts and bolts to one historian is 
‘congealed culture’ to another,” Larry Owens once observed, implying that 
things can be described in terms of their “brute facts” of existence, to excru- 
ciating detail, but they also “embody conceptual schemes and logical strate- 
gies for dealing with the world.” The historian’s task, ideally, is to employ 
interpretive and descriptive tools that present an integrated portrait of the 
machine/object/thing and the ideas and aspirations it embodies. Owens’s very 
definition of a good historian [of technology] was someone with sensitivity to 
“socioeconomic and institutional environments.”1° 
8. John S. Duffield, “Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds 
Neorealism,” International Organization 53 (1999): 765-803, noting Jepperson and Swidler describ- 
ing institutions as “congealed” culture; John D. Kelly, “Nature, Natives, and Nations: Glorification 
and Asymmetries in Museum Representation, Fiji and Hawaii,” Ethnos 65, no. 2 (1 July 2000): 
195-216; Sham Gray, quoted in “Aesthetics of Computer Graphics,” pixxelpoint, http://www. 
pixxelpoint.org/2002/article-O1. html. 
9. Discussions with Pamela Mack over the years. 
10. Larry Owens, “Book Review,” Isis 78 (1987): 625-626 (review of Michael R. Williams, A 
History of Computing Technology [Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 19851). 
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A machine can certainly embody ideas and assumptions. First, implicit 
in its design are ideas about the way nature works, as well as assumptions of 
the ways humans work, as well as assumptions about how a particular human 
goal can be met. Take the telescope: it definitely embodies basic assumptions 
about how nature works. Although invented before systematic rules in geo- 
metrical optics provided guidance, empirical or experimental exploration soon 
showed how to build telescopes with greater magnification, resolution, and 
light-gathering power. Following the development of astronomical telescope 
technology, then, how it changed over time, has the potential of revealing 
how technical limitations, intellectual drives, and social issues influenced the 
development of each of these powers or inhibited their growth for one reason 
or another. Yet, with but few exceptions, histories of telescope technology in 
the past tended not to be organized this way and instead were chronologi- 
cal and periodized, or centered on observatory development. And with even 
fewer exceptions, mainly the work of Albert van Helden and others noted 
below, histories of telescope technologies have not required the survival of 
the telescopes themselves. Yet telescopes are lovingly preserved and beauti- 
fully displayed throughout European culture as an enduring legacy of human 
achievement and curiosity. Faced with this situation, any curator of things 
must, at some point in life, pause and ask, “Why?” 
This essay, then, is an exploration of these questions: Is the existence of 
an artifact useful to history, or does its value reside elsewhere? Is there a sen- 
sible difference, in researching and writing history, having the actual artifact 
involved in that history at hand or not? We will begin by looking at institu- 
tional rationales for collecting, then at individual arguments, and finally we 
will sum up by suggesting some alternative ways to justify the effort. 
ADDRESSING THE ISSUE: RATIONALES FOR COLLECTING 
It is surprising that there doesn’t appear to be a literature critical of the 
act of formal collecting. There is a literature defending and rationalizing col- 
lecting and a smaller literature looking into the psychological motives that 
stimulate collecting on both individual and collective bases, but there appears 
not to be one questioning the value or importance of collecting. Of course, 
I raise this as an observation in the hopes that a reader who has read more 
widely than I have at this point will offer a correction and direct me to what 
I have missed. Until that happens, however, I will labor under the assump- 
tion that collecting is a core act of human culture, bound up some way in a 
search for identity and even for power and transcendence.” But I will also 
11. Werner Muensterberger, Collecting: An Unruly Passion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1994). 
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accept the possibility that formal collecting, by institutions and nations, is a 
self-conscious act that in and of itself is artificial enough to warrant rational- 
ization. Therefore, we should begin by looking at the rationalizations people 
and organizations have given for collecting. 
Institutions and organizations are, first and foremost, composed of indi- 
viduals, and these individuals act singly and collectively out of both personal 
and professional motivations. Personal motivations to collect derive from a 
wide variety of impulses and drives: collecting can provide a sense of identity, 
personal exploration, security and validation, self-worth, transcendence, and 
power. All manner of people collect all imaginable things, from stamps, coins, 
and baseball cards to M&M items, cars, telescopes, and phonograph records.12 
It is one of our more basic instincts and seems to be shared among many cul- 
tures. Styles vary, of course, from astute collectors to indiscriminate hoard- 
ers. Individuals rarely rationalize why they collect, nor do they need to. But 
institutions, especially public ones or those existing on private or corporate 
philanthropy, typically try to, because of the costs involved. 
Historians, museum professionals, anthropologists, geologists, biologists, 
collectors of all types, and their institutions have presented numerous and 
varied arguments for preservation. In the cultural arena, possibly the most 
pervasive effort was established by the National Park Service emerging from 
the Historic Sites Act of 1935: “To preserve places of national significance 
that retain exceptional value as commemorating or illustrating the history of 
the United States for the inspiration and benefit of the pe~ple .”’~ The 1946 
enabling legislation that ultimately gave life to the National Air and Space 
Museum in 1976, which we always cite in the various editions of the intro- 
duction to our “Collections Rationale,” calls upon us to “memorialize the 
national development of aviation and space flight.” Our charge is to ”serve as 
the repository for, preserve, and display aeronautical and space flight equip- 
ment and data of historical interest and significance to the progress of aviation 
and space flight, and provide educational material for the historical study of 
aviation and space flight and their techn~logies.”’~ 
In order to carry out its designated task, the Park Service has mounted 
numerous “theme studies” and has created a standardized “National Register 
‘ 
12. Ibid.; Igor Kopytoff, “The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as Process,” 
in The Social L@ .f Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, ed. Arjun Appadura (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 64-91; Freder~ck Kunkle, “A Heart Melts at Sight of All 
Things M&Ms,” Washington Post (10 February 2005): Montgomery Extra, pp. 16-17. 
13. National Historic Landmarks Survey, “Surveying American History,” June 2003, ht$. // 
www.cr.nps.gov/nhl/, p. 1 (accessed 10 February 2005). 
14. Public Law 79-722, chap. 955, 70th Cong., 2nd sess., 12 August 1946. “Initially the legisla- 
tion did not mention ‘space,’ but this was added and now serves as basis for the Museum’s Mission 
Statement, as promulgated July 29, 1996,” accord~ng to the Division ofspace History, “Collections 
Rationale,” 2005, NASM Curatorial Files, Washington, DC. 
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Nomination Form” that contains room for not only describing the candidate, 
but for including a narrative statement of historical, cultural, and architectural 
significance and how these characteristics meet a set of criteria maintained by 
the NPS. Reproduced in full, it reads: 
The quality of significance in American history, architecture, 
archeology, engineering, and culture is present in districts, 
sites, buildings, structures, and objects that possess integrity of 
location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and 
association, and: 
A.That are associated with events that have made a signifi- 
cant contribution to the broad patterns of our history; or 
B. That are associated with the lives of significant persons 
in or past; or 
C. That embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, 
period, or method of construction, or that represent the 
work of a master, or that possess high artistic values, 
or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity 
whose components may lack individual distinction; or 
D. That have yielded or may be likely to yield, [sic] infor- 
mation important in history or prehi~tory.’~ 
Commemorating, validating, and illuminating historical events, lives of 
note, or objects of construction or manufacture within their original environ- 
ments is thus the domain of an agency concerned with such diverse issues as 
land use and national identity. An entity of the Department of the Interior, it 
promotes programs in public recreation and education, with preservation at 
its core: more than half of the parks represent land management “set aside as 
symbols and evidence of our history and prehistory.”16 
The process followed by curators at the National Air and Space Museum 
is somewhat different than the National Park Service, though many of its 
criteria map onto those of the NPS. Symbolism and national identity per- 
vade the collection. Although collecting activity ranges over the whole of 
the 20th century, collecting in space history itself was heavily augmented 
15. National Register Bulletin, “How to Apply the National Register Criteria for Evaluation,” 
National Register Publications, http://w~.anps.gov/nripublicationsibulletins/nrb 15/nvb15_2. htm (accessed 
10 February 2005). 
16. “History,” National Park Service Web site, http://www.cv.nps.gov/history/hisnps/ (accessed 10 
February 2005). 
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by an agreement between NASA and the Smithsonian set out in 1967 and 
modified on numerous occasions. This special agreement was set up because 
NASA realized that it was rapidly becoming responsible for “a growing num- 
ber of artifacts, many with great historical value and others with great value 
for educational, exhibition, and other purposes, relating to the development, 
demonstration, and application of aeronautical and astronautical science and 
technology of flight.”” 
NASA decided that the Smithsonian was a more appropriate place to take 
on this responsibility since NASA did not really want to be in the business of 
managing a large collection of iconic objects that attracted wide public and 
political attention. Further, it sought out both a political buffer and a means 
of historical validation. Left unsaid but implicit in the act of agreement was 
the fact that in making this arrangement, the Smithsonian was also tacitly 
agreeing to a formal method of removing objects from the commodity sphere 
(commercial trading and speculation in space artifacts) and placing them into 
a singularized and sacralized sphere, to adopt (for the moment) the notions 
and rhetoric of the economic anthropologist. If one views the NASA/NASM 
Transfer Agreement as a cultural act from this perspective, one can see it as 
an example of culture counteracting commoditization (in fact, curators in the 
department have made this point repeatedly)-since the essence of culture is 
discrimination, and societies typically set aside or set apart certain objects they 
deem to be sacred. Anthropology teaches us that culture demands that cer- 
tain things be singular, unexchangeable, and “publicly precluded from being 
c~mmoditized.”’~ Typically, such constraints are imposed by the state, seeking 
to create a symbolic inventory akin to the crown jewels of monarchies and 
reflecting the power of the state itself. National museums, then, can be likened 
to agencies of the state and mechanisms through which the state imposes its 
eminent domain to sacralize particular objects. To my knowledge, however, 
no other federal agency has this form of continuing formal agreement with 
the Smithsonian. Therefore, the existence of the act itself defines NASA as 
a unique cultural entity, and it would be useful if, sometime in the future, 
someone examined the agreement in that light. 
This agreement, however, does not compel the Smithsonian to collect 
a NASA object but gives it first right of refusal. In addition, this arrange- 
ment does not limit the Smithsonian’s interest to collecting NASA artifacts, 
since significant programs exist elsewhere within our culture and our focus is 
space history, not NASA history. Our department has thus identified issues of 
17. “Agreement Between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Smithsonian 
Institution Concerning the Custody and Management of NASA Historical Artifacts,” signed 10 
March 1967, in the introduction to Division of Space History’s “Collections Rationale,” 2005. 
18. Kopytoff, “Cultural Biography of Things,” p. 73. 
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concern when evaluating any object for inclusion in the national collection, 
independent of national origin or the part of the government, academe, or 
industry responsible for it. These are placed within a context that we hope and 
expect will somehow illuminate and inform space history generally. Choices 
are made based upon 
1. the unique qualities of [the object] 
2. the relationship of flown items to engineering prototypes, 
backups, and models 
3. the place for ground support equipment such as simulators, 
operational consoles, test stands, and the like, and 
4. the different metrics of culture, history, and technology 
that come into play when assessing the historical value of a 
space artifact.’’ 
Within the agreement set forth by the two agencies, one also finds rheto- 
ric describing what should be collected, again offering some guidance on how 
and why, and overall it attests to NASA’s view that these objects possess cul- 
tural and educational, as well as technical, value. We maintain no other agree- 
ment with any other agency or institution in this country or with any nation. 
However, although there is a tacit understanding that the criteria we utilize 
to collect any object remain independent of the originating institution, our 
special agreement with NASA creates an institutional bias that we cannot and 
should not ever forget or ignore. The quotation from Jim Bennett at the outset 
of this paper should always be kept in mind: that collections represent choices 
made and therefore should not be construed as history but as part of history. 
Thus far, looking at the rhetoric of these two very different collect- 
ing agencies, NASM and the Park Service, one finds consistent appeal to the 
need to memorialize, display, educate, or stimulate. These goals are presumed 
by museum professionals and, again, are the results of choices, both indi- 
vidual and collective. Even though these choices are socially conditioned, one 
can easily find in the rhetoric of museology a presumption of warrant: the 
International Council of Museums offers, for instance, a “Code of Ethics” 
for museums that identifies their collective purpose and their unique respon- 
sibilities.20 Excerpting relevant elements, we find that according to ICOM, 
“Museums preserve, interpret and promote the natural and cultural inheri- 
19. “Preface,” Division of Space History, “Collections Rationale,” 2005. 
20. ICOM, “ICOM Code ofEthics for Museums,” 2004, http://icom.mtrretrm/ethics.html (accessed 
20 February 2005). 
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tance of humanity” and hold their collections “in trust for the benefit of soci- 
ety and its development.” Museums are, in effect, social institutions that exist 
to “acquire, preserve and promote their collections as a contribution to safe- 
guarding the natural, cultural and scientific heritage.” ICOM sees these col- 
lections as a “significant public inheritance” that must be protected by law and 
international legislation. Throughout its ethics statement, there is a strong and 
explicit sense of stewardship “that includes rightful ownership, permanence, 
documentation, accessibility and responsible disposal.” 
Central to ICOM’s warrant is that “museums hold primary evidence for 
establishing and furthering knowledge.” Professional staff within museums 
are responsible not only for collections care and public accessibility, but for 
the interpretation of the collection as “primary evidence.” Indeed, the notion 
of “primary evidence” stands at the very core of ICOMs ethics statement. 
ICOM, which represents all types of museums, including art, technology, 
and the natural sciences, asserts without example or citation that what muse- 
ums collect constitutes primary evidence. It recognizes that the designation 
of primary evidence should not be “governed by current intellectual trends 
or museum usage” and offers out hope that primary evidence will be used 
to make a “contribution to knowIedge that it would be in the public interest 
to preserve.” Thus, according to ICOM, museums should regard collections 
as both a present and a future potential resource for knowledge production. 
The overall policy of the Smithsonian Institution reflects this sensibility, reaf- 
firmed by its Board of Regents in 2001: “Collections serve as an intellectual 
base for scholarship, discovery, exhibition, and education.”’l 
From the standpoint of the collecting institution, then, whose statements are 
largely bureaucratic and organizational, to say nothing of being self-serving, one 
finds arguments that still presume the value of collecting, rather than dem- 
onstrate value. Once again, it would be easy to reinterpret ICOM’s assertions 
using the perspective of the economic anthropologist: “Power often asserts 
itself symbolically precisely by insisting on its right to singularize an object, 
or a set or class of objects.”22 Taken together with ICOM’s view, these two 
interpretations offer copious evidence for rationalizing why we collect. 
Each assumes that collections will be useful to “memorialize” or to “edu- 
cate” and “inform” and even to “inspire.” Each also assumes that collections 
constitute “primary evidence” for historical and scientific inquiry. Indeed, the 
economic anthropologist goes to considerable and quite convincing lengths to 
21. Board ofRegents, “Smithsonian Collections Management Guidelines,” SD-600,26 October 
22. Kopytoff,”Cultural Biography of Things,” p. 73. Sometimes that power is tested.When a National 
Park Service theme study promised to designate a number of observatories as potential candidates for 
landmark status, observatory directors objected, fearing that such a designation would limit their power 
to modify their equipment and buildings. Landmark status was not conferred. 
2001, p. 37. 
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argue how a biography of a thing reveals new knowledge about culture. One 
can learn a lot, for instance, about inheritance rules and practices, as well as 
family structure, by following how a particular object moved through a fam- 
ily down through the generations. The biography of a thing, therefore, is not 
only contained in its production, but in its use and treatment as a commod- 
ity, and if that thing is somehow removed from the world of commerce and 
deified as a sacred object, its biography needs somehow to be preserved and 
made accessible in order for it to illuminate the culture involved.23 Historians 
acting as curators might see this as a new way to appreciate the importance 
of the “provenance” of an object, the history of who owned the object and 
the conditions of transfer from one hand to another. But few, to my knowl- 
edge, have knowingly explored how provenance informs us about the overall 
culture-its values, priorities, and stability-within which the object moved. 
Economic anthropologists have long used these techniques to map out change 
among generations. Historians might take a cue from this and look for ways 
to apply provenance. 
WHY PRESERVE OBJECTS? 
THE VIEWS AND ACTIONS O F  INDIVIDUALS 
In his survey of a decade’s worth of articles in the journal Technology and 
Culture, Joseph Corn also identified ways that a few historians used objects as 
primary evidence, showing that indeed there is potential knowledge if the 
right questions are asked. He points to five different ways scholars have used 
objects as primary source material: 
1. Looking at the object in use or (if a machine) in motion can reveal 
information about the tacit shop practices and techniques of the cul- 
ture that produced it. 
2. Performing a technical analysis of a manufactured object can reveal 
the process of manufacture, through contemporary accounts as well 
as retrospective accounts by producers and users. 
3.  Simulating an object can test behavior and evaluate design expertise 
through models. 
4. Testing actual objects through use can reveal norms of precision. 
5. Microscopic analysis of surface markings and looking for consistency 
in dimension and weight may be evidence of skill and motive. 
23. Kopytoff, “Cultural Biography of Things,” p. 66. 
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Corn identified each of these methods in specific case studies, mainly of 
objects from periods where other forms of documentation were not plentiful. 
Using a case study of a pin-making machine by Steve Lubar to illustrate the 
first modality, Corn argues that documentary sources (patent records) showed 
that there were many ways to make a pin machine, but the way the sample 
was made indicates choices based upon “specific beliefs and practices” because 
it mimicked manual assembly-line  practice^.^^ This was only apparent when 
Lubar experienced the machine functioning, which underscores an argument 
recently made by Deborah Jean Warner that objects-scientific and techno- 
logical artifacts and instruments-are interesting because they are functional 
and therefore should be interpreted in terms of their “performance charac- 
teristics.” Performance characteristics include all aspects of the building and 
use of the objects-the skills of  design and manufacture involved, the ways 
to operate them, repair them, and finally, how they are disposed of after their 
production life.25 
None of Corn’s methodologies apply across the board, and there is sig- 
nificant overlap between some of them. Still and all, it is a useful exercise in 
articulating how objects have been found to increase historical knowledge 
and understanding. One finds examples from the history of astronomy that 
fit one or more of these methods. For instance, there is the famous case of 
the Antikythera mechanism that significantly improved understanding of the 
complexity obtained by the Greeks in gearing and clockwork.26 Modern inter- 
ferometric studies of optical elements of 17th-century telescope makers like 
Torricelli, Divini, and Campani revealed the level of their optical polishing 
technologies and improved understanding of the limits of telescopic knowl- 
edge of  that time.27 However, once we get beyond the 17th and into the 18th 
and 19th centuries, it is typically archival investigation that yields the most 
telling information about technological capabilities, as in Robert Smith and 
Richard Baum’s excellent study of William Lassell’s reflectors, whose optical 
imperfections led him to believe that he had detected a ring around the planet 
Neptune even though he was aware of those imperfections.28 But examples 
are harder to find when one moves into the contemporary era. This trend is 
24. Corn, “Object Lessons/Object Myths?” p. 37. 
25. Deborah Jean Warner, “A Matter of Gravity, with reflections on the differences between 
Gizmos and Works of Art” (unpublished manuscript; text kindly provided by Warner in advance 
of presentation, March 2005). 
26. Derek De Solla Price, Gearsfrom the Greeks: The Antikythera Mechanism-A Calendar Computer 
from ca. 80 B.C. (New York: Science History Publications, 1975). 
27. Mara Miniati, Albert Van Helden, Vincenzo Greco, and Giuseppe Molesini, “Seventeenth- 
century Telescope Optics of Torricelli, Divini, and Campani,” Applied Optics 41 (February 2002): 
28. Robert W. Smith and Richard Baum, “William Lassell and the Ring of Neptune: A Case 
644-647. 
Study in Instrumental Failure,”Journalfor the History ofAstronomy 15 (1984): 6-15. 
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likely similar for all types of collecting. The history of the technical museum 
in Western culture reflects this trend. 
Originally collections of antique instruments, machines, patent models, 
and industrial products, in the 20th century, technical museums became ven- 
ues to commemorate “native scientific and technological genius” as well as to 
supplement the academic program attendant to a technical education: if there 
was a trend, it was toward commemoration and pedagogy. Thus the technical 
museum became what Robert Multhauf has described as “a laboratory course 
extended in space rather than in time, arranged in some historical sequence 
to exploit the value of historic apparatus.” These museums were also initially 
regarded as repositories of knowledge and inspiration insofar as they acted as 
places where inventors, designers, and engineers could go to get new ideas or 
to solve specific problems in design and manufacture. This application, how- 
ever, closest to Corn’s ideal methodologies, proved to be transitory; it was 
merely a passing interest through the early 20th century. And so the trend 
moved on once again, when technical museums returned to promote industrial 
products and act as places for the “preservation of our cultural heritage and to 
the inspiration of young people with an interest in science and te~hnology.”’~ 
Multhauf‘s goal in this 1958 essay was to highlight the limitations of perspec- 
tive: “Unlike the engineer of the last century,” he pointed out, “we begin our 
training, and rest our work, upon a basis of knowledge much of which is out- 
side our own e~perience.”~’ Therefore, for Multhauf, technical museums were 
the best places where one could explore, through utilizing all available primary 
and secondary source material, the many ways that discovery and invention 
happen, the very human artificial element in the inventive process. 
Like Kranzberg, Multhauf did not actually regard the thing itself as 
embodying knowledge, but rather as a locus for the gathering in of knowl- 
edge in all forms and with increasing and changing perspective over time. His 
allusion to how the experience of the engineer of the last century differs from 
our experience offers testimony to how one needs to read an artifact: a worker 
who experienced the development of a technology before it was successful and 
before the principles upon which it was based were fully worked out would 
see that artifact very differently than someone looking at it years later, after it 
had proven itself and the principles it embodied. All the doubt, uncertainty, 
and promise congealed within the artifact can only be assumed, unless one 
has at hand numerous accounts of attempts made in that day to solve the same 
functional problem or goal, like attaining the facility of traveling in space and 
then having to learning how to work in that new theater, or how to build a 
I 
29. Robert P. Multhauf, “The Function of the Technical Museum in Engineering Education,” 
30. Ibid., p. 200. 
journal ofEngineering Education 49 (December 1958): 200. 
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pin machine that would be acceptable to piece workers, or a rifle that could be 
assembled, disassembled, and made reliable in the field. 
To a certain extent, episodes in the recent history of the National Air and 
Space Museum’s space history collection bear out this transitory phase, but 
they also show that it lingers even today and no doubt will be present in the 
future. The NASA/NASM Transfer Agreement explicitly states that if NASA 
decides that an object it had transferred to the national collection somehow 
reacquired its usefulness to the space program, it would be recalled. Sometimes 
this works, sometimes not. When the Viking 1 lander failed to call home from 
Mars in November 1982, NASA engineers came to the Museum to inspect 
the computer inside the engineering model we display in the Milestones of 
Flight gallery, hoping that their inspection might help them figure out how 
to regain communication with the lander. Unfortunately, the box holding the 
on-board computer in our example, although real, was empty of its contents. 
Our Skylub orbital workshop, originally built for flight, has been on display 
since 1976, though modified to allow visitors to walk through the living quar- 
ters. In the early 1980s, Marshall Space Flight Center engineers requested the 
return of a set of circulating air fans and, a few years later, came to inspect the 
toilet systems, since surviving documentation was apparently unobtainable 
when they were looking for ways to adapt these designs for new human space 
initiatives. And on occasion, engineers and scientists have expressed inter- 
est in everything from our Saturn F-1 engines to the backup Hubble Space 
Telescope mirror now on display. In the case of the engines, the engineers 
sought out the technical documentation we held in our archives rather than 
the object itself. 
Multhauf‘s views on the use of objects in pedagogy were reflected in at 
least one of Corn’s methodologies, as well as by some of the presentations at 
a 1975 conference at the Winterthur Museum held to explore how material 
objects are useful to the study of American history. Historians, archaeologists, 
ethnologists, American studies specialists, and even a molecular chemist spoke 
from their perspectives and experiences. James V. Kavanaugh suggested how 
a course in American studies could be augmented by using anthropologi- 
cal techniques upon “accumulated material evidence” to more fully explore 
the culture of invention in American life.31 Cary Carson, Saint Mary’s City 
Commission, echoing Corn’s later observations, argued that artifacts have not 
contributed at all to “developing the main themes of American history” but 
have, in their design and arrangement, especially in the buildings of surviving 
early communities, certainly helped to fill in the details and provided new 
31. lames V Kavanaugh, “The Artifact in American Cu1ture:The Development of an Undergraduate 
Program in American Studies,” in Material Culture and the Study of American L+, ed. Ian M. G. 
Quimby (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), pp. 65-74. 
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insights. Facing the aljegation that things “have seldom been a source of ideas 
for historians,” he argued that by looking differently at objects, the mind is 
certainly capable of thinking up questions that they can answer or conten- 
tions they might prove or disprove. Embracing Kranzberg’s “New History,” 
Carson argues that “bottom up” history can often best be reconstructed by 
looking at the details of living environments, and thereby it can pose new 
questions. The experience of life, of “society as a working organism,” can 
best be appreciated by somehow encountering the material vestiges of that 
experience. Although he applied his methodology to 17th- and 18th-century 
life on the Eastern Shore of Maryland, showing how “architecture became the 
instrument of segregation” and other insights, one might map these concepts 
into an exploration of the contemporary dwellings of scientific instruments 
and space  operation^.^^ Building upon a recent comment by Pam Mack, it is 
one thing to examine graphic profiles or even photographs of the interior of a 
Mercury capsule. But it is quite another to actually experience that tiny space, 
looking from the outside, of course.33 Possibly someday someone might ask 
the crowded and complex chamber specific questions relating to the actual 
role of the astronaut in the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo eras that cannot be 
answered as completely or as poignantly by other forms of indirect documen- 
tation. One might also find such reminiscences in debriefing documents after 
the flights. Definitely riding in a machine and being part of its operation is a 
most valuable experience. Many historians have expressed how important it 
has been for them to fly in an aircraft they have studied; Ron Davies at NASM 
recently commented that it was an essential experience, even though his pri- 
mary data came from airline timetables.34 
Probably the most eloquent argument for the value of experience at the 
1975 Winterthur Conference was Brooke Hindle, who was the lead speaker. 
Hindle was then Director of the National Museum of American History, and 
he took the occasion to explore the essence of material culture in his now- 
classic “How Much Is a Piece of the True Cross Worth?” Hindle identified 
the factors that led him to what we today might call “priceless.” Pondering 
Lenin’s body, Dolley Madison’s gown, Ben Franklin’s printing press, he first 
stated that artifacts provide “direct, three-dimensional evidence of individu- 
als who otherwise exist only as abstractions in words, paintings, or monu- 
men t~ . ’ ’~~  In order to utilize them properly, however, one has to know how 
32. Cary Carson, “Doing History with Material Culture,” in Material Culture and the Study of 
33. Telephone conversations with Pamela Mack, February 2005. 
34. Ron Davies, personal communication in response to informal questionnaire sent to NASM 
35. Brooke Hindle, “How Much Is a Piece ofthe True Cross Worth?” in Material Culture and the 
American Life, ed. Quimby, pp. 42-50. 
curators, February 2005. 
Study of American Life, ed. Quimby, p. 6 .  
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to apply “linguistic models to the nonverbal, three-dimensional world.” This, 
however, was not a simple matter for Hindle, who felt that language “floats on 
top of the material world” and so remains separate from it. One must walk the 
battlefields, cruise the oceans, make landfall as explorers did, to find the words 
appropriate to the experience. Only in this experiential way, Hindle felt, “the 
abstractions of language are penetrated by direct knowledge of life’s complex 
multidimensional and instantaneous ~haracter .”~~ 
Hindle’s concept of the importance of experiential reality underscores 
what is, in fact, both a compelling but essentially still abstract circumstance. 
He did not describe any one set of analytical tools one must bring to the experi- 
ence in order to sense it and then reduce it to language. He provided examples, 
as all writers of this genre tend to do, and many of those are compelling, such 
as Eugene Ferguson’s attempt to reconstruct the methods of artisans by show- 
ing how they thought in pictures, suggesting that one might do the same for 
the builders of machinery. His strongest suit, of course, is how the techniques 
of industrial archaeology have radically changed our view of Eli Whitney’s 
role in the development of interchangeable parts. This was indeed a wonderful 
example of how, in a manner suggested by Carson and others, asking the right 
questions of a set of artifacts yielded new knowledge about their history and 
provided a correction to the broader history of industrial technology. 
The success of the interchangeability study naturally raises the question 
of what is important about today’s space technology, especially what is impor- 
tant that might be studied by examining artifacts in the ways Corn and others 
suggest. Is the ability to exchange parts important in the technology of space 
history, does it define modern capabilities and practice? Does it typify an era? 
The answer is probably no, at  least not in the way rifles illuminated manufac- 
turing techniques of their day. However, a modern counterpart might be the 
ability to ensure consistency and reliability across a very widely spread-out 
system or infrastructure. How sure is an instrument developer, for instance, 
that his instrument will work within the environment of a satellite housing 
that has been launched into space? What steps does that developer take to 
design his instrument to be as forgiving and robust as possible-resistive to 
vast swings of temperature, pressure, and acceleration, yet sensitive enough to 
get the job done effectively? This is only one of many questions about “inte- 
gration” that has been an issue ever since scientific instruments were flown 
on vessels that were not under the direct control of the instrument maker or 
scientist.37 The need to integrate a scientific instrument into a system used 
either remotely or by surrogates changes the way science is done and certainly 
36. Ibld., pp. 9-11. 
37. David DeVorkin, Race to the Stratosphere: Manned Scientific Ballooning in America (New York: 
Springer-Verlag, 1986). 
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changes the experience of the scientist, much as the telephone changed how 
we communicate. A more obvious approach might be to compare designs of 
instruments flown on different vehicles, looking for changes or shifts that are 
only understood in terms of the capabilities of the vehicle. These and other 
questions can be asked by historians of space artifacts, whether they be launch 
vehicles, manned or unmanned craft, subsystems, or instruments. 
Historians of this contemporary scene might be more interested in 
issues such as how nations achieve new levels of capability or performance 
(as with Campani’s lenses), how design variations reveal compromise, or how 
adaptations were made to existing technologies to make them work in the 
space environment or to survive launch or landing. But unlike the study of 
Campani’s lenses, it is doubtful that the space historian will ask these questions 
of the artifacts themselves. 
Indeed, one usually finds questions directed to the nature of the individu- 
als or organizations that produced the technology. Among historians contrib- 
uting to the Osivis volume “Instruments” in the early 1990s, Robert Smith and 
Joseph Tatarewicz represented space history, showing how the technical com- 
plexity of the Hubble Space Telescope not only symbolizes the complexity of 
the institutions and motivations involved in creating the thing, but also reveal- 
ing how these motivations were often in conflict. It is clear from their study of 
how the largely untested charge-coupled device (CCD) became the detector 
of choice for the critical Wide Field/Planetary Camera that one can only hope 
to understand the ultimate technological artifact through the interactions of 
conflicting institutional priorities between science, the military, and NASA, 
each possessing different goals, different resources, and different agendas.38 
This study of the CCD and the complexity of HST gets about as close 
to the artifact as I have seen in the literature of space history. It is typical 
of a small but hopefully growing literature that uses some characteristic of 
the hardware to inform a larger story. But the majority of the literature of 
space history is still rather far from this sort of treatment. Major characteristics 
include early practitioner histories, going into great detail describing exam- 
ples of early rocketry and speculative space vehicles but asking few, if any, 
questions about them that informed broader historical interests. The NASA- 
sponsored histories of the 1970s,  O OS, and ’90s focused, correctly, on the elu- 
cidation of missions and the application of broad technologies, rarely focusing 
on specific examples of the technology and questions about their origin and 
application. Among the synthetic reviews and disciplinary histories, one often 
finds descriptions of objects, who built them and why, and what they did, but 
38. Robert W. Smith and Joseph N. Tatarewicz, “Counting on Invention: Devices and Black 
Boxes in Very Big Science,” Osiris 9 (1994): 101-123. 
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rarely, if ever, is an artifact in a collection at the center of attention or used in 
any explicit way in the analysis. 
One can find this attitude explicitly stated in some of the papers from the 
XIX Scientific Instrument Symposium in September 2000, held in Wadham 
College, Oxford, where a session was devoted to “Instruments in the 20th 
Century,” organized by Paolo Brenni. Speakers said the usual things, like how 
instruments might provide useful information when other documentation is 
lacking, but gave no hint in their abstracts of the kind of information one 
might extract from an instrument other than suggesting that one look at an 
instrument or actually use it in performing an experiment. The most refresh- 
ing remarks about the value of collecting were made by Roland Wittje, who 
pointed out that any collection of 20th-century instrumentation was for pur- 
poses of exhibition and not for the study of history.39 In other venues, histori- 
ans have said much the same thing. Marvin Bolt of the Adler Planetarium and 
Astronomical Instrument Collection, echoing a strong and persistent theme 
among educators, presented demonstrable evidence for how historical replicas 
can reveal physical and chemical processes more simply than modern devices. 
Others concentrated on how, reflecting Hindle, an encounter with an histori- 
cal object can stimulate greater interest in the subject matter surrounding the 
actions of that device and the efforts of their human creators and users. 
We have touched on Hindle’s experiential argument before. It continues 
to appear in a wide range of studies. An excellent example is Paul Forman’s 
recent study of three mechanical wave guides from I. I. Rabi’s early research 
program that were part of the museum’s accession of his materials after his 
death and his office was cleaned out at Columbia. Paul was already interested 
in Rabi, of course, but, stimulated by the existence of these relics, he realized 
that their survival after all these years confirmed that Rabi regarded these 
early experiments very dearly and saved the devices as a result, even though 
they were completely overshadowed by his later work that won him the Nobel 
Prize. This encouraged Paul to search out the nature of his early work, and he 
found it to be more significant than hitherto realized. These wave guides also 
confirmed designs previously known only from publications.“’ 
At the same 1999 Artefact Conference where Paul Forman reported on 
Rabi’s devices, Paul Ceruzzi recalled an incident where someone examin- 
ing a circuit board recognized that it was probably designed by the legend- 
39. Roland Wittje, “How Can Scientific Instruments Teach the Historian about 20th Century 
Physics?” in Session V I I  A: Instruments in the 20th Century, session abstract, http://www.sic.iuhps. 
org/conf2000/ox_s07u.htm (accessed 18 January 2005). 
40. Paul Forman, “Researching Rabi’s Relics: Using the Electron to Determine Nuclear 
Moments Before Magnetic Resonance,” in Exposing Electronics, ed. Bernard Finn, Robert Bud, and 
Helmuth Trischler (Netherlands: Harwood, 20001, pp. 161-174. 
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ary Seymour Cray because it had specific design earmarks that Cray had 
pioneered, specifically his “cordwood packaging” technique that achieved 
greater densities than hitherto attained. There were no markings on the board 
other than the known fact that it was part of a military mainframe called the 
Naval Tactical Data System, or NTDS, built by Sperry. This was a highly 
specialized machine known only within military circles, and nothing was 
known about its design. It was also not generally known that Cray worked 
for Sperry, although he left Sperry before the NTDS was delivered. There 
is little in the published record linking Cray to the NTDS-no reference 
in the technical manuals or other contemporary descriptions. In presenting 
this analysis of a design style and using it to discern design origins in other 
computing devices, Paul examined a CDC 3800 acquired by the National 
Air and Space Museum, finding the same packaging design, even though 
no documentation has yet been found identifying it as a Cray design. Paul 
describes this as a “reading of the text of the machine itself” and is using it as 
a guide to search for traditional doc~mentation.~~ 
“Reading the text of the machine itself” includes many other areas 
beyond the survival, existence, or design style of a device, but quite frankly, 
it is a circumstance that is not as common as one might like. However, there 
are ways to increase the chances that a reading of an artifact will result in new, 
useful knowledge. Here I offer two examples from my personal experience: 
one involves documentation efforts, and the other involves exhibit prepara- 
tion. Both, by their nature, required the survival, existence, and availability 
of artifacts. 
The first example deals with the use of video to document objects. In 
the late 1980s, the Smithsonian decided to experiment with the use of video 
recording to better document its collections. This program, sponsored by the 
Sloan Foundation, brought together artifacts with their makers and users. 
As part of this effort, between 1988 and 1990, I interviewed sets of scien- 
tists and technicians who had been involved in space research at the Naval 
Research Laboratory from the 1940s through the 1980s. During the course of 
these interviews, sessions were devoted to voice-overs of a series of slow pans 
through laboratories and workspaces, followed by on-camera “enactments” 
and, following that, by direct examination of artifacts, mainly x-ray and ultra- 
violet detectors, collimators, and other elements of flight systems. I could fill 
many pages with examples of how this experience produced evidence that 
documented the interface between an instrument and its builder, as well as the 
interaction between the instrument and the laboratory environment within 
which it was designed and tested in prototype fashion. We documented design 
41. Paul Ceruzzi, “The Mind’s Eye and the Computers of Seymour Cray,” in Exposing Electronics, 
ed. Finn, Bud, and Trischler, pp. 151-160. 
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Typical x-ray ionization chamber designed, built, and used by the Naval Research 
Laboratory team on sounding rocket flights in the 1950s and early satellite systems. 
(File no. A1988-0012000, NASM Curatorial Files) 
choices, instrumental styles, experimental procedures, and testing methodolo- 
gies, not merely through reminiscences, but through recording the tactical 
connection between instrument and builder, On one occasion, one scientist 
demonstrated the methods used to fill halogen Geiger counters with gas and 
then test them for sensitivity. He used a contemporary filling station as a back- 
drop, but his hands twisted invisible dials and stopcocks as if he was using one 
from the 1950s. They were literally imprinted in his tactile memory. These 
explorations of working environments gave body to other sessions where the 
people who built these detectors talked about them while they handled them. 
Edward T. Byram was faced with many detectors he had built, laid out on 
a table in front of him. He rarely took his eyes off the detectors during the 
interview, and when asked if his efforts making these devices work properly 
were frustrating, he replied: “I was never frustrated. I enjoyed fighting them. 
It wasn’t a frustration, it was a challenge. It was mind over Geiger tube.”42 
His behavior matched his rhetoric-throughout the interview, Byram’s gaze 
42. E. T. Byram, quoted in David H. DeVorkm, “Preserving a Tool-Building Culture: 
Videohistory and Scientific Rocketry,” in A Practical Introduction to Videohistory, ed.  Terri A. 
Schorzman (Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing, 1993), pp. 125-137. 
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Early halogen counter with an entrance window of mica, capable of sensing ionizing 
ultraviolet radiation. Note the suspended anode just behind the mica window. This is 
a tube similar to the one Kreplin tapped during his video-history interviews. (File no. 
A1988-0010000, author digital file, NASM Curatorial Files) 
remained on the tubes. Obviously, he was still very attached to them, attached 
to devising ways to adhere exotic radiation entrance windows onto their shells 
and ways to ensure that the halogen gas mixtures he was filling them with 
did not leak or cause the seals to deteriorate. And finally, one of Byram’s col- 
leagues, Robert Kreplin, was also asked to talk about the tubes he built. He 
held an early example while he talked, and in the review, I noticed that as he 
discussed ways to test the mechanical integrity of these detectors, which had 
to survive the launch of a rocket, he instinctively tapped the side of the tube 
and peered through the mica window at a small protruding wire anode. His 
tapping was reminiscent of the group’s concern for the survival of the anode, 
which in later models was supported at both ends.43 
Although my basic goal for these interviews was to produce a collective 
profile of what I deemed to be a tool-building culture at the Naval Research 
Laboratory and to explore aspects of that culture, I also came away with a bet- 
ter appreciation for how these people organized themselves, raised issues and 
43. Image of Kreplin holding a tube, in DeVorkin,“Preserving a Tool-Building Culture,” p. 134. 
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problems, and dealt with outside entities first in the Navy and then at NASA. 
In a very definite, though not explicit, way, I feel that the surviving artifacts 
that we interrogated, and which are now in the collection, stimulated memo- 
ries and physical responses and led to discussions between team members that 
rekindled behaviors that I could actually discern. From this vicarious experi- 
ence, I feel I gained a fuller portrait of this tool-building culture. 
As my second example of the stimulus generated by a surviving artifact, 
1 turn to recent activities preparing for NASM’s new Udvar-Hazy Center. 
Curators had an unprecedented opportunity to examine a significant portion 
of the collections in a process that included improving documentation, preser- 
vation techniques, and methods of monitoring them, since from now on they 
will be on permanent display/storage. In the past, various factors have limited 
our access to these objects. They were stored off-site, sealed and boxed up, 
and required manpower and coordination for examination. One of the doz- 
ens of objects I had never had the chance to fully inspect was a model of the 
Explorer VI1 satellite identified as a “full scale replica.” It had been acquired 
on paper in 1976, inventoried several years later, but never actually examined 
at the Alabama Space and Rocket Center, where it was presumably on display. 
It finally was shipped to the Garber Facility in 1989. It was quickly inspected, 
but the box was never actually opened, nor were the insides of the object 
inspected. As a replica, it was, frankly, not of great interest. As to documenta- 
tion, we were left with hardly more than a shipping document. 
In the years leading up to preparation for the Udvar-Hazy facility, our 
department’s sensitivity for the critical importance of adequate documenta- 
tion vastly improved. Udvar-Hazy afforded me a chance to acquire intimate 
knowledge of a set of early satellites and the scientific instruments they hope- 
fully contained, so I opted to examine Explorer VI1 as part of a suite of first- 
generation geophysical satellites. 
Typically, anything marked as a mock-up or replica or even reconstructed 
satellite is not going to contain actual flight hardware, so I was really not 
expecting much. However, many of those objects hauled out and destined for 
Udvar-Hazy labeled replica or model have turned out to be very real. Based 
upon my experience with the videotaping of NRL detectors, I quickly realized 
that the detectors in the skin of Explorer VI1 were, in fact, real. One detector 
had a clear entrance window revealing a small chamber that had a single wire 
on the cylindrical axis, just like the one Kreplin was tapping. Explorer VI1 
may well have been a flight backup, which means that everything about it is 
real. Documents in our technical files in the NASM library confirmed that 
the detectors were indeed built by the NRL group, and other elements of the 
craft closely matched the descriptions in an extensive Technical Note. 
None of this effort would ever have been made if I had not been com- 
pelled to answer detailed questions raised by an intimate inspection of an 
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Explorer VI1 before cleaning and evaluation. Note that the artifact inventory tags were 
tied to a damaged x-ray detector similar to those examined at the Naval Research 
Laboratory and recorded during video-history sessions. See the image on page 593 for 
an intact example. (File no. A1978-1109000, author digital file, NASM Curatorial Files) 
artifact. Explorer VI1 is interesting as a representative of the state of tech- 
nology available for multifaceted studies of solar radiation and the nature of 
the low-Earth-orbit environment in the late 1950s. As with any early flight, 
there were some technical “firsts” and at least one first for science: the detec- 
tion of micrometeorite impacts. But whether or not the remnants of the craft 
itself reveal anything beyond what is still available from our technical files, at 
NASA, in our archives and oral histories (with people like Herbert Friedman 
and James Van Allen, another instrument principal investigator on Explorer 
VII), or from the published literature, it remains a fact that in the process of 
inspection and evaluation, more documentation was gathered and consistently 
filed away than was available before, and hence is likely to be retrievable in 
the future. Scattered documentation was collected, recorded, and filed away, 
hopefully someday to be of use in some unpredictable way, stimulated by 
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motivations that we cannot predict. My contention is that the motivation 
would come either from the recognition someday that this was a watershed 
flight in space history (the first application of passive techniques of thermal 
stabilization) or that an artifact that has survived in a major collection calls 
out, by its very existence, for attention to the fine structure of nuts-and-bolts 
history, for only through such efforts is a full picture of the nature of the first 
years of true space research likely to emerge. 
SO, WHY COLLECT? 
As I prepared my remarks for the “Critical Issues” conference, I queried 
colleagues at NASM, asking them questions stimulated in part by Corn’s find- 
ings but also by my inability thus far to find unequivocal evidence of how an 
object relating to space history has actually been used as a source of historical 
knowledge. I also queried aeronautics curators as a cursory check on a collect- 
ing area where documentation tends to be not as rich or institutionally based. 
In general, the responses confirmed the impressions I was getting from the 
literature and from experience. Curators (John Anderson, Michael Neufeld, 
Ron Davies, Tom Crouch, and Jeremy Kinney) typically felt that direct and 
personal experience with an artifact stimulated them to make historical inqui- 
ries. Neufeld, in particular, felt that an encounter with an historical object 
can stimulate intellectual interests and makes the past seem more real, less dry 
and distant even for academic historians, but how much they drive any his- 
toriography is questionable. Others, like Tom Crouch, felt that they learned 
from these inspections and gained important intellectual insights. For Crouch, 
“interpretation . . . was in large measure based on a combination of examining 
the objects and knowing the documentary record.” Jeremy Kinney reported 
that what he learned from his detailed inspection of variable pitch propellers 
in the collection is reflected in his publications in significant ways, but that his 
physical inspections largely confirmed textual descriptions in primary sources. 
All felt more or less strongly that the survival of artifacts could be a stimulus to 
researching and writing history. Artifacts provide information on design and 
shop practices that run hand in hand with the intellectual methods of aero- 
nautical engineering. As for the limits on collecting and the importance of the 
survival of the “real thing,” Tom Crouch added that it is impossible to preserve 
all the details of a machine (the written and visual records are approximations); 
close examination always reveals more detail-small mechanical details. For 
Crouch, one of the museum’s failings is the lack of attention to machine tools 
and production machinery-transitions from one medium (wood) to another 
(metal) and from metal to modern composite materials are always constrained 
by fundamental changes in tooling and production machinery. Reflecting 
issues raised by Warner and others, he also sees a problem with collecting 
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“black boxes” if it is not possible to “turn them on” and examine their behav- 
ior. Finally, reflecting Jim Bennett’s qualification cited under the title to this 
essay, he suggests that we all have to consider carefully what we collect for 
exhibit and what we collect for research-these are not necessarily the same 
class of object, and selection rules may tend to be very different.“4 
From the arguments so far reviewed from the literature, from the responses 
of my Museum colleagues here, and from my own experiences, what conclu- 
sions do I draw as to the value of collection and preservation? Here is a brief 
summary of my impressions. Objects can provide the following: 
Validation-material proof that something happened in space history 
(Hindle). This requires solid information on provenance, however, 
and requires as well that the object that is experienced by the visitor 
was actually the very same one involved in the historical episode it 
preserves. Collections in space history are rather peculiar in that, as 
often is the case, the actual historical object that performed the act 
or the function deemed worthy of note is not accessible-it has been 
used up or lost in the process of conducting its business, or, simply 
put, it is still “up there” where we put it, and we have no known 
means or the wherewithal of retrieving it. There are very notable 
exceptions, of course: vehicles that have returned to Earth as part 
of their mission or, even rarer, have been returned to Earth through 
some conscious act unrelated to the historical event or process that 
made it noteworthy. For all the rest, we are left with some form of 
surrogate: an exact flight backup, just like the flight model in every 
way except that it, in and of itself, did not experience the final act of 
making history but was still very much a part of that history. It had a 
role in that process but definitely comes in second place. Third place 
are various levels of engineering models and mock-ups, reconstructed 
replicas using parts that were fabricated out of the same computer 
program, melt, or block. And a distant fourth is all sorts of replicas 
or reproductions. Are these approximations merely surrogates for the 
“True Cross,” or does each and every one of them tell a particular 
story that is available no where else in quite the same way? What does 
their existence, and their survival today, reveal about the culture in 
which they were made? 
2. Celebration-sense of transcendence promoted by physically encoun- 
tering an object that made history. Accompanies commemorative 
44. Responses to curatorial questionnaire, author files, copy available in chronological publica- 
tion files, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC. 
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or memorializing events, lends visibility and weight to these efforts 
(NASM legislation). 
3.  Inspiration-evidence of challenges met or exceeded, handicaps over- 
come, struggles vindicated. Promotes insight into ways to illustrate 
basic principles of science and technology (Multhauf, Corn, Bolt). 
4. Illumination-preserves something about an historical event, era, or 
trend that, when means of interpretation are devised, provides addi- 
tional knowledge that otherwise would not be available. Objects can 
survive for specific reasons, and searching out those reasons illumi- 
nates history (Corn, Lubar, Ceruzzi, Forman). 
5. Stimulation-the preservation of an object stimulates interest in it 
and efforts to learn about it and the history it symbolizes or repre- 
sents. It also obligates those responsible for its curation to ensure that 
adequate documentation is collected and preserved to understand it in 
the future (Explorer VII, Forman, curatorial questionnaire). 
Of course, neither celebration nor inspiration actually requires the sur- 
vival of an artifact, though it would clearly help. Even illumination and stimu- 
lation are possible without the real thing, though impact would be even more 
restrictive. Nothing but the actual object, however, can provide validation- 
no facsimile, replica, reproduction, or description will ever suffice, although 
the survival of any of these items still stands testimony at some level. 
AFTERWORD 
If the survival of an artifact is useful to history in any of the five catego- 
ries listed above, one still has to look beyond history to the institutions that 
house and somehow represent it to ask how they react to the suggestion that 
collections are important to their own survival. In a recent Smithsonian sur- 
vey cited as significant by the Washington Post, 60 percent of the respondents 
claimed that they were visiting the Mall museums to see “the real thing,” 
whether it is Dorothy’s red shoes or the Apollo 11 capsule.45 The Post itself was 
concerned with what motivates programming at the Smithsonian in its efforts 
to overcome the tourist slump after 11 September 2001. Ironically, the part of 
45. “Smithsonian Institution Office of Planning and Analysis Report” (internal document, 
2004), quoted in J. Trescott, “The Smithsonian’s Concession to the Bottom Line,” Washifigton Post 
(13 April 2005): Al, A8. 
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the Smithsonian being covered by the Post reporter and as reported by her, its 
Business Ventures arm, responded as if this fact gave it a “mandate” to push 
IMAX films, simulators, jazz concerts, and anything else it could imagine 
would raise revenues. The irony was, unfortunately, lost on the Post reporter. 
Yet the fact remains, the public, when asked in this instance, reified “the real 
thing” just as Hindle argued it should. This runs counter to opinions voiced 
by museum watchers and critics in studies over the past several years, who 
have claimed that, in the face of theme parks and Disneylands, public tastes 
have shifted “to immersion in an environment, to an appeal to all the senses, 
to action and interactivity, to excitement, and beyond that to aliveness.” And 
in response to this shift, many modern museums have “shifted their allegiance 
from real objects to real e~perience.”~~ Oddly, these are just the sorts of expe- 
riences that, at least in the case of Smithsonian Business Ventures, a museum 
can charge money for. No one knows if it is a viable strategy for long-term 
survival of these institutions as collecting agencies. 
46. Randolph Starn, “A Historian’s Brief Guide to New Museum Studies,” American Historical 





C O M M U N I T Y  AND EXPLANATION IN SPACE HISTORY (?)
Martin Collins 
The deep sign$cance o f  certain problemsfor the advance o f  mathematical science 
in general and the important role which they play in the work of the individual 
investigator are not to be denied. As long as a branch of science offers an abun- 
dance ofproblems, so long is it alive; a lack of problems foreshadows extinction 
or the cessation o f  independent development. Just as every human undertaking 
pursues certain objects, so also mathematical research requires its problems. It is 
by the solution ofproblems that the investigator tests the temper o f  his steel; he 
jinds new methods and new outlooks, and gains a wider andjeer horizon. 
-David Hilbert, “Mathematical Problems,” 1900 
ilbert, a pivotal figure in mathematics in the late 19th and early 20th cen- H turies, addressed these thoughts in 1900 to the International Congress 
of Mathematicians in Paris-a quadrennial, premier gathering of practitio- 
ners.’ In this year, poised at the crossing between centuries, Hilbert and his 
colleagues self-consciously took stock as to professional ethos, standards, and 
research. Holding center stage, Hilbert presented (in what was recognized 
then and since as) one of the most significant templates for research in math- 
ematics, providing a conceptual outlook for his discipline and a list of 23 out- 
standing problems that engaged, in different ways, the foundations of the field. 
These problems, for Hilbert, served as vital links among practice, theory, and 
tacit notions of professional community-and, more broadly, connected all of 
these to European culture. 
Hilbert’s moment, of course, is not ours. The early modernist tempera- 
ment, confidently ascendant, shines through-the application of reason seems 
to confiont few limits. Too, the “profession” as social and intellectual instrument 
1. David Hilbert, “Mathematical Problems: Lecture Delivered before the International Congress 
of Mathematicians at Paris in 1900” (trans. by Dr. Maby Winton Newson), Bulletin ofthe American 
Mathematical Society 8 (1902): 437-479. 
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(with scientific disciplines as model) seems to promise a progressive, well-oiled 
engine to extend and secure reason’s reach-indefinitely. Hilbert’s moment 
reminds us of the arc (choose your geometric tracing) from then to now and 
of the undermining of that world’s foundational assumptions. Late modern 
and postmodern perspectives have made problematic the relationship among 
researcher, subject, and knowledge claims-the ontology and epistemology 
of the “true” and the “objective”-as well as the idea of the profession as self- 
contained and self-regulated in its pursuits. 
Hilbert’s thoughts and their context provide one of many possible points 
of departure for reflecting on notions of discipline and profession in space his- 
tory. The aim here is not an extended comparison with that earlier example, 
but a simple reminder of the history of these inventions and the complex of 
issues embedded within them. Nor is this afterword a critique of the seminar’s 
papers, separately or collectively, nor is it a meta-literature review. Rather, it 
is an attempt to foreground assumptions that lingered backstage in many of 
the papers, assumptions that speak to our sense of what space history is and 
does. The “(?)” in the title above signals one part of this examination: How 
and why we self-identify as “space history” rather than as space “something 
else”-and what such a choice implies. 
All of these bits of critique, of course, are right out of the big playbook of 
analytic moves-a (pseudo-) knowing voice taking us from background to fore- 
ground, dark to light, fuzzy to sharp-yet necessary and useful as part of think- 
ing about “critical issues.”Reviews of this type are the rare occasions when“we” 
and “1”-as much as our subject matter-are preeminently our concern. 
This discussion will touch on two intertwined themes central to notions 
of discipline and profession (hereafter, for concision, I will use “discipline” 
to speak for both), yet largely submerged in this “Critical Issues” conference: 
community and explanation (our equivalent of Hilbert’s problems). The for- 
mer, with a nod to Robert Merton, refers to norms and shared practices, and 
the latter to how we conceptually establish ourselves in relation to history and 
related disciplines and how we frame the aims of inquiry. In outline, these 
themes almost are banally familiar; in application to space history, they may 
illuminate “we” choices that should be explicit rather than implicit. 
COMMUNITY 
Is there something missing in our sense of community, in the way we 
approach our research domain? 
Such a question may seem off. The very fact ofthis seminar, ofa thoughtful 
focus on critical issues, signaled health and intellectual robustness. It reflected 
a shared interest (at least to the level of subject matter) among scholars from 
a range of disciplines. In narrative and argument, the individual papers were 
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“right on,” embodying a knowledgeable engagement with the best method- 
ological practice. And as a topical map of the field, the seminar provided a 
thorough survey. 
Yet there were two prominent lacunae: a collective self-awareness and 
openness on the importance of methodology-of presenting, testing, and cri- 
tiquing the conceptual tools that define a field as a domain of inquiry-und 
of the core aims of research. In short, the seminar shied away from “dis- 
cipline”-of explicit correlation between methods and aims, a communal 
orientation and set of commitments that distinguish a discipline from a sub- 
ject area. Open, systematic exchange, rumination, and struggle on points of 
method and explanatory focus (and attaching value to such) are integral to 
community practice within a discipline. To suggest the relative absence of 
such a mindset at the seminar is not to cast aspersion, but to bring to the fore 
an important choice: discipline (or more accurately, subdiscipline) or subject 
specialty? This choice was a largely unspoken tension within the seminar: we 
assumed discipline but performed as subject specialty. 
Does this distinction or choice matter? Space history as subject specialty 
can be commodious, welcoming a range of scholarship under a big tent-the 
seminar was a showcase. Under this mode of practice, we can learn from each 
other, then head back to our respective subfields-a kind of intellectual tourist 
model of research. And that may be enough. Space history best may be pur- 
sued as loose confederation sans discipline. But does the notion of discipline 
offer us opportunities worth considering? 1’11 highlight a few issues associated 
with method first, and then with aims and explanation. 
Method, of course, is not an end in itself. In recent years, its reputation has 
edged, on occasion, into a preoccupation with dreary, constant self-reference 
and culture-war comedy (recall Alan Sokal’s parody of postmodernism and 
deconstructionism in Social Text, a journal edited by the noted Stanley Fish).’ 
And, of course, to refer to method abstractly, without accounting for the 
many variants that have effloresced since the early 1960s, is to risk reduction 
and simplicity (Margaret Weitekamp’s essay, nonsimplistically, gives one over- 
view of this landscape). But the point for us is primarily attitudinal-to note 
that a primary motivation for the boon in critique was a fundamental (and 
from a disciplinary perspective, necessary) question: How do we know and 
justify what we know (about the ~ o r l d ) ? ~  Taking that question seriously is not 
to turn historians (or other disciplines represented at the seminar) into phi- 
2. Alan Sokal, “Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of 
Quantum Gravity,” Social Text 46/47 (1996): 217-252. 
3. For one recent overview of the centrality of epistemology and of the genealogy of critique in 
relation to the modern and postmodern, see Bruno Latour, “Has Critique Run Out of Steam: From 
Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern,” Critical Inquiry 30 (2004): 225-248. 
606 CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
losophers, but to foreground the importance of method in any discipline’s 
practice-in establishing the constructs and categories through which we do 
research. Such a concern, for example, was at the heart of the formation of 
science and technology studies. There, method served two functions: to ele- 
vate epistemological issues as just noted and, equally important, as a focus for 
creating a sense of community among a congeries of disciplines. Method and 
explicit talk about method provided a means for drawing disciplines together 
and connecting and building on each community’s research perspectives. This 
orientation and the norm which is its corollary led to the designation of “stud- 
ies” to characterize this research enterprise. 
With this “Critical Issues” seminar, space history, I think, faces, i la Yogi 
Berra, the simple recognition that there is indeed a fork in the road.4 The 
seminar was notable in that this norm regarding methodology (making how 
we do research as much a part of the discussion as the subject of research) was 
largely absent. How, for example, do we fruitfully interconnect history, polit- 
ical science, sociology, and policy studies (the four major disciplines repre- 
sented at the seminar)? What are the issues arising from-the goals for-such 
interconnection? Are we after merely some vague expansion of “context”? Or 
can explanatory aims be integrated? Are there research projects that emerge 
from such interconnection that confront basic issues of historical change and 
explanation? To entertain these (or similar) questions is to probe the possibili- 
ties of discipline and space history as multidisciplinary crossroad. 
The supercilious “(?)” I keep pinning on the rump of space history is a sug- 
gestion that self-description matters-as it did with science and technology stud- 
ies, women’s studies, and other domains of research-that it is a marker of our 
notion of community (subject specialty or [subldiscipline); goals; and organized, 
professional self-reflection. If we wish to emulate these examples, then we might 
rethink how we designate what we do-to self-identie in a way that embraces a 
range of disciplines in a common enterprise. Space history, hereafter in this essay, 
will stand, awkwardly, for history as well as a constellation of other disciplines 
interested in the cultural meaning and manifestations of space activity. 
Discipline is more than branding-as with that bygone image of the teacher 
rapping knuckles with a ruler, it imposes restraints, or, at the very least,“stop and 
think” road markers. One of those is a commitment to clarity in what meth- 
odological tools are in play and how they interrelate. In the seminar, this issue 
most often came to the fore in the several papers that sought to join a policy 
voice (concerned with the prescriptive and/or normative) and either a histori- 
cal, political science, or sociological voice (concerned, primarily, with descrip- 
tion and explanation). These two voices involve a different use of time and 
4. For those unfamiliar with Yogi Berra wisdom, the aphorism is: “If you come to a fork in the 
road, take it.” 
AFTERWORD: COMMUNITY AND EXPLANATION. . . 607 
tense, approach to conditionals and normative claims, and modes of argument. 
They have, succinctly, different narrative standards. To shifi casually between 
these narrative strategies is to muddy what is at stake analytically in space history 
as subject matter-and to blur the distinction between the methods and aims of 
explanation and the elucidation of options in service of policy. 
These concerns raise a deeper consideration regarding notions of dis- 
cipline and space history: the stance of practitioners to subject matter and, 
especially, to participants in that subject matter. As noted by Roger Launius, 
many writers on space history conflate their research with a “fer it or agin it” 
normative stance on space exploration’s social or political value.5 The preva- 
lence of this stance, of the conflation of the normative (which presumes at 
least a partial overlap between analytic practitioners and participants) with 
narrative explanation, is profoundly antidisciplinary-that is, undermines 
discipline’s formative characteristic: independence in intellectual standards.6 
In an important but not often cited essay, “Independence, not Transcendence, 
for the Historian of Science,” Paul Forman addressed a closely similar set of 
relations in history of science.’ His argument was that for history of science 
to be history of science it had to frame questions, methods, and aims distinct 
from those of science. History of science, if it was to be a profession (sporting 
more than the social trappings of self-regulation), had to separate itself from 
providing social and intellectual justification for (or dismantling of) science 
and scientists’ self-image. It had to be thoroughly, completely historical. The 
thick veins of a similar predicament run through space history. If space history 
leans toward discipline rather than subject specialty, then issues of practice and 
boundary setting will need to come to the fore. 
EXPLANATION 
Let’s take as given that understanding and explaining change-socially, 
culturally, historically-is a fundamental task of our effort, that description 
and causality loom large. To think in terms of discipline, then, is to ask in 
what ways space history might define its research domain and to focus an 
5. Roger D. Launius, “The Historical Dimension of Space Exploration: Reflections and 
Possibilities,” Space Policy 16 (2000): 23-38. 
6. This point is not to say that history cannot be “useful” or be applied to a wide range ofcultural 
concerns. The notion of utility, too, has been a central methodological issue for sociology and politi- 
cal science since their formation as disciplines in the 19th century. The issue is whether “usefulness” 
provides the right intellectual basis for a discipline that aims toward explanation. For one of the most 
prominent statements on history and its application, see Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking 
in Time: The Uses of Historyfor Decision-Makers (New York. Free Press; London: Collier Macmdlan, 
1986). Importantly, for Neustadt, “usefulness” is a byproduct of disciplinarity, not an aim. 
7. Paul Forman, “Independence, not Transcendence, for the Historian of Science,” Isis 82 (1991): 
71-86. 
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explanatory enterprise.’ In contrast to space history as subject specialty, this 
slight shift of the kaleidoscope has ramifications. 
Consider Walter McDougall’s seminal . . . The Heavens and the Eavth? This 
work, I think, is most often viewed as an exemplar of contextualization, of 
rescuing space history from the modalities of program and institutional history 
and binding the subject to the perspectives of diplomatic history and politi- 
cal science. For McDougall, the emergence of spaceflight was not a subplot, 
but a major narrative thread of the all-encompassing drama of the Cold War. 
Less noted, but more germane here, is that McDougall’s work was not merely 
context-expanding and thesis-driven, but broadly explanatory-an identifiable 
set of causes (preeminently ideology, new social/technical tools associated with 
systems thinking, and an uptick in the concentration of power in the federal 
government and willingness to apply it-in combination, technocracy) struc- 
tured historical description and shaped historical change on a broad cultural 
scale. It was an explanatory framework that, with national variations, provided 
a common way of seeing events in the U.S., USSR, and Europe and that yielded 
good, scholarly fruit: a coherent (albeit contestable) notion of period.” 
It is a revealing feature of space history scholarship that this call to expla- 
nation generated little to no resonance in the community.” The work was 
absorbed into mantras for “context” (an improvement over “internalism,” but 
still a half-rigorous notion for a research program) and into quasi-policy research 
agendas (Why did spaceflight diminish in the U.S.’s political agenda?). Vestigial 
trails of this absorption were evident throughout the seminar. Embedded in 
this stance is a stultifying (and unexamined) research proposition: that with 
the undoing of the 1960s framework for spaceflight, space history itself has no 
deep relation to explanatory accounts of change in the world after 1970 and, 
thus, provides no distinctive vantage onto recent history. Or, stated somewhat 
differently, the field has no overarching explanatory outlook. 
8. For adherents to history-as-special-kind-of-narrative, explanation as an aim of inquiry is not 
a given. The description versus explanation stands in history have, well, a tangled history. The 
best account, seen through the lens of the “objective,” is Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The 
“Objectivity Question” and the Amencan Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988) For an enlightening but philosophically muddled defense of description and its relation to 
explanation, see Allan Megill, “Recounting the Past: ‘Description,’ Explanation and Narrative in 
Historiography,” American Historical Review 94 (1989). 627-653. 
9. Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New 
York: Basic Books, 1985). 
10. These views were more succinctly argued in an earlier essay: Walter McDougall, “Technocracy 
and Statecraft in the Space Age: Toward the History of a Saltation,” American Historical Review 87 
11. To be clear: My claim is that the space history literature seems to have had little interest in 
the explanatory element of McDougall’s work. Science and technology studies, Cold War studies, 
and diplomatic history did engage and integrate the issues of explanation posed by McDougall into 
the problematics of their respective fields. 
(1982): 1010-1040. 
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If this is true, then space history is history at the margins-or, more 
generously, serves as a source of case studies for other disciplinary projects 
(for example, for sociology in understanding organizations that manage risk 
or pursue complex problems, or for political science in unpacking decision- 
making in technology-infused modern polities) or as a site for exploring 
important but largely disaggregated themes: exploration, innovation, and 
so on. This may be the proper research stance-but it should be arrived at 
through open examination, not happenstance. If space history is to have a self- 
identity, to be discipline-oriented, then a concern with explanation, with the 
relation of space history to macrostructures of change, seems a crucial starting 
point. This is not to say that the only ’‘good’’ history is grandly explanatory, 
that theory reigns over the hard work of research-but rather that models of 
explanation, and debate about them, are central to discipline.” 
Perhaps, historiographically, the Cold War lulled us into anticipating 
an explanatory framework (in that case, the centrality of state action joined 
to an overweening interest in science and technology) that was conceptually 
straightforward, yet capable of informing and being informed by a variety 
of “local” histories. Is there an explanatory framework, post-Heavens and 
the Earth, which offers us the start of a (contingent) synthetic view of space 
history and currents of change in recent decades? Significantly, McDougall 
hinted at the necessity of new interpretive frames nearly contemporane- 
ously with publication of Heavens and the Earth in his article “Space-Age 
Europe: Gaullism, Euro-Gaullism, and the American Dilemma.”13 Here he 
argued that to comprehend the European approach to space, the market as 
well as the state needed to be incorporated into post-Apollo and broadly 
geopolitical analyses. 
But a deeper, sustained response to the problem of post-World War I1 
periodization arose in other scholarly quarters-in sociology, literary criti- 
cism, and philosophy-as part of the tangled reflections on demarcating 
the modern from the postmodern. For discussion and to retain a focus on 
explanation in space history, I will pull only a few threads G-om this skein. 
Postmodernism (by no means monolithic) is best known for its epistemologi- 
cal and ontological claims, particularly Francois Lyotard’s dictum that grand 
narratives (transcendent certainties about human nature, culture, knowledge 
12. Exemplars ofsuch history abound in which explanation, problems, research, cases, and debate 
create a disciplinary ecology. A beautiful recent snapshot of such scholarship is captured in Leonard 
Rosenband’s retrospective on David Landes’s seminal The Unbound Prometheus: Leonard Rosenband, 
“Never Just Business: David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus,” Technology and Culture 46 (2005): 
168-176. Seminar contributor Phil Scranton has been at the center of a related research ecology for 
most of his career through his scholarship on innovation, business, and U.S. industrialization. 
13. Walter A. McDougall, “Space-Age Europe: Gaullism, Euro-Gaullism, and the American 
Dilemma,” Technology and Culture 26 (1985): 179-203. 
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of the “real”) no longer could withstand ~crutiny.’~ But, more important for 
our purpose here, it advances a set of causes that provide tentative reference 
points for description and explanation of contemporary culture (generally, 
and not coincidentally for space history, taking the 1970s as watershed). And 
these causes that shape the postmodern condition ring familiar: that, rela- 
tively, economic and political power have shifted from states to markets; that 
communications technologies and systems (and that large-scale technological 
systems of many types) have been integral to this shift; and that, in combina- 
tion, these factors have remapped processes of cultural production, changing 
the ways in which states, corporations, communities, ethnic groups, and indi- 
viduals exercise power and create identities. The acceleration of actions and 
reactions across national borders, of the collapse of geographic distance, of 
the sense that everyone and every place potentially seem proximate become, 
in this frame, distinctive features of a global cultural landscape. This new 
condition mirrors, with steroids injected, McLuhan’s infamous “global vil- 
lage,” a notion partially rooted in the beginnings of the Space Age. That 
postmodernism has attempted to specify a template of material causes for such 
phenomena is not too surprising. The leading exponents draw heavily on the 
Marxist intellectual tradition that links base to superstructure, economics to 
~ul ture . ’~ Too, in considering causes and explanation, postmodernism must be 
seen in conjunction with its close cousin, globalism. The two roughly map 
onto each other-but with one important difference in emphasis: globalism 
addresses more directly the functioning of political and economic power on 
the transnational stage, particularly as regards the U.S. dominant position in 
the aftermath of the Cold War. 
Should these turns of thinking be of interest to space history? Readers 
already will have their pointy objects handy to prick the above notions of any 
seeming juice;-at minimum, we might skeptically ask if such causal asser- 
tions have empirical weight. But as a set of ideas, as a heuristic, I think this 
framework is provocative for space history, suggesting ways to explore notions 
of causation and change that (re)integrate the field into broader structures of 
meaning and reconceptualize our sense of the problem map of the field.“ 
14. See Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: 
University ofMinnesota, 1984 [originally published in 1979]), and Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, 
or, The Cultural Logic ofLate Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991). 
15. The most lucid and extended account of the interconnections among epistemology, causes, 
and cultural effects in the postmodern is David Harvey, The Condition ~~Postmodernity: An Enquiry 
into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1989). 
16. One case study that attempts to connect space history with the interpretive frames of post- 
modernism and globalism is Peter Redfield, “The Half-Life of Empire in Outer-Space,” Social 
Studies ofScience 32 (2002): 791-825. See also Martin Collins, “One World . . . One Telephone: 
Iridium, One Look at the Making ofa Global Age,” History and Technology 21 (2005): 301-324. 
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At a simple level of correspondence, elements of space activity seem 
central to postmodern/global analysis: a variety of space-based transnational 
technical systems-communications, navigation, and surveillance and moni- 
toring-are implicated in their material and causal account of the how and 
why of recent cultural change. Notably, these applied space systems-with 
origins in markets, civilian government, and military and intelligence agen- 
cies-have not been, relatively, the center of policy debate (at least in the 
U.S.), nor the perceived strategic focus of scholarship. Through the lens of 
postmodernism/globalism, though, one is inclined to start from the proposi- 
tion that these undertakings, individually and collectively, are crucial sites 
for research, for understanding the very composition of a post-1960s world 
order. This emphasis on the applied, on systems of culture and technology that 
intersect with the global “everyday” (including constructions of power and 
identity), if taken seriously, de-centers NASA and human space exploration as 
the signature markers of geopolitics-an orientation that aligns with the halt- 
ing course of decisions and funding in post-Moon-landing space history-yet 
provides a rich, alternative framework for making the “international” a cen- 
tral area of investigation. 
Conceptually, postmodernism and globalism, too, reemphasize, in com- 
parison to the focus on state-centered accounts in Cold War space history, the 
centrality of markets and culture (in particular, their distinctive interrelation in 
the postmodern) as loci of change. To say this is almost to be “history 101” obvi- 
ous. But the persistent legacy of Cold War literature seems to have pushed the 
obvious to the margins. Regarding markets, postmodernism/globalism high- 
lights the issue of developing better accounts of state-market configurations in 
the post-Moon-landing years as a means to situate all space activities, including 
human space exploration. Thus considered, NASA’s travails in the 1970s and 
after might be examined as part of a broader framework of change, rather than 
as (often, normatively, bemoaned) exemplars of half-measure policy-making 
and institutional diminishment. This, I think, put somewhat differently, is Asif 
Siddiqi’s point on the “problem” of Apollo in space history scholarship. 
Regarding culture, postmodernism points us to a fundamental (and not 
yet fully articulated) question in the field: How do we analytically frame 
the interconnections between space activity and culture? Is this primarily a 
dynamic in which cultural tropes broadly circulate to be plucked, adopted, 
and made instrumental by a range of groups (individuals, civil associations, 
markets, government)? Is such a process marked by a mutual perfusion of the 
real and fictional-with broad consequences for creators and consumers of 
space-related cultural productions? Or, more narrowly, is space culture merely 
an overlay, a gloss, a distraction from the meaty acts of political and business 
decision-making? In considering such questions, postmodernism advances 
an important claim: that culture, especially in the post-World War I1 years, 
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serves not primarily as a set of restraints but becomes an active instrument, a 
resource to be deployed by the powerful and, in the information age, by the 
less powerful. Culture, thus, is not only precepts, assumptions, ways of doing, 
but is as protean and purpose-driven as capital-and is as central to macro- 
structures of change.” Seen from this angle, culture is not a side motif in space 
history, but a central explanatory problem. 
These reflections are not meant to suggest that we swallow the bait and 
barb of postmodernism and globalism claims without care. Rather it is, first 
and foremost, to point to the value of generating our own conscientious 
engagement with scholarly discussions of historical change-with a sugges- 
tion that postmodernism and globalism make provocative foils. Second, it is 
to acknowledge the special place of historical (and other) research in situat- 
ing and grounding explanatory claims in the empirical. This latter task is not 
insignificant. In the case of postmodernism/globalism, an outlook primarily 
developed by disciplines other than history, it theorizes about but often fails to 
engage the tough actualities of how technology, markets, states, and cultures 
17. A little more needs to be said here. Consider two prominent definitions of culture. 
First, Clifford Geertz: “The concept of culture I espouse . . . is essentially a semiotic one. 
Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself 
has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimen- 
tal science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning. It is explication I am 
after . ” (Clifford Geertz, The  Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays [New York. Basic Books, 
Second, Raymond Williams: “Culture is ordinary: that is the first fact. Every human society has 
its own shape, its own purposes, its own meanings. Every human society expresses these, in institu- 
tions, and in arts and learning. The making of a society is the finding of common meanings and 
directions, and its growth is an active debate and amendment under the pressures of experience, 
contact, and discovery, writing themselves into the land. The growing society is there, yet it is also 
made and remade in every individual mind. The making of a mind is, first, the slow learning of 
shapes, purposes, and meanings, so that work, observation and communication are possible. Then, 
second, but equal in importance, is the testing of these in experience, the making of new observa- 
tions, comparisons, and meanings. A culture has two aspects: the known meanings and directions, 
which its members are trained to; the new observations and meanings, which are offered and 
tested. These are the ordinary processes of human societies and human minds, and we see through 
them the nature of a culture: that it is always both traditional and creative; that it is both the most 
ordinary common meanings and the finest individual meanings” (Raymond Williams, Culture and 
Soctefy [New York: Columbia University Press, 19581). 
These notions of culture were used implicitly and effectively in a number ofthe essays, especially 
in those that focused on institutions and communities (including those by Diane Vaughan, Todd 
La Porte, Phil Scranton, and Alexander Brown). Postmodernism/globalism does not upend these 
analytic frameworks but does claim that “capital” and new communications technologies (to be 
unwarrantedly deterministic) have assumed an enhanced role in lifting and disconnecting cultural 
products from their local settings, resulting in two strata of culture. that associated with capital and 
global information flows and that associated with the “traditional” and the local. This dynamic 
is the core idea in a range of global “clash” literature, including work by Samuel Huntington, 
Bernard Barber, and Thomas Friedman. 
19731, pp. 4-5). 
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interrelate, of how technological innovation occurs and integrates with cul- 
ture, and of how the local and global are variously co-related. 
But those are tepid aspirations and disciplinary goals. More, I think, post- 
modernism and globalism highlight the ways in which space and associated 
undertakings are central to the modern condition, and provide crucial sites 
of research for an explanatory enterprise. Three longstanding, deep cultural- 
technical themes of space history-exploration, control, and systems-also 
are integral to unpacking and giving substance to postmodern and globalism 
accounts. Space history, too, raises issues that these literatures largely side- 
step: for example (and crucially), analytic engagement with the meaning and 
import of military and intelligence space activities (especially in relation to the 
U.S.). The scale of these activities (in terms of funding, geospatial reach, and 
range of technologies) and, for a significant fraction, their relative invisibility 
behind barriers of security classification, pose important issues for models that 
seek to interconnect states, markets, and global technical systems. As Stephen 
Johnson’s essay ably and starkly details, great chunks of military and intelli- 
gence space activity are shadowed. The emphasis in the postmodern has been 
on the public transnational modalities of interconnection. But what are we to 
make of the largely secret global systems of surveillance and control, of their 
interconnections with markets, of their integration into models of explanation 
and change? Given classification barriers, this now may be an unresearchable 
question, but as a discipline, it is of the first consequence to pose it.18 
I have offered here at least two layers of idiosyncrasy: my own reading 
of the present state of the field and of possible responses and questions that ask 
us to consider the implications of subject specialty versus discipline. My goal 
here was not to make the case for a particular formulation of community, but 
to argue that we face a substantive choice-and that space history possesses 
the intellectual heft to make that choice important. We have come to a fork 
in the road. Take it. 
18. An important reconnaissance of this problem in the Cold War and after (especially post-9/11) 
is Peter Galison, “Removing Knowledge,” Critrcal Inquiry 31 (2004): 229-243. On the compara- 
tive scope of unclassified and classified information in the United States, the money quotation is: 
“In fact, the classified universe, as it is sometimes called, IS certainly not smaller and very probably 
much larger than this unclassified one” (p. 229). The “unclassified one” that Galison uses as a point 
of reference is the total estimated page count of all material in the Library of Congress: 7.5 billion 
pages. The significance of classified activity in understanding the Cold War or “postmodern” eras 
is yet to be fully mapped. 
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American Association for the Advancement of Science 
American Astronautical Society 
American Broadcasting Company 
antiballistic missile 
Army Ballistic Missile Agency 
Air Collection and Enrichment System 
Air Force Base 
Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development 
American Historical Association 
American Institute ofAeronautics and Astronautics 
American Rocket Company 
Air Research and Development Command 
Advanced Research Projects Agency 
American Studies Association 
antisatellite 
American Society for Electrical Engineering; American 
Society for Engineering Education 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
Aerothermodynamic/elastic Structural Systems Environ- 
mental Tests 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
Advanced Technology Vehicle 
Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept 
ballistic missile defense 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System 
Unpiloted Orbital Rocketplane (in Russian) 
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command and control 
command, control, communications, and intelligence 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
California Institute ofTechnology 
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Chicago Bridge and Iron 
charge-coupled device 
Contract Change Proposal 
Centers for Disease Control 
Complementary Expendable Launchvehicle 
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Central Intelligence Agency 
Civilian-Military Liaison Committee (of the House) 
commercial satellite; communications satellite 
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Command and Service Module (Apollo) 
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Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Defense Contract Administration Services 
Delta Clipper-Experimental 
Delta Clipper-Experimental Advanced 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering; Deputy 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering; design- 
ing, developing, researching, and engineering 
Distant Early Warning 
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 
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Department of Defense 

































Department of Energy 
Defense Satellite Communications System I1 
Defense Support Program 
Dynamic Soaring 
Engineering Change Request 
European Economic Community 
Evolved Expendable Launchvehicle 
European Launcher Development Organisation 
electronics intelhgence 
expendable launch vehicle 
Executive Office of the President 
Electronic Intelligence Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite 
Earth Observing System 
Environmental Protection Agency 
European Space Agency 
European Space Research Organisation 
eastern standard time 
External Tank (of the Space Shuttle) 
extravehicular activity 
Federal Communications Commission 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
First Lady Astronaut Trainees 
Fleet Satellite Comunications 
Fractional Orbiting Bombardment System 
full operational capability 
Freedom of Information Act 
Flight Research Center 
Flight Readiness Review 
fiscal year 
Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory at the California 
Institute of Technology 
General Accounting Office 
General Electric 

































Ground-Based Electro-optical Deep Space Surveillance 
Group for the Investigation of Reactive Engines and Reac- 
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Global Navigation Satellite System 
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite 
Gemini Program Office; Government Printing Office 
Global Positioning System 
Galactic Radiation and Background 
Chief Directorate of the Space Systems (Soviet) 
Chief Directorate of Reactive Armaments (Soviet) 
Historic American Engineering Record 
Horizontal Lander 
high-reliability organization 
History of Science Society 
Hubble Space Telescope 
High Mobility Multipurpose WheeledVehicle 
International Astronomical Union 
intercontinental ballistic missile 
Intermediate Circular Orbit 
International Council of Museums 
Initial Defense Communications Satellite Program 




Imager for Mars Pathfinder 
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International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium 
intermediate-range ballistic missile 
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International Space Station 
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Journal .f the British Interplanetary Society 
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Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
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Soviet secret police organization 
Kennedy Space Center 
Space Forces (Soviet) 
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Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Lyndon Baines Johnson 
Lunar Excursion Module 
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Lunar Landing Trainingvehicle 
Lunar Module (Apollo) 
lunar orbit rendezvous 
Ministry of Space Industry (Chinese) 
measurement and signature intelligence 
Multiple Axis Space Test Inertia Facility 
Mission Control Center 
Missile Defense Agency 
Missile Defense Alarm System 
Manned Military Space System; Man-In-Space-Soonest 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Mission Management Team 
Military Orbital Development System 
MOL Manned Orbiting Laboratory 
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MSC Manned Spacecraft Center (later renamed Johnson 
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Ministry of Machine Building (Soviet) 

































Manned Spaceflight Engineer 
Ministry of Armaments (Soviet) 
North American 
North American Aviation 
NASA Advisory Council 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
National Archives and Records Administration 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
National Aeronautics and Space Council 
National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing 
National Air and Space Museum 
National Aero-Space Plane 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Near-Earth Object 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
National Launch System 
nautical mile 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
North American Air Defense Command 
Naval Ordnance Test Station 
designation combining “Naval Ordnance Test Station” 
and “Sputnik” 
Scientific-Production Association (Soviet) 
National Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellite System 
National Park Service 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Naval Research Laboratory 
National Reconnaissance Office 
national security 
National Security Action Memorandum 
National Security Council 
National Security Directive 
National Security Decision Directive 
































National Science Foundation 
NASA and the Space industry 
National Security and International Mairs Division 
(within GAO) 
National Space Policy Directive 
National Security Study Directive 
National Science andTechnology Council 
Naval Tactical Data System 
Organization of American Historians 
Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
designation for a Soviet design bureau 
(such as Om-1 or OKB-52) 
Office of Management and Budget 
Office of Naval Research 
Office of the Secretary of Defense 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
Orbital Space Plane 
Office of Science and Technology Policy 
Passive Geodetic Earth Orbiting SateUite 
Phased Array Warning System 
Presidential Directive 
President’s Science Advisory Committee 
pounds per square inch 
Public Utility Commissions 
quality assurance 
research and development 
Royal Air Force (United Kingdom) 
Reusable Aerodynamic Space Vehicle 
Radio Corporation ofAmerica 
Request for Proposals 
Russian State Archive of the Economy 
reusable launch vehicle 
Recoverable Orbital Launch System 

































Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite 
Rossum’s Universal Robots 
Missile Forces of Strategic Designation (Soviet) 
School ofAdvanced Airpower Studies 
Scientific Advisory Board (USAF) 
Strategic Air Command 
Society of Automotive Engineers 
Spacecraft Assembly and Encapsulation Facility 
Semi-Automatic Ground Environment 
Satellite Inspector for Space Defense 
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks 
RCA Americom Satellite “SATCOM” series 
Space-Based Infrared System 
Signal Communication by Orbiting Relay Equipment 
social construction of technology 
supersonic combustion ramjet 
System Development Corporation 
Strategic Defense Initiative 
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization 
Satellite Data System 
Space Exploration Initiative 
Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence 
Society for Experimental Test Pilots 
Super High Frequency 
Society for the History ofTechnology 
Senior Interagency Group 
signals intelligence 
Shuttle Imaging Radar 
space launch complex 
Standardized Launch Vehicle 
Space Maneuver Vehicle 
Shuttle Operations and Planning Complex 


































Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance (NASA) 
Solid Rocket Booster 
Solid Rocket Motor 
Solid Rocket Technical Committee 
Space Services, Inc. 
Space Shuttle Main Engine 
single stage to orbit 
Space Technology & Applications International Forum 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties 
Space Task Group 
space test program 
Space Transportation System 
Thrust-Assisted Orbiter Shuttle 
Trans Atmospheric Vehicle 
Technological Capabilities Panel 
Traclung and Data Relay Satelhte System 
Television and Infrared Observation System 
transition quarter 
Thompson Ram0 Wooldridge Corporation 
Central Directorate of Space Systems (Soviet) 
University of California, Los Angeles 
Ultra-High Frequencies 
University of North Dakota 
Directorate of the Space Systems Commander (Soviet) 
unknown unknowns 
United States 
active radar (Soviet) 
US. Army 
U.S. Army Construction Engineering Research Laborato- 
US. Air Force 
passive radar (Soviet) 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
632 CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE HISTORY OF SPACEFLIGHT 
VKS Military Space Forces (Soviet) 
VNIIEM All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Electromechanics 
(Soviet) 
Forces of Anti-Missile Defense (Soviet) V-PRO 
WDD Western Development Division (USAF) 
ws Weapons System (USAF) 
WWMCCS World-Wide Military Command and Control System 
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The Galileo spacecraft and its Inertial Upper Stage 
booster rocket were deployed from the Space 
Shuttle Atlantis on 18 October 1989. Shortly there- 
after, the booster rocket fired and separated, 
sending Gafileo on its six-year journey to the planet 
Jupiter. Upon its arrival at Jupiter in December 
1995, Galileo released a probe into the atmosphere 
so that scientists could survey the composition of 
the planet's clouds. The Orbiter has relayed probe 
information, surveyed its surroundings, and photo- 
graphed Jupiter and some of its major satellites. 
(NASA photo no. STS-34-71-0001?) 
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